BANGKOK’S RELUCTANCE TO GRANT LEGITIMACY TO ITS DIALOGUE PARTNERS IN THE FAR SOUTH HAS CLOSED OFF THE POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS IN TALKS
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
Confused signals from Bangkok have brought two setbacks for the deep South peace process that would never have happened if policymakers had taken a more progressive attitude towards the Malay-speaking region from the start.
The first setback was the dismissal of Lt-General Nakrob Boonbuakarn, the secretary-general of the so-called Dialogue Panel of Thai negotiators in ongoing talks with MARA Patani, an umbrella group of Patani Malay separatist organisations.
Nakrob was accused by his Bangkok overseers of stepping beyond his mandate, which was never clearly defined in the first place. Junta leaders are said to be concerned about their legacy in the far South, and don’t want to be seen as the ones who “gave away” the historically contested region.
The second setback was the government’s pressuring of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to refrain from mentioning MARA Patani in resolutions adopted at its recent summit in Turkey. Thailand succeeded in this quest, though some of the 57 OIC membernations insisted on referring to the ongoing peace dialogue.
In its summit communiqué the OIC urged Bangkok to “grant the group of representatives of the Muslim community in the South the required recognition and called upon the government to provide guarantee of safety in travelling to and from Thailand to members of the dialogue team and protection from detention and prosecution during their engagement in the peace process”.
Bangkok has always been concerned at MARA Patani receiving international recognition beyond that granted by appointing the Dialogue Panel to talk with the separatists.
Thailand’s policy is somewhat contradictory here, mixing a willingness to acknowledge and sit down for talks with MARA Patani with irritation every time the group seeks dialogue with others.
However, it is only natural that a nonstate actor such as MARA Patani would seek ways to enhance its legitimacy internationally and with the people of Patani, the historically contested region encompassing the southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and the four Malay-speaking districts of Songhla.
In December last year, OIC secretarygeneral Iyad Ameen Madani met with members of MARA Patani in Malaysia prior to coming to Thailand.
Bangkok expressed its disapproval of the meeting and blamed Kuala Lumpur for arranging it. But MARA Patani members were quick to point out it was their own initiative.
Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha stopped the OIC chief in his tracks during their meeting in Bangkok, informing him that his concern was welcome but not his intervention.
The conflict in the far South has drifted on and off OIC’s radar screen for decades. In 2010, then OIC secretarygeneral Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu secretly met with leaders of longstanding Patani separatist organisations in Saudi Arabia.
He urged them to forge a political front – the United Patani People Council (UPPC) – while the OIC vowed to help facilitate a dialogue process with the Thai government.
Once the front was formed, a regional assembly called the Patani People Congress (PCC) was to be next in the pipeline. The purpose of the PCC was to provide the needed legitimacy for the UPPC.
But the government of Abhisit Vejjajiva refused to go along with the plan, halting the OIC initiative.
Patani was mentioned again in the 2012 OIC foreign ministers meeting, where the 57-member organisation expressed concern at “meagre progress” made on the 2007 joint statement between the two sides. The OIC also expressed dismay at the “continued application of the emergency law in most southern areas and the limited progress in introducing [the local Malayu] language … as a language of instruction in the schools of the South”.
The OIC also criticised the “continued extensive military presence of armed forces throughout the southern border provinces and its negative impacts on the population’s normal life”, as well as “the mounting reliance on undisciplined paramilitary militias accused of committing illegal acts, [with their] consequences of increasing ethnic and religious polarisation”.
The 2007 joint statement, inked with the government of Surayud Chulanont, has become the OIC’s reference point for measuring Thailand’s commitment to peace in the far South. The statement was somewhat bold, making references to the disappearance of Somchai Neelaphaijit, the Krue Se standoff and the Tak Bai massacre, plus more general issues of human rights violations and the culture of impunity among Thai security forces.
But Bangkok’s bold bid for peace didn’t last beyond the tenure of Surayud’s military administration. No government since then has had the courage to make peace with the Malays of Patani, not even that of Yingluck Shinawatra, whose clumsily put-together dialogue constituted something between a hoax and a huge leap of faith.
For fear of being perceived as antipeace, the current ruling junta decided to resurrect that so-called peace process. That decision helps explain their footdragging now and their unwillingness to make concessions necessary to progress.
Lt-General Nakrob, who was part of the Yingluck initiative and stayed aboard after the May 2014 coup, was forced to operate in a confusing environment.
Nakrob was caught between MARA Patani separatists desperate to shore up their own legitimacy and international standing, and a junta in Bangkok whose unwillingness to make concessions extends to refusing to call their dialogue partners by name.
Nakrob was set an impossibly broad task – as secretary- general for the Dialogue Panel, spokesman for the initiative, and head of the technical team mapping out the terms of reference for the talks.
He backed the involvement of the separatist umbrella group even before it became MARA Patani. Back then the separatists were engaged as “Plan B” for the original Yingluck peace process that had Hasan Taib at the negotiating table.
And when Hasan threw in the towel, Plan B became Party B.
Nakrob was working in an environment where progress was held hostage by stakeholders unwilling to make concessions.
Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the longstanding separatist group that controls the vast majority of separatist combatants, says it will not come to the table until properly prepared and ready.
BRN also says Bangkok is only interested cutting the number of violent incidents for domestic consumption, not in addressing the root cause of the conflict.
The government refuses to address the roots of historical grievances in the South since that would mean having to make concessions.
For independent observers of the conflict, signals coming from the junta seem confusing: Nakrob and the Dialogue Panel are mandated to meet MARA Patani but are not permitted to utter the name “MARA Patani” because the generals don’t want to lend the separatists legitimacy.
Meanwhile government sources report that the top brass in Bangkok has yet to be convinced that MARA Patani has command and control over the militants in the deep South.
BRN says it is not prepared to come to the table and adds that the OIC is just one more international organisation out there looking to gain entry to the peace process in their historical homeland.
The question is, whether Bangkok is willing to entertain the idea of allowing foreign entities to get involved with peace initiatives in the southernmost provinces.
DON PATHAN is an independent security consultant based in Thailand. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).
DON PATHAN - Thailand-based security analyst/development consultant (Photo: Anjaman Pass, Afghanistan, with two Northern Alliance fighters, October 2001)
Wednesday, 27 April 2016
Thursday, 7 April 2016
The moment a peace process was exposed as futile?
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
Separatists at the table have just denied involvement in violence - further evidence they have no control over the combatants
MARA Patani is stuck between the devil and the deep blue sea.
