Battle is on for hearts and minds in the South

Govt walking a fine line between security and sensitivity

Don Pathan
The Nation

Last August a team of police officers headed by then Pattani police chief Colonel Manit Rattanawin marched confidently into Ban Banna village to arrest a suspect believed to have been behind a spate of killings of security officials in Thailand's deep South over the previous year.

A team of journalists was permitted to come along to videotape and photograph what Manit thought would be a simple surrender by a suspected Muslim separatist.

The photo-op that developed turned out to be rather different than the one the journalists had expected. Instead of surrendering, Mahama Mae-roh, a former Army rifleman, grabbed his assault rifle and ran into a nearby house. He positioned himself, took aim, and fired, killing Manit, another senior police officer, and a sergeant.

Ten minutes later a team of reinforcements arrived and within half an hour Mahama was killed.

Intelligence sources said the information on Mahama's whereabouts had come from his associate, Manase Jeh-da, also known as Nasae Saning, who was nabbed in Malaysia's Terengganu State and quietly handed over to Thai officials just days before the shooting in Ban Banna. Manase, on Thailand's wanted list for years, had a Bt200,000 bounty on his head.

On the same day Manase, having mysteriously escaped custody, was shot dead by police in Pattani's Nong Chik district, some 28 kilometers from Ban Banna.

In the following days, subsequent sweeps through the region netted two more associates of the dead Muslim separatists.

This display of swift and deadly justice did little to comfort the local Muslim community, who still remember the heavy-handed tactics of previous decades when Thai security forces used questionable means to take down local Muslim separatist groups such as Barisan Revolusi Nasional and the Pattani United Liberation Organisation.

National media reported the harsh words of Manase's wife and other family members, who claimed Manase was the victim of extra-judicial killing. They pointed to the bruises on his wrists and other parts of his body, saying he had been beaten before he was shot dead in what they believed was an evening of the score.

Authorities described both Mahama and Manase as operation chiefs of the Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Movement, known in the Bahasa Malaysia language as Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP).

GMIP has been on the radar screen of security agencies in the deep South since the mid-1990s but authorities generally dismissed them as bandits involved in extortion and killings.

But last Sunday, when a group of about 60 armed men stormed an Army base in Narathiwat, killing four soldiers on guard duty and making off with some 300 weapons, Thailand's political leaders realized they could no longer deny the GMIP's ideological influence.

The GMIP has been singled out as the main group behind the attack, which came as a slap in the face to the country's political and military elite, who had repeatedly dismissed any suggestion that a Muslim insurgency might be brewing in the South.

The attack made a mockery of the "ordinary bandit" label that political leaders had placed on those behind the violence in the region.

Many officials here dismissed outright the age-old "dirty business" theory that attackers steal weapons only so they can sell them to Malaysian or Indonesian insurgents to make money. It would have been far less risky for the GMIP to go to the Cambodian border, like the Burmese rebel groups do, to buy their weapons, local officials said.

What impressed many military commanders and observers of the South was the tactical competence of the assault.

Traps were set up on the roads to prevent troops from going after the attackers and both relay poles for wireless telephone communications in the area were taken out.

Security officials on the ground have said for years, albeit quietly, that the GMIP is more than just a bunch of "ordinary bandits", or "jone kra-jok" in Thai.

Security officers admitted that the GMIP is as well known for its criminal ambitions as for its religious convictions, but said the group has conveniently found a new "political context" in the global Jihadi movement, which arose in the early 1990s in the aftermath of the war against the Russians in Afghanistan.

Though GMIP leader Nasori Saesaeng – also known as Ae Wae Keleh after his home village of Keleh in Bachoh district of Narathiwat – may not have fought against the Russians troops, he did gain a wealth of experience when he went there in the early 1990s to take part in the civil war.

Which Afghan factions or warlords he fought under remains unclear but sources believe that his experiences in the war-torn country inspired him to return to southern Thailand to carry out insurgencies.

It has been reported that while in Afghanistan, Nasori befriended Nik Adli Nik Aziz, the son of the spiritual leader of Parti Islam se-Malaysia, a Malaysian opposition party with a stronghold in the northern part of the country bordering Thailand.

Thai intelligence sources said Nik Adli, who has been detained since late 2001 under Malaysia's draconian Internal Security Act, maintained close relations with Nasori after the two returned to their respective countries from Afghanistan. The two men helped set up an organization on their respective sides of the border – the underground Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia as well as the GMIP.

Since the attack against the Army battalion last Sunday, the government has submitted a list of names, most of them suspected GMIP members, to Malaysia requesting their arrest.

It is not certain to what extent the Malaysian authorities will stick their necks out for Thailand, said one Army intelligence source, saying Kuala Lumpur wants to be extremely certain of the consequences of its actions before it moves.

Nevertheless, in Thailand, the admission by political leaders of the existence of a home-grown separatist group has brought some relief to officials because it permits them to speak more openly about the problem and deal with it accordingly.

However, they insist that the heavy-handed tactics of the previous decade are a thing of the past. The catchphrase, for the time being, is how to "win the hearts and minds of the local Muslim community".

"In the old days they used to go after family members of the separatists to put a squeeze on them," said one local politician who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Today, military and police officers on the ground have been told to be extremely careful when dealing with suspects who are community or religious leaders. This may explain why those who have been brought in by the authorities are merely being "detained" and not formally charged with any crime.

Regardless, many officials acknowledge that there is a lot of hard work ahead of them. Corruption and interagency rivalries, along with the inability of state agencies to deal with the cultural and economic gap between the South and the rest of the country, have obstructed the process of healing between the predominantly Muslim region and the central government.

One senior security official said today's insurgents have split into small cells, many of which have penetrated local communities. This makes it extremely difficult for authorities to take the organizations down, he said.

Moreover, resentment and hard feelings between the local population and government officials have again resurfaced following the declaration of martial law in the three southernmost provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani, and the imposition of curfews has drawn a strong reaction from the communities here.

Heavy-handed methods may be a thing of the past, but winning the hearts and minds of the local Muslim population, it seems, remains as difficult as ever. 

