The Nation
A spike in violence in the deep South can be traced directly to the Army's rough reactions to events
The Army’s so-called “Tung Yang Daeng model” – an effort to integrate the operation of the military, villagers and local security into one cohesive unit – is facing a severe test in that Pattani district after back-to-back incidents that illustrated the vulnerability of security units in remote areas.
The first incident came in mid-July, with some 40 insurgents surrounding a police substation and sparking an intense exchange of gunfire.
Road spikes, felled trees and a roadside bomb stalled the reinforcements and an Army helicopter had to be dispatched to the scene. The attack left two soldiers seriously wounded and several more with severe burns after the station was set aflame and razed.
In a routine response, a group of young men from nearby Islamic boarding schools were rounded up and interrogated. Locals said the way they were mistreated set the stage for the second attack, in which insurgents burned down six public schools on October 12, apparently to demonstrate their disapproval of the authorities’ tactics.
The Army billed the arson attacks as a response to its recent arrest of key figures in the insurgency, though no names were mentioned.
In a bid for damage control, “the Tung Yang Daeng model” was conjured up. How this differs from previous attempts to outsource security work to local residents – or try to get villagers involved in security details – is anybody’s guess. It has strong echoes of the so-called “Pentagon II initiative” concocted after a truckload of insurgents killed four soldiers patrolling on motorbikes in Pattani’s Ma-Yor district in July 2012.
That incident was caught on CCTV and broadcast all over the social media. The government of Yingluck Shinawatra had to give the impression that it was in control of the situation, and so units, agencies and people were shifted around to create Pentagon II. And yes, the policymakers said more or less the same thing about how they were going to step up coordination among the security agencies.
This time around, the Army is counting on village protection units as part of the line-up. But the military has tried handing off security duties to the villagers before and knows the results can be disastrous.
Witness, for example, the protest in Tak Bai in October 2004 that led to what many now call a massacre. The protesters were calling for the release of a group of village-defence volunteers who had been accused of handing their weapons to insurgents. The volunteers had said they surrendered the weapons to avoid being slaughtered by a superior force. The military opened fire on the demonstrators and then stacked the survivors in trucks, resulting in 85 deaths, mainly from suffocation.
For some reason the Army continues to believe that residents in the Muslim-majority deep South are obligated to put their lives on the line for the nation, despite the fact that authorities often fail to respect their cultural difference and address their historical grievances.
Perhaps the military needs to look closer to home when it comes to accountability and responsibility for security.
The killing of a Malay Muslim child, 14-year-old Muhammad-Azuwan Sohoh, by a paramilitary Ranger in Narathiwat’s Sri Sakorn district on August 21 is a case in point.
Muhammad-Azuwan’s case deserves attention because investigators discovered that the Ranger involved, Aekapot Samansuan, had shot the boy and then placed a pistol in the victim’s hand to disguise him as an insurgent.
Then, just a week ago, Marines opened fire on a pickup truck at a checkpoint in Hutaeyulo in Narathiwat’s Bacho district, killing 10-year-old Hizula Taemoh and wounding her mother and younger sister. The family was heading to market to sell coconuts.
Once again, the military unit involved tried to portray the victims as insurgents. But this time around, eyewitnesses spoke out and revealed the truth.
Human Rights Watch called on the government to “wake up to the fact that attempts to cover up misconduct of its security units and protect them from criminal responsibility fan the flames of violent reprisals”.
“Insurgents have repeatedly used the impunity of government forces to
justify brutal attacks on civilians,” it said.
Thai security forces in the South must clean up their own house before they can expect others to join in efforts to keep the peace.
DON PATHAN - Thailand-based security analyst/development consultant (Photo: Anjaman Pass, Afghanistan, with two Northern Alliance fighters, October 2001)
Friday, 31 October 2014
Wednesday, 22 October 2014
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/confronting-ghosts-thailands-shapeless-southern-insurgency
In this Lowy Institute Paper, Joseph Chinyong Liow and Don Pathan examine the ongoing violence in the majority Muslim Malay provinces of Thailand’s south. Through unprecedented fieldwork, the authors provide the deepest and most up-to-date analysis of the insurgency and problems the Thai Government faces in dealing with it.
Joseph Chinyong Liow is the Associate Dean at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Don Pathan is a senior reporter at The Nation newspaper in Bangkok.
The Lowy Institute is an independent, nonpartisan international policy think tank located in Sydney, Australia. Ranked as Australia's leading think tank, it provides high - quality research and distinctive perspectives on the international trends shaping Australia and the world.
Wednesday, 8 October 2014
New approach to peace efforts offers hope in deep South
By Don Pathan
Bangkok's move to verify militant groups' involvement through back-channel talks could create inclusive process so far lacking
The Thai government is assembling a peace-negotiating team to revive talks with Patani Malay separatist leaders, and this time around, Bangkok wants it to be as inclusive as possible.
Because there are many groups claiming to have command-and-control over the militants, the Thai side would like to meet each of them individually to better assess their involvement in the insurgency.
Some of the longstanding Patani Malay separatist groups welcome face-to-face talks with the Thai military, as these would give them the opportunity to show what they are capable of. Some are prepared to claim responsibility for violent attacks, as well as outline their plans for future action.
Militants say the idea of this "secret track" in negotiations sounds interesting because it opens a way for horse trading, including asking for the release of their members from prison as part of exchanges to be discussed at the table.
One senior official said the idea of individual separatist groups wanting to be credited with their respective activities is understandable and that it's a part of the natural progress of any insurgency towards peace.
Of course, these back-channel meetings will be strictly off the public radar. And for this to work the two sides will have to keep the number of participants very small, with the understanding that there will be virtually no room for bluffing.
Ideally, participants in the backdoor meetings must have some degree of command-and-control over combatants so that they can deliver what is agreed upon. Items on the table may include rules of engagement, establishing a demilitarised zone for certain routes and/or ceasefires for certain areas or occasions.
One member of a longstanding separatist group said his cadres were turned off by the fact that the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), an umbrella organisation of separatist combatants, is credited with carrying out virtually all insurgent violence. The back channel, he said, would allow the Thai side to see what his network is capable of.
