Beliefs shaken as theatre of violence widens in South

Don Pathan

Special to The Nation  

August 1, 2014 

Officials check out the rubble after the massive car bomb attack in Yala

The latest attack in Yala's Betong district, which the authorities believed would remain untouched, demonstrates that the separatists cannot be dismissed

Expect it to happen when you least expect it. This seemed to be the message the separatist militants had for Thai authorities when they launched a massive car-bomb attack in Yala's Betong district last Friday.

Until this incident, which claimed three lives and inflicted injuries on more than 30 others, Betong had been untouched by the wave of insurgency that actually erupted in 2001 but wasn't officially recognised until January 4, 2004. Authorities woke up to it when, in 2004, militants raided an Army battalion and made off with more than 300 weapons. This was when the authorities could no longer dismiss the political underpinnings of the attack.

The Betong attack came seven months after the insurgents had effectively expanded their theatre of violence to include Songkhla's Sadao district. In December 2013 three bomb attacks had been carried out in Sadao in a single day - two police stations were hit by motorbike bomb and one car bomb was detonated in the heart of the Dan Nok red-light area.

But what was even more nerve-wracking for security officials was the twin-canister bomb, with a blast radius of 500 metres, which was discovered at the Phuket police station compound on that very day in December 2013. The bomb, hidden in a stolen pickup truck, was wired and ready to be set off, except the culprit had forgotten to turn on the switch to arm it. The idea was to demonstrate to the authorities what the insurgents are capable of, according to an exiled Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C) source.

If nothing else, the Sadao and Betong incidents sent a stern message to Thailand's security apparatus that the insurgents were expanding their violence into new territory and that they would continue to discredit the authorities and make the area as ungovernable as possible.

The two incidents also defied the long-standing conventional belief among Thai security officials that Sadao would be left undisturbed because it served as a transit route for insurgents leaving and entering Thailand through the Andaman Sea.

The same people also believed that Betong would be left untouched due to logistics. There is only one road that leads to this border town and there is hardly anywhere to run and hide.

The Betong attack, as well as the Sadao attack in December, essentially destroyed this argument as the insurgents have proved that they are capable of reaching beyond their traditional grid. Now, whether they can sustain their operation in these newly charted territories still remains to be seen.

Like the warning that preceded the simultaneous attacks on four petrol stations and 7-Eleven convenience stores in Pattani in late May, the Betong attack also had a warning of sorts to minimise casualties. This warning came in the form of a much smaller bomb.

Before the Pattani attacks, the culprit dashed for a waiting motorbike after parking a bomb-laden motorbike next to the station's fuel pump. Similar obvious moves were made at the convenience stores. And after 10 years of non-stop violence, residents know how to read these signs and make a run for it.

Yet, the insurgents' restraint is rarely publicised because the authorities make no differentiation among the victims, be they bystanders or directly targeted, since they prefer to demonise the separatists rather than put the conflict and the violence into proper perspective.

The separatists have shifted their theatre of violence from remote areas to urban and "high-profile" sites, thus making civilian casualties almost inevitable. Nevertheless, the issue of collateral damage continues to be a topic of debate within the movement.

The very fact that the BRN and insurgents are concerned about this issue is a positive sign, because it suggests that the benchmark for massive bomb attacks is not necessarily the body count but more the political statement aimed at discrediting the authorities.

The apparent restraint by the insurgents has also suggested that, despite the brutality, which the media often play up, there is room for compromise.

Of course there have been target killings of innocent civilians, including women and children. However, rebel sources and security officials maintain that such killings are of a tit-for-tat nature that usually emerges when one side or the other violates the unwritten ground rules. It is understood that the killings of Muslim religious leaders is basically prohibited, no matter how close they might be to the separatists, as is the killing of innocent Buddhist monks, women and children.

Both the government and the separatists are saying it is the "spoilers" that are a growing problem - namely influential figures, crime syndicates, smugglers, drug traffickers and others who have an axe to grind with the authorities.

One way to weed out these spoilers is for the security officials and the BRN cadre to set up a clearinghouse.

Though both sides have acknowledged the benefits of having such a clearinghouse, they also admit that it is uncharted territory.

In the past, communication between local government officials and separatist militants had been channelled either through the combatants' parents or a trusted go-between, like a village imam. But that was on a case-by-case basis.

A clearinghouse, on the other hand, would comprise people from both sides who have a wider bird's-eye view of the conflict. The project would also require the blessing of top leaders from both sides before the forum progresses and evolves into something bigger and better. This could also mean more horse-trading.

The difficult part, it seems, is taking that first step. So far no interlocutor has been found. The ulema who have thought about taking up this role say they don't trust either side to keep their word. Besides, the situation is not conducive to such an initiative because there will still be people out there who disagree with this initiative and prefer to use the long-standing method - bullets - to settle old scores.

Don Pathan is a security analyst based in the South of Thailand. He is also member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).