The umbrella organisation of six longstanding Patani Malay separatist movements is facing its moment of truth.
Are they or are they not involved in the recent spike in separatist violence in the far South, particularly the operation in which a Narathiwat hospital was used as a staging post for an attack on the Paramilitary Ranger unit next door?
Answering yes could have legal ramifications that complicate ongoing peace negotiations with the Thai government. It would also suggest a violation of international humanitarian norms amid efforts by the umbrella organisation to gain legitimacy from the international community.
The Malaysian government is facilitating the latest peace talks and has posted its former spy chief to oversee a poorly thought-out initiative that's being driven by its Special Branch.
If, on the other hand, MARA Patani were to deny involvement in the violence, their status as partners in the talks would automatically be rendered irrelevant. Why, after all, should Bangkok be speaking to people who are not involved with the insurgency's combatants?
After a barrage of criticism from local and international human rights organisations and the Bangkok government over the invasion of the hospital, MARA Patani decided to play it safe and deny any involvement.That prompted Thai security officers to ponder out loud the merits of dealing with an organisation that appeared to have no command and control over the militants.
Bangkok's longstanding practice in dealing with the Patani Malay separatists has always been to use either the envelope (bribe money) or the bullet.
But unlike the previous wave of insurgency that surfaced in the mid-1960s and subsided in the late 1980s, this time around the men with command-and-control are not interested in talking, leaving the negotiations to figures whose influence waned decades ago.
The half-baked peace initiative was launched under Yingluck Shinawatra's government in February 2013. A so-called Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) leader, Hasan Taib, was hastily placed at the centre of the negotiations without anyone questioning what role or influence, if any, he had in the militant separatist leadership.
The Thai and Malaysian security officials involved knew that Yingluck's initiative was doomed from the start because they didn't have the right people.
As a backup, the so-called Track 1.5 quietly came into being as the official Track 1 with Hasan Taib at the helm died a natural death.
That death was hastened by the concerted efforts of a Thai military that was not part of the inception or planning of the peace initiative cooked up by Yingluck and her fugitive brother Thaksin.
But then came the May 2014 coup and with it the question of what to do with this hot potato. Junta chief General Prayut Chan-o-cha had seven months to think about it - the time between the coup and his December 2014 visit to Kuala Lumpur.
During the visit, Prayut announced that Malaysia would continue to facilitate the peace dialogue though conditions would be added. The separatists would have to develop a common platform and then demonstrate they had command-and-control over the militants.
One thing the junta had going for them was that the overall number of insurgent attacks had dropped dramatically.
For those invested in the peace dialogue, the drop in violence was proof of the talks' traction. But separatist sources and other close observers insisted that the lull meant nothing, pointing out that as long as the insurgents still existed, the state hadn't won.
Now, with the return of almost daily violence to this historically contested region, notions of a link between the peace talks and the insurgency have been shattered.
Separatist sources said a car bomb planted just two days before a Pattani seminar on the peace talks was a stern warning to participants that the conflict is far from over. Foreign participants were forced to cancel their trip to the event.
And then came the operation in Cho Ai Rong, Narathiwat, which signalled a moment of truth for many stakeholders. The hospital raid was a slap in the face for the peace initiative's much-vaunted "safety zone", where Bangkok was relying on MARA Patani to enforce a ceasefire. Cho Ai Rong was supposed to be among the five districts designated for the zone.
Separatist sources say last Friday's gun and grenade attack on a teashop full of Malay Muslim residents in Yala's Raman district was carried out either by a rogue unit or a pro-government death squad in retaliation for the spike. One villager was killed and four others suffered bullet wounds.
Meanwhile, the unprecedented nature of the Cho Ai Rong operation has shaken the Thai military to its foundations, demonstrating a capability and daring to undermine the entire security apparatus at will.
In the final analysis, however, Cho Ai Rong was not a military operation. It was a public relations exercise performed in front of hospital CCTV cameras and aimed at sapping Thai military will and morale. Needless to say, it succeeded in doing that - and much more besides.
Don Pathan is a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a Thailand-based security consultant.
Special to The Nation
Separatists at the table have just denied involvement in violence - further evidence they have no control over the combatants
MARA Patani is stuck between the devil and the deep blue sea.
The umbrella organisation of six longstanding Patani Malay separatist movements is facing its moment of truth.
Are they or are they not involved in the recent spike in separatist violence in the far South, particularly the operation in which a Narathiwat hospital was used as a staging post for an attack on the Paramilitary Ranger unit next door?
Answering yes could have legal ramifications that complicate ongoing peace negotiations with the Thai government. It would also suggest a violation of international humanitarian norms amid efforts by the umbrella organisation to gain legitimacy from the international community.
The Malaysian government is facilitating the latest peace talks and has posted its former spy chief to oversee a poorly thought-out initiative that's being driven by its Special Branch.
If, on the other hand, MARA Patani were to deny involvement in the violence, their status as partners in the talks would automatically be rendered irrelevant. Why, after all, should Bangkok be speaking to people who are not involved with the insurgency's combatants?
After a barrage of criticism from local and international human rights organisations and the Bangkok government over the invasion of the hospital, MARA Patani decided to play it safe and deny any involvement.That prompted Thai security officers to ponder out loud the merits of dealing with an organisation that appeared to have no command and control over the militants.
Bangkok's longstanding practice in dealing with the Patani Malay separatists has always been to use either the envelope (bribe money) or the bullet.
But unlike the previous wave of insurgency that surfaced in the mid-1960s and subsided in the late 1980s, this time around the men with command-and-control are not interested in talking, leaving the negotiations to figures whose influence waned decades ago.
The half-baked peace initiative was launched under Yingluck Shinawatra's government in February 2013. A so-called Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) leader, Hasan Taib, was hastily placed at the centre of the negotiations without anyone questioning what role or influence, if any, he had in the militant separatist leadership.
The Thai and Malaysian security officials involved knew that Yingluck's initiative was doomed from the start because they didn't have the right people.
As a backup, the so-called Track 1.5 quietly came into being as the official Track 1 with Hasan Taib at the helm died a natural death.
That death was hastened by the concerted efforts of a Thai military that was not part of the inception or planning of the peace initiative cooked up by Yingluck and her fugitive brother Thaksin.
But then came the May 2014 coup and with it the question of what to do with this hot potato. Junta chief General Prayut Chan-o-cha had seven months to think about it - the time between the coup and his December 2014 visit to Kuala Lumpur.
During the visit, Prayut announced that Malaysia would continue to facilitate the peace dialogue though conditions would be added. The separatists would have to develop a common platform and then demonstrate they had command-and-control over the militants.
