What to make of Thailand’s Ramadan-time ‘truce’ offer to BRN rebels

Commentary by Don Pathan
BenarNews
Yala, Thailand

Tan Sri Gen. Zulkifli Zainal Abidin (right), Malaysia’s new facilitator for peace talks in Thailand's far South, shakes hands with Thailand's chief negotiator, Gen. Wanlop Raksanoh, in Bangkok, Thailand, during his visit on March 3, 2023. (Credit: Fourth Army Area Command, Public Relations Department)

The Thai government, in an apparent peace overture in late March, urged Barisan Revolusi Nasional separatist rebels to stand down from hostilities during Ramadan in the far south.

In a statement that seemed to offer BRN the olive branch of a truce, Thailand’s negotiating team in Malaysia-brokered peace talks with the insurgents expressed its “intention of having a good atmosphere and without violence throughout the month of Ramadan so that our brothers and sisters can observe Ramadan safely.”

Meanwhile, sources on both sides told this observer that the negotiating team representing the rebel group has now decided to sit out meetings with the Thais at all levels until after next month’s general election in Thailand.

Because Islam’s holy month of fasting overlaps this year with another auspicious religious observance, the Buddhist New Year of Songkran, the Thai side in its March 24 statement invited BRN “to help create a positive and non-violent atmosphere” in Thailand’s southern border region, where Muslims are the majority.

On the surface, the idea sounded pleasant to the casual observer and general public. But to people who observe this conflict closely, politicizing holidays, regardless of religion, doesn’t help the situation. 

For Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, a political action group that promotes the right to self-determination for the people of this historically contested region, “The pretentiousness behind Thailand’s suggestion is so unnecessary.” 

“If they really wanted to carry out a ceasefire, they need to do it right, like accepting suggestions from the BRN that terms of reference (TOR) be jointly drafted to allow the participation of an international monitoring team,” Artef said. 

The rebels were hoping the issue would make it to the high-level negotiation during the last round of peace talks, held in Malaysia in late February. But the Thais had other things in mind.

Thailand’s appetite for members of the international community to get involved in conflict resolution in the far south has always been low. There is a general understanding that any foreign participation has to be done on Thailand’s terms.

The extension of the olive branch struck many as something created for public consumption, as was the case with a recent statement from the head of the Thai panel in the talks, Gen. Wanlop Rugsanaoh, who expressed the hope that the long-running conflict could be settled in two years’ time. Anything to suggest progress is being made is welcome, especially in the middle of an electoral campaign season.

Seeing no point in talking to a government that is totally focused on the upcoming general election, BRN has since indicated that it would not be meeting again with the Thai side at any level until a new administration is formed in Bangkok.

By the look of it, Thailand’s veiled invitation for a ceasefire was ripped from BRN’s playbook.

In April 2020, when Thailand and other Southeast Asian nations were in the early throes of the  COVID-19 pandemic, BRN announced a unilateral ceasefire on humanitarian grounds across the Deep South, saying that health workers shouldn’t have to worry about being caught up in the crossfire between the combatants in the long-running conflict.

In spite of an appeal from local activists for the military to stand down and reciprocate BRN’s goodwill gesture, the army at the time unleashed its troops to hunt down BRN combatants staying in remote villages. BRN said these cells weren’t part of any ongoing operation and their fighters were merely laying low while observing the unilateral ceasefire. 

However, during the first 24 months of BRN’s unilateral ceasefire – from April 2020 to April 2022 – Thai troops killed scores of suspected BRN fighters in a series of standoffs, where government security forces, who heavily outnumbered and outarmed the insurgents, surrounded them as they hid out in villages. 

As many as 64 suspected BRN insurgents were killed by Thai forces in such standoffs during BRN’s unilateral ceasefire, and only one rebel surrendered. Many of those who were holed up  fought to their deaths knowing that the odds of escaping alive were slim to none. 

So far, the Deep South has not been free of violence during this year’s Ramadan.

Thai authorities have reported at least four suspected attacks by insurgents, including a fatal one and a flurry of attacks this past weekend:

On March 29, a deputy village headman was shot and injured in Pattani province.

On April 7, two defense volunteers were injured by a roadside bombing in Pattani.

On Saturday evening, suspected rebels shot dead a village defense volunteer as he was leaving a mosque and walking home after prayers in Tak Bai, a district in neighboring Narathiwat province.

And early Sunday morning, suspected insurgents attacked a military outpost in Yala province, but no one was injured.

BRN in polls waiting mode

BRN’s move lately to push the pause button on any more meetings until a new Thai government is formed will give all the sides some time to go back to the drawing board. 