Coup or no coup, insurgency goes on in the deep South

Until Thailand achieves greater political stability, there's little hope for any peace initiative

All change: Thawee Sodsong has been removed from his post as director of the Southern Border Provinces Administration, making way for a fresh, junta-initiated bid for peace in Thailand

Don Pathan
The Nation 
June 5, 2014

Nobody was surprised when one of the first things the Thai generals did after launching their coup was to remove the secretary-general of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), Thawee Sodsong, from his post.

Thawee was deemed too close to fugitive ex-premier Thaksin Shinawatra, the de facto leader of the Pheu Thai-led government ousted by the military. Thaksin had seen in Thawee an opportunity to heal the rift between the Thai state and the Malay Muslims of the southernmost provinces. Thawee was told to be generous and to give the Malays whatever they wanted. According to his supporters, it was Thaksin's way of showing gratitude to the Muslim world for giving him refuge after he went into exile.

No one is sure if Thaksin's supporters actually believe this rationale, especially as there is little indication that the United Arab Emirates and other Middle Eastern countries are remotely interested in the conflict in Thailand's deep South. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) did issue a statement of concern about the situation, but that's about it.

Thaksin's so-called generosity translated into cash handouts - to the families of those killed by Thai security forces, to innocent victims caught in the crossfire, and to those whose homes or property were damaged in insurgent attacks. It was also used to win favours from local residents and leaders deemed helpful to the government's cause of bringing peace to this restive region.

It's hard to measure the scale of Thawee's success, but he did establish good working relations with some civil-society organisations. Others chose to keep their distance, including youth activists and the Ulema Council of Fatoni - especially when Thawee became the centre of a Thaksin-initiated peace process facilitated by Kuala Lumpur and launched there on February 28, 2012.

Many locals detected good intentions in Thawee and they flocked to bid him farewell at his official residence in Yala. Others, especially those in the separatist community, took him to be playing a dangerous game, especially when the peace process quickly turned into a political circus as talks between the Thai delegation and a motley crew of self-proclaimed Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) leaders got underway.

Within days of the talks' launch in Kuala Lumpur, respected former separatist leader Wan Kadir Che Man arrived at the SBPAC office in Yala to give Thawee a lengthy scolding.

Wan Kadir was not a member of the BRN but he knew that the so-called rebels at the negotiating table did not represent the stance and the sentiment of the separatist movements, or have much clout with the combatants. Wan Kadir had been a leader of the now-defunct Bersatu, an umbrella organisation for the longstanding separatist movements.

He didn't see Malaysia as an honest broker and suggested that the talks should be directly between the separatists and the Thai government. And if there was a need for mediation, he preferred that a Western government take the role.

Hardly a day has passed since the February 28 launch without news of at least one violent incident in this historically contested region. But several months ago, the theatre of violence shifted beyond the rural areas to embrace towns and cities as the militant separatist stepped up their campaign to inflict psychological damage on the Thai state's security apparatus.

Thawee made a name for himself back in 2004 when he was sent by Bangkok to investigate the famous raid on an Army camp on January 4 of that year. Insurgents killed four soldiers on guard duty and made off with more than 300 military-grade weapons. Thaksin wanted to teach the militants a lesson and reckoned Thawee, then a police officer, could get things done.

Thawee swung into action, issuing a number of arrest warrants, including one for Sapae-ing Basor, the former principle of Thamvithya Mulnithi School in Yala, accusing him of being a separatist leader. Sapae-ing is a well-known spiritual leader in the region.

Eight years later when he was assigned to lead the SBPAC and then took charge of a peace process that was hatched by Thaksin himself, Thawee realised that he wasn't fighting a bunch of criminals, but that this was a "culture war" between the Thai state and the Malays of Patani. Realising that the separatists embraced an alternative historical narrative, Thawee believed that if he could gain the ear of a key spiritual leader, he might have a chance at peace.

Thawee toyed with the idea of dropping the charges against Sapae-ing, but there was no guarantee that the ageing spiritual leader was going to reciprocate.

Thai officials who read Sapae-ing's file said the allegations against him would not hold up in court, suggesting that the charges were politically motivated. But nobody had to the courage to see that justice was done. And so the charges against the one man many believe could have helped Bangkok's bid for peace with the insurgents remained intact.

With Thawee now out of the picture, the junta in Bangkok is working on putting together a new team, though the faces are familiar. Former SBPAC chief Panu Uthairat, a veteran in the region, has replaced Thawee, and will be part of the military-backed team of top bureaucrats tasked with overseeing the peace process in the deep South.

Panu will join with recently reinstated NSC chief Thawil Pliensri and his former deputy Somkiet Boonchu. Between 2005 and the time Yingluck came to power, both men were part of the NSC team involved in secret talks with one of the three main Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) groups headed by Sweden-based Kasturi Mahkota. The initiative, which was facilitated by a Geneva-based NGO, was ditched by the Yingluck government, which gave the mandate to Malaysia.