Others say they are wary of the divide-and-rule nature of this approach. But since there is no real unity among the established separatist groups as they compete among themselves for legitimacy and recognition, such a concern is not that big a deal.
The Army is hoping that the back channel can deliver tangible progress in the deep South, since the current crop of coup-makers needs to show the public quantifiable results.
However, the idea of conducting secret talks with the separatist movements is easier said than done, and both sides say there are obstacles that they will have to overcome for this initiative to succeed. These challenges include getting all the Thai security agencies to agree to a common agenda. In other words, no more turning a blind eye to rogue security units taking matters into their own hands.
As for the separatist side, the problem is a lack of unity, especially among the established groups and their exiled leaders. Like the Thais, they are plagued with longstanding rivalries. And even if the groups unanimously agreed to the idea of a secret track of negotiations, there are plenty of spoilers - drug dealers, smugglers, crime syndicates - with an axe to grind with the security agencies.
As for the official track, Army chief General Udomdej Sitabutr has said Malaysia will continue to be the facilitator. The process was launched on February 28, 2013 in Kuala Lumpur with Hasan Taib, a member of the BRN-C, designated as the "liaison".
Hasan threw in the towel late last year after he realised that he could not achieve the task that Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok had set for him, which was to generate enough traction for the process and bring other groups on board.
BRN-C sources and combatants said his role was doomed from the beginning because Hasan never had the support or endorsement of the group's leaders or those actually doing the fighting. A similar lack of cohesion plagued peace efforts by the Yingluck Shinawatra government, which failed to get the Army on board before launching the February 28, 2013 initiative.
The BRN-C source also admitted that the inclusiveness of this new phase adds tremendous pressure for the group to participate in the talks one way or another.
This is not to say that the BRN-C does not want to talk; it just wants to be sure about what it is getting into, because it maintains it has far more to lose than other groups.
Its claims have been echoed by Thai military sources, who said the BRN-C's participation in the process is crucial because the vast majority of the separatist combatants fall under its network.
Meanwhile, Bangkok is in the process of putting a team of negotiators together. This team will report to a policy body made up of various ministries and agencies, with the Army chief as head.
The jury is still out on who will get the job of chief negotiator for the Thai side, though local media point to retired General Akanit Muansawat, a long-time friend of Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, as favourite for the position. Akanit has spent much of his career working on the insurgency in the Malay-speaking South.
Rumours of Akanit's possible appointment have generated a great deal of discussion, much of it in the form of criticism, as reflected in recent media reports that quote unnamed exiled separatist sources explaining why Akanit should not get the job. Others have come out in his defence, saying the retired general is a capable person and familiar with the conflict in the southernmost provinces.
"We still have a long way to go before the government appoints a negotiating team and a policy body, not to mention the fact that a sound policy and strategy has yet to be worked out," said a senior Thai Army source.
In what was billed by the Thai military as an attempt to "test the water", Wae Hamad Wae Yusuf, head of the longstanding separatist organisation Patani Malay Consultative Congress (MPRMP), recently issued a statement via YouTube announcing the independence of Patani, the Malay historical homeland in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand.
Wae Hamad, in 2008, led a delegation to Bogor, Indonesia to meet with a representative from Bangkok sent by then-prime minister Samak Sundaravej. Mediated by Indonesian vice president Jusuf Kalla, the event quickly fell apart after it became public knowledge.
So far, only Akanit's name has been made public as a potential chief negotiator for the Thai side. That it has generated so much heated debate reflects the enthusiasm of the stakeholders and the people who want to be at the negotiating table.
But from the perspective of one BRN-C cadre, "These so-called stakeholders and want-to-be players can debate all they want. If we [the BRN-C] are not part of the process, it will be just a bunch of old men griping about this and that."
Don Pathan is a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a freelance security consultant based in Yala.
Because there are many groups claiming to have command-and-control over the militants, the Thai side would like to meet each of them individually to better assess their involvement in the insurgency.
Some of the longstanding Patani Malay separatist groups welcome face-to-face talks with the Thai military, as these would give them the opportunity to show what they are capable of. Some are prepared to claim responsibility for violent attacks, as well as outline their plans for future action.
Militants say the idea of this "secret track" in negotiations sounds interesting because it opens a way for horse trading, including asking for the release of their members from prison as part of exchanges to be discussed at the table.
One senior official said the idea of individual separatist groups wanting to be credited with their respective activities is understandable and that it's a part of the natural progress of any insurgency towards peace.
Of course, these back-channel meetings will be strictly off the public radar. And for this to work the two sides will have to keep the number of participants very small, with the understanding that there will be virtually no room for bluffing.
Ideally, participants in the backdoor meetings must have some degree of command-and-control over combatants so that they can deliver what is agreed upon. Items on the table may include rules of engagement, establishing a demilitarised zone for certain routes and/or ceasefires for certain areas or occasions.
One member of a longstanding separatist group said his cadres were turned off by the fact that the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), an umbrella organisation of separatist combatants, is credited with carrying out virtually all insurgent violence. The back channel, he said, would allow the Thai side to see what his network is capable of.
Others say they are wary of the divide-and-rule nature of this approach. But since there is no real unity among the established separatist groups as they compete among themselves for legitimacy and recognition, such a concern is not that big a deal.
The Army is hoping that the back channel can deliver tangible progress in the deep South, since the current crop of coup-makers needs to show the public quantifiable results.
However, the idea of conducting secret talks with the separatist movements is easier said than done, and both sides say there are obstacles that they will have to overcome for this initiative to succeed. These challenges include getting all the Thai security agencies to agree to a common agenda. In other words, no more turning a blind eye to rogue security units taking matters into their own hands.
As for the separatist side, the problem is a lack of unity, especially among the established groups and their exiled leaders. Like the Thais, they are plagued with longstanding rivalries. And even if the groups unanimously agreed to the idea of a secret track of negotiations, there are plenty of spoilers - drug dealers, smugglers, crime syndicates - with an axe to grind with the security agencies.