One thing the junta had going for them was that the overall number of insurgent attacks had dropped dramatically.
For those invested in the peace dialogue, the drop in violence was proof of the talks' traction. But separatist sources and other close observers insisted that the lull meant nothing, pointing out that as long as the insurgents still existed, the state hadn't won.
Now, with the return of almost daily violence to this historically contested region, notions of a link between the peace talks and the insurgency have been shattered.
Separatist sources said a car bomb planted just two days before a Pattani seminar on the peace talks was a stern warning to participants that the conflict is far from over. Foreign participants were forced to cancel their trip to the event.
And then came the operation in Cho Ai Rong, Narathiwat, which signalled a moment of truth for many stakeholders. The hospital raid was a slap in the face for the peace initiative's much-vaunted "safety zone", where Bangkok was relying on MARA Patani to enforce a ceasefire. Cho Ai Rong was supposed to be among the five districts designated for the zone.
Separatist sources say last Friday's gun and grenade attack on a teashop full of Malay Muslim residents in Yala's Raman district was carried out either by a rogue unit or a pro-government death squad in retaliation for the spike. One villager was killed and four others suffered bullet wounds.
Meanwhile, the unprecedented nature of the Cho Ai Rong operation has shaken the Thai military to its foundations, demonstrating a capability and daring to undermine the entire security apparatus at will.
In the final analysis, however, Cho Ai Rong was not a military operation. It was a public relations exercise performed in front of hospital CCTV cameras and aimed at sapping Thai military will and morale. Needless to say, it succeeded in doing that - and much more besides.
Don Pathan is a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a Thailand-based security consultant.
Friday, 18 March 2016
Outrage over hospital raid reveals military hypocrisy
Insurgents are accused of violating humanitarian principles; meanwhile Thai security forces continue to place monks and children in line of fire
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
Sunday's raid by militant separatists on a Joh I Rong hospital in Narathiwat couldn't have come at a better time for the Thai side.
The incident has provided a much-needed pretext for the military to attack armed insurgents who continue to discredit the government's peace effort with MARA Patani, the umbrella organisation of six longstanding separatist organisations that the militants say does not represent them.
Bangkok is struggling to justify talks with MARA Patani whose lack of traction is being underscored by a spike in violence in the far South. The Thai side is also facing ill-feeling among the local community over a Bangkok court's decision to seize the 14-rai grounds of an Islamic boarding school, Jihad Withya pondok, in Pattani's Tambon Tha Dan, Yaring district, which was used as an insurgent training facility a decade ago.
The land belongs to the family of Abduloh Waemanor, a local cleric and suspected Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) member who fled the region back in 2005.
Thai military officers have quietly requested that the Waemanor family appeal the court's decision, but they refuse to do so, saying they are unable to come to terms with the state's action.
Some in the separatist movement are suggesting the decision not to appeal was a deliberate move to drive a bigger wedge between local Malay Muslims and the state. Judging from the reaction of local residents - an outpouring of support and sympathy - the alleged strategy appears to have worked.
The seizing of the Jihad Withya pondok - part of a venerable institution that forged the cradle of Islamic civilisation in Southeast Asia - reinforces a notion that the Thai state has never dealt fairly with the Malays of Patani.
The court decision sent shock waves through the region, serving as a warning of what the future could hold. Thai authorities see the pondoks as a hotbed for recruitment and indoctrination of the current generation of insurgents.
Local residents take a different view, pointing out that the Patani historical and cultural narrative is ingrained in their society, making it unfair to single out any institution.
The Thai side has made it clear that the raid on the Narathiwat hospital was a gross violation of humanitarian and international norms for which the militants should be condemned in the strongest terms.
This is not the first time that insurgents have targeted a medical facility, however. In May 2014, three people were seriously wounded when militant separatists detonated a bomb in the parking lot of Pattani's Khok Pho hospital, damaging at least 50 vehicles.
Yet the militants consider the Thai military's ongoing efforts to demonise them via references to humanitarian principles a case of the pot calling the kettle black. The security forces' underhand tactics in managing a decade or so of conflict in the Malay-speaking South are well documented, as is the culture of impunity among its personnel.
The Thai military has been criticised for positioning outposts in the grounds of temples and schools, thereby placing monks and students in line of fire. Such decisions not only violate international humanitarian norms, they are also made without consulting local residents.
Insurgent attacks against schools and temples were a regular occurrence a decade ago but now take place less frequently, and only as retaliation for instances in which the Thais are deemed to have "crossed the line" and/or violated unwritten rules of engagement.
Separatist sources say the scores of militants behind the recent attacks were aware that using the hospital as a staging point for an attack on Paramilitary Rangers was a violation of international norms. Accordingly, they made a concerted effort not to harm the people inside the hospital.
But they didn't foresee that the Thai side would "milk" the situation to such a degree, even rounding up local imams to carry out a "prayer for peace" at the hospital. Observers outside the region likely saw the prayer event as a slap in the face for the insurgents. But locals know that the clerics would have been under pressure to go with the flow or else risk being accused by the military of being uncooperative.
Claims by the authorities that a nurse was tied up were discredited by the nurse in question, who told reporters that while she was tied to her chair to prevent her from moving she quickly realised the insurgents weren't out to harm people in the hospital.
The vast majority of separatist militants operate under the BRN, whose leadership continues to keep a distance from the Kuala Lumpur-facilitated peace initiative between the Thai government and MARA Patani.
Although MARA Patani claims to have BRN members on board, militants and sources in the movement dismiss any suggestion that the movement's ruling council endorses the peace initiative.
The raid on the Paramilitary Ranger unit, which is situated next to the hospital, was part of an ongoing spike in violence after more than a year of relative quiet.
Don Pathan is a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a Thailand-based freelance security and development consultant.
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
Sunday's raid by militant separatists on a Joh I Rong hospital in Narathiwat couldn't have come at a better time for the Thai side.
The incident has provided a much-needed pretext for the military to attack armed insurgents who continue to discredit the government's peace effort with MARA Patani, the umbrella organisation of six longstanding separatist organisations that the militants say does not represent them.
Bangkok is struggling to justify talks with MARA Patani whose lack of traction is being underscored by a spike in violence in the far South. The Thai side is also facing ill-feeling among the local community over a Bangkok court's decision to seize the 14-rai grounds of an Islamic boarding school, Jihad Withya pondok, in Pattani's Tambon Tha Dan, Yaring district, which was used as an insurgent training facility a decade ago.