Military sources say the junta in Bangkok is still brainstorming over their next move for the deep South and has been meeting with experts and academics on what to do. And while the Thaksin-initiated peace process is pretty much dead, it does not necessary mean an end to Malaysia's role in future process, they say.

The extent of Malaysia's role has yet to be decided but sources in the BRN movement say they are annoyed at the lack of commitment from the Thai side, with each change of government bringing a new team for the deep South.

The absence of continuity is a direct result of political instability in the country. Until Thailand achieves greater political stability, separatist leaders say they don't have much hope for any peace initiative in the pipeline.

Don Pathan is a freelance consultant based in southern Thailand and a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).

Bomb attacks in Thai south 'challenge' to coup leaders

Sources in southern Muslim separatist movement tell Anadolu Agency that bomb attacks and gunfight show new junta what militants are still capable of

By Don Pathan
Anadolu Agency

PATTANI, Thailand

Bomb attacks and a sporadic gunfight between security forces and Malay Muslim separatists in Thailand's three southernmost provinces this weekend were a contemptuous gesture to a new Thai junta, which has this week seized power through a coup and placed the Muslim-majority region under an even tighter leash.

Sources in the separatist movement told The Anadolu Agency on Sunday that the simultaneous attacks, which claimed three lives and injured more than 60 people, were in the planning for some time.

Nevertheless, the sources underlined that the timing of the coup was an opportunity for them to show the junta what they are capable of in spite of strict measures imposed on a southern region that has already been living under controversial martial law and security acts for nearly a decade.

The sources -- who did not wish to be named out of matters of personal security -- are part of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), a long-standing armed separatist group that surfaced in the mid-1960s.

They told the AA that the attacks were a statement to the military forces that they will not let up on efforts to discredit their operations, and will make the area as ungovernable as possible.

More than 5,000 people have been killed in Thailand’s Muslim-majority southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and five Malay-speaking districts in Songkhla since the current wave of insurgency resurfaced in January 2004.

BRN said they are determined to reclaim their historical homeland in the three southernmost provinces.

In recent years the group has suggested that they are willing to enter into negotiation with the Thai government but has remained ambiguous on whether they are willing to settle for anything less than full independence.

Thailand announced in early 2013 that it had entered into peace talks with a faction of BRN, but a vast majority of the movement -- especially leaders with command-and-control over insurgents on the ground -- refused to go along with talks mediated by the Malaysian government.

Part of the reason, said the BRN sources and Thai officials speaking on condition of anonymity, was because the movement does not see Kuala Lumpur as an honest broker.

Moreover, the movement said it has yet to forgive Malaysian officials for secretly handing over to Thailand some of its leaders, some of whom are serving life in Thai prison on treason charges.

The Saturday evening explosions were mostly carried out in the city of Pattani, the historical capital of the Malay Muslim sultanates.

About a dozen power poles were brought down in the blasts, crippling power supplies and sending much of Pattani into darkness.

Many ATM's were also shut down due to the ensuing power shortage, and gas stations were forced to close for the day. Sporadic gunfights were heard in at least a couple of locations on the outskirts of Pattani.

Narong Sahamethapat, the permanent secretary for public health, was quoted by the Bangkok Post Sunday as saying that 51 of the injured had been released from hospitals and 22 were still being treated, including a two-year-old boy who was seriously wounded.

The Royal Thai Navy’s Adm Narong Pipattanasai reportedly ordered sailors and marines to go on high alert after a patrol boat anchored on Pattani River was hit by a grenade thrown by suspected insurgents.

"The explosion ripped a big hole in the side of the vessel and slightly injured three officers," Navy spokesman Rr Adm Kan Dee-ubon was quoted as saying by the Bangkok Post.

Colonel Banpote Poolpien, spokesman for the Fourth Army’s Internal Security Operation Command, the army-dominated multi-agencies that oversee the situation in Thailand’s deep South, told reporters that the military believes the Saturday night attacks were linked to the political turmoil in Bangkok.

Lt. General Walit Rojanaphakdi, commander of Army Region 4, however, ruled out blaming the attacks on the removal of Thawee Sodsong, the recently ousted secretary-general of the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SPBAC).

Thawee was the key figure behind the Malaysia-backed peace process that was formally launched in February 2012 by the recently ousted government of Yingluck Shinawatra.

His transfer put the already shaky Kuala Lumpur-backed peace process in jeopardy but sources in the Thai army said they are still interested in talking to the separatists, preferably without Malaysia’s participation. The army would like to keep the dialogue strictly between the combatants of both sides and without third party mediation or facilitation.

Sources in the BRN said they welcome the idea of a back channel communication to talk about various issues, such as rules of engagement, and to function as a sort of clearinghouse to verify which attacks are part of the conflict and which are criminal in nature.

Both sides said that taking the first step toward establishing such a channel will be very difficult because it requires taking a big leap of faith, but insisted that the Thai side is willing to do so.