As for the official track, Army chief General Udomdej Sitabutr has said Malaysia will continue to be the facilitator. The process was launched on February 28, 2013 in Kuala Lumpur with Hasan Taib, a member of the BRN-C, designated as the "liaison".
Hasan threw in the towel late last year after he realised that he could not achieve the task that Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok had set for him, which was to generate enough traction for the process and bring other groups on board.
BRN-C sources and combatants said his role was doomed from the beginning because Hasan never had the support or endorsement of the group's leaders or those actually doing the fighting. A similar lack of cohesion plagued peace efforts by the Yingluck Shinawatra government, which failed to get the Army on board before launching the February 28, 2013 initiative.
The BRN-C source also admitted that the inclusiveness of this new phase adds tremendous pressure for the group to participate in the talks one way or another.
This is not to say that the BRN-C does not want to talk; it just wants to be sure about what it is getting into, because it maintains it has far more to lose than other groups.
Its claims have been echoed by Thai military sources, who said the BRN-C's participation in the process is crucial because the vast majority of the separatist combatants fall under its network.
Meanwhile, Bangkok is in the process of putting a team of negotiators together. This team will report to a policy body made up of various ministries and agencies, with the Army chief as head.
The jury is still out on who will get the job of chief negotiator for the Thai side, though local media point to retired General Akanit Muansawat, a long-time friend of Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, as favourite for the position. Akanit has spent much of his career working on the insurgency in the Malay-speaking South.
Rumours of Akanit's possible appointment have generated a great deal of discussion, much of it in the form of criticism, as reflected in recent media reports that quote unnamed exiled separatist sources explaining why Akanit should not get the job. Others have come out in his defence, saying the retired general is a capable person and familiar with the conflict in the southernmost provinces.
"We still have a long way to go before the government appoints a negotiating team and a policy body, not to mention the fact that a sound policy and strategy has yet to be worked out," said a senior Thai Army source.
In what was billed by the Thai military as an attempt to "test the water", Wae Hamad Wae Yusuf, head of the longstanding separatist organisation Patani Malay Consultative Congress (MPRMP), recently issued a statement via YouTube announcing the independence of Patani, the Malay historical homeland in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand.
Wae Hamad, in 2008, led a delegation to Bogor, Indonesia to meet with a representative from Bangkok sent by then-prime minister Samak Sundaravej. Mediated by Indonesian vice president Jusuf Kalla, the event quickly fell apart after it became public knowledge.
So far, only Akanit's name has been made public as a potential chief negotiator for the Thai side. That it has generated so much heated debate reflects the enthusiasm of the stakeholders and the people who want to be at the negotiating table.
But from the perspective of one BRN-C cadre, "These so-called stakeholders and want-to-be players can debate all they want. If we [the BRN-C] are not part of the process, it will be just a bunch of old men griping about this and that."
Don Pathan is a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a freelance security consultant based in Yala.
Saturday, 9 August 2014
Time to switch tracks in deep South peace process
Direct talks between Thai security forces and the separatist leaders controlling combatant insurgents may be the only way to build trust
The National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) is having a difficult time explaining to the Malaysian government that there will be a serious adjustment to the role Kuala Lumpur had been playing in peace talks launched under the government of Yingluck Shinawatra.
The NCPO is hoping that Malaysia will understand that it has other priorities and that the peace talks with the so-called Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C) and others, an initiative that was launched in Kuala Lumpur on February 28 last year, will progress according to a new course.
The military has not followed the example of the 2006 coup-makers, who ousted Thaksin Shinawatra, by citing the government's handling of the unrest in the southernmost provinces as one of their reasons for seizing power. This time around, the military pointed to the political deadlock to justify their ouster of the Pheu Thai government.
Moreover, the Army was not exactly "on board" with the February 28 initiative, which was the work of a few trusted bureaucrats along with the Pheu Thai's Wadah politicians closely aligned with Thaksin and his sister.
While giving the impression it was going along with the government, the military at the same time looked for ways to hamper the Kuala Lumpur-backed peace talks, a job that had historically been under its purview.
One way to rock the boat was to permit the return to Thailand of Wan Kadir Che Man, the former leader of the now-defunct Bersatu separatist umbrella group and the founder of long-standing separatist movement, Barisan Islam Pembangunan Pattani (BIPP). The Thai Army knew that Wan Kadir was not in favour of having a third party, especially Malaysia, at the negotiating table. He had been suggesting all along at private meetings with the Thai side that any talks at this point should be strictly between the Thai side and the separatist movements.
During his three visits to Thailand between December 2013 and January, Wan Kadir didn't mince words in his disapproval of Malaysia, or Western NGOs for that matter, as mediators for the talks.
Then came the first anniversary of the February 28 initiative and a declaration by designated facilitator Dato Ahmad Zamzamin Hashim, former spy chief of Malaysia, that all three factions of the Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) and the BIPP would be joining the peace talks.
Wan Kadir, who no longer runs the BIPP, was dismissive of the claim that the group he had helped create was the same one now joining the talks, saying people could call themselves anything nowadays. The reality, he said, was that people with command and control over the insurgents on the ground had yet to surface because the atmosphere was not conducive to them going public.
The claim of progress in talks had some in the international community scratching their heads when, two months later, in April this year, foreign embassies in Bangkok issued travel warnings, citing new information indicating that insurgents might be targeting Westerners.
Although the warnings did not name the separatist organisations suspected of targeting foreigners - something that has never happened before in the history of the deep South insurgency - a source said that Thai authorities had singled out one of the groups set to be joining the peace talks.
Leaders in the separatist community, including BRN cadres, are dismissive of the claim that insurgents could be targeting Westerners. They believe the information was part of counter-intelligence issued to discredit the "progress" towards peace being claimed by the Pheu Thai government.
But with the change of power brought by the coup, the ball is now in the Army's court. It's one thing to sit on the sidelines criticising a (Pheu Thai) government peace initiative and rocking the boat. It's another thing to be in sole control of the country's governance, with no critics or real opposition to contend with.