In the past, there was a problem with continuity; a new government in Bangkok used to mean a new team of negotiators. It remains to be seen if the current team of Thai negotiators – officially known as the Peace Dialogue Panel – will remain in place when the next government comes to power. 

Still, much work still lies ahead because the peace process has reached a critical juncture as Thailand, Malaysia, and the BRN struggle to identify common ground on how to push the talks along. The list of issues that need to be pinned down in the negotiations includes public consultations, reduction of violence, and political solutions for bringing this conflict to an end. 

Of late, inclusivity has also emerged as an issue to put on the table; Thailand wants other insurgent groups in the far south to join the talks but BRN thinks it’s too early to include them in high-level negotiations. However, BRN is willing to consider the participation of these groups at the technical level where in-depth discussions on the aforementioned three items usually take place, according to one informed rebel source. 

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/peace-talks-ramadan-04092023232102.html
(ไทย)  https://www.benarnews.org/thai/commentary/th-my-deepsouth-pathan-04102023015327.html

 

Gen. Zulkifli’s first task for peace process

Don Pathan
Special to Thai PBS World

It seems like the right thing to do – a visit by Malaysia’s newly appointed facilitator for the peace process between the Thai Government and the rebel Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) to the conflict-affected area, Thailand’s predominantly Malay-speaking South, to meet with local residents to get a sense of what he is up against.

The visit will come five days after the February 21st and 22nd high-level negotiation between the two sides. It will be Gen. Zulkifli Zainal Abidin’s first time chairing the meeting in a process that has been referred to as a “pool of crocodiles” by a senior BRN officer.

Numerous peace initiatives have come and gone over the past 18 years when this wave of insurgency-related violence surfaced in the far South, but none has significantly moved beyond confidence-building measures.

Even with less than a week to go, some insiders are still saying this round of talks might not get off the ground, pointing to the BRN’s internal bickering over various issues, from selecting the right person to represent the movement at the talks to the argument over which items should be removed or revised from the negotiation agenda.

Some in the BRN even suggested that the back channel, which is being facilitated by a foreign NGO on a separate track from the Malaysian one, should be ditched entirely because working on two separate tracks has not produced the desired outcome.

Malaysia has never been happy with Thailand’s back channel, but this is not to say that the BRN is doing Malaysia’s bidding. The BRN might have problems with Malaysia, but jumping ship is not in their best interests either. Moreover, the two tracks are in competition and at times have turned BRN members against one another.

Thai officials said the back channel comes at the expense of the Thailand-Malaysia bilateral ties, which should not be held hostage by the conflict or conflict resolution for the far South.

Even without the internal bickering, Thailand and the BRN are still struggling to find common ground on the pending issues on the table, namely Public Consultation (PC), Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), and political solutions, whatever that means, to bring this conflict to an end.

COHA has been described by some BRN leaders as a form of surrender and they wonder why they would agree to anything like that, while PC, the meetings between BRN representatives and the constituency, will not take place in the Patani region, because the authorities are afraid that it would generate the kind of excitement that could undermine local “tranquility”, in the words of an Army officer.

Gen. Zulkifli’s visit to the Patani region could very well generate more excitement than Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s official trip to Bangkok on February 9th and 10th for a summit with his Thai counterpart, Gen. Prayut Chan-o-cha.

The excitement generated by Gen. Zulkifli’s visit may not, however, be the kind that the Thai security agencies are hoping for. Anwar’s trip to Bangkok was presented as something positive, a gesture of goodwill from the southern neighbor. Muslims who he visited at the central mosque in Bangkok were Thai Muslims, not Malay, and the two don’t share the same historical-cultural narrative, much less identity.

Patani Malay activists, on the other hand, are known for speaking their minds, especially when they have the home turf advantage. Such a scenario has the security community in the far South worried. To ensure that the locals don’t get too excited, or that the conservation doesn't get too frank for Thailand’s taste, the Internal Security Operation Command-Region 4 will screen and approve all of Gen. Zulkifli’s meetings.

The fact that Gen. Zulkifli is not opposing this outright suggests that he is willing to “go along to get along” but, in the case where Malaysia’s interest and international standing are at stake, like the challenges posed by the back channel that presented Malaysia as a peace spoiler, it remains to be seen what Gen. Zulkifli will do.

Should the back channel be ditched, the onus will rest squarely on Malaysia, the designated facilitator for the peace process.

While Anwar’s visit to Thailand was largely billed as a success, not all stakeholders in the conflict see it that way. Among them were the Patani rebels, who felt that his rejection of the use of violence to settle the southern conflict was a bit naïve. They said Anwar conveniently ignored the political aspect of the violence.