Shan State Army kicks the habit but gets little respect

Don Pathan

Special to The Nation

Myanmar's notorious narco-army is reinventing itself in the name of peace, but the govt isn't listening

Back when Shan drug baron Khun Sa reigned over the notorious Golden Triangle, there was nothing pretentious about the narcotics business in this lawless region where opium warlords play for keeps.Opium, they said, was as good as gold. Some of the local residents were even using it in place of the official currency.Today, groups like the Shan State Army (SSA), which once fought alongside Khun Sa for Shan independence, are working hard to reinvent themselves as drug-free armed ethnic outfits with their own counter-narcotic policies.The opportunity to assert their anti-drugs campaigns came after the Myanmar government decided to push for a series of political reforms and renegotiate a ceasefire deal with the armed ethnic armies, including the SSA.Opium eradication and crop substitution became common ground on which the two sides could work together to strengthen confidence and trust.

But that process has been far from easy. The government has other priorities during this transition period and cooperating with Shan rebels is not high on the list.The SSA feels it has been shunned, but the ill-feeling is not enough to turn back the clock to when the two sides were at each other’s throats on the battlefield.Opium has always been a part of Myanmar’s longstanding insurgencies.For the numerous armed ethnic armies fighting the Burmese military for autonomy or independence during Khun Sa’s time, opium was main the source of income.

Residents in Thailand’s northern border provinces, as well as the ethnic Shan and other anti-Burmese junta forces, didn’t mind if men like Khun Sa were producing and trafficking opium and heroin if it was in a good cause.In January 1996, following a relentless assault from combined forces of the Burmese and troops from the United Wa State Army (UWSA) – dubbed the world’s largest armed drug-trafficking outfit – Khun Sa decided to surrender in exchange for amnesty.Certain factions in Khun Sa’s Mong Tai Army (MTA), like the one led by warlord Maha Ja, joined peace talks in exchange for limited self rule.

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Others, like Colonel Yawd Serk, relocated his troops near the Thai border to set up the Shan State Army-South and continue the fight against the government.Yawd Serk’s decision not to join the Burmese junta served the Thai military quite well. Burma and Thailand at the time were engaged in a quiet proxy war fought via ethnic armies.This explains why rebel forces fighting the Burmese junta were not considered a threat to Thailand. On the other hand, those with a ceasefire agreement with Rangoon, were considered a threat by Bangkok.Khun Sa’s MTA was slightly different because the outfit was not under “Myanmar’s legal fold” but was not exactly a Thai lackey either.And so when his MTA fell apart, Yawd Serk’s SSA had to turn to Thailand to ensure that his security and economic lifeline remained intact.As part of their effort to shake off the ghost of Khun Sa, the SSA pushed through an anti-narcotics campaign with drug-burning ceremonies to attract the attention of foreign and local media.

The UWSA, the world’s largest producer of heroin, was not exactly public-relations savvy, but nevertheless tried to convince the world that it, too, wanted to kick the habit.In late 2004 the Wa leadership said they were planning to announce an end to opium cultivation in exchange for formal recognition from the Burmese government and the world community.

But in January 2005, a New York court indicted eight Wa leaders, some of whom, like the notorious Wei brothers and the Bao brothers, had already been convicted on heroin trafficking charges in the US.Chinese security officials had hush-hush working relations with the Wa and were hoping that an “opium-free” UWSA would make their dealings with the Wa leaders easier. 

Nevertheless, ties between the UWSA and the Chinese authorities are as strong as ever.Wa officials often joke about how disappointed Burmese officials are when they visit the UWSA base, Panghsang, and find “it feels like a Chinese town”. From the cellphone signal to the currency and language, the Wa-controlled area in Burma’s Shan State is very much an extension of China.The UWSA wanted a better relationship with Thailand. Much of Khun Sa’s territory along the Thai border was occupied by Wa troops who began to build towns and small cities and pack them with villagers the UWSA had forcibly relocated from the Chinese border.

Many of these villagers died along the way, according to a report by Chiang Mai-based Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN), but the end result was the strengthening of UWSA regiments along the Thai border.It has not been a comfortable stay for the UWSA troops. Gunfights occasionally break out between the Wa and Thai troops. Just about every border crossing leading to the Wa stronghold has been shut.As for the SSA, the changing nature of its relationship with the Myanmar government has given it another chance to show the world it is serious about kicking the habit. But going “cold turkey” has been a rough ride.

The SSA’s political wing, the Restoration Council of the Shan State (RCSS), in October 2012 entered into a joint pilot project to eradicate drugs with the UN and the Thein Sein government. This past week, the group issued a statement accusing the Myanmar government of dragging its feet over the project.“The experience of the RCSS in attempting to carry out the joint drug eradication project indicates that the agreement is only on paper and the government has no intention of cooperating on drug eradication,” said the RCSS, adding that the “government’s failure to adhere to its agreement is affecting trust-building in the peace process”.

The very fact that the SSA is urging the government to get moving on the project shows how things have changed in the region.The SSA may want to turn Shan State into a drug-free area, but the reality on the ground shows it faces a long and tough road. According to a recently released annual United Nations report, opium production in Myanmar has risen 26 per cent since 2012. 

This year marked the seventh consecutive year poppy cultivation has increased in the country. Some 870 tonnes of opium was produced this year, the largest amount since 2002.Until there is a meaningful political and economic alternative for the area, opium production, it seems, will continue to form a large part of the locals’ livelihood.Don Pathan is a freelance consultant and an independent security analyst based in Thailand.

https://www.nationthailand.com/opinion/30223306

Tocsins for Thaksin and His War on Drugs

Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra declared his controversial war on drugs a victory. But the battle may have just begun. 

Don Pathan
The Irrawaddy

Just when he thought he was flying high, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was quickly brought back down to earth when former Thai Third Army Commander Gen Wattanachai Chaimuangwong insisted that the war on drugs is far from over. 

On the very day that Thaksin boldly declared the war on drugs a victory, Wattanachai quickly pointed out that millions of methamphetamine pills, known locally as yaa baa, are sitting on the Thai-Burmese border awaiting transport into the kingdom. 