The junta thought that announcing the continuation of peace talks, with secretary-general of the National Security Council Thawil Pliensri in charge, would ease the concerns of other stakeholders about the future of the peace process.
But Kuala Lumpur, which traditionally sees Thailand's Malay-speaking South as its own backyard, would like to see a firmer commitment from Bangkok. In contrast, Thawil comes across to many observers as a "lame duck" looking forward to a retirement which is just months away.
According to one Malaysian source, what Kuala Lumpur would like to see is a statement from the NCPO saying that it will respect the memorandum of understanding signed on February 28, 2013 by the three parties.
But what Kuala Lumpur wants and what Kuala Lumpur gets may be two different things, Thai officials say.
It took the junta chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha nearly two months following the coup to say anything in public about the conflict in the deep South. That goes to show that he has other priorities and that the insurgency is not exactly high on his list.
Moreover, the designated BRN "liaison", Hassan Taib, has managed to wriggle his way out of having to represent a movement that never gave him the necessary mandate or moral support to play the role that Kuala Lumpur and theYingluck government had designed for him.
One way out of this fiasco is to proceed along two tracks. Track One would be an inclusive, official process for international and public consumption, which would save Malaysia's face and "keep them happy", said a Thai security official.
The second track, on the other hand, would be talks between Thai security forces and mid-ranking separatist leaders who have direct command over the combatant insurgents.
The idea with the latter track is to go after issues within reach, such as rules of engagement - which could evolve into more tangible issues, such as declaring demilitarised zones on certain roads and in certain communities.
Thai soldiers in the South have said that addressing non-political issues at this level is the only way for the two sides to build any trust and traction that could eventually lead to a more meaningful peace process.
A BRN cadre said that the top-down approach employed by the Yingluck government could only work if there was a strong chain of command within the separatist movements. But the reality is that the separatists' command-and-control chain is fluid and has never been tested.
In other words, if the leaders of the BRN or any other separatist organisations cut a deal with the Thai state, there is no guarantee that the separatists actually doing the fighting will follow through with what the exiled leaders have agreed upon in peace talks.
Don Pathan is a security consultant based in southern Thailand. He is also a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).
The NCPO is hoping that Malaysia will understand that it has other priorities and that the peace talks with the so-called Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C) and others, an initiative that was launched in Kuala Lumpur on February 28 last year, will progress according to a new course.
The military has not followed the example of the 2006 coup-makers, who ousted Thaksin Shinawatra, by citing the government's handling of the unrest in the southernmost provinces as one of their reasons for seizing power. This time around, the military pointed to the political deadlock to justify their ouster of the Pheu Thai government.
Moreover, the Army was not exactly "on board" with the February 28 initiative, which was the work of a few trusted bureaucrats along with the Pheu Thai's Wadah politicians closely aligned with Thaksin and his sister.
While giving the impression it was going along with the government, the military at the same time looked for ways to hamper the Kuala Lumpur-backed peace talks, a job that had historically been under its purview.
One way to rock the boat was to permit the return to Thailand of Wan Kadir Che Man, the former leader of the now-defunct Bersatu separatist umbrella group and the founder of long-standing separatist movement, Barisan Islam Pembangunan Pattani (BIPP). The Thai Army knew that Wan Kadir was not in favour of having a third party, especially Malaysia, at the negotiating table. He had been suggesting all along at private meetings with the Thai side that any talks at this point should be strictly between the Thai side and the separatist movements.
During his three visits to Thailand between December 2013 and January, Wan Kadir didn't mince words in his disapproval of Malaysia, or Western NGOs for that matter, as mediators for the talks.
Then came the first anniversary of the February 28 initiative and a declaration by designated facilitator Dato Ahmad Zamzamin Hashim, former spy chief of Malaysia, that all three factions of the Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) and the BIPP would be joining the peace talks.
Wan Kadir, who no longer runs the BIPP, was dismissive of the claim that the group he had helped create was the same one now joining the talks, saying people could call themselves anything nowadays. The reality, he said, was that people with command and control over the insurgents on the ground had yet to surface because the atmosphere was not conducive to them going public.
The claim of progress in talks had some in the international community scratching their heads when, two months later, in April this year, foreign embassies in Bangkok issued travel warnings, citing new information indicating that insurgents might be targeting Westerners.
Although the warnings did not name the separatist organisations suspected of targeting foreigners - something that has never happened before in the history of the deep South insurgency - a source said that Thai authorities had singled out one of the groups set to be joining the peace talks.
Leaders in the separatist community, including BRN cadres, are dismissive of the claim that insurgents could be targeting Westerners. They believe the information was part of counter-intelligence issued to discredit the "progress" towards peace being claimed by the Pheu Thai government.
But with the change of power brought by the coup, the ball is now in the Army's court. It's one thing to sit on the sidelines criticising a (Pheu Thai) government peace initiative and rocking the boat. It's another thing to be in sole control of the country's governance, with no critics or real opposition to contend with.
The junta thought that announcing the continuation of peace talks, with secretary-general of the National Security Council Thawil Pliensri in charge, would ease the concerns of other stakeholders about the future of the peace process.
But Kuala Lumpur, which traditionally sees Thailand's Malay-speaking South as its own backyard, would like to see a firmer commitment from Bangkok. In contrast, Thawil comes across to many observers as a "lame duck" looking forward to a retirement which is just months away.
According to one Malaysian source, what Kuala Lumpur would like to see is a statement from the NCPO saying that it will respect the memorandum of understanding signed on February 28, 2013 by the three parties.
But what Kuala Lumpur wants and what Kuala Lumpur gets may be two different things, Thai officials say.
It took the junta chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha nearly two months following the coup to say anything in public about the conflict in the deep South. That goes to show that he has other priorities and that the insurgency is not exactly high on his list.
Moreover, the designated BRN "liaison", Hassan Taib, has managed to wriggle his way out of having to represent a movement that never gave him the necessary mandate or moral support to play the role that Kuala Lumpur and theYingluck government had designed for him.