BRN sources, on the other hand, said they are not in a hurry and wanted to make sure that the channel will not be a trap.

aa.com.tr/en

Map of violence could open a path to peace in deep South

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation 
May 24, 2014 

Both sides want to create a channel of communication to verify which attacks are insurgency-related and which are criminal

Mapping violence in Thailand's southernmost provinces, where a decade-old wave of insurgency has claimed more than 5,000 lives, is not easy, especially when there is no identifiable group claiming responsibility for the attacks and no neutral body to verify those claims. 

As a result, the two warring factions have been left to unilaterally observe unwritten ground rules: no direct attacks against civilians - though "unavoidable collateral damage" is "acceptable".

Meanwhile the security apparatus, and the pro-government death squads working for "rogue" units, are not supposed to target religious leaders and imams, no matter how close they are to local militant cells. Insurgents reciprocate by excluding Buddhist monks, temples and Chinese religious shrines, as well as public schools and teachers, from their hit list.

Not long after the current wave of insurgency went into full swing in January 2004, insurgents decapitated and castrated soldiers after gunning them down. The idea was to make a contemptuous gesture to the local commanders, nothing more.

Sources in the separatist movements said such acts were a far cry from the actions of South Asian or Middle Eastern jihadists, who often videotape the beheading-execution of their victims and post the clips on the Internet.

As for the insurgents in Thailand's Malay-speaking South, it took some time for the religious element within the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and other circles to convince the militants to end such practices. 

Ironic as it may seem, a nationalist conflict in Thailand's Malay-speaking South is citing Islamic rules of war to end the practice of decapitation and mutilation, while self-proclaimed holy warriors in South Asia and the Middle East have no qualms about beheading their enemies to make a political statement. 

The ground rules in Thailand's insurgency also extend to prohibiting arson attacks on public schools, the bastion of state-constructed narrative that local Malays dismissed as an assault on their historical and cultural identity. 

But because there is little unity among Thai security agencies, and the fact that the command-and-control on the BRN side is still somewhat fluid, while other longstanding separatist groups also have militants in the field, abiding by the ground rule is easier said than done.

Too often, emotion gets the better of combatants on both sides, generating a vicious cycle of tit-for-tat killings.

The attack in February this year on a family in Narathiwat's Bacho district that ended in the killing of three brothers by two Paramilitary Rangers is a case in point. Authorities insisted that the two Rangers had acted on their own, seeking revenge against a suspect who had entered into a plea bargain with the authorities in exchange for their dropping legal action against him. Authorities said the man whose three sons were killed was affiliated with a local insurgent cell and that he had ordered a hit on a Rangers' family member some time ago.

Neither Muslim residents nor the insurgents bought the explanation, refusing to believe that the two rangers had acted without permission from above. 

There were reports of a third assailant - a Buddhist member of the armed forces - but his identity was not revealed. According to government sources, the third attacker's identity had to be kept out of the public gaze because it would have raised unwanted questions and undermined the official line - that the killing of the boys was part of a blood feud between local Muslims and something the authorities had nothing to do with.

At about the same time, another series of tit-for-tat killings between Muslim residents and Muslim security officials was taking place in Yala's Bannang Sata. The killing spree escalated and the "collateral damage" spread as family members - parents, children and toddlers - from both sides were targeted. 

Insurgents hit back with a two-day bomb blitz in Yala, including a car bomb that started a fire that burned down an entire block of wooden shophouses in the heart of the city's busy business district.

They also extended the "warning" attacks to Hat Yai, an area that is supposed to be off-limits but is targeted as a pressure point whenever the insurgents deem that the Thai side has violated the ground rules. 

The last time insurgents hit Hat Yai was in March 30, 2012, two weeks after fugitive former premier Thaksin Shinawatra met with 16 separatist leaders in his attempt to kick-start a peace process. The same day also saw a triple car bomb in Yala's busy Ruammit Street that resulted in at least 13 deaths and more than 130 injuries. Both the Thai Army and the insurgents billed the attacks as a slap in the face for Thaksin. It was a way for the BRN and the insurgents affiliated with their movement to show their disapproval of his intervention. 

A similar spike in violence came later that year in November following the shooting death of a young and influential imam, Abdullateh Todir, in Yala's Yaha district, reportedly assassinated by a pro-government death squad. The "spike" - not so much in terms of the number of attacks but more their brutal nature and the fact that the targets were supposed to be off-limits - lasted for six weeks. Three Buddhist teachers were shot dead and three public schools torched during that period. A pro-government death squad hit back with a gangland-style shooting at a teashop full of Muslims on December 11, 2012 in Narathiwat's Rangae district, killing four, including an 11-month-old baby girl. 

One of the biggest concerns for security agencies is the possibility that the insurgency violence could be expanded to areas outside the Malay-speaking region. Hat Yai is technically off-limits, but an attack against the city signals a strategic violation of the ground rules by the insurgents. 