Another setback for the poised Prime Minister came two days later. In his annual birthday speech, His Majesty the King raised the question of accountability regarding the deaths of some 2,500 suspected drug dealers. The government had claimed that all but 30 of the deaths were merely a matter of "bad guys killing bad guys." 

The King called on the government to investigate these deaths and explain them to the Thai people as well as to the international community, including the European Union and the United States. 

Throughout both phases of the heavy-handed campaign, which officially began on Feb 1, human rights groups and members of the international community, including the EU and the US, have raised concerns over the extrajudicial killings. 

Observers said that Thai-US relations could be at risk because of America’s Leahy Amendment, which prohibits the US government from giving aid to any foreign agency responsible for gross violations of human rights, including extrajudicial killings. 

Should the amendment become law, it could very well damage the cozy relationship between the two countries, especially in the area of counterterrorism. The passing of the amendment may also effect Thailand’s decision to join the US-led war in Iraq, where about 450 Thai troops are helping coalition forces rebuild the country. Another tocsin for Thaksin came just days ago, when Narumi Yamada, senior program management officer for the UN Office of Drug and Crime, said that the rise of amphetamine-type substances (ATS) in Southeast Asia could become the world’s most severe drug problem. 

"The region faces the threats of ATS, which has turned into an alarming epidemic in Southeast Asia, drawing younger consumers, offering large profit margins," Yamada said. 

"Whilst law enforcement alone cannot control this menace," she told the gathering, held annually to exchange ideas with law enforcement agencies, "law enforcement agencies have an undoubtedly critical and indispensable role to play—and urgently." 

According to figures released before the war on drugs, Thailand was the world’s largest per capita consumer of methamphetamines, with five percent of its 63 million people thought to be users. The war was aimed primarily at the amphetamines flooding into Thailand from the Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle, where drug warlords and their armies operate with impunity. 

The current administration believes the war was won. But the key factors that have enabled the illicit industry to prosper for decades remain intact. Many see the campaign as a calculated effort to please voters, who are tired of seeing drugs in playgrounds and on the streets. 

Indeed the level of public frustration over the drug problem resulted in overwhelming support for Thaksin’s harsh measures, while issues such as transparency, accountability and due process went by the wayside. Observers say that there has been a clear psychological impact on the illicit drug industry in Thailand, but that it’s just a matter of time before the industry recuperates. 

Chinese business associates of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), a 20,000-strong pro-Rangoon outfit considered by the US government to be the world’s largest armed drug trafficking group, said Thaksin’s campaign caused a drop in methamphetamine orders coming from Thai dealers during the height of the killing spree in the first stage of the campaign. Despite the slowdown, Wa commanders and other Golden Triangle drug lords are still in business. 

Though income from drugs still accounts for a sizeable portion of their income, they have begun to diversify. In their respective domains, as well as on the Chinese side of the border, the drug lords have invested in fisheries, hotels, casinos and telecommunications. Regarding supply, the chemicals needed to produce methamphetamines are still plentiful and readily available. 

Traffickers take advantage of the porous border linking Laos and Burma with China, where these chemicals are legally produced. Under the second stage of Thaksin’s war, the government was supposed to pursue big-time distributors and their political backers. US authorities reportedly provided Thai officials with a list of Thai nationals allegedly involved in drug trafficking.

And the Thaksin government claimed to have a blacklist of its own. But judging from the growing number of shoot-outs between drug caravans intercepted by Thai soldiers as they cross from Thailand into Burma, the war’s psychological effect may be waning. 

Over the past three years, Thaksin has twice witnessed strains in Thai-Burmese relations. The border between the two countries erupted in February 2001, as both sides traded shells and rockets following disputes over territorial rights. And in May of last year, the Thai Army crossed what they considered to be an un-demarcated border area and then destroyed scores of labs belonging to the Wa and other drug armies. Recriminations came from the top brass of both countries as a result. 

Since then Thaksin has worked hard to mend ties with Rangoon. His strategy is to push trade with Burma in the hope that the country’s drug-infested northeast frontier would say no to drugs if the area was more developed. But so far he has not demanded that trade be linked to improved narcotics suppression by Rangoon. 

Meanwhile old Burma hands believe that the drug war is doomed to fail without an adequate political settlement between the military junta and the ethnic nationalities, some of whom have signed ceasefire agreements but remain armed. Until a settlement is reached, they say, Thaksin’s "victory" will only be a temporary one. 

Don Pathan is a journalist based in Bangkok.

Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) Special 4-part series

Part I: Bangkok plays terror cards close to its chest 

The Nation
July 29, 2003

More than a month after Thailand announced the arrest of four suspected members of the militant Islamist organisation Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), it's still wait-and-see as to which direction the government will take Thailand in the war against global terrorism.

The authorities insist they have enough evidence to convict the four suspects and that the crackdown was the result of a lengthy investigation. Yet they continue to play their cards close to their chests, keeping everybody guessing about what kind of evidence they have against these men. There have been growing calls for a clearer picture of what Thailand is really up against.

At the same time, there is growing pressure from Thailand's Muslim community, with calls on the government to provide the evidence against the four suspects.

The community sees the arrest of the four suspects as a direct challenge against them and a big dent to national reconciliation between the Muslim region and the predominantly Buddhist state.

Reactions to the arrests from local media and the public have been mixed, with conspiracy theories and vicious accusations making headlines in some local dailies.

There were allegations that Thaksin was selling Thailand out to Singapore, which in turn is accused of being an American vassal. Singapore supplied Thailand with information that led to the arrest of the four suspects.

It has even been suggested that the arrests were an attempt to keep Southeast Asia's Muslim community on its knees because the US sees Malaysia as an economic threat. One writer pointed to Malaysian cell-phone companies making headway in Iran as if American companies were lining up to invest there.

Such arguments overlook the fact that many Muslim countries, like Malaysia - a verbose critic of Washington - Indonesia, Pakistan and Persian Gulf states, were rounding up terrorist suspects in their respective territories years before Thailand jumped on the boat.