One way out of this fiasco is to proceed along two tracks. Track One would be an inclusive, official process for international and public consumption, which would save Malaysia's face and "keep them happy", said a Thai security official.
The second track, on the other hand, would be talks between Thai security forces and mid-ranking separatist leaders who have direct command over the combatant insurgents.
The idea with the latter track is to go after issues within reach, such as rules of engagement - which could evolve into more tangible issues, such as declaring demilitarised zones on certain roads and in certain communities.
Thai soldiers in the South have said that addressing non-political issues at this level is the only way for the two sides to build any trust and traction that could eventually lead to a more meaningful peace process.
A BRN cadre said that the top-down approach employed by the Yingluck government could only work if there was a strong chain of command within the separatist movements. But the reality is that the separatists' command-and-control chain is fluid and has never been tested.
In other words, if the leaders of the BRN or any other separatist organisations cut a deal with the Thai state, there is no guarantee that the separatists actually doing the fighting will follow through with what the exiled leaders have agreed upon in peace talks.
Don Pathan is a security consultant based in southern Thailand. He is also a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).
Friday, 1 August 2014
Beliefs shaken as theatre of violence widens in South
Don Pathan
Until this incident, which claimed three lives and inflicted injuries on more than 30 others, Betong had been untouched by the wave of insurgency that actually erupted in 2001 but wasn't officially recognised until January 4, 2004. Authorities woke up to it when, in 2004, militants raided an Army battalion and made off with more than 300 weapons. This was when the authorities could no longer dismiss the political underpinnings of the attack.
The Betong attack came seven months after the insurgents had effectively expanded their theatre of violence to include Songkhla's Sadao district. In December 2013 three bomb attacks had been carried out in Sadao in a single day - two police stations were hit by motorbike bomb and one car bomb was detonated in the heart of the Dan Nok red-light area.
But what was even more nerve-wracking for security officials was the twin-canister bomb, with a blast radius of 500 metres, which was discovered at the Phuket police station compound on that very day in December 2013. The bomb, hidden in a stolen pickup truck, was wired and ready to be set off, except the culprit had forgotten to turn on the switch to arm it. The idea was to demonstrate to the authorities what the insurgents are capable of, according to an exiled Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C) source.
If nothing else, the Sadao and Betong incidents sent a stern message to Thailand's security apparatus that the insurgents were expanding their violence into new territory and that they would continue to discredit the authorities and make the area as ungovernable as possible.
The two incidents also defied the long-standing conventional belief among Thai security officials that Sadao would be left undisturbed because it served as a transit route for insurgents leaving and entering Thailand through the Andaman Sea.
The same people also believed that Betong would be left untouched due to logistics. There is only one road that leads to this border town and there is hardly anywhere to run and hide.
The Betong attack, as well as the Sadao attack in December, essentially destroyed this argument as the insurgents have proved that they are capable of reaching beyond their traditional grid. Now, whether they can sustain their operation in these newly charted territories still remains to be seen.
Like the warning that preceded the simultaneous attacks on four petrol stations and 7-Eleven convenience stores in Pattani in late May, the Betong attack also had a warning of sorts to minimise casualties. This warning came in the form of a much smaller bomb.
Before the Pattani attacks, the culprit dashed for a waiting motorbike after parking a bomb-laden motorbike next to the station's fuel pump. Similar obvious moves were made at the convenience stores. And after 10 years of non-stop violence, residents know how to read these signs and make a run for it.
Yet, the insurgents' restraint is rarely publicised because the authorities make no differentiation among the victims, be they bystanders or directly targeted, since they prefer to demonise the separatists rather than put the conflict and the violence into proper perspective.
The separatists have shifted their theatre of violence from remote areas to urban and "high-profile" sites, thus making civilian casualties almost inevitable. Nevertheless, the issue of collateral damage continues to be a topic of debate within the movement.
The very fact that the BRN and insurgents are concerned about this issue is a positive sign, because it suggests that the benchmark for massive bomb attacks is not necessarily the body count but more the political statement aimed at discrediting the authorities.
The apparent restraint by the insurgents has also suggested that, despite the brutality, which the media often play up, there is room for compromise.
Of course there have been target killings of innocent civilians, including women and children. However, rebel sources and security officials maintain that such killings are of a tit-for-tat nature that usually emerges when one side or the other violates the unwritten ground rules. It is understood that the killings of Muslim religious leaders is basically prohibited, no matter how close they might be to the separatists, as is the killing of innocent Buddhist monks, women and children.
Both the government and the separatists are saying it is the "spoilers" that are a growing problem - namely influential figures, crime syndicates, smugglers, drug traffickers and others who have an axe to grind with the authorities.
One way to weed out these spoilers is for the security officials and the BRN cadre to set up a clearinghouse.
Though both sides have acknowledged the benefits of having such a clearinghouse, they also admit that it is uncharted territory.
In the past, communication between local government officials and separatist militants had been channelled either through the combatants' parents or a trusted go-between, like a village imam. But that was on a case-by-case basis.
A clearinghouse, on the other hand, would comprise people from both sides who have a wider bird's-eye view of the conflict. The project would also require the blessing of top leaders from both sides before the forum progresses and evolves into something bigger and better. This could also mean more horse-trading.
The difficult part, it seems, is taking that first step. So far no interlocutor has been found. The ulema who have thought about taking up this role say they don't trust either side to keep their word. Besides, the situation is not conducive to such an initiative because there will still be people out there who disagree with this initiative and prefer to use the long-standing method - bullets - to settle old scores.
Don Pathan is a security analyst based in the South of Thailand. He is also member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).
The latest attack in Yala's Betong district, which the authorities believed would remain untouched, demonstrates that the separatists cannot be dismissed
Expect it to happen when you least expect it. This seemed to be the message the separatist militants had for Thai authorities when they launched a massive car-bomb attack in Yala's Betong district last Friday.Until this incident, which claimed three lives and inflicted injuries on more than 30 others, Betong had been untouched by the wave of insurgency that actually erupted in 2001 but wasn't officially recognised until January 4, 2004. Authorities woke up to it when, in 2004, militants raided an Army battalion and made off with more than 300 weapons. This was when the authorities could no longer dismiss the political underpinnings of the attack.