“What Malaysia, as the mediator, could and should do is stress the need to respect a greater degree of civility in this conflict,” said Artef Sohko, the president of The Patani, a political action group which advocates for rights to self–determination of the people in the far South. “The rest is up to Thailand as to what kind of concessions, if any, the Government is willing to make for the sake of peace in Patani,” Artef said.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst and a former reporter with various media outlets and publications in the region.

Important juncture: Thailand-BRN

Don Pathan
Special to Thai PBS World

Thailand’s negotiation with the rebel Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) has reached a critical juncture as both sides continue to struggle to identify common ground on how to move the peace talks forward.

To complicate the matter even further, this peace process has produced two competing tracks — the official one with Malaysia as the designated Facilitator and the not-so-secretive backdoor channel that not only leaves Malaysian officials in the dark but deepened the existing mistrust between Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur.

Malaysian officials said the incoming Facilitator, Gen. Tan Sri Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, will not tolerate Thailand’s two-track approach. Malaysia’s disapproval of the two-track is not just about protocol; a narrative has been built around this back channel, painting Malaysia as the peace spoiler.

The unwillingness of the outgoing Facilitator, Tan Sri Rahim Muhammad Noor, to raise this point with the Thais had created some resentment among Malaysian officers in the Facilitator’s Secretariat. Furthermore, not all Thai government agencies agree with the use of back channels on the ground that it comes at the expense of Thai-Malaysian bilateral relations.

Gen. Zulkifli’s role in the peace process is expected to bring some degree of professionalism and integrity to the current peace process that was kicked off in January 2020 in Kuala Lumpur. But peace initiatives have come and gone over the past 18 years when the current wave of insurgency surfaced in this historically contested region, and none has generated any meaningful traction as neither side was willing to make concessions or compromise. 

Nearly two decades later, the two sides have yet to move beyond confidence-building measures, or CBM, and onto something more concrete. There was a moment of hope in the Ramadan ceasefire in 2022. But that was short-lived as BRN combatants stepped up their attacks in what was billed as a “payback” for the Thai Army’s refusal to reciprocate positively to the rebel’s unilateral ceasefire that came into effect in April 2020.

More than 7,300 people have died since January 2004 when the current wave of insurgency resurfaced after a decade of relative calm.

For the time being, Thai and BRN negotiators are struggling to find a common ground for the three key issues on the table: public consultations, reduction of violence, and political solutions to bring this conflict to an end.

BRN’s request to enter the Patani region to conduct public consultation — discussions with residents — was shot down by the Thai Army who is afraid of a public relations nightmare; an outpour of support for the BRN delegates from the locals would destroy the Thai government’s long-standing narrative that says the Malays of Patani are with the Thai State.

Indeed, one only has to look at the funerals of the combatants on the ground, not to mention the various social media platforms, to understand the extent of support BRN enjoys in Thailand’s far South.

Regarding the reduction of violence, more work has to be done on the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA). The same goes for the so-called Road Map, a guideline for future talks.

But while the text of the public consultation and other items on the table is still being negotiated, BRN has begun to reach out to local Buddhists and Muslims in Thailand’s far South for a series of discussions that took place inside Malaysia.

Technicalities and negotiated texts aside, the burning issue for BRN is whether the movement is willing to settle for something less than complete independence. Since BRN negotiators have indicated that they are willing to negotiate under the Thai Constitution and in line with the principles underlining the Unitary State of Thailand, many observers, including combatants, have interpreted this willingness to be a compromise for something less than independence.

“BRN can no longer claim to be a revolutionary outfit fighting for the independence of Patani if the movement is to negotiate under the Thai Constitution,” said Asmadee Bueheng, the communication officer for The Patani. This political action group promotes self-determination for the people of this historically contested region.

BRN leadership was led to believe that if they negotiated under the Thai Constitution, their organization would be a “legitimate” movement in the eyes of the Thais and the international community.

But there are other ways to obtain legitimacy and acceptance, argued Artef Sohko, president of The Patani. BRN’s actions on the ground, as well as the agreements that the group has or is planning to make with members of the international community, will bring about the recognition they desired.

“But if BRN is willing to settle for something less than complete independence, they have to make it clear to their fighters on the ground,” said Artef. “And if they let go of their original goal of independence, then the Thai government shouldn’t be surprised if a splinter group emerges from the ground. You can be sure that negotiation will not be on their mind,” Artef added.

Dropping the clause on the Thai Constitution does not necessarily mean killing the peace process. There are many outstanding issues for BRN negotiators can raise — issues such as state-minority relations, the historical narrative of Patani, and greater cultural space for the Malays of this region, Asmadee said. As for the conflict itself, the two sides can talk about code of conduct, civilian protection, and rules of engagement, among other things, Asmadee added.