The Southeast Asia-based terrorist organisation is seeking to carve out an Islamic state stretching from southern Thailand through Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and several islands of the Philippines.

Some local officials have even suggested that if we continue to turn a blind eye to possible terrorist activities, everything will turn out okay.

Nevertheless, Thailand's decision to join the war on terror was welcomed by the US as well as other Asian countries.

Many said the decision made a lot of sense because international cooperation was the only way to go. But other observers have questioned whether Thai intelligence agencies - who don't have a strong tradition of cooperation, even among themselves - are not in over their heads.

Some said Thaksin had done the right thing by admitting that Thailand was just as vulnerable as any other country in the region. The fact that the announcement came on the eve of his meeting with US President George W Bush, however, raised the question of whether the prime minister was doing the right thing for wrong reasons.

Political agendas aside, Thailand's decision to commit itself in this war did not come out of a vacuum. Soon after the Bali attack that killed more then 200 people, Singapore and Malaysia launched an all out hunt for al-Qaeda and JI operatives on their soil.

Scores of suspected terrorists rushed across the border into Thailand, while others fled to Indonesia. The archipelago is the world's fourth most-populous country and an ideal place to lie low.

Thailand received warning that some suspected terrorists could flee into the country, but unsure of what to do, the government decided to stick to the old familiar line, insisting Thailand was safe and that no terrorist cells were operating here.

At stake was the country's massive tourism industry that serves as the nation's economic engine. About 10 million visitors come to Thailand annually.

Thaksin stubbornly clung on to his position, dismissing the claims that terrorist cells might be operating in Thailand as "ridiculous" and fabricated by "crazy people".

But in spite of the lack of guidance and a clear mandate from the top, Thai security agencies were not taking any chances. The consequences would have been too costly if the allegations were proven true. Besides, said one senior intelligence officer, it was a just matter of time before the government had to come clean.

So the agencies began to exchange lists of names with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. The end result was a rough sketch of the movements of suspected operatives and a pattern of their cash flow.

Two names that emerged from these lists were Mas Selamat Kastari and Arifin bin Ali, also known as John Wong and Ah Hung, both Singaporean nationals.

Kastari, an alleged JI operations chief who authorities said had masterminded a foiled plan in 2001 to hijack an aircraft and crash it into Singapore's Changi Airport, was reported to have entered Thailand with Ali nearly two years ago.

Alleged JI operative Arifin bin Ali was arrested in Bangkok last May following a tip-off from the Singaporean authorities, while Kastari was nabbed in February in Indonesia.

Thai police say Ali was working with the four arrested Thai nationals, planning a series of attacks on foreign embassies.

Kastari, on the other hand, admitted recently at the Indonesian trial of alleged JI spiritual leader Abu Bakar Bashir that he and Riduan Isamuddin, an al-Qaeda point man in the region known as Hambali, had made plans to blow up a US naval facility in Singapore.

Thaksin accused Kastari of planning bomb attacks to coincide with the upcoming Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in October.

Thailand's deputy police chief, General Sunthorn Saikwan was reported as saying that Ali was also linked to an alleged terror cell in Cambodia where two Thai nationals and one Egyptian teaching at an Islamic school near Phnom Penh were arrested last month.

So for the time being it's still wait and see. Security officials said the recent arrests in Thailand and Cambodia were a sign of more to come. Some even admit that they may be in over their heads and that a major overhaul of national security policies and mandates is needed in order to work effectively in dismantling terrorist cells in the country.

On the other hand, it remains to be seen whether the officials can live up to the commitments of political leaders in this country and the region.

This is the first part of a four-part series on Jemaah Islamiyah in Thailand and its long-term implications. 

Part II: Thailand joins the global war on terrorism

The Nation
July 30, 2003

The announcement of the arrest on June 10 of the three Thai nationals accused of being members of the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist organisation amounted to a declaration of war on global terrorism by the Thai government.

It came as a big surprise to many, given the fact that Thailand has consistently dismissed mounting reports in the local and international media linking the country to global terrorism.

A closer look into the issues amid lengthy investigations by Thai and regional authorities shows the threat of terrorism in the country is very real. Like it or not, because of its proximity, Thailand can not conveniently exclude itself from the Southeast Asia terrorism theatre.

In extensive interviews with The Nation, both senior police at the Special Branch and Army generals went as far as saying JI operations in Thailand might include front companies and other commercial outlets to facilitate the transfer of money and coordinate terrorist activities, including the purchase of weapons and explosives.

"The JI group has operated in Thailand for years," said an army general.

They said Thailand's denial throughout the past year had been tactical and necessary. Given the importance of tourist money to Thailand's economic well-being, it was not timely to admit that there were regional terrorists inside the country.

Thai leaders including Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra knew the negative consequences, so they stood firm, insisting that Thailand was not a safe haven for international terrorists, following exposure in a string of Western media.

The decision to arrest the first three suspected JI members, Dr Waemahad Waedaoh, Maisuru Hajiabdulloh and Muyahid Hajiabdulloh in Narathiwat was swift, according to the general, who asked for anonymity. 

It was part of a comprehensive anti-terrorism strategy known as "Burn". "We want to strike at them first, by burning them," he explained. The arrests were to jolt the terrorist networks in Thailand, including whatever plans they might have in mind. The Thai intelligence services, with assistance from their counterparts in Singapore, believed that several ploys to harm Western interests as well those of their own countries at home had been foiled.

According to Singaporean intelligence cited by Thai officials, Thailand is part of the four mantiqis, or regional divisions, with Abu Bakar Bashir as the spiritual head. 

Malaysia, Southern Thailand, Burma and Singapore belong to Mantiqis No 1, while Mantiqis No 2 includes Java and Sumatra and the rest of Indonesia except Sulawesi, Kalimantan and Papua. Mantiqis No 3 covers Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Sabah, Sarawak, Brunei and the southern Philippines. Australia and Papua belong to Mantiqis No 4.

Mantiqis No 1 has at least eight branches or wakalahs. Southern Thailand, centred on Narathiwat, is in Wakalah No 7.