The Betong attack came seven months after the insurgents had effectively expanded their theatre of violence to include Songkhla's Sadao district. In December 2013 three bomb attacks had been carried out in Sadao in a single day - two police stations were hit by motorbike bomb and one car bomb was detonated in the heart of the Dan Nok red-light area.
But what was even more nerve-wracking for security officials was the twin-canister bomb, with a blast radius of 500 metres, which was discovered at the Phuket police station compound on that very day in December 2013. The bomb, hidden in a stolen pickup truck, was wired and ready to be set off, except the culprit had forgotten to turn on the switch to arm it. The idea was to demonstrate to the authorities what the insurgents are capable of, according to an exiled Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C) source.
If nothing else, the Sadao and Betong incidents sent a stern message to Thailand's security apparatus that the insurgents were expanding their violence into new territory and that they would continue to discredit the authorities and make the area as ungovernable as possible.
The two incidents also defied the long-standing conventional belief among Thai security officials that Sadao would be left undisturbed because it served as a transit route for insurgents leaving and entering Thailand through the Andaman Sea.
The same people also believed that Betong would be left untouched due to logistics. There is only one road that leads to this border town and there is hardly anywhere to run and hide.
The Betong attack, as well as the Sadao attack in December, essentially destroyed this argument as the insurgents have proved that they are capable of reaching beyond their traditional grid. Now, whether they can sustain their operation in these newly charted territories still remains to be seen.
Like the warning that preceded the simultaneous attacks on four petrol stations and 7-Eleven convenience stores in Pattani in late May, the Betong attack also had a warning of sorts to minimise casualties. This warning came in the form of a much smaller bomb.
Before the Pattani attacks, the culprit dashed for a waiting motorbike after parking a bomb-laden motorbike next to the station's fuel pump. Similar obvious moves were made at the convenience stores. And after 10 years of non-stop violence, residents know how to read these signs and make a run for it.
Yet, the insurgents' restraint is rarely publicised because the authorities make no differentiation among the victims, be they bystanders or directly targeted, since they prefer to demonise the separatists rather than put the conflict and the violence into proper perspective.
The separatists have shifted their theatre of violence from remote areas to urban and "high-profile" sites, thus making civilian casualties almost inevitable. Nevertheless, the issue of collateral damage continues to be a topic of debate within the movement.
The very fact that the BRN and insurgents are concerned about this issue is a positive sign, because it suggests that the benchmark for massive bomb attacks is not necessarily the body count but more the political statement aimed at discrediting the authorities.
The apparent restraint by the insurgents has also suggested that, despite the brutality, which the media often play up, there is room for compromise.
Of course there have been target killings of innocent civilians, including women and children. However, rebel sources and security officials maintain that such killings are of a tit-for-tat nature that usually emerges when one side or the other violates the unwritten ground rules. It is understood that the killings of Muslim religious leaders is basically prohibited, no matter how close they might be to the separatists, as is the killing of innocent Buddhist monks, women and children.
Both the government and the separatists are saying it is the "spoilers" that are a growing problem - namely influential figures, crime syndicates, smugglers, drug traffickers and others who have an axe to grind with the authorities.
One way to weed out these spoilers is for the security officials and the BRN cadre to set up a clearinghouse.
Though both sides have acknowledged the benefits of having such a clearinghouse, they also admit that it is uncharted territory.
In the past, communication between local government officials and separatist militants had been channelled either through the combatants' parents or a trusted go-between, like a village imam. But that was on a case-by-case basis.
A clearinghouse, on the other hand, would comprise people from both sides who have a wider bird's-eye view of the conflict. The project would also require the blessing of top leaders from both sides before the forum progresses and evolves into something bigger and better. This could also mean more horse-trading.
The difficult part, it seems, is taking that first step. So far no interlocutor has been found. The ulema who have thought about taking up this role say they don't trust either side to keep their word. Besides, the situation is not conducive to such an initiative because there will still be people out there who disagree with this initiative and prefer to use the long-standing method - bullets - to settle old scores.
Don Pathan is a security analyst based in the South of Thailand. He is also member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).
Friday, 6 June 2014
Coup or no coup, insurgency goes on in the deep South
Until Thailand achieves greater political stability, there's little hope for any peace initiative
The Nation
June 5, 2014
Nobody was surprised when one of the first things the Thai generals did after launching their coup was to remove the secretary-general of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), Thawee Sodsong, from his post.
Thawee was deemed too close to fugitive ex-premier Thaksin Shinawatra, the de facto leader of the Pheu Thai-led government ousted by the military. Thaksin had seen in Thawee an opportunity to heal the rift between the Thai state and the Malay Muslims of the southernmost provinces. Thawee was told to be generous and to give the Malays whatever they wanted. According to his supporters, it was Thaksin's way of showing gratitude to the Muslim world for giving him refuge after he went into exile.
No one is sure if Thaksin's supporters actually believe this rationale, especially as there is little indication that the United Arab Emirates and other Middle Eastern countries are remotely interested in the conflict in Thailand's deep South. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) did issue a statement of concern about the situation, but that's about it.
Thaksin's so-called generosity translated into cash handouts - to the families of those killed by Thai security forces, to innocent victims caught in the crossfire, and to those whose homes or property were damaged in insurgent attacks. It was also used to win favours from local residents and leaders deemed helpful to the government's cause of bringing peace to this restive region.
It's hard to measure the scale of Thawee's success, but he did establish good working relations with some civil-society organisations. Others chose to keep their distance, including youth activists and the Ulema Council of Fatoni - especially when Thawee became the centre of a Thaksin-initiated peace process facilitated by Kuala Lumpur and launched there on February 28, 2012.
Many locals detected good intentions in Thawee and they flocked to bid him farewell at his official residence in Yala. Others, especially those in the separatist community, took him to be playing a dangerous game, especially when the peace process quickly turned into a political circus as talks between the Thai delegation and a motley crew of self-proclaimed Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) leaders got underway.