Phuket and Bangkok, on the other hand, are supposed to be totally off the radar screen. That psychological threshold was violated on December 22, 2013 when Phuket police discovered a massive bomb with a blast radius of 500 metres inside a stolen pickup truck parked inside the station's lot. The vehicle was stolen from Pattani's Sai Buri in May 2012, so how long it had been parked at the Phuket police station is anybody's guess.

Separatist sources said the bomb plot deliberately targeted Phuket. The idea, they said, was to send a stern warning to the authorities of what the movement is capable of. 

Bangkok's Ramkhamhaeng Soi 43/1 was hit in May 2013 by a Malay Muslim cell, but the official line is that the attack was part of a local dispute.

Meanwhile, Thai security forces are saying they want to set up a back channel of communication with the insurgents, especially those in direct contact with combatants, to function as a sort of clearing house to verify which attacks are part of the conflict and which are criminal in nature.

Sources in the BRN say they welcome the idea, as it could clear up misunderstandings over who is doing what. But if security forces are planning to use the channel to spread the same half-truths they dish out to the public, the BRN will not be interested in talking to them. 

Both warring sides say they are interested in seeing this back channel evolve into something bigger and better. But taking this first initial step won't be easy, as it requires each side to take a big leap of faith towards trust and confidence in the other. 

Don Pathan is a security and development consultant based in Yala. He is also a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).

Ten years on from Krue Se, but no closer to truth

Don Pathan

Special to The Nation

April 29, 2014
Yala, Thailand

Security officials investigate the site of an attack in Pattani

Thai security forces blamed 'drug-crazed Islamists' for the mosque stand-off that ended in slaughter; now they say family feuds are behind the latest wave of violence in the deep South

Ten years ago yesterday, more than 100 young men armed with little more than knives and machetes charged against 10 police outposts and one police station.

Believing they were protected by a mystical power that made them invincible, the men were charging towards almost-certain death.

These so-called insurgents were met with a hail of machinegun fire. Rules of engagement permitted state security officials to shoot to kill.

After attacking an outpost, one group of 32 retreated to the nearby historic Krue Se Mosque, where they took up a defensive position with the few weapons they had. They then commandeered the mosque's loudspeaker and called on Malay Muslims of the region to rise up against the invading Siamese forces and liberate their historic homeland.

In Songkhla's Saba Yoi district, 19 young men, part of the same network of "mystical-leaning" insurgents, were lined up and shot dead by the authorities at point-blank range, execution style. The 19 came from different schools but all played for a local football team.

Fearing that local residents would turn against the authorities, General Pallop Pinmanee, the highest-ranking officer at the Krue Se Mosque stand-off, called for an all-out bombardment before nightfall.

For security officials, the fact that well over 100 young men were willing to charge against machineguns was nothing less than disturbing. It was generally concluded that the incident was not a suicide mission but a suicidal one. After all, the insurgents had some form of weapons and they thought they were invincible.

The militants were dismissed by government officials as a bunch of drug-crazed youths who had embraced a defective strain of Islam and a distorted version of history. It was a line the Thai government continued to use for other insurgency-related incidents.

However, after the government declared in February last year that it was entering into peace talks with longstanding separatist groups, the official explanation for what's fuelling insurgency violence - drugs, militant Islam and false history - had to make way for a new one.

The new official line, which is just as unconvincing, blamed much of the killing on local family feuds - Muslims killing Muslims to settle old scores.

One recent case that comes to mind was the killing of three brothers, aged three, five and nine, in Narathiwat's Bacho district on February 3 this year by at least two Muslim men, both Paramilitary Rangers, who authorities said had acted on their own. The boys' parents were wounded but survived the incident.

According to various sources, there was a third assailant, a Buddhist security official, but his identity was kept secret as it would have contradicted the official line that the killings were part of a feud between local Muslims.

But authorities knew that their official version of events would carry little weight with the insurgents, who would be looking for retaliation over the death of the boys. Suspects had to be produced to contain the situation. But it took the authorities four weeks to present the suspects. For the insurgents, it was too little and too late.

Unsurprisingly, the killing of the three brothers sparked a spate of violence in the following days. Three Buddhist women were shot dead, their bodies set alight. A Buddhist monk and four lay people were also gunned down by suspected insurgents.

A hand-written left at the site of one attack read: "To the Commander of the Thai Army. This is not the last victim. [This killing is] for the three brothers."

And then came the shooting death of an elderly couple on February 23 in Yala's Bannang Sata district. The 15 or so assailants, some of whom were local Defence Volunteers, set fire to the couple's home, a pick-up truck, a car and a motorcycle.

Again, authorities trotted out the same line: That the incident was personal in nature and that the superiors of the Defence Volunteers involved had nothing to do with the attack.