Thai intelligence units began to look into global terrorism as far back as late 2000 when US intelligence agencies asked them to investigate three companies - Al Jallil Trading Ltr Co Ltd, Al Amanah Enterprise Co Ltd and Sidco Co Ltd - thought to have links with Osama bin Laden. These three companies were subsequently closed down, according to a police source who did not elaborate.

Some admitted that it was like working with their hands tied behind their backs, saying the absence of a political mandate had raised the question of whether the government was willing to change tack if there was enough evidence to suggest it should.

For two years, with limited resources and the absence of a political commitment, government law-enforcement agencies more or less took it upon themselves to look into matters. The two main Thai agencies mandated with international terrorism responsibilities are the National Intelligence Agency and the National Security Centre. Besides them there are commando units set up to respond to situations on a case-by-case basis.

Apart from the absence of a full mandate, Thailand also lacks the proper legal infrastructure to assist these agencies in carrying out their duties when it comes to investigating bank transactions among suspected individuals and other forms of financial transaction.

Zachary Abuza, a terrorist expert from Simmons College in Boston, said that the porous borders between Thailand and its neighbours made the country an attractive destination for terrorists to come in and out, set up front companies and transfer funds to desired destinations.

A leading Indonesia-based researcher on terrorism in Southeast Asia, Sydney Jones, pointed out that based on interviews with suspected terrorist members in Indonesian custody, many of these suspects had visited Thailand and sought refuge there in times of trouble.

Top JI leaders such as Ali Ghufron, also known as Muchlas, have lain low in Thailand's deep South for some time and made friends with sympathetic mullahs, or tok kuru, in the predominantly Muslim region, said Jones, who works for the Brussels-based International Crisis Group.

For decades, Thailand has been a prime destination for many dissident groups from many parts of the region. Burmese, Tamils, Khmer, Laos, Vietnamese, ethnic Indians and Chinese have all established units in Thailand to carry out operations against regimes in their homelands. 

Many kept a very low profile for fear that their presence would force the Thai government to clamp down on them. However, following the arrest in Cambodia on May 28 of the first three suspects and that of Abdulazi Hajicheming and Mohamad Yalarudin Mading, both Thai religious teachers, the Thai intelligence services have kept a watch on Thai-Muslim students who have graduated in Middle Eastern countries.

According to a Foreign Ministry source, at least 5,000 Thai students have graduated in Muslim countries - Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Syria, Sudan, Yemen, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Half these students finished their education in Saudi Arabia.

Thailand's concern was well reflected by Defence Minister General Thamarak Israngkura's comment that 10 per cent of the scholarship students from Thailand who studied in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt had been recruited to extremist Islamic organisations. His comment upset these countries' embassies, and they are reviewing whether to suspend scholarships to Thai-Muslims. 

Dr Arong Suthasarana, director of World Islamic Studies at Chulalongkorn University, dismissed the comment, saying that these scholarship students were serious and wanted only to study religion. "It has caused a lot of misunderstanding among Thai Muslims," he said. 

Thailand has hundreds of pondoks, or religious schools, where these young Thai graduates from the Middle East teach. For example, at the Burana Tohnor religious school, where the Hajiabdulloh pair were apprehended, most of the 21 religious teachers graduated from Middle Eastern countries such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya and Lebanon. They all speak Arabic fluently.

Part III: Suspects squeezed out to Thailand

The Nation
July 31, 2003

At the start of the crackdown on Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members in Malaysia and Singapore about 18 months ago, Thai authorities were warned that terrorist suspects might flee to the country.

While the country's political leaders were taking their usual wishy-washy approach as to what kind of stance Thailand should take on the matter, its security agencies went to work.

Security analysts say that like other criminal activities, terrorist organisations such as JI are subject to the so-called "balloon" effect - whereby as authorities put the squeeze on one area, another area of the same organisation, or balloon, enlarges.

So, under this kind of pressure from the authorities it would have been natural for suspects in Malaysia and Singapore to flee elsewhere. And Thailand, it seems, became a convenient destination. 

The government appears to have come to terms with the fact that foreign terrorist cells have established themselves on Thai soil. 

Early on, Thai intelligence officers began to exchange names with their counterparts in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. 

The end result is a list of some 400 names and a money trail linking these cells to those in Cambodia and other countries, including Saudi Arabia.

For Thailand, one name stands out - Arifin bin Ali, popularly known as John Wong Ah Hung. 

This Singaporean citizen of Chinese extraction converted to Islam and married a Thai. 

The time of his recruitment into JI is not known but Thai officials say there are records of him coming in and out of the country going back three years.

Arifin was arrested in May in Bangkok and deported to Singapore. But the arrest was made several months after a tip-off by the Singaporean government. A Thai intelligence officer defended this apparent time delay, telling The Nation that Bangkok wanted to be certain before taking Arifin down.

Thai officials say that Arifin is cooperating with the Singaporean authorities and that the information he has provided has so far led to the arrests of six Thai nationals and an Egyptian.

Four of the six - Maisuri Haji Abdulloh and his son Muyahi, who were both teachers at an Islamic school, Waemahdi Waedao, a medical doctor, and Samarn Waekaji, a suspected JI bomb-maker who turned himself in - were arrested in southern Thailand.

The other two Thai nationals and the Egyptian were arrested at an Islamic school on the outskirts of the Cambodian capital Phnom Penh, where they were teaching.

These three Muslims, who are currently being detained in a Cambodian prison, met Waemahdi on at least seven occasions, according to Thai police.

Somchai Niraphaijit, the lawyer representing the four arrested in Thailand, said the man who introduced his clients to Arifin goes by the name Suhaimee, whose whereabouts are not known.

Some believe Suhaimee, who is said to have owned a restaurant in the Pratunam area of Bangkok, is still at large, while others say he is being kept at a "safe house" by one of the country's security agencies. Investigators have called him the missing link.

It is understood that Suhaimee was the "money man" in charge of transferring and receiving money to and from other cells through a tour company that he had been using as a front.

Somchai, for the time being, is likely to continue to play the obvious cards, demanding that police either charge his clients or set them free. 

He is also likely to play up the due-process angle, pointing out that police can make a maximum of seven requests to the court for permission to detain the suspects further.