About their quest for legitimacy, BRN is planning to expand its strategy to include a “foreign focal point”. An office in Europe is in the pipeline. It would make it easier for BRN representatives to meet and explain their cases to members of the international community.

Don Pathan, is a Thailand-based security analyst and a former reporter with various media outlets and publications.

Thai PBS World

BRN rebels deal blow to Thai hopes for Buddhist Lent ceasefire

Commentary by Don Pathan
BenarNews

Yala, Thailand

BRN rebels deal blow to Thai hopes for Buddhist Lent ceasefire

A Thai officer stands beside a burnt-down oil tanker at a gas station in Pattani province after an overnight wave of arson and bomb attacks in Thailand’s southernmost provinces that authorities have blamed on Muslim separatist rebels, Aug. 17, 2022. Sumeth Panpetch/AP Photo

It wasn’t long ago that Thai officials spoke optimistically about building upon the success of a Ramadan ceasefire when government forces and BRN Muslim Malay rebels refrained from violence during the entire Islamic holy month across the Deep South.

The 40-day ceasefire, which both sides agreed to at peace talks in Malaysia in early April, lasted throughout Ramadan and into mid-May. It encompassed Buddhist observances of Visakha Bucha, arguably the most important holy day for members of Thailand’s religious majority, as a gesture of goodwill.

Some saw this as a turning point for an armed separatist insurgency that has seen peace initiatives come and go since the conflict in Thailand’s southern border region reignited nearly 20 years ago. The gesture went beyond the usual confidence-building measures discussed at the negotiations table.

Unfortunately, the optimism of the Thai officials was short-lived.

The reality kicked in hard when, within two weeks of the Ramadan ceasefire expiring, BRN combatants launched a vicious attack on a Marine Police outpost in Tak Bai, a border town along a river that separates Thailand from Malaysia.

It was not your typical assault by Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National Revolutionary Front) insurgents involving a roadside IED explosion followed by a gunfight lasting no more than three minutes.

This time around, the insurgents wanted people on both sides of the frontier to hear it. An intense gunfight went on for 15 minutes, and shots could still be heard an hour after the first round rang out.

And then last week, late at night on Tuesday and into Wednesday morning, the militants carried out simultaneous arson and bomb attacks targeting 17 convenience stores, mostly located at gas stations throughout the far south.

As in the Tak Bai operation in late May, the combatants avoided casualties by instructing the store clerks to step out. In the Tak Bai case, the vendors were told to take cover before the shooting started. However, in last week’s attack, a 21-year-old clerk at a 7-Eleven store in Narathiwat province was killed when he got trapped in a blaze when the shop was firebombed as part of the coordinated attacks, officials said.

And, as was the case in the Tak Bai incident, BRN officials neither confirmed nor denied that their group carried out last week’s coordinated attacks. BRN, a highly secretive organization, has a long-standing policy of not commenting on or claiming responsibility for specific incidents or operations.

This is partly because the group has no identifiable public representation through a political body or party in the same manner as the Irish Republican Army had through the Sinn Fein party in Northern Ireland. BRN has negotiators representing it but the movement has not set up a “political wing” that can fully engage with the general public and members of the international community.

Anas Abdulrahman (center), the head of the panel representing Barisan Revolusi Nasional rebels in peace talks with Thailand who is also known as Hipni Mareh, and fellow BRN delegates take part in a post-meetings press conference at a hotel in Petaling Jaya, near Kuala Lumpur, Aug. 3, 2022. [S. Mahfuz/BenarNews]

Observers with working relations with BRN operatives said the combatants were itching for a fight for some time but had been held back by the talks of a ceasefire.

Moreover, BRN combatants are still upset at the Thai Army for belittling a unilateral ceasefire announced by the rebel group in April 2020. It was a humanitarian gesture, in line with a global appeal from U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, so that health workers would not have to worry about getting caught up in any crossfire as they worked to deliver medical aid and curb the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, which hit the Deep South hard at the time.

Not only did the Thai Army give the rebels the cold shoulder by dismissing the gesture as insignificant as well as ignoring pleas from local activists to stand down, the Thai military unleashed its wrath on the BRN combatants, saying the law was on its side.

During the year between the unilateral declaration of the pandemic-related ceasefire and the start of this year’s Ramadan in early April, Thai security forces killed 64 BRN combatants, taking out one to two at a time in a lopsided standoffs in remote villages throughout the border region.

The combatants were laying low, obeying orders from their commanders to stand down during the unilateral pause in operations.

Villagers believed that informants had tipped off the authorities in return for rewards. One point of concern for the authorities was that in all of the standoffs, only one person surrendered. The rest fought to their deaths even though the chances of them making it out alive – that is, to escape – were next to nothing.

