https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/far-south-view/monk-deaths-01222019163803.html
Commentary by Don Pathan
BenarNews
Yala, Thailand
This past Friday, suspected separatist insurgents gunned down two monks – an abbot and vice-abbot – and wounded two other clerics during an attack on a Buddhist temple in Sungai Padi, a district of southern Thailand’s Narathiwat province.
The shooting was the first killing targeting the Buddhist clergy in the southern border region in five years.
The slain abbot, Prakru Prachote Rattananurak, was said to have had close working relations with local residents from both the Buddhist and Muslim communities. They praised his positive outlook on life, no matter how bleak the situation got in the historically contested and predominantly Islamic Thai Deep South.
Human rights organizations were quick to condemn the shootings, as did Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha, who ordered a manhunt for the killers and urged people not to lose faith in the military government’s efforts to end the conflict in the southern border region.
And, in a statement released Monday, Prayuth accused the insurgents of trying to provoke a nasty retaliation from the government’s security forces aimed at attracting international intervention.
After visiting the temple where the monks were killed, Thailand’s Army chief, Gen. Apirat Kongsompong told reporters that he planned to ask soldiers to volunteer to become ordained as monks in temples across the Far South to make locals feel safer. He didn’t say whether the undercover soldiers would carry weapons.
Insurgents targeted the monks in last week’s shooting to retaliate for the slayings in recent months of three Muslim clerics in the Deep South, and to reject pressure put on leaders of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) rebel group to join Malaysia-brokered peace talks, sources familiar with the organization said.
BRN is a long-standing armed separatist group that controls virtually all insurgent forces in Thailand’s southernmost provinces.
According to the sources, top BRN leaders went into hiding because they grew tired of the relentless and nagging pressure on them to meet with Thailand’s negotiators in the talks.
What remains unclear is whether Friday’s killings represented a one-off incident or whether it marked a return to a period more than a decade ago, when insurgents regularly targeted Buddhist temples and monks as a way to humiliate the government’s security apparatus in the south.
Past attacks
In 2006-07, the region was gripped by a spate of arson attacks that targeted more than 100 public schools, and during which the bodies of dead soldiers were mutilated or decapitated. All that stopped after local Muslim leaders and activists spoke out and told the insurgents that the brutality only undermined their political objective.
Since then, there has been an understanding between the two warring sides, a sort of unwritten ground rule that no children and no religious figures, monks and imams should be harmed. However, there have been violations, which have usually fanned more violence.
On Jan. 11, Doloh Sarai, the last of the three imams to be slain in recent attacks, was shot dead by gunmen as he rode his motorbike in Narathiwat’s Ruesoh district.
The attack, in which the assailants used military-grade weapons, took place about 200 meters (656 feet) from an army checkpoint. Locals and separatist sources said a government or pro-government death squad was behind the killing.
There were little or no condolences from the country’s national leaders following the deaths of the three Muslim leaders, and investigations into their killings didn’t seem to be going anywhere, said a local Muslim activist, Suhaimee Dulasa.
“Peace will prevail when there is an understanding that all human lives are precious, regardless of who the victims may be,” said Suhaimee, a senior member of The Patani, a political action group that promotes the right to self-determination for the people of this restive region.
The last time a Thai Buddhist monk was killed in an insurgency-related incident was July 2015 in Sai Buri, a district of Pattani province, when an IED hidden in a trash can went off. The apparent target was a group of patrolling soldiers, not the monk.
In February 2014, in Pattani’s Mae Lan district, insurgents dressed in military fatigues opened fire on residents who were giving alms to monks. Four people, including a monk and a young boy, died in the attack.
It came days after three boys under age 10 were slain at their home in Narathiwat’s Bacho district. Two paramilitary rangers confessed to killing the boys – apparently to get a spate of retaliatory attacks to stop – but retracted their confession when the case went to court months later.
In November 2012, a member of the Islamic Committee of Yala province, imam Abdullateh Todir, was shot dead in Yaha district.
His killing ignited a six-week long spike of violence and a refusal by the Muslim leaders in the region to endorse a peace initiative by then-Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s government that was officially launched in Kuala Lumpur in February 2013.
In May 2011, a roadside bomb killed, set off by insurgents who lay in wait from a nearby tree line, killed two monks in Yaha district. The attack fell on Visaka Bucha, the most important day on the Buddhist calendar.