And each time, the court can only order that the suspects be held for 12 days. If there are no formal charges against the suspects, the court is obliged to set them free

Part IV: War on terrorism begs legal footing

The Nation
Aug 01, 2003

Thailand's declaration of war on terrorism has not only placed the country's international standing but also its legal system under the spotlight.

While it is clear that the decision to join the global war against terrorism was partly a political one, questions remain as to whether the nation has the will to make the necessary changes in its legal infrastructure.

The debate over the extent to which Thailand should comply with the pace and direction of the international community in an all-out war against terrorism began shortly after the September 11 attacks against the United States.

However, it was generally agreed that the threat of intentional terrorism was a distant issue.

Thailand has no enemies, officials said. And while other countries in Southeast Asia were waging war on extremists, Thailand chose to put the matter on the back burner.

But with the recent arrests of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) suspects in the south, as well as the cracking of a cell in Cambodia that led to the arrests of two Thai Muslims and an Egyptian, Thailand was pushed to the frontline, along with Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.

In formulating its own anti-terrorism law, Thailand has adopted the India-sponsored Draft of [a] Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.

Today, government whips are rushing to get the draft anti-terrorism bill through the Cabinet and on to Parliament.

However, the proposed law has attracted a great deal of criticism from humanitarian organisations that fear it would give law-enforcement agencies a free hand to wield their power in other areas.

Others are afraid that a legal definition of terrorism could have implications for members of separatist organisations, the so-called freedom fighters.

Charan Dithaapichai, a National Human Rights commissioner, said he is afraid that due process of law could be overlooked in implementing the anti-terrorism act.

His concern reflects the popular feeling that the country's police force has not been a source of comfort.

The defence lawyer for the Thai JI suspects was quick to point to the police handling of a Singaporean JI suspect, Arifin bin Ali, who was arrested in May and immediately deported to the island-state. He argued that the police had charged Arifin with a simple immigration violation in order to avoid the legal process that could have exposed the weakness of the case.

Police insiders admitted that documents were written to say that Arifin had violated immigration regulations.

But with the government's current popular support, few foresee any real obstacle. It appears that Arifin bin Ali's lawyer has scant reason to hope he will get his client released on a technicality.

Members of the Muslim community have expressed their concerns and doubts over the allegations, but generally, the public mood is supportive of the government. Many people are looking for a quick fix to a number of nagging social and security issues, be they terrorism, narcotics or corruption.

But security analysts say the intelligence community may be in over its head in this war against terror.

The mode of operation in many intelligence units is to keep their information to themselves and simply give other agencies and politicians "chicken feed".

According to one intelligence officer, this attitude prevails because of the lack of trust among the agencies. 

In other words, it will take much more than political will to make the necessary adjustments. Without cooperation among all the security forces concerned, Thailand could be biting off more than it can chew.

(This is the final article of a four-part series that began on Tuesday.)

THE FALL OF A WARLORD

Wa commander - and Thai 'mole' - Wei Sai-tang's jailing by the UWSA offers a rare glimpse inside the narco-army's power structure 

Don Pathan
The Nation

The recent sentencing of Wa commander Wei Sai-tang to 75 years in jail for a number of offences has puzzled senior Thai Army and narcotic officers. 

Wei, 35, was officially convicted by the United Wa State Army (UWSA) for, among other things, printing fake Burmese kyat notes, a currency that is not highly sought after either inside or outside Burma 

The real reason behind Wei's fall, said Thai and Wa sources, appears to be his alleged dealings with the Thai Army. 

UWSA Chairman Bao Yuxiang (Pathan - 2003)

The commander had turned rogue, viewing himself as the leader of a breakaway faction, they said. 

A closer look at Wei's story provides a glimpse into the UWSA's secret power structure. It also lends support to reports that the 20,000-strong organisation is split between two chief players: Chairman Bao Yu-xiang in the north and notorious opium warlord Wei Hsueh-kang, who commands the Wa's Division 171 in the south, near the Thai border. 

For commander Wei, the desire to cut a deal with Thailand was inviting. It could have provided him with much-needed economic and logistic links through Thailand and ensured his future in a terrain shaped by decades of opium politics and insurgency. 

The UWSA has been accused by Thai authorities of flooding the country with methamphetamine pills and some of the world's best heroin. 

With Wei, their UWSA "mole" ousted, the Thai Army must now seek new options. 

There have been a couple of consultations with the Chinese military to tackle the UWSA but so far, there has been no sign of a breakthrough. 

In recent years, the UWSA has positioned some 10,000 troops along the Thai border, and forcibly relocated nearly 100,000 villagers from its traditional stronghold along the Chinese border to areas along the Thai border. 

The Thai Army insists on taking a hard line on the UWSA. But the Thaksin government, keen on mending fences with Rangoon, has opted for promoting a crop substitution programme in conjunction with the Burmese government in a Wa-controlled area adjacent to Chiang Rai. 

A senior officer at the Office of the Narcotics Control Board, said his agency might be able to cool down the conflict if the UWSA was willing to cooperate to curb narcotics. 

But the Wa have proved a tough nut to crack. 

For local and international drug agents, Wei's conviction effectively puts his rival, Wei Hsueh-kang, the most notorious heroin kingpin in the Golden Triangle, in a very comfortable position. 

The kingpin and his two brothers came to the region decades ago to seek their fortune. Intelligence sources say he has investments in Bangkok, Hong Kong and Shanghai. 

Thaksin had vowed to hunt down the drug lord "dead or alive". 

Wei Hsueh-kang has also been convicted in the United States and Thailand on charges of heroin trafficking and there is a US$2 million (Bt83 million) bounty on his head. 

Rumours that he was detained in the outskirts of Panghsang have been dismissed by both Wa and Thai intelligence officials. Given his stature and power, they said, it was unlikely he would surrender without a fight. 

A Wa insider said that although there may be "complications" between the northern command under Chairman Bao and the drug lord and his brothers both sides now needed each other's support more then ever. 

If the UWSA continued on its present course and expands its turf from the Chinese border to Thailand, it was unlikely that the two Wa regions would split any time soon. 