Moreover, senior BRN figures felt their negotiators were getting “too comfortable” with their Thai counterparts. They pointed to the audacity of the Thais to ask for the ceasefire only when it would serve their political interests.

At a technical-level meeting in June 2022, Thailand decided to push their luck and ask for another ceasefire. This time they were asking for a ceasefire that would last more than three months and cover the period of Buddhist Lent, which goes until Oct. 10 in Thailand.

BRN political officers surprised everybody when they succeeded in persuading the military wing to go along. Again, they gave the Thais more than they had bargained for; BRN even tacked on another month to the requested ceasefire by extending it until the end of November 2022.

But there was one condition: the Thai would have to sign the General Principles of the Peace Dialogue Process, a blueprint setting the terms for future talks.

The Thais did not object to the content, which includes a point stipulating that both sides must agree to negotiate under the Thai Constitution, and that the principle underlying the Unitary State of Thailand must be embraced.

Not signing anything has long been the standing tradition of the Thai government, perhaps out of fear that inking any document would unnecessarily enhance the legitimacy of the BRN – thus upsetting hardliners in the country. BRN officials, for their part, said that a signature from the Thai chief negotiator would enhance their acceptance and legitimacy as an organization.

Disagreement over the General Principles grew.

At the last round of in-person peace talks brokered by Malaysia near Kuala Lumpur on Aug. 1-2, it all came crashing down on the peace process.

BRN gave the Thais the cold shoulder. One Thai official described the meeting as a “setback” and another said a “reset button” had been pushed.

“It was as if the BRN didn’t want to be there,” said the officer. The two sides did not dine with each other and there was no mingling during coffee breaks either.

A senior BRN official dismissed the term “setback” but admitted that the meeting was a bit sour and it did not end on a good note. BRN was just being “firm with our stance,” he said.

Both sources spoke to this columnist on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to go on the record about issues discussed during the last round of talks.

Conservatives in Thailand believe that inking any agreement with the BRN would set the stage for the internationalization of the conflict, where the United Nations or other countries or members of the world community could intervene.

‘Getting too comfortable’

Meanwhile, there appears to be some kind of disagreement between the BRN negotiators, the group’s senior leadership, and its fighters in the field.

The field-level combatants believe their leaders should explore other ways to generate acceptance and legitimacy. The combatants don’t like the General Principles because of two stipulations about the Thai Constitution and the Unitary State of Thailand. The first article in the Thai Constitution says the kingdom is inseparable.

BRN leaders, however, have insisted that the political objective – independence for the people of Patani – which they equate as a “sacred value,” has not changed.

“Legitimacy and acceptance will depend on BRN living up to the commitments they made or plan to make with members of the international community. It also depends on their actions on the ground,” said Artef Sohko, the president of The Patani, a political action group that supports the right to self-determination for the people of the historically contested border region.

BRN leaders have expressed a desire for a better understanding of international norms and humanitarian principles.

In Artef’s view, the Thai government and the Malaysian facilitator, Abdul Rahim Noor, should appreciate and welcome this because it could mean greater civility in the conflict zone.

Commenting on the sour atmosphere at the recently concluded talks in Kuala Lumpur, Artef said, “BRN distancing themselves from the Thai negotiators is a good thing.”

“The Thai side was getting too comfortable,” said Artef, pointing to their “audacity” to request a 108-day ceasefire for Buddhist Lent while ignoring the “all or nothing” attitude of the government security forces deployed in the theater of operations.

Artef said the Thais conveniently ignored that BRN combatants in the field reluctantly went along with the Ramadan ceasefire. They didn’t want to humiliate their negotiators, he explained, so that’s why they gave in and stood down during the entire whole month of Ramadan.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

English:  https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/far-south-view/brn-attacks-08212022123508.html
Thai:  https://www.benarnews.org/thai/commentary/th-my-pathan-deep-south-08222022104414.html 

Southern Thailand glimpses hope for peace after lengthy ceasefire

Don Pathan
BenarNews

Yala, Thailand

Southern Thailand glimpses hope for peace after lengthy ceasefire

A glimpse of hope has emerged for Thailand’s far south: A ceasefire has been in place since April 1 without any violent confrontation between government troops and rebel forces.

Yala Central Mosque after the morning Eid al-Fitr prayer on May 2, 2022. Photo by Don Pathan

Observers said the ceasefire, announced that day at the end of a two-day, in-person meeting between the Thai negotiators and Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) representatives, was a leap of faith that stayed aloft as both sides kept their promises to put a lid on the violence.