The land belongs to the family of Abduloh Waemanor, a local cleric and suspected Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) member who fled the region back in 2005.
Thai military officers have quietly requested that the Waemanor family appeal the court's decision, but they refuse to do so, saying they are unable to come to terms with the state's action.
Some in the separatist movement are suggesting the decision not to appeal was a deliberate move to drive a bigger wedge between local Malay Muslims and the state. Judging from the reaction of local residents - an outpouring of support and sympathy - the alleged strategy appears to have worked.
The seizing of the Jihad Withya pondok - part of a venerable institution that forged the cradle of Islamic civilisation in Southeast Asia - reinforces a notion that the Thai state has never dealt fairly with the Malays of Patani.
The court decision sent shock waves through the region, serving as a warning of what the future could hold. Thai authorities see the pondoks as a hotbed for recruitment and indoctrination of the current generation of insurgents.
Local residents take a different view, pointing out that the Patani historical and cultural narrative is ingrained in their society, making it unfair to single out any institution.
The Thai side has made it clear that the raid on the Narathiwat hospital was a gross violation of humanitarian and international norms for which the militants should be condemned in the strongest terms.
This is not the first time that insurgents have targeted a medical facility, however. In May 2014, three people were seriously wounded when militant separatists detonated a bomb in the parking lot of Pattani's Khok Pho hospital, damaging at least 50 vehicles.
Yet the militants consider the Thai military's ongoing efforts to demonise them via references to humanitarian principles a case of the pot calling the kettle black. The security forces' underhand tactics in managing a decade or so of conflict in the Malay-speaking South are well documented, as is the culture of impunity among its personnel.
The Thai military has been criticised for positioning outposts in the grounds of temples and schools, thereby placing monks and students in line of fire. Such decisions not only violate international humanitarian norms, they are also made without consulting local residents.
Insurgent attacks against schools and temples were a regular occurrence a decade ago but now take place less frequently, and only as retaliation for instances in which the Thais are deemed to have "crossed the line" and/or violated unwritten rules of engagement.
Separatist sources say the scores of militants behind the recent attacks were aware that using the hospital as a staging point for an attack on Paramilitary Rangers was a violation of international norms. Accordingly, they made a concerted effort not to harm the people inside the hospital.
But they didn't foresee that the Thai side would "milk" the situation to such a degree, even rounding up local imams to carry out a "prayer for peace" at the hospital. Observers outside the region likely saw the prayer event as a slap in the face for the insurgents. But locals know that the clerics would have been under pressure to go with the flow or else risk being accused by the military of being uncooperative.
Claims by the authorities that a nurse was tied up were discredited by the nurse in question, who told reporters that while she was tied to her chair to prevent her from moving she quickly realised the insurgents weren't out to harm people in the hospital.
The vast majority of separatist militants operate under the BRN, whose leadership continues to keep a distance from the Kuala Lumpur-facilitated peace initiative between the Thai government and MARA Patani.
Although MARA Patani claims to have BRN members on board, militants and sources in the movement dismiss any suggestion that the movement's ruling council endorses the peace initiative.
The raid on the Paramilitary Ranger unit, which is situated next to the hospital, was part of an ongoing spike in violence after more than a year of relative quiet.
Don Pathan is a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a Thailand-based freelance security and development consultant.
Outrage over hospital raid reveals military hypocrisy
Insurgents are accused of violating humanitarian principles; meanwhile Thai security forces continue to place monks and children in line of fire
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
Sunday's raid by militant separatists on a Joh I Rong hospital in Narathiwat couldn't have come at a better time for the Thai side.
The incident has provided a much-needed pretext for the military to attack armed insurgents who continue to discredit the government's peace effort with MARA Patani, the umbrella organisation of six longstanding separatist organisations that the militants say does not represent them.
Bangkok is struggling to justify talks with MARA Patani whose lack of traction is being underscored by a spike in violence in the far South. The Thai side is also facing ill-feeling among the local community over a Bangkok court's decision to seize the 14-rai grounds of an Islamic boarding school, Jihad Withya pondok, in Pattani's Tambon Tha Dan, Yaring district, which was used as an insurgent training facility a decade ago.
The land belongs to the family of Abduloh Waemanor, a local cleric and suspected Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) member who fled the region back in 2005.
Thai military officers have quietly requested that the Waemanor family appeal the court's decision, but they refuse to do so, saying they are unable to come to terms with the state's action.
Some in the separatist movement are suggesting the decision not to appeal was a deliberate move to drive a bigger wedge between local Malay Muslims and the state. Judging from the reaction of local residents - an outpouring of support and sympathy - the alleged strategy appears to have worked.
The seizing of the Jihad Withya pondok - part of a venerable institution that forged the cradle of Islamic civilisation in Southeast Asia - reinforces a notion that the Thai state has never dealt fairly with the Malays of Patani.
The court decision sent shock waves through the region, serving as a warning of what the future could hold. Thai authorities see the pondoks as a hotbed for recruitment and indoctrination of the current generation of insurgents.
Local residents take a different view, pointing out that the Patani historical and cultural narrative is ingrained in their society, making it unfair to single out any institution.
The Thai side has made it clear that the raid on the Narathiwat hospital was a gross violation of humanitarian and international norms for which the militants should be condemned in the strongest terms.
This is not the first time that insurgents have targeted a medical facility, however. In May 2014, three people were seriously wounded when militant separatists detonated a bomb in the parking lot of Pattani's Khok Pho hospital, damaging at least 50 vehicles.
Yet the militants consider the Thai military's ongoing efforts to demonise them via references to humanitarian principles a case of the pot calling the kettle black. The security forces' underhand tactics in managing a decade or so of conflict in the Malay-speaking South are well documented, as is the culture of impunity among its personnel.
The Thai military has been criticised for positioning outposts in the grounds of temples and schools, thereby placing monks and students in line of fire. Such decisions not only violate international humanitarian norms, they are also made without consulting local residents.
Insurgent attacks against schools and temples were a regular occurrence a decade ago but now take place less frequently, and only as retaliation for instances in which the Thais are deemed to have "crossed the line" and/or violated unwritten rules of engagement.
Separatist sources say the scores of militants behind the recent attacks were aware that using the hospital as a staging point for an attack on Paramilitary Rangers was a violation of international norms. Accordingly, they made a concerted effort not to harm the people inside the hospital.