Sources on the insurgents' side said there was some truth to the family-feud claim, but they dismissed outright the notion that all the attackers' superiors were clueless about events on February 23 in Bannang Sata, especially when the tit-for-tat killings had been going on for months.

Leaflets supposedly passed out by an insurgent cell identified Defence Volunteer Abdulhakim Darasae as the lead suspect for the February 23 attack.

On March 5, a Buddhist gardener was murdered in the district, presumably as part of insurgents' effort to discredit the security apparatus.

Things were pretty quiet for a few days, until on March 27 when gunmen snuck into the house of Marosidi Kachaladi, 42, in Bannang Sata, and shot him dead while he was sleeping. One local resident suspected that Marosidi was targeted because he was closely associated with the local security forces.

Then on April 2, a village chief and two female deputies were killed in an ambush. One of the deputies was beheaded.

Insurgents struck again on April 6 and 7 and this time they took the fight to the heart of Yala, unleashing four simultaneous explosions, including a car bomb that started a fire that gutted nearly an entire block of shophouses. One man, a Muslim, was killed in the explosion. The following morning, a warehouse just a few metres away from the main army camp was razed to the ground by an arson attack.

Ten days later, on April 17, the plague of violence in Bannang Sata continued when suspected insurgent Mukta Ali-mama was gunned down along with his six-year-old son. Grisly photos of the son's body were spread via the social media, prompting condemnation from local civil-society organisations from both ends of the political spectrum.

Two days later, on April 19, the parents of Abdulhakim, the Defence Volunteer allegedly behind the February 23 attack on the elderly couple, were gunned down along with their two-year-old niece.

Army Chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha ordered the recently appointed commander of the Fourth Army Area, Lt-General Walit Rojanapakdi, to visit Bannang Sata district, which he did on April 21. The visit was little more than a public relations exercise given the fact that the Army, or any Thai state agency, is not seen as an honest broker by many in the deep South. After all, local Malay Muslims and separatist militants don't believe that the "rogue" members of the Army's Paramilitary Rangers and the Ministry of Interior's Defence Volunteers acted without consent from higher-ups.

There has been talk of bringing the feuding clans in Bannang Sata to the table to negotiate a peaceful settlement. Some suspect that the suggestion could be an attempt to whitewash the authorities, as they are likely to pin everything on Abdulhakim in the same manner that the two Paramilitary Rangers "confessed" to the killings of the three boys in Bacho.

Face-to-face talks between the feuding clans may bring a much-needed pause in the ongoing tit-for-tat killings. But insurgent sources say it won't change the nature of the conflict between them and the state.

Don Pathan is a freelance consultant based in Yala. He is also a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).

Turkish officials trying to identify group found in Thailand

Source tells the Anadolu Agency that he suspects an unidentified group is Uighur Muslims from Xinjiang province in China.

Turkish officials are trying to identify a group found in Thailand.

Don Pathan
Anadolu Agency

HAT YAI, Thailand--Diplomats from the Turkish Embassy in Bangkok arrived at an immigration detention center in southern Thailand on Friday to identify 220 people who claim to be Turkish refugees and have expressed a desire to be relocated to the country.

 "I have been instructed to establish their identity. My findings will be passed to my headquarters. They don't have documentation, as far as I know,” Ahmet Akay, the deputy chief of mission from the Turkish Embassy in Bangkok, told the Anadolu Agency.  

Speaking to reporters immediately after a brief meeting with the refugees' leaders, Akay said they appeared to be speaking a dialect of a Turkic language and that they had expressed a desire to be relocated to Turkey.    

 When asked if the refugees were Turkish citizens, Akay said, “Ethnicity and citizenship are two different things. This is a humanitarian situation.”    

He said it was not up to the embassy in Bangkok to decide whether they would be permitted to relocate to Turkey or whether they would be classified as asylum seekers. 

The two diplomats will remain at the scene until Sunday to work with Thai officials to determine the identity of the 220 refugees -- 78 of whom are men, 60 are women, and 82 are children, mostly toddlers.    

 The group was discovered on Wednesday night, residing in a remote camp surrounded by a rubber plantation, and was immediately relocated to the detention center. 

Authorities initially tried to separate the women and children from the men to place them at a government-run Child Protection Centre, but the men refused to allow them to do so. 

The group then spent two nights in tents at the Immigration Detention Centre compound, which is situated less than two kilometers from the entrance to Hat Yai International Airport.  

During this time, authorities were unable to garner little information from them.

Police Major General Thatchai Pitaneelaboot, the chief of Thailand’s immigration bureau in the south, said the refugees would not provide any personal information, such as their country of origin, their nationality, or how they arrived in southern Thailand.    

 Only one person, a presumed leader of the group, would talk, and all he would say was that his people are “Turkish” and added that he would only talk to Turkish officials, Pitaneelaboot said.    

A group of local Thai Muslim females arrived at the detention Friday afternoon with halal food and to act as a go-between for the authorities by speaking Arabic, yet the refugees refused to provide any more information. 