In an interview with The Nation from his headquarter in Panghsang late last year, Bao dismissed Thai claims that UWSA presence along the Thai border was a security threat. 

Bao and dep Wa leader Li Zuru in northern Wa region

Bao insisted that the effort was part of the UWSA's opium eradication programme. 

Old Burma hands, meanwhile, see the expansion as a strategic move, saying it made a lot of sense as it gave the UWSA two outlets - China and Thailand. 

Complicating the issue, however, was a move by Rangoon to position one of its units right in the middle between the two Wa regions. 

The UWSA's border presence continues to be a thorn in Thai-Burma relations. 

Armed clashes between Thai units and Wa militia from Wei Hsueh-kang's outfit flare up almost every month. On a couple of occasions, they have escalated into full-scale battles and drawn Burmese troops into the fray. 

In Panghsang, Bao continues to work hard to win the hearts and minds of the international community. He receives visiting foreign diplomats on a regular basis and encourages the United Nations and other international agencies to help him with crop substitution and development projects in the opium area. 

Bao has downplayed the drug charges against drug lord Wei as Thailand's problem, saying it was the authorities' own fault for letting him escape from a Thai prison in the first place. 

The Rangoon government has said a military move against the Wa is out of the question. 

The chairman knows quite well what kind of political liability drug lord Wei poses to the UWSA, said a Wa source. But what choice, he asked, does he have? 

Any attempt to take him down could drive a wedge between the northern and the southern Wa regions, and destroy the UWSA itself. 

Thaksin Shuffles his Hand

The military and cabinet reshuffles have all but assured Thaksin’s hold on domestic politics. Now, he has his sights set on grander goals. 

By Don Pathan
The Irrawaddy

Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra must have had some sleepless nights leading up to the bureaucratic shakeup. Given the outbreak of public criticism and mudslinging prior to the annual military reshuffle and the nagging from politicians looking to secure seats in the new cabinet lineup, the political pressure would have taken its toll on the PM. 

But with his overwhelming public mandate, a secure Parliamentary majority, and the hype surrounding his populist policies, there could be nothing left to stop the PM and his trusted lieutenants from selecting "the right man for the right job". Unscathed from his previous political imbroglios, Thaksin has learned that he has what it takes to squeak by and still come out on top. 

Although Thaksin maintains that he did his best regarding the new cabinet lineup and denies any interference with the annual military reshuffle, his power nevertheless seems more consolidated than ever before. And now that his relatives and close allies have assumed key military and government positions, everything should be smooth sailing from here on out—or so he hopes. 

For the past 20 months, Thaksin’s camp has swooped in on various government offices, removing and transferring a number of top posts in the Bank of Thailand, the Stock Exchange of Thailand and other state-owned enterprises like Krung Thai Bank. Moving in on the military’s turf, however, is a different story altogether. The men in uniform traditionally see themselves in a different light than other bureaucrats—as the defenders of national sovereignty. So when a here today, gone tomorrow politician comes barking orders, the top brass understandably takes offense. 

Unlike the previous administration, Thaksin and his men do not consider themselves fly-by-night officeholders. Judging from their track record over the previous 20 months, they are here to stay, and the military will have to get used to it—like it or not. After all, this is an administration elected to office with an unprecedented public mandate. In August, more than two months before the military reshuffle, Thaksin took the previously unimaginable step into a domain where past premiers had dared not stray too far. He handpicked the new army commander-in-chief, Somdhat Attanand, with the understanding that Somdhat would work with the outgoing Gen Surayud Chulanont to assemble the new military lineup. Initially, it seemed like a good idea on the surface. But in reality, it became a "big mess", to use the words of former Defense Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. 

As defense minister, Chavalit is entitled to his say in allocating military positions. But the deputy premier also knows that the political tides are turning against him. The challenge was to draw up a list that all sides would find satisfactory. But considering the high level of political interference and the number of hands in the cookie jar, it would have been impossible not to create any bitterness. 

The military posed the final barrier in this administration’s quest to consolidate its grip on the bureaucracy. The stakes were too high to leave the reshuffle in the hands of Gen Surayud, a man who has never seen eye-to-eye with the premier about Burma. Historically, politicians and the top brass have had to walk a fine line during reshuffles and bureaucratic appointments. The rule of thumb was that politicians were not supposed to do anything that would alienate the armed forces with their selections. On the other hand, military leaders were expected to stand firm while simultaneously presenting themselves as reasonable sorts who could negotiate and compromise with political leaders. This time around, however, the military has accepted the fact that civilian politicians, with the people’s indisputable mandate behind them, are now their superiors. For the men in uniform, this is a bitter pill to swallow. 

The decision to kick the widely respected Gen Surayud upstairs to the ceremonial post of armed forces supreme commander has raised a number of eyebrows. Another "promotion", genuinely a case of career advancement in this instance, is the appointment of the premier’s cousin, Gen Chaisit Shinawatra, to the post of assistant commander of the army. This places him in the top-five of the army hierarchy and makes him a likely candidate for the commander-in-chief post next year when Gen Somdhat, along with Gen Surayud, steps down at the mandatory retirement age of 60. Gen Surayud is seen by many as a professional soldier who helped exorcise the ghosts from the army’s May 1992 killing of unarmed protestors, and who restored public trust in Thailand’s armed forces.

His firm stance against Burma’s military build-up along their shared border, and his swift responses to repeated incursions by pro-Rangoon ethnic armies have earned him, as well as the armed forces, tremendous public support. But now, with Surayud out of the way, and Chavalit slowly fading from view, the spotlight has shifted to Foreign Minister Surakiart Sathirathai, the PM’s trusted aid. The decision to leave Burma in the hands of Surakiart irks Chavalit, who considers himself a "brother" of the junta. He took pride in his unique brand of defense diplomacy and often boasted of how it would save Thai-Burmese relations. In fact, a great deal of his political life has been devoted to Burma and Burma-related issues, so it was no surprise when he could no longer hold back his sarcastic remarks about the government handing Burma over to Surakiart. Criticizing the planned luncheon between the Thai and Burmese cabinets scheduled while the border remained closed, Chavalit quipped, "I accept the fact that we are friends…but that doesn’t mean we have to take orders from them." 