The deal was pretty straightforward – the Thai military vowed not to go after cell members, while the rebel BRN agreed not to carry out attacks during Ramadan and through Visakha Bucha Day, a Buddhist holiday observed this year on May 15.

A bigger leap of faith was the move to declare all mosques in this conflict-affected region a sanctuary where combatants could meet their family members during the last 10 days of Ramadan, which ended on May 1. That did not happen.

Artef Sohko – president of The Patani, a political action group that advocates self-determination for the people of this historically contested region – said coming into an open public space like a community mosque was too big a security risk for combatants.

Mistrust is still high, he said.

In the past, the idea of standing down didn’t appeal to the Thai Army, which was bent on using military means to take down BRN combatants. Even after the BRN announced a unilateral ceasefire in April 2020, following a call for a global ceasefire from U.N. chief António Guterres at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Thai security forces relentlessly crushed BRN operatives, going after cell members one by one as they lay low in remote villages.

For 24 months, Thai forces killed nearly 60 BRN operatives, according to my own tally based on media reports. Military sources told me they found it astonishing that all but one of these combatants chose to fight to the death instead of surrendering, even though their chances of making it out alive were slim to none.

“It’s their way of showing their commitment to merdeka (independence),” said Asmadee Bueraheng, an executive member of The Patani, in reference to the fight-to-the-death attitude of the combatants.

The attitude caught the attention of a leading Thai security expert, associate professor Panitan Wattanayagorn, the chairman of the Prime Minister’s Security Advisory Committee, whose team of counter-violent extremism (CVE) researchers said these qualities would continue to pose tremendous challenges to Thailand’s counterinsurgency programs.\

Sermon at the Yala Central Mosque, May 2, 2022. Photo by Don Pathan

Speaking at a recent event at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand, Panitan said Thai security officials can take comfort in the fact that the overall number of violent incidents has gone down steadily over the past decade.

But the level of commitment among activists and combatants should be a wake-up call about the nature of the conflict and what qualifies as counterinsurgency success, he said.

Getting BRN negotiators to agree that future talks will be in line with the “Unitary State of Thailand in accordance with the Constitution” may be an achievement, but many officials and militants don’t see it that way.

Some Thai top brass see BRN embracing the Thai Constitution as a calculating move – part of a long-term strategy to get national acceptance and international legitimacy.

According to this theory, BRN believes that it can achieve acceptance if it is no longer branded an organized crime group – and that in time, the international community will respond positively to its legitimate grievances. In other words, independence is still their ultimate aim.

Meanwhile, combatants on the ground want to know if embracing the Thai Constitution means an end to their quest for independence. If this political goal is compromised, a splinter group could be in the pipeline. Article 1 of the Thai Constitution says the country is inseparable.

Secret movement

There were plenty of local and international NGOs interested in working with both the Thais and the BRN on conflict resolution and mediation. But accessing the key decision-makers – the supreme leaders of the movement – has proven virtually impossible.

BRN is a secret movement and anyone who surfaces into public space is considered “expendable,” military sources say. There is disagreement on whether that extends to the seven BRN negotiators – and whether they can actually deliver on their promises, much less control the powerful military wing of the movement.

Meanwhile, the decision by BRN negotiators to talk under the Thai Constitution has given needed ammunition for other long-standing Patani separatist movements to reassert themselves by appealing to those who disagree with the move.

To demonstrate this point, the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO), in the early morning of April 15, carried out a double-tap strike that killed one villager and wounded three Army ordinance officials while the BRN and Thai security forces were observing the ceasefire. PULO President Kasturi Mahkota was quick to credit the movement’s military wing, which he called G-5, and stated that he is willing to return to the negotiating table, but not under the Thai Constitution.

PULO, along with other long-standing movements that came under the umbrella of the MARA Patani organization, was sidelined from the peace talks after the Thais secured a buy-in from the BRN to come to the table under the current process, which was launched in January 2020.

And while PULO is contemplating its next move, MARA Patani’s chief negotiator, Sukree Hari, also resurfaced to issue a public statement on YouTube on May 1. While his statement merely marked the end of Ramadan, it was also a reminder to the Thais that MARA Patani, too, should be invited back to the negotiation table.

For the PULO to regain its old status and strength – which peaked in the 1980s – the movement would have to complete its organizational blue print and fill up the slots, particularly the military and political wings.

On the other hand, BRN went into hibernation for about 10 years in the 1990s and caught the Thai security apparatus off guard when it resurfaced with a bang on Jan. 4, 2004, raiding an army battalion in Narathiwat and making off with more than 350 Thai military weapons.