A turning point came with the arrival of the Turkish diplomats and a self-proclaimed teacher, Erkin Ezizi, who flew from Ankara and arrived in southern Thailand on the same flight as the Turkish diplomats. 

The refugee men wept openly on seeing him. Some walked over and hugged Ezizi tightly as he appeared to comfort them with encouraging words. 

Ezizi was traveling on a Turkish passport, but a Thai translator said, judging from his dialect, he may have been an ethnic Uighur living in Turkey. 

Ezizi and the diplomats urged the refugees to cooperate with Thai immigration officials, who have expressed frustration over their inability to communicate with the refugees and the refugees' unwillingness to provide basic information about their country of origin, their immediate plans in southern Thailand, or how they arrived in the Southeast Asian country. 

Thai immigration officials also held a closed-door meeting with a Chinese official from the consulate in Songkhla province on Friday morning, but the diplomat did not meet with the refugees or speak to the press. 

“The Chinese diplomat just wanted our briefings and informed us that they stand by to provide any assistance should we request it,” Police Major General Thatchai said. 

Thatchai said he suspected that the refugees are part of a human trafficking network that works with local “agents.” 

“Rohingya refugees (from Burma) have come through this region, and lately, more Bangladeshi have been arriving on our shores. This is the first of such a group, of this scale, who appeared to have originated from Central Asia,” Thatchai said.

He added that Thailand has a porous border with many entry points, especially along the coastal areas, making it easy for people to enter.   

In what appeared to be a related incident, Malaysian border officials have detained 62 self-proclaimed “Turks” suspected of entering Malaysia illegally on its northern border with Thailand. They were spotted on the Thai-Malaysian border fence at about 5:30am on Thursday.  

Authorities have yet to establish if the 220 “Turks” in southern Thailand were from the same human trafficking network. 

Senior Thai government officials told the Anadolu Agency on Friday that they are aware that the entire world is watching and that they have to be careful about how they handle this issue. 

A source working in an environment connected to the livelihood of refugees told the Anadolu Agency on Thursday that he suspected that the unidentified group of Muslims is Uyghur from Xinjiang province in western China. 

“If it is established that they are Uighur from Xinjiang, it could be a diplomatic headache if the Chinese government decides to pressure Thailand and ask for their deportation,” the man, who did not wish to be named for reasons of confidentiality, said.

Malaysia came under strong criticism from human rights organizations in December 2013 when officials deported six Uyghur.    

Similarly, in December 2009, Cambodia, despite objections from the United States and the United Nations, deported 20 ethnic Uyghur minority back to China. 

The deportation came at the height of communal violence between ethnic Han Chinese and the local Uyghur in the Chinese province of Xinjiang. Nearly 200 people, mostly Han Chinese, were killed during the riot. 

The Uyghur people are a Turkic-speaking ethnic minority group who have accused the Chinese of government of human rights violations and discrimination against them. 

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Deep South talks: a fresh attempt to revive the corpse

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

February 27, 2014 

Government negotiators are about to claim "progress"; in reality this is a sham process that refuses to include the real powers behind the insurgency

Last year on February 28, the Thai government announced it was entering peace talks with the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C) to seek a political solution to the conflict in the southernmost provinces.

Representing the BRN-C was Hasan Taib, the designated "liaison". Malaysia's former intelligence chief, Dato Ahmad Zamzamin Hashim, was appointed as facilitator by the Malaysian government.

The public face for the Thais was National Security Council (NSC) chief Lt Gen Paradon Pattanatabut, and by his side was the head of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre, Pol Colonel Thawee Sodsong. Both men are extremely close to the Pheu Thai Party and its de facto leader, Thaksin Shinawatra.

Among Thai officials and some casual observers there is a longstanding belief that Malaysia has been backing separatist movements in the deep South.

They believed that with Kuala Lumpur on board the dialogue process, peace and political settlement was inevitable.

But the people who embrace this notion never bothered to ask whether the exiled separatist leaders and the Kuala Lumpur government had patched up differences that date back as far as 1997, when Malaysian officials handed over number of senior separatist leaders to their Thai counterparts. At the time, Malaysia wanted to show Thailand it was a friend, but the damage stemming from the handover has haunted Malaysia ever since.

The insurgents, or "juwae", operating in the South, wasted no time in displaying their disapproval of the Kuala Lumpur-backed initiative. Within 24 hours of the official launch of talks on February 28, 2013, juwae unleashed a bomb attack in the heart of Patani just metres away from the city's iconic clock tower. Since than, hardly a day has gone by without an insurgency-related attack in the contested region.

This is hardly surprising, given that the February 28 initiative did not have the blessing of the BRN-C's inner circle. Thawee and Paradon like to claim that Hasan is a part of that circle, but sources and operatives in the movement insist otherwise.