Afterward Thai national media went crazy for days, concluding that the attack was a deliberate attempt to drive a bigger wedge between Buddhists and Muslims. But investigators said there was no line of vision and the perpetrators could not have seen the monks sitting inside a taxi.
‘Now it’s time to back off’
The killing of the monks on Friday came amid a spike since last November in violence by the insurgents. According to conversations with sources on both side of the conflict, the rebels were sending a message to Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur to stop pressuring their leaders to come to the negotiating table.
The shooting death of the three imams over the past recent months was also a factor because it violated the aforementioned unwritten ground rule, the sources said.
The spike in violence in this restive region has come at a time when the current crop of the junta is about to announce the date for the next general election.
There isn’t much for Gen. Prayuth to show for in terms of a legacy for his counterinsurgency in the Deep South. A simple face-to-face meeting between Thai representatives and BRN leaders at this juncture would be considered a major breakthrough, and perhaps good enough for Prayuth to claim progress.
Prayuth recently replaced his chief negotiator for three years with another retired army general, Udomchai Thamsarorat, who appeared to be reaching out to members of the international community for advice – but not meditation – on how to advance the talks.
Other than that, Bangkok doesn’t appear to want to make any meaningful concessions to the BRN, who have already said they were not interested in negotiating with the Thais at this time.
And if and when they do decide to come to the table, according to the BRN’s demands, the peace process must be in line with international best practices – which means mediation by members of the international community.
The Friday killings of the monks jolted the entire nation, including representatives from local Malay civil society organizations (CSO) who have been quietly trying to convince the insurgents to respect humanitarian principles and international norms.
“They have made their point, and now it’s time to back off a little,” said one CSO member who spoke on condition of anonymity.
“Bringing in some degree of civility has been a very difficult challenge. A significant number of militants on the ground still see these humanitarian principles, such as International Humanitarian Law and rules of engagement, as foreign ideas that not only tie their hands in a fight where the playing field is already against them,” the source said.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security and development consultant for international organizations. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/far-south-view/monk-deaths-01222019163803.html
DON PATHAN - Thailand-based security analyst/development consultant (Photo: Anjaman Pass, Afghanistan, with two Northern Alliance fighters, October 2001)
Tuesday, 22 January 2019
Strong-handed approach not working in the South
 |
| Photo: CHAROON THONGNUAL |
DON PATHAN
SPECIAL TO THE NATION
IN AN attempt to calm fears about the security situation in the deep South, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha issued a statement yesterday urging the public not to lose faith in his government’s efforts to bring an end to the conflict in this historically contested region.
The people behind the deadly attack on a temple in Narathiwat province last week wanted to provoke the forces into launching a forceful crackdown and in the process draw international attention to the situation in the South, Prayut said.
“Those who were behind the attack in Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district on January 19 intended to destroy the morale, spirit as well as the patience of Thailand in using peaceful methods to solve the ongoing conflict and violence in the South,” he said in the statement. His security tsar, Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan, urged security officials on the ground to exercise utmost restraint, to desist from any revenge motives, and to take recourse to the country’s justice system.
Analysts said there was nothing new in the government’s reaction. Prayut sounded very much like a broken record when he accused the separatist militants of trying to provoke a nasty retaliation by the security forces, of killing monks in order to discredit Thailand’s “peaceful approach” to the conflict, and of using violence to attract international attention.
Judging from the tone and content of his statement, it is clear that Prayut is worried about his legacy. He has been in power since the military coup in May 2014 and there is hardly anything that he and his government can point to in terms of success or progress in the deep South.
The government spent the past three years barking up the wrong tree, talking to MARA Patani – which has no control over the insurgents on the ground – about a quirky Safety Zone Project. Thai negotiators were led to believe by the previous Malaysian government – the official facilitator of the talks with MARA Patani – that a breakthrough was around the corner and that the separatist Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) would come to the table for face-to-face talks with the Thai negotiator, respect the Safety Zone and observe the ceasefire.
None of that was true. When a new government came to power in May last year in Kuala Lumpur, led by veteran Mahathir Mohamad, it adopted an all-or-nothing approach with the BRN leaders – come to the table to negotiate with the Thais or face unspecified consequences.
The BRN leaders decided to go into hiding, sources said. The problem with this strong-handed approach was that the BRN leaders and its political wing did not have a chance to prepare for the peace process, they said. The authorities in Bangkok knew that the peace process was uncharted territory for BRN leaders. They did not want the international community to work with the movement to prepare them for possible talks. Today, that zero-sum game approach is returning to haunt the authorities. Peace negotiations may be a no-go area for the BRN, but it does not mean that they will not come to the table someday. But the process, which can lead to that day, is yet to start.