Surakiart will have big shoes to fill as he carries out the daunting task of patching things up with the junta, who never falter in keeping one step ahead of the Thais. Too bad for Surakiart. The Thai Foreign Ministry, unlike the armed forces, has never been regarded as a source of comfort for the Thai people. Thus, no matter what spin he puts on things, Surakiart faces an uphill battle trying to convince the public that his dealings with Burma are in the best interest of a people whose opinions are already fixed about the Burmese junta’s moral rectitude. 

As the tumult over these hectic rounds of military and Cabinet reshuffles dies down, and the new team settles in to their posts before embarking on a bureaucratic joy ride, the premier will again find some breathing space. Critics and political cartoonists have already had their turn taking jabs at the new lineup. While all the huffing and puffing from those who lost their seats have vented most of their steam. And now that the key people have been placed in their respective positions, political insiders say that Thaksin is turning his attention to bigger and better things. Thaksin, they say, wants to be seen as a regional leader; recognized as an exemplary statesman in the same light as Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamed and Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew. And with Mahathir stepping down next year and Lee gradually sliding out of the picture as Singapore’s third generation of leaders takes over, Thaksin regards himself as the man to take center stage as leader of the region. 

Thaksin and his men have placed much hope and hype on the Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), presenting this forum as the launching pad from which Thaksin could achieve international stardom. But the informal gathering of Asian ministers has been billed merely as an expensive talk-fest lacking in direction, purpose, and political commitment. 

For the political commentators, journalists, and other Bangkok-based diplomats covering the event, the ACD became a sad joke. While nobody doubts Thaksin’s determination to become an international statesman, the people in Thaksin’s camp recognize that the reputations of Lee and Mahathir, like Rome, were not built in a day. Regardless of how much energy they spend trying to turn the telecom tycoon into a statesman of stature, Thaksin’s supporters know well that he is ultimately going to have to earn his reputation the old-fashioned way. There are no shortcuts to international stardom. If his handling of crises on an international scale—from the terrorist attacks against the US to the waxing and waning of Thai-Burmese bilateral ties—over the past 20 months is any indication, Thaksin’s quest to be recognized as an exemplary international statesman will not be smooth sailing at all.

https://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=2757&page=1

How a policeman dodged bullets in broad daylight

Don Pathan
The Nation

SUNGAI PADI, Narathiwat

Staff Sergeant Marohsae Moohanan has no problem going to bed at night but admits the pictures in his head still haunt him every now and then.

"They were within my vision. I could see them take the bullets," said the 33-year-old Pattani native who spent 11 years on the force. "We couldn't make out where the bullets were coming from."

For five minutes, Marohsae's life hung by a thread, and he did not know whether he was going to make it or not. Two of his colleagues were knocked down in the blink of an eye when three men sprayed them with AK47 automatic rifles as they were carrying out a routine assignment.

It was a sunny afternoon when the four officers, doubling up on two motorbikes, were on their way to a nearby school to provide a security escort for a group of schoolteachers on their way to their quarters. The officers at Sungai Padi police station have been doing this for the past year since the discovery of the bullet-riddled body of a teacher from a nearby district.

It was supposed to be a routine assignment, but it turned out to be one of the most haunting experiences of his life, Marohsae admits. "I emptied half of the magazine in my automatic rifle. We were about 30 to 40 metres away from them," he said.

Outnumbered and outgunned, Marohsae yelled at his partner to retreat until reinforcements arrived. But by then, the gunmen were gone and about 80 empty metal jackets were scattered along the small dirt road in the midst of a highly wooded area.

"This is the first time I have ever experienced anything like this," the officer admitted. "It's too bad. They were good guys," Marohsae said of his dead colleagues.

The local community echoed the sentiments, saying the two young officers had no enemies and that they don't understand why anybody would want to kill them.

The death of Marohsae's fellow officers is part of a spate of violence that has not only rocked the predominantly Muslim community in the country's deep South but also made a mockery of the nation's leadership in Bangkok who appear at a loss about what to do.

Since December last year, 21 police officers have been shot dead by automatic rifle fire, and not a soul has been brought to justice. Police chief Pol General Sant Saruthanond thinks the killings are the work of some influential figures who are determined to create a situation of instability so that they can continue to demand protection money from developers and businessmen in the region.

Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, ruling out suggestions that Muslim separatists were behind the attacks, says the illicit activities may involve government officials as well. He also admits more work has to be done to bring the local community and government officials closer together.

Local residents and analysts say decades of heavy-handed tactics by the country's security apparatus, bent on weeding out separatists, still lingers in the minds of many Muslims.

During a recent visit to the region to meet with community and religious leaders, Sant boasted of a new government strategy that would guarantee all the security agencies - civilians, Army and police - pool their intelligence information. He admitted that in the past, intelligence tended to remain with the respective agencies but vowed that things would change from now on.

Still, the feeling on the ground does not reflect the optimism of political leaders, while morale is still low in spite of the 1,500 flak jackets passed out to officers by Sant himself. The jackets, locally made, are designed to stop .22 calibre and 44 magnum bullets - but all of the 21 dead policemen were shot with automatic rifles.

Officers manning checkpoints along the roads in remote areas opt for nearby bushes rather than stand behind their official sandbags, saying they were sitting ducks just waiting to be shot if they remain within the illuminated area.

Politicians dismissed suggestions the killing could be the work of Muslim separatists, calling the attackers "slapdash bandits". But a former leader of the Pattani United Liberation Organisation, or Pulo, says the government is not in a position to count anything out.

Because nobody seems to have a convincing answer to the killings, coupled with the fact that no one has been arrested for the incidents, the government's credibility in the eyes of the local community has been dented tremendously, says Yusof Longpi, the former secretary-general and a co-founder of Pulo.

"The psychological impact is tremendous. If you can take out police officers, then where is public safety, where is the leadership, and where is the direction?" asked the former rebel leader who surrendered in 1991 in return for a blanket amnesty.