Instead, the movement "used" Hasan to make demands, knowing that the Thais would never agree. The idea was to test the water. And Team Thailand danced to their tune.

Tired of being kicked around like a football between the BRN, Malaysian authorities and the Thai negotiating team, Hasan threw in the towel and has been incommunicado since December last year.

Talking to Malay-Muslim separatist leaders is nothing new for Thai officials, of course. Back in the 1980s, the task went to mid-ranking army officers, who treated the dialogue as more of a news-gathering exercise for the top brass.

In 2006 the Thai NSC was brought into the picture, and then-prime minister Surayud Chulanont gave the green light for a Geneva-based NGO to facilitate talks.

The so-called Geneva Process brought together the Thai NSC and one of the three Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) factions, under the leadership of Kasturi Mahkota. NSC deputy secretary-general Somkiet Boonchoo was named Thailand's point-man in the negotiations.

Then, shortly after Yingluck came into power, the Geneva Process was scrapped and Malaysia was brought in to mediate the process.

Somkiet and his NSC chief at the time, Thawil Pliensri, were moved to inactive posts. Thawil kicked up a fuss about the transfer but Yingluck couldn't care less. She and her brother Thaksin were more concerned with loyalty, and they put their trust in Thawee and Paradon.

Not only did Thaksin conjure up the idea of bringing Malaysia to the peace process, he thought that if he played a more direct role he would add legitimacy to the process. Thaksin met with a group of 16 exiled separatist leaders in March, 2012, in Kuala Lumpur, asking them to close the book on this conflict.

Those who took Thaksin's bait were dismissed as 'opportunists", while the core insurgents, namely the BRN inner circle and the operatives, were labelled as "hardliners".

BRN leaders refuse to recognise Kuala Lumpur as an honest broker and have yet to forgive the Malaysians for the secret handovers.

Insurgent operatives also showed their disapproval of Thaksin's initiative by launching a triple car bomb attack on March 30, 2012, in the heart of Yala two weeks after he met with the 16 exiled leaders. A major hotel in downtown Hat Yai was also hit. In all, the attacks killed at least 13 people and injured more than 100.

But Thaksin, his political cronies and Malaysia decided to overlooked the warning and went ahead with the Kuala Lumpur-backed initiative in February last year.

Local politicians under the Pheu Thai Party's wing did the leg work to pave the way for a process that BRN leaders said had more to do with whitewashing Thaksin for his questionable handling of the conflict than getting to the bottom of the historical grievances between the Malays of Patani and the Thai state.

Kasturi's faction was kept out of the process while a rival Pulo faction, under the leadership of Noor Abdulrahman (also known as Abae Kamae), was given a seat at the table.

The snub for Kasturi's faction was understandable given that the Geneva Process wouldn't permit Kuala Lumpur to join their initiative. A deal was cut in October last year to give Kasturi's Pulo faction a seat at the table. Details about the trade-off were not disclosed but government sources said it centred on rules of engagement.

The Army, needless to say, never liked the idea of having civilians running a peace process. And so late last year, the Army sponsored three trips for Wan Kadir Che Man, former leader of the now defunct Bersatu, an umbrella group for the longstanding separatist movements, to speak in Thailand.

Wan Kadir, a well-known exiled separatist leader, has long been critical of using Malaysia as facilitator or mediator for talks. He didn't mince words in lashing out at the current peace process. He wasn't too keen on the Geneva Process either, and suggested that the Thai government and the separatist leaders should meet face to face. And if there was need for a mediator, Wan Kadir suggested that Western governments with a long record of humanitarian actions should be in the frame, not NGOs.

While the Yingluck government has paid lip-service to a political solution for the conflict, the Thai team working on the current initiative is an ad hoc group that hardly inspires confidence. There is no secretariat and team members have regular day jobs to attend to, only coming together a day before any meeting with Hasan.

From the beginning, their immediate goal has been to get Hasan to convince the core BRN leadership and the juwae to reduce the number of attacks in the South. They needed something tangible to show their political bosses and the public that they are moving in the right direction.

But when it became clear that the BRN-C and juwae were not going to play along, Hasan decided to thrown in the towel and go into hiding last December.

Ironically, the political crises and street protests in Bangkok have given everyone in the deep South talks breathing space. Team Thaksin and Zamzamin went back to the drawing board. This week Zamzamin is expected to announce the "progress" on the process, like securing the participation of the third Pulo faction, led by Samsudine Khan, as well as that of the Barisan Islam Pembangunan Pattani (BIPP). There is also talk of permitting other separatist groups and local NGOs into the process.

BRN sources are reportedly unimpressed with this numbers game. They say they look at Bangkok and see a big mess, and as a result there is no way they are going to believe anything that comes out of Thawee's or Paradon's mouth.

Moreover, regardless of how many NGOs or separatist groups take part in the next round of talks, without the blessing of the core BRN leaders and the juwae, any attempt to salvage this sinking boat of a peace process will be met with the insurgents' wrath.