The ongoing pressure on these leaders, coupled with the killings of imams in recent months, as well as allegations of torture in detention centres, have resulted in nasty retaliation from the militants on the ground. Prayut should have thought about his legacy four years ago when he decided to continue with the peace initiative that was started by the government he ousted. Pressuring the BRN leaders to come to the table so that Bangkok can claim some sort of a breakthrough will only invite more retaliation on the ground. Moreover, his defence planners should have seen the writing on the wall after the targeted killings of three imams in recent months. There is an unwritten rule that Muslim and Buddhist religious leaders and children should be free from harm.
The past decade, unfortunately, has seen bloody retaliations whenever this ground rule has been violated. The BRN militants look at their leaders as spiritual figures. And when these “spiritual leaders” get targeted, they stoop to a no-holds-barred approach. The past 15 years is a testimony of this sad reality.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/national/30362692
EDITORIAL
Eye for an eye: Why clerics are dying again in the South
The Nation
January 22, 2019
Both sides in the unrest are aware of an unwritten rule – leave the holy men alone or pay a high price
Insurgency violence in the southern border provinces looks to be entering another disturbing phase, matching the level of mayhem witnessed 10 years ago with attacks on Buddhist monks and temples.
The strategy appears the same – discredit the state security apparatus put in place to quell the separatist uprising. Friday’s attack in Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district left two monks dead and two others wounded, ensuring a jolt to the nation. Buddhists and Muslims alike are repelled by such attacks on defenceless targets in sanctified places.
There was room for doubt the last time a monk was murdered in the South, in 2015. It was argued that the bomb hidden in a roadside trash bin in Pattani was intended to kill or maim patrolling troops, not a passing holy man. This time there can be no doubt about the intent.
In February 2014 a monk was shot dead along with three laymen, one a youngster, at an alms-giving rite in Pattani’s Mae Lan district. Insurgents dressed in military fatigues opened fire on the crowd in retaliation for the killing days earlier of three little boys in Bacho district by a pair of paramilitary rangers. Only the monks’ own security detail prevented more deaths at the scene.
The revenge killings stopped after the two rangers admitted to killing the youths – confessions withdrawn months later when the case went to court. The rangers, both Muslims, insisted they acted alone, but there were reports of a Buddhist military officer also being present in what was described as an attempt to wipe out an entire family.
The slain boys’ father and four-months-pregnant mother were shot but survived. It was claimed that the presence of the third party was kept secret because the authorities wanted to dismiss the killings as part of a feud among Muslims. Charting the violence in the deep South in a bid to understand its causes and find solutions is of course exceedingly difficult.
Hampering efforts is the fact that the separatist movement has no identifiable spokesperson able to issue confirmations or denials. One clear trend in recent years, though, is that civility disappears whenever there is a perceived violation of the unwritten ground rule that religious figures must be left unharmed. When one side breaches that rule, the other side will respond with extreme force.
In the past two months, three imams – Muslim religious teachers – have been shot dead gangland-style and many more have been detained, interrogated and otherwise harassed.
There have been reports of Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur harassing people with strong religious credentials to help get peace negotiations rolling.
The pressure applied to bring forward leaders of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) has had the opposite effect – driving them deeper underground. The attack on the monks in Sungai Padi last Friday must be condemned in the strongest possible terms as an attack on the very fabric of local society.
It’s possible that the abbot, Prakru Prachote Rattananurak, was targeted – despite the enormous respect he commands among both Muslims and Buddhists – simply to test southerners’ resilience.
The government spent three years talking about establishing “safety zones” free of violence and conducive to peacemaking, only to jettison the idea recently when a new chief negotiator arrived on the scene. This is what ratcheted up the pressure to find the BRN. The murder and harassment of Muslim clerics cannot continue with impunity and without repercussions. We will all continue paying a high price for violations of the rules.
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/opinion/30362681
Thursday, 10 January 2019
Insurgency flare-up signals Bangkok still on wrong track
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
(www.nationmultimedia.com)
Treating insurgents as criminals only pour fuel on a conflict underpinned by historical grievances
This past Tuesday, a group of separatist militants killed a retired schoolteacher in Songkhla, stole his pickup truck and used it for a car-bomb attack on a military target. Investigating officers found him hanging from his neck in the bathroom of his home