But they didn't foresee that the Thai side would "milk" the situation to such a degree, even rounding up local imams to carry out a "prayer for peace" at the hospital. Observers outside the region likely saw the prayer event as a slap in the face for the insurgents. But locals know that the clerics would have been under pressure to go with the flow or else risk being accused by the military of being uncooperative.
Claims by the authorities that a nurse was tied up were discredited by the nurse in question, who told reporters that while she was tied to her chair to prevent her from moving she quickly realised the insurgents weren't out to harm people in the hospital.
The vast majority of separatist militants operate under the BRN, whose leadership continues to keep a distance from the Kuala Lumpur-facilitated peace initiative between the Thai government and MARA Patani.
Although MARA Patani claims to have BRN members on board, militants and sources in the movement dismiss any suggestion that the movement's ruling council endorses the peace initiative.
The raid on the Paramilitary Ranger unit, which is situated next to the hospital, was part of an ongoing spike in violence after more than a year of relative quiet.
Don Pathan is a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a Thailand-based freelance security and development consultant.
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
Sunday's raid by militant separatists on a Joh I Rong hospital in Narathiwat couldn't have come at a better time for the Thai side.
The incident has provided a much-needed pretext for the military to attack armed insurgents who continue to discredit the government's peace effort with MARA Patani, the umbrella organisation of six longstanding separatist organisations that the militants say does not represent them.
Bangkok is struggling to justify talks with MARA Patani whose lack of traction is being underscored by a spike in violence in the far South. The Thai side is also facing ill-feeling among the local community over a Bangkok court's decision to seize the 14-rai grounds of an Islamic boarding school, Jihad Withya pondok, in Pattani's Tambon Tha Dan, Yaring district, which was used as an insurgent training facility a decade ago.
The land belongs to the family of Abduloh Waemanor, a local cleric and suspected Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) member who fled the region back in 2005.
Thai military officers have quietly requested that the Waemanor family appeal the court's decision, but they refuse to do so, saying they are unable to come to terms with the state's action.
Some in the separatist movement are suggesting the decision not to appeal was a deliberate move to drive a bigger wedge between local Malay Muslims and the state. Judging from the reaction of local residents - an outpouring of support and sympathy - the alleged strategy appears to have worked.
The seizing of the Jihad Withya pondok - part of a venerable institution that forged the cradle of Islamic civilisation in Southeast Asia - reinforces a notion that the Thai state has never dealt fairly with the Malays of Patani.
The court decision sent shock waves through the region, serving as a warning of what the future could hold. Thai authorities see the pondoks as a hotbed for recruitment and indoctrination of the current generation of insurgents.
Local residents take a different view, pointing out that the Patani historical and cultural narrative is ingrained in their society, making it unfair to single out any institution.
The Thai side has made it clear that the raid on the Narathiwat hospital was a gross violation of humanitarian and international norms for which the militants should be condemned in the strongest terms.
This is not the first time that insurgents have targeted a medical facility, however. In May 2014, three people were seriously wounded when militant separatists detonated a bomb in the parking lot of Pattani's Khok Pho hospital, damaging at least 50 vehicles.
Yet the militants consider the Thai military's ongoing efforts to demonise them via references to humanitarian principles a case of the pot calling the kettle black. The security forces' underhand tactics in managing a decade or so of conflict in the Malay-speaking South are well documented, as is the culture of impunity among its personnel.
The Thai military has been criticised for positioning outposts in the grounds of temples and schools, thereby placing monks and students in line of fire. Such decisions not only violate international humanitarian norms, they are also made without consulting local residents.
Insurgent attacks against schools and temples were a regular occurrence a decade ago but now take place less frequently, and only as retaliation for instances in which the Thais are deemed to have "crossed the line" and/or violated unwritten rules of engagement.
Separatist sources say the scores of militants behind the recent attacks were aware that using the hospital as a staging point for an attack on Paramilitary Rangers was a violation of international norms. Accordingly, they made a concerted effort not to harm the people inside the hospital.
But they didn't foresee that the Thai side would "milk" the situation to such a degree, even rounding up local imams to carry out a "prayer for peace" at the hospital. Observers outside the region likely saw the prayer event as a slap in the face for the insurgents. But locals know that the clerics would have been under pressure to go with the flow or else risk being accused by the military of being uncooperative.
Claims by the authorities that a nurse was tied up were discredited by the nurse in question, who told reporters that while she was tied to her chair to prevent her from moving she quickly realised the insurgents weren't out to harm people in the hospital.
The vast majority of separatist militants operate under the BRN, whose leadership continues to keep a distance from the Kuala Lumpur-facilitated peace initiative between the Thai government and MARA Patani.
Although MARA Patani claims to have BRN members on board, militants and sources in the movement dismiss any suggestion that the movement's ruling council endorses the peace initiative.
The raid on the Paramilitary Ranger unit, which is situated next to the hospital, was part of an ongoing spike in violence after more than a year of relative quiet.
Don Pathan is a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a Thailand-based freelance security and development consultant.
Thursday, 18 February 2016
Bombs, bullets fly as ‘peace’ message fails to reach South
Upsurge in deadly violence suggests neither insurgents nor security officials are willing to put down their guns just yet
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
Insurgent attacks this past weekend have prompted speculation galore on why violence in the far South has spiked after months of relative calm.
Some officials believe insurgents carried out the region-wide attacks in retaliation for a February 10 assault by security forces on a small base camp hidden in the mangroves of Pattani's Nong Chik district.
It remains unclear why the operation was deemed a "success" when five militants deployed at the camp succeeded in escaping after a brief gunfight with the security officials.
Gas cylinders and bomb making materials were seized, though, and one local resident detained for questioning.
Improvised explosive devices are locally made and the material to make them is legally available in the region. But the fact that authorities were able to identify the location of this small camp suggests that intelligence on the ground has improved over the year. Tracking down the militants, however, is another matter. They are proving to be as elusive and slippery as ever, thanks in part to the strong support they enjoy among local residents.
Some officials also suggested that the spike in violence was a means for insurgents to commemorate fallen comrades, namely the 16 militants who walked into a hail of gunfire at a marine base camp in Narathiwat's Bacho district on February 13 three years ago.
That operation was led by well-known militant Mahroso Jantarawadee, who according to separatist sources ignored warnings from his superiors about the danger of attacking a base where reinforcements were close by.
Last Friday night, four blasts shook Narathiwat's Bacho district, while a petrol station in Pattani's Nong Chik district was set on fire. The same evening saw a group of assailants in Pattani's Muang district spray bullets at a police-military checkpoint in Tambon Lulor.