Within days of the talks' launch in Kuala Lumpur, respected former separatist leader Wan Kadir Che Man arrived at the SBPAC office in Yala to give Thawee a lengthy scolding.
Wan Kadir was not a member of the BRN but he knew that the so-called rebels at the negotiating table did not represent the stance and the sentiment of the separatist movements, or have much clout with the combatants. Wan Kadir had been a leader of the now-defunct Bersatu, an umbrella organisation for the longstanding separatist movements.
He didn't see Malaysia as an honest broker and suggested that the talks should be directly between the separatists and the Thai government. And if there was a need for mediation, he preferred that a Western government take the role.
Hardly a day has passed since the February 28 launch without news of at least one violent incident in this historically contested region. But several months ago, the theatre of violence shifted beyond the rural areas to embrace towns and cities as the militant separatist stepped up their campaign to inflict psychological damage on the Thai state's security apparatus.
Thawee made a name for himself back in 2004 when he was sent by Bangkok to investigate the famous raid on an Army camp on January 4 of that year. Insurgents killed four soldiers on guard duty and made off with more than 300 military-grade weapons. Thaksin wanted to teach the militants a lesson and reckoned Thawee, then a police officer, could get things done.
Thawee swung into action, issuing a number of arrest warrants, including one for Sapae-ing Basor, the former principle of Thamvithya Mulnithi School in Yala, accusing him of being a separatist leader. Sapae-ing is a well-known spiritual leader in the region.
Eight years later when he was assigned to lead the SBPAC and then took charge of a peace process that was hatched by Thaksin himself, Thawee realised that he wasn't fighting a bunch of criminals, but that this was a "culture war" between the Thai state and the Malays of Patani. Realising that the separatists embraced an alternative historical narrative, Thawee believed that if he could gain the ear of a key spiritual leader, he might have a chance at peace.
Thawee toyed with the idea of dropping the charges against Sapae-ing, but there was no guarantee that the ageing spiritual leader was going to reciprocate.
Thai officials who read Sapae-ing's file said the allegations against him would not hold up in court, suggesting that the charges were politically motivated. But nobody had to the courage to see that justice was done. And so the charges against the one man many believe could have helped Bangkok's bid for peace with the insurgents remained intact.
With Thawee now out of the picture, the junta in Bangkok is working on putting together a new team, though the faces are familiar. Former SBPAC chief Panu Uthairat, a veteran in the region, has replaced Thawee, and will be part of the military-backed team of top bureaucrats tasked with overseeing the peace process in the deep South.
Panu will join with recently reinstated NSC chief Thawil Pliensri and his former deputy Somkiet Boonchu. Between 2005 and the time Yingluck came to power, both men were part of the NSC team involved in secret talks with one of the three main Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) groups headed by Sweden-based Kasturi Mahkota. The initiative, which was facilitated by a Geneva-based NGO, was ditched by the Yingluck government, which gave the mandate to Malaysia.
Military sources say the junta in Bangkok is still brainstorming over their next move for the deep South and has been meeting with experts and academics on what to do. And while the Thaksin-initiated peace process is pretty much dead, it does not necessary mean an end to Malaysia's role in future process, they say.
The extent of Malaysia's role has yet to be decided but sources in the BRN movement say they are annoyed at the lack of commitment from the Thai side, with each change of government bringing a new team for the deep South.
The absence of continuity is a direct result of political instability in the country. Until Thailand achieves greater political stability, separatist leaders say they don't have much hope for any peace initiative in the pipeline.
Don Pathan is a freelance consultant based in southern Thailand and a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).
Monday, 26 May 2014
Bomb attacks in Thai south 'challenge' to coup leaders
Sources in southern Muslim separatist movement tell Anadolu Agency that bomb attacks and gunfight show new junta what militants are still capable of
By Don Pathan
Anadolu Agency
PATTANI, Thailand
Bomb attacks and a sporadic gunfight between security forces and Malay Muslim separatists in Thailand's three southernmost provinces this weekend were a contemptuous gesture to a new Thai junta, which has this week seized power through a coup and placed the Muslim-majority region under an even tighter leash.
Sources in the separatist movement told The Anadolu Agency on Sunday that the simultaneous attacks, which claimed three lives and injured more than 60 people, were in the planning for some time.
Nevertheless, the sources underlined that the timing of the coup was an opportunity for them to show the junta what they are capable of in spite of strict measures imposed on a southern region that has already been living under controversial martial law and security acts for nearly a decade.
The sources -- who did not wish to be named out of matters of personal security -- are part of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), a long-standing armed separatist group that surfaced in the mid-1960s.
They told the AA that the attacks were a statement to the military forces that they will not let up on efforts to discredit their operations, and will make the area as ungovernable as possible.
More than 5,000 people have been killed in Thailand’s Muslim-majority southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and five Malay-speaking districts in Songkhla since the current wave of insurgency resurfaced in January 2004.
BRN said they are determined to reclaim their historical homeland in the three southernmost provinces.
In recent years the group has suggested that they are willing to enter into negotiation with the Thai government but has remained ambiguous on whether they are willing to settle for anything less than full independence.
Thailand announced in early 2013 that it had entered into peace talks with a faction of BRN, but a vast majority of the movement -- especially leaders with command-and-control over insurgents on the ground -- refused to go along with talks mediated by the Malaysian government.
Part of the reason, said the BRN sources and Thai officials speaking on condition of anonymity, was because the movement does not see Kuala Lumpur as an honest broker.
Moreover, the movement said it has yet to forgive Malaysian officials for secretly handing over to Thailand some of its leaders, some of whom are serving life in Thai prison on treason charges.
The Saturday evening explosions were mostly carried out in the city of Pattani, the historical capital of the Malay Muslim sultanates.
About a dozen power poles were brought down in the blasts, crippling power supplies and sending much of Pattani into darkness.
Many ATM's were also shut down due to the ensuing power shortage, and gas stations were forced to close for the day. Sporadic gunfights were heard in at least a couple of locations on the outskirts of Pattani.