While many Thai officials say they don’t see a PULO military wing in the making, it doesn’t mean that it’s not in the pipeline. Thai officials were caught off guard when the BRN reactivated its cells 18 years ago. No one wants to be humiliated with the same shock-and-awe scenario with the return of PULO.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

Latest Deep South Peace Talks: Too Far Too Fast?

Don Pathan
BenarNews

Anas Abdulrahman (also known as Hipni Mareh), the head of a panel representing BRN rebels at Malaysian-brokered peace talks with Thailand, speaks during a press conference as other BRN officials sit beside him at a hotel near Kuala Lumpur, April 1, 2022. S. Mahfuz/BenarNews

On the surface, the latest peace talks between Thai government negotiators and representatives of the BRN rebel group seem promising for people in Thailand’s far south, where violence linked to a separatist insurgency has claimed more than 7,300 lives since 2004. But it is not clear if Barisan Revolusi Nasional combatants will embrace the direction of the talks.

Just last Wednesday, on the eve of the talks, a powerful roadside bomb and gunfight left two police officers dead and wounded two others in Yala province – a reminder that the end is nowhere in sight in this predominantly Malay-speaking region.

The March 31-April 1 negotiations picked up where they had left off in January when the two sides agreed to work towards greater public consultations, reduction of violence, and finding political solutions to this separatist insurgency.

Meanwhile, it has emerged that in the course of secret discussions since late last year, a working paper came out that outlined the General Principles for future talks. Both sides agreed that future discussions would be conducted “under the Unitary State of Thailand in accordance with the Constitution.”

The clause showed up again in a press statement issued by Thailand’s negotiating team to mark the end of the latest round of in-person talks.

“It sounds like a breakthrough but in reality, it is a cheap and pretentious effort that has no bearing on reality on the ground,” said Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, a political action group that promote rights to self-determination for Thailand’s Malay-speaking Deep South.

The first article of the Thai Constitution stipulates clearly that the kingdom is inseparable. For the BRN combatants – or any ordinary person on the street, for that matter – BRN negotiators embracing Thailand’s Constitution means an end to the quest for independence.

When reporters asked them about this after the two-day meeting in Malaysia, neither rebel nor Thai negotiators would confirm or deny that BRN, which controls virtually all of the combatants in the field, is willing to settle for something less than independence.

For the past 18 years, since the violence in this historically contested region surfaced, combatants have been told that their fight is nothing less than a moral obligation and sacred duty to liberate a historically Malay homeland from invading Siamese/Thai forces.

Fighters in the field are now learning about the move to “embrace the Thai Constitution.” BRN leadership has advised them to remain calm, saying the engagement with Thai negotiators is part of a “diplomatic exercise,” said a source with knowledge of such conversations.

Artef believes the BRN military wing could splinter if combatants believe their political goal and “sacred” values have been compromised. Like any other splinter groups in a sub-national conflict, a splinter group in Thailand’s far south would want to demonstrate their capability.

Subnational groups like the Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) took years to develop a narrative acceptable to their combatants before they went to the negotiating table. Conflict resolution for southern Thailand, abnormally, is the opposite.

The recent annual Ramadan statement posted on YouTube in mid-March 2022 by Abdulkarim Khalid, a member of BRN’s Information Department, expressed hope that the year’s holy month would be peaceful.

The Thai Army, meanwhile, says it will stand down during this year’s Ramadan if combatants do the same, as part of confidence-building measures. All mosques in the region will become a sanctuary ground during the last 10 days of Ramadan so combatants can meet with their families.

In the current atmosphere, a ceasefire during Ramadan is a big leap of faith.

BRN fighters have been targeted in relentless search-and-kill operations over the past two years, after the group declared a unilateral ceasefire in April 2020 so that public health officials wouldn’t have to worry about getting caught in crossfire while working to contain the spread of COVID-19. Since then, at least 50 combatants have been killed by Thai security forces, who did not reciprocate the BRN goodwill gesture.

With that in mind, Artef and other activists in his circle believe the Army has a long way to go to earn the trust of the BRN.

Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that Thai security forces will not resume their search-and-kill operations after Ramadan.

At the same time, BRN leaders and negotiators don’t seem to have the courage to tell their fighters that their original political objective may have been compromised.

What is needed is a new narrative to explain and justify the course of actions taken by the BRN leaders and the Thai negotiators.