Earlier that day, two soldiers were killed and five injured when a roadside bomb exploded in Yala's Krong Pinang district. It was aimed at a seven-strong foot patrol passing through the hilly Ban Sa-ae village. A 100-metre-long detonating wire was found bundled up under a nearby tree.
More deadly violence followed on the same morning when a resident of Tambon Tam Masu in Pattani's Yaring district was found shot in the head on a well-travelled road. Locals said he had a good working relationship with security officials in the area.
Elsewhere, an arson attack was carried out at the Ban Khai School in Pattani's Nong Chik district at about 4am on Friday morning. It was the first incident of what was to become a very long day for local authorities.
Perhaps the most disturbing attack over the weekend was the point-blank shooting death of a cargo truck driver, whose two colleagues were spared. Initial reports said the victim was singled out because he was not able to speak Malay.
A Barisan Revolusi National source insisted that the movement had no policy of singling out innocent people but admitted that "collateral damage" was still a problem. The murder of the truck driver in Narathiwat's Rangae was perhaps a one-off incident in which emotion got the better of the assailant.
Cargo trucks are part of the economic lifeline on which the local residents, regardless of race and religion, depend for their livelihood. Hence, said the BRN source, it is a policy that this lifeline goes untouched.
The same policy applies to businesses such as rubber factories and auto showrooms, though these have been caught in the crossfire as part of retaliatory actions against Thai security officials accused by the militants of grossly abusing their power.
Separatist sources say militants have been told to scale back their campaign of violence over the last 12 months unless the situation calls for retaliation - which the militants are encouraged to do on a massive scale.
Militant attacks should be carried out on "legitimate targets" (security officials) with consideration given to "collateral damage" (to civilians). The aim should be to demoralise government troops, as well as discredit the security apparatus and associated measures such as the Thung Yang Daeng Model - an attempt to outsource security to local village officials.
The raid at the mangrove camp on Wednesday last week was in line with these unofficial rules of engagement and did not merit retaliation. Neither did the third anniversary of Mahroso's death, the BRN sources said.
What set off the spate of violence at the weekend was the February 6 shooting death of a community leader in Tambon Yupo in Yala's Muang district. One local resident said authorities had accused the victim of turning a blind eye to insurgent activity in his area, particularly the December 13 killing of a Paramilitary Ranger who was described by government and separatist sources as a "high value" target because of his local intelligence work.
The Ranger was on leave visiting the grave of his recently deceased mother when he was killed by a bomb buried at the site. His father was injured by the blast.
BRN sources suspected that the community leader from Tambon Yupo accused of turning a blind eye to the attackers had been killed by a pro-government death squad.
Despite the upsurge of violence, the Thai government is determined to show that it is making progress on its "Track I" peace negotiations with a group of six longstanding separatist organisations who call themselves MARA Patani.
Bangkok is set to push for the implementation of a "safety zone" - a fancy term for "ceasefire".
The designated Malaysian facilitator of the peace talks, Dato Ahmad Zamzamin Hashim, and MARA Patani representative Awang Jabat, have been invited to speak at a conference in Pattani later this month. Sources in the Thai government said the idea is to assure members of MARA Patani that they have immunity from prosecution or other government action.
But such display of half-baked openness may not be enough, as men like Awang Jabat have no legal charges pending against them.
The umbrella organisation is likely to make immunity one of its demands before the dialogue process becomes official negotiation between the two sides.
The real challenge at this informal stage of negotiations is to demonstrate that MARA Patani has influence over the insurgents who are actually doing the fighting.
The BRN, the group that controls the vast majority of militants, has repeatedly declined to take part in the current peace initiative.
The spike in violence over this past week is a reminder that nothing comes easy for this historically contested region, where militants, security officials and other stakeholders play for keeps.
Don Pathan is an independent consultant based in southern Thailand. He is also a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
Insurgent attacks this past weekend have prompted speculation galore on why violence in the far South has spiked after months of relative calm.
Some officials believe insurgents carried out the region-wide attacks in retaliation for a February 10 assault by security forces on a small base camp hidden in the mangroves of Pattani's Nong Chik district.
It remains unclear why the operation was deemed a "success" when five militants deployed at the camp succeeded in escaping after a brief gunfight with the security officials.
Gas cylinders and bomb making materials were seized, though, and one local resident detained for questioning.
Improvised explosive devices are locally made and the material to make them is legally available in the region. But the fact that authorities were able to identify the location of this small camp suggests that intelligence on the ground has improved over the year. Tracking down the militants, however, is another matter. They are proving to be as elusive and slippery as ever, thanks in part to the strong support they enjoy among local residents.
Some officials also suggested that the spike in violence was a means for insurgents to commemorate fallen comrades, namely the 16 militants who walked into a hail of gunfire at a marine base camp in Narathiwat's Bacho district on February 13 three years ago.
That operation was led by well-known militant Mahroso Jantarawadee, who according to separatist sources ignored warnings from his superiors about the danger of attacking a base where reinforcements were close by.
Last Friday night, four blasts shook Narathiwat's Bacho district, while a petrol station in Pattani's Nong Chik district was set on fire. The same evening saw a group of assailants in Pattani's Muang district spray bullets at a police-military checkpoint in Tambon Lulor.
Earlier that day, two soldiers were killed and five injured when a roadside bomb exploded in Yala's Krong Pinang district. It was aimed at a seven-strong foot patrol passing through the hilly Ban Sa-ae village. A 100-metre-long detonating wire was found bundled up under a nearby tree.
More deadly violence followed on the same morning when a resident of Tambon Tam Masu in Pattani's Yaring district was found shot in the head on a well-travelled road. Locals said he had a good working relationship with security officials in the area.
Elsewhere, an arson attack was carried out at the Ban Khai School in Pattani's Nong Chik district at about 4am on Friday morning. It was the first incident of what was to become a very long day for local authorities.
Perhaps the most disturbing attack over the weekend was the point-blank shooting death of a cargo truck driver, whose two colleagues were spared. Initial reports said the victim was singled out because he was not able to speak Malay.
A Barisan Revolusi National source insisted that the movement had no policy of singling out innocent people but admitted that "collateral damage" was still a problem. The murder of the truck driver in Narathiwat's Rangae was perhaps a one-off incident in which emotion got the better of the assailant.
Cargo trucks are part of the economic lifeline on which the local residents, regardless of race and religion, depend for their livelihood. Hence, said the BRN source, it is a policy that this lifeline goes untouched.
The same policy applies to businesses such as rubber factories and auto showrooms, though these have been caught in the crossfire as part of retaliatory actions against Thai security officials accused by the militants of grossly abusing their power.