Narong Sahamethapat, the permanent secretary for public health, was quoted by the Bangkok Post Sunday as saying that 51 of the injured had been released from hospitals and 22 were still being treated, including a two-year-old boy who was seriously wounded.
The Royal Thai Navy’s Adm Narong Pipattanasai reportedly ordered sailors and marines to go on high alert after a patrol boat anchored on Pattani River was hit by a grenade thrown by suspected insurgents.
"The explosion ripped a big hole in the side of the vessel and slightly injured three officers," Navy spokesman Rr Adm Kan Dee-ubon was quoted as saying by the Bangkok Post.
Colonel Banpote Poolpien, spokesman for the Fourth Army’s Internal Security Operation Command, the army-dominated multi-agencies that oversee the situation in Thailand’s deep South, told reporters that the military believes the Saturday night attacks were linked to the political turmoil in Bangkok.
Lt. General Walit Rojanaphakdi, commander of Army Region 4, however, ruled out blaming the attacks on the removal of Thawee Sodsong, the recently ousted secretary-general of the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SPBAC).
Thawee was the key figure behind the Malaysia-backed peace process that was formally launched in February 2012 by the recently ousted government of Yingluck Shinawatra.
His transfer put the already shaky Kuala Lumpur-backed peace process in jeopardy but sources in the Thai army said they are still interested in talking to the separatists, preferably without Malaysia’s participation. The army would like to keep the dialogue strictly between the combatants of both sides and without third party mediation or facilitation.
Sources in the BRN said they welcome the idea of a back channel communication to talk about various issues, such as rules of engagement, and to function as a sort of clearinghouse to verify which attacks are part of the conflict and which are criminal in nature.
Both sides said that taking the first step toward establishing such a channel will be very difficult because it requires taking a big leap of faith, but insisted that the Thai side is willing to do so.
BRN sources, on the other hand, said they are not in a hurry and wanted to make sure that the channel will not be a trap.
aa.com.tr/en
By Don Pathan
Anadolu Agency
PATTANI, Thailand
Bomb attacks and a sporadic gunfight between security forces and Malay Muslim separatists in Thailand's three southernmost provinces this weekend were a contemptuous gesture to a new Thai junta, which has this week seized power through a coup and placed the Muslim-majority region under an even tighter leash.
Sources in the separatist movement told The Anadolu Agency on Sunday that the simultaneous attacks, which claimed three lives and injured more than 60 people, were in the planning for some time.
Nevertheless, the sources underlined that the timing of the coup was an opportunity for them to show the junta what they are capable of in spite of strict measures imposed on a southern region that has already been living under controversial martial law and security acts for nearly a decade.
The sources -- who did not wish to be named out of matters of personal security -- are part of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), a long-standing armed separatist group that surfaced in the mid-1960s.
They told the AA that the attacks were a statement to the military forces that they will not let up on efforts to discredit their operations, and will make the area as ungovernable as possible.
More than 5,000 people have been killed in Thailand’s Muslim-majority southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and five Malay-speaking districts in Songkhla since the current wave of insurgency resurfaced in January 2004.
BRN said they are determined to reclaim their historical homeland in the three southernmost provinces.
In recent years the group has suggested that they are willing to enter into negotiation with the Thai government but has remained ambiguous on whether they are willing to settle for anything less than full independence.
Thailand announced in early 2013 that it had entered into peace talks with a faction of BRN, but a vast majority of the movement -- especially leaders with command-and-control over insurgents on the ground -- refused to go along with talks mediated by the Malaysian government.
Part of the reason, said the BRN sources and Thai officials speaking on condition of anonymity, was because the movement does not see Kuala Lumpur as an honest broker.
Moreover, the movement said it has yet to forgive Malaysian officials for secretly handing over to Thailand some of its leaders, some of whom are serving life in Thai prison on treason charges.
The Saturday evening explosions were mostly carried out in the city of Pattani, the historical capital of the Malay Muslim sultanates.
About a dozen power poles were brought down in the blasts, crippling power supplies and sending much of Pattani into darkness.
Many ATM's were also shut down due to the ensuing power shortage, and gas stations were forced to close for the day. Sporadic gunfights were heard in at least a couple of locations on the outskirts of Pattani.
Narong Sahamethapat, the permanent secretary for public health, was quoted by the Bangkok Post Sunday as saying that 51 of the injured had been released from hospitals and 22 were still being treated, including a two-year-old boy who was seriously wounded.
The Royal Thai Navy’s Adm Narong Pipattanasai reportedly ordered sailors and marines to go on high alert after a patrol boat anchored on Pattani River was hit by a grenade thrown by suspected insurgents.
"The explosion ripped a big hole in the side of the vessel and slightly injured three officers," Navy spokesman Rr Adm Kan Dee-ubon was quoted as saying by the Bangkok Post.
Colonel Banpote Poolpien, spokesman for the Fourth Army’s Internal Security Operation Command, the army-dominated multi-agencies that oversee the situation in Thailand’s deep South, told reporters that the military believes the Saturday night attacks were linked to the political turmoil in Bangkok.
Lt. General Walit Rojanaphakdi, commander of Army Region 4, however, ruled out blaming the attacks on the removal of Thawee Sodsong, the recently ousted secretary-general of the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SPBAC).
Thawee was the key figure behind the Malaysia-backed peace process that was formally launched in February 2012 by the recently ousted government of Yingluck Shinawatra.
His transfer put the already shaky Kuala Lumpur-backed peace process in jeopardy but sources in the Thai army said they are still interested in talking to the separatists, preferably without Malaysia’s participation. The army would like to keep the dialogue strictly between the combatants of both sides and without third party mediation or facilitation.
Sources in the BRN said they welcome the idea of a back channel communication to talk about various issues, such as rules of engagement, and to function as a sort of clearinghouse to verify which attacks are part of the conflict and which are criminal in nature.
Both sides said that taking the first step toward establishing such a channel will be very difficult because it requires taking a big leap of faith, but insisted that the Thai side is willing to do so.
BRN sources, on the other hand, said they are not in a hurry and wanted to make sure that the channel will not be a trap.
aa.com.tr/en
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