They don’t need to explain or convince the public and the donor community that they are moving in the right direction. But both the Thais and the BRN negotiators need to think about how to get their soldiers and fighters on board this peace process and move forward as one.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

English: https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/far-south-view/don-pathan-analysis-04042022131041.html?fbclid=IwAR2myRVD_5WyyAs742hbdtN5qtza6WOW-8xaMxhUF2hTtd9IAN9bT8WnMJY

Thai: https://www.benarnews.org/thai/commentary/th-deep-south-don-pathan-analysis-04042022165342.html?fbclid=IwAR0GaPKUZiVbGd3mre8v8nhtCY8gF1X3RTYy-Kdng18MYYzYI7cHLhqV8ZE  

Junta’s three-year peace effort in South fizzles to embarrassing end

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

Peace talks with separatist insurgents have hit a snag after longstanding tensions between Thai negotiators and MARA Patani, an umbrella organisation of separatist movements in the Muslim-majority South, came to the boil.

The first sign of trouble came in the middle of last year when Bangkok refused to ink an agreement on a pilot Safety Zone, a high-profile initiative before it was ditched by the new chief negotiator, General Udomchai Thamsarorat.

Udomchai saw the Safety Zone project and its ceasefire as unrealistic because MARA Patani has little or no control over the insurgent combatants.

 With faith in the umbrella group draining, the Thai side decided to seek direct contact with Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the longstanding separatist movement that controls virtually all of the rebel combatants.

BRN is not currently part of the Malaysia-facilitated talks and Kuala Lumpur has had no success in convincing the movement’s leadership to endorse the peace initiative.

The latest hiccup came during a February 2 visit to Kuala Lumpur by Udomchai and his team, for a meeting with technical officials from MARA Patani. Udomchai said he went along just to meet Abdul Rahim Noor, the designated Malaysian facilitator for the talks.

But out of nowhere, Malaysia insisted the meeting constituted high-level talks, which would require Udomchai and Rahim Noor’s participation.

Udomchai refused but suggested compromise: an informal meeting with Shukri Hari, a senior MARA Patani negotiator.

The following day, Shukri appeared in a YouTube video calling on the Thai government to replace Udomchai with someone “more credible”. The group also said they would not talk to the Thais until a new government was formed in Bangkok.

Why all the drama over protocol? According to Artef Sohko, chair of The Patani, a local political action group dedicated to promoting self-determination for the people of Patani, the tension stems from a feeling among Malaysia and MARA Patani that Udomchai may be moving away from them to establish a separate back-channel with BRN.

“MARA Patani is concerned that they will become irrelevant. The drama in Kuala Lumpur and Shukri’s statement on YouTube afterward stemmed from that fear,” Artef said.

For some in the international community, Udomchai’s appointment  was a breath of fresh air for the peace push. After all, he broke with tradition to seek their views – although foreign mediation is still out of the question.

For mediation, he instead turned to local political activists and civil society organisations in the hope they might help bridge the divide or perhaps even mediate the talks. However, local activists with access to BRN leaders are not rushing to take up the offer.

Udomchai may have the mandate from Bangkok but no one is convinced he can deliver on agreements made at the negotiation table. There are too many “players” in power and none of them appears to be singing from the same hymn sheet. 

Continuity is another concern; each change of Thai government has brought a new negotiating team. And with a general election scheduled for March 24, no one is certain how the new administration will treat the far South.

Moreover, the junta has little to show in terms of a legacy in the far South. The Safety Zone that peace negotiators had been working on over the past three years has proved a leap of faith too far.

Delivering a new initiative at this point in time appears unrealistic given the impending general election. But Bangkok is still hoping it can open a channel of communication with the BRN, with or without MARA Patani’s participation.

The move is a U-turn on the path pursued by Udomchai’s predecessor as chief negotiator, General Aksara Kherdpol. Aksara depicted himself as having the upper hand and the moral high ground because of the mandate handed to him. He forgot that the BRN couldn’t care less about the current talks, meaning the brutality continued.

Yet Bangkok’s bid to establish communications with the BRN leadership hit trouble from the start.

Udomchai was supposed to meet BRN leaders Abdulloh Waemanor and Deng Awaeji on November 24 for talks arranged by Malaysia. But the two BRN men refused to show up and have been in hiding ever since.

Thai sources say Malaysian authorities have pinpointed the location of the pair, who unlike other Patani separatist leaders have no travel documents and thus are dependant on being granted asylum.

Malaysian facilitators decided that it was best to leave Abdulloh and Deng at their “safehouse” until Kuala Lumpur decided on its next move.

Frustrated with having virtually nothing to show for its near three-year peace effort with MARA Patani, Bangkok decided to lower its sights. It declared talks with BRN did not have to be at the leadership level as long as they had the blessing of separatist movement’s ruling council, the Dewan Pimpinan Parti.

But with BRN leaders keeping their heads down as they await Malaysia’s next move in this big “game of chicken” between them and Kuala Lumpur, meeting Udomchai is the last thing on their minds.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based development and security consultant and a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation dedicated to critical discussion of the conflict in Thailand’s far South.