Separatist sources say militants have been told to scale back their campaign of violence over the last 12 months unless the situation calls for retaliation - which the militants are encouraged to do on a massive scale.
Militant attacks should be carried out on "legitimate targets" (security officials) with consideration given to "collateral damage" (to civilians). The aim should be to demoralise government troops, as well as discredit the security apparatus and associated measures such as the Thung Yang Daeng Model - an attempt to outsource security to local village officials.
The raid at the mangrove camp on Wednesday last week was in line with these unofficial rules of engagement and did not merit retaliation. Neither did the third anniversary of Mahroso's death, the BRN sources said.
What set off the spate of violence at the weekend was the February 6 shooting death of a community leader in Tambon Yupo in Yala's Muang district. One local resident said authorities had accused the victim of turning a blind eye to insurgent activity in his area, particularly the December 13 killing of a Paramilitary Ranger who was described by government and separatist sources as a "high value" target because of his local intelligence work.
The Ranger was on leave visiting the grave of his recently deceased mother when he was killed by a bomb buried at the site. His father was injured by the blast.
BRN sources suspected that the community leader from Tambon Yupo accused of turning a blind eye to the attackers had been killed by a pro-government death squad.
Despite the upsurge of violence, the Thai government is determined to show that it is making progress on its "Track I" peace negotiations with a group of six longstanding separatist organisations who call themselves MARA Patani.
Bangkok is set to push for the implementation of a "safety zone" - a fancy term for "ceasefire".
The designated Malaysian facilitator of the peace talks, Dato Ahmad Zamzamin Hashim, and MARA Patani representative Awang Jabat, have been invited to speak at a conference in Pattani later this month. Sources in the Thai government said the idea is to assure members of MARA Patani that they have immunity from prosecution or other government action.
But such display of half-baked openness may not be enough, as men like Awang Jabat have no legal charges pending against them.
The umbrella organisation is likely to make immunity one of its demands before the dialogue process becomes official negotiation between the two sides.
The real challenge at this informal stage of negotiations is to demonstrate that MARA Patani has influence over the insurgents who are actually doing the fighting.
The BRN, the group that controls the vast majority of militants, has repeatedly declined to take part in the current peace initiative.
The spike in violence over this past week is a reminder that nothing comes easy for this historically contested region, where militants, security officials and other stakeholders play for keeps.
Don Pathan is an independent consultant based in southern Thailand. He is also a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).
Wednesday, 30 December 2015
Southern insurgency: Islamic schools next in firing line?
Bangkok ruling over renowned ponok in Pattani could be a bleak precedent for the peace process
Don PathanSpecial to The Nation
Pattani
Two weeks ago a Bangkok court ruled that the 14-rai grounds of Jihad Withya School at Tha Dan village be confiscated as state property - an order that dismayed local Muslims in Pattani.
The school is a renowned ponok (or pondok in standard Malay), a traditional boarding school where just about every local Muslim boy is sent to learn about Islam and what it means to be Malay. Each ponok is run by a headmaster, known as a tok guru, who is held in high esteem by his community.
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| Jihad Withaya School. Court ruled a state property. |
Even today, the mystique of the ponoks and the Islamic education they provide continues to attract students from across of Southeast Asia. Jihad Withya was one of several hundred traditional boarding schools that dot this historically contested region.
Citing the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the court ruled that the state had the right to seize Jihad Withya's land since, according to two testimonies, it was being used to support insurgency activities.
The state's definition of "support for insurgency activities" is ambiguous since almost every form of social gathering or forum in this region appears to feature talk of independence.
Local tok gurus have tried in vain to convince state security agencies that the ponoks do not teach separatism. That topic is woven into public discourse in the far South, which makes it unfair to single out any one single institution.
In one case, for example, 19 suspected insurgents who were executed extrajudicially at a restaurant in Saba Yoi, Songkhla, during an uprising on April 28, 2004, were members of a local football team. And they all came from different schools.
If a football team can provide the forum for separatist militants to come together, then just about any social gathering can do the same, provided that its members share the same cultural and historical narrative of Patani as a homeland occupied illegitimately by the Thai state.
A petition from the state prosecutor on behalf of the Anti-Money Laundering Office claimed two insurgents had confessed to being trained at the school by, among others, the then-tok guru Abdulloh Waemanor.
Abdulloh, also known as Poksu Loh, fled Southern Thailand 10 years ago to escape arrest. His whereabouts are unknown, but Thai security officials believe he is in Malaysia.
Poksu Loh is reckoned to be one of the key leaders in the secretive ruling council of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), which controls the vast majority of insurgents in the South.
Jihad Withya was ordered closed in May 2005. For the past 10 years, authorities have kept a close watch on the school, questioning those going in and out.
The close monitoring reflects their conviction that Poksu Loh has great influence over the course of the conflict in this historically contested region, where more than 6,000 people have died in insurgency-related violence since January 2004.
The timing of the decision to seize the school also raises many questions. Why did the state wait so long when it could have moved 10 years ago, separatist sources have asked.
Thai military and security officials confirmed they had reached out to Poksu Loh for his support in the ongoing Malaysia-facilitated peace talks, but to no avail.
Launched by the government of Yingluck Shinawatra on February 28, 2013 and reluctantly taken up by the current military-backed administration, the peace process has brought negotiators from Bangkok face to face with leaders of six longstanding separatist movements under the umbrella organisation known as MARA Patani.
Bangkok has claimed that BRN members are at the table, but it has become clear that these self-proclaimed BRN cadres in MARA Patani have no command and control over the militants.
The Yingluck government dumped international mediators who worked on "pre-talks" initiatives between 2005 and 2011, handing the role of facilitator to Kuala Lumpur.
Officially, the Thai government and MARA Patani are still in the unofficial pre-talks phase, though negotiators on both sides have been paraded before the media for public consumption.
MARA Patani has insisted that Bangkok make the talks a national agenda item, which would entail parliamentary endorsement.
It has also demanded that the Thai government grant MARA Patani legitimacy as a group negotiating on behalf of the people of the Malays' historical homeland. With that demand comes an
insistence that its negotiators be granted immunity from prosecution.
Yet Bangkok is not in the mood to grant MARA Patani much in the way of legitimacy. For the junta, said one top security adviser, the willingness to talk to separatists it regards as "criminals" represents all the legitimacy they are likely to get.
In fact, Bangkok even refuses to use the name MARA Patani, fearing it would entail acknowledgement of the Malays' historical homeland. Instead it refers to the separatist umbrella organisation by the neutral moniker "Party B".
Other security officials say Bangkok's half-hearted attitude towards MARA Patani stems from the fact that it is not convinced the umbrella organisation has genuine influence over the militants.
And so, Thai authorities continue to reach out behind the scenes to exiled leaders like Sapae-ing Basor, the former principle of Thamvithya Mulnithi School in Yala, who is regarded as one of the region's top spiritual leaders, with influence over the militants.
But the seizing of Jihad Withya has brought an end to the quiet charm offensive, at least with Abdulloh Waemanor.
BRN militants along with observers of the conflict have said that, while these men are important in their own right, the conflict is about much more than them. It concerns the historical mistrust and an absence of justice in dealings between the state and the Malays of Patani. These are beyond the control of any one spiritual or insurgent leader, they said.
Local activists said the seizing of the ponok has worked in the separatists' favour as it drives an even bigger wedge between the government and the Pattani residents it has been trying to win over.
Others are concerned that the ruling could set an unwanted precedent for the confiscation of other ponoks and local institutions, grounded in allegations of insurgency activity.
Don Pathan is a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a Thailand-based freelance security and development consultant.
Thursday, 26 November 2015
Bomb exposes fatal flaw in far South security plan
Transfer of defence responsibilities is pushing local residents further into the line of fire
Don PathanSpecial to The Nation
Ban Khok Khilek, Pattani
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But when a powerful home-made bomb exploded from within, killing four of the volunteers, injuring five others and ripping apart the makeshift structure, the impact was felt through the entire region.
For outsider observers, the details are all-too familiar: Malay Muslim insurgents killed Buddhist militiamen with an explosive hidden inside their makeshift outpost.
But for officials and observers on the front line of this conflict, the November 12 incident was far from a routine attack by insurgents bent on carving out a separate homeland for the Malay Muslims.
It was directed at a group of village defence volunteers who are normally left alone because they pose little or no threat to the insurgents.
Chor Ror Bor receive shotguns and weapons training at the order of the Interior Ministry. Members don't patrol beyond their village limits and only join up in the evening for guard duty. Each unit receives a small budget, enough to buy a monthly supply of coffee and other drinks to make the nights a little more bearable.
So when they were targeted in November 12's deadly attack, eyebrows were raised.
Hovering over these village defence volunteer outposts is the controversial Village Protection Force, also known as the Or Ror Bor, a network of exclusively Buddhist militiamen that stretches across the Malay-speaking region of the three southernmost provinces and four districts in Songkhla province.
While the Chor Ror Bor is a village-based outfit, the Or Ror Bor has a much higher degree of mobility and commands a bird's-eye view of the situation in this historically contested region.
But Cha-ont Bualern 52, a local Or Ror Bor militiaman, was speechless, unable to make sense of the attack on the Chor Ror Bor outpost at Ban Khok Khilek.
"What happened here was unprecedented," Cha-ont said, as fellow Buddhist villagers stood silently observing what was left of the security outpost.
Unlike the Chor Ror Bor, members of the region-wide Or Ror Bor have been declared targets by insurgents.
Thai military officials have quietly expressed concern over the kind of flexibility that the Or Ror Bor enjoy, and the group's tendency to take matters into their own hands.
Local observers - both Muslim and Buddhist - have been cautious about drawing conclusions from the November 12 attack, though there's general agreement it was meant as a "strong message" from insurgents that local militia would pay a price for going beyond their traditional, non-threatening role.
In other words, it was a direct attack on the Army's so-called Thung Yang Daeng Model, a half-baked strategy to outsource security responsibilities to local villagers via the Chor Ror Bor, village chiefs and Defence Volunteers, all of whom fall under the Interior Ministry's line of command.
Authorities believe insurgents had planted the bomb while the outpost was deserted. Nevertheless, it was a daring raid considering the prominence and visibility of the fortification.
The community in and around Ban Khok Khilek is a mix of Muslims and Buddhists, with the latter in the slight majority. The outpost was manned in the evening by a group of local Buddhist volunteers. A separate, all-Muslim Chor Ror Bor unit is based just a kilometre away.
The two groups continue to mingle with one another, but local Muslims say the November 12 incident has driven a psychological wedge between the two sides because the attack had singled out one ethnic group.
The bombing wasn't the first time the Tung Yang Daeng Model has come under the spotlight. Shortly after midnight on July 31, a group of about 20 insurgents armed with machine guns opened fire on a Defence Volunteers' camp in Yala's Yaha district, injuring 18 men, all of whom were local Malay Muslims.
Local observers and sources in the separatist movement said the insurgents had shown restraint in the Yaha attack, with the militants deliberately stopping short of killing the Defence Volunteers because they merely wanted to send the Thai government, as well as local residents, a stern warning of what they could do to counter the Thung Yang Daeng initiative.
Sources in the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the longstanding separatist movement that controls the vast majority of insurgent militia, say the routine work of locally elected officials and village defence volunteers had never posed a threat to insurgency activities.
But any government move to arm them and push them into the front line would make them targets, BRN sources say.
One component of the strategy governing the Thung Yang Daeng Model is to slowly phase out regular Army patrols and replace them with Paramilitary Rangers, preferably hired locally so they know the terrain.
One village chief in Narathiwat reports that two young Malay Muslim men from his community have joined the Paramilitary Rangers. Their local knowledge is helping reconnaissance patrols search for insurgents' training sites and makeshift camps.
But the task is not easy: the insurgents are mobile and have sympathetic local villagers to serve as their eyes and ears.
The two Rangers are making decent money - about Bt15,000 a month - but they are afraid to visit their parents because they know the insurgents now consider them fair game. Meanwhile relations between the Rangers' parents and their community have become somewhat awkward, said the chief. "They walk past one another but won't say anything or look at each other's faces," he said.
Nevertheless, Malay Muslim villagers in the far South think the Thung Yang Daeng Model will backfire because they doubt that many in this region are willing to put their lives on the line for the state.
The fact that most local residents share the insurgents' mistrust of the state does not help the situation.
Security officials are aware of this sentiment, said the village chief.
"They [the military] are taking it slow. They are asking us to go on joint patrols with them but they are only asking us to man certain positions at certain times," he said.
Local Army officials say they are fully aware that public mistrust of the state and its security officials poses a tremendous challenge for the Thung Yang Daeng Model.
But that's life in the far South, say locals and government officials, where the reality on the ground continues to be a world apart from policy coming out of Bangkok.
Don Pathan is an independent security consultant based in Yala, and a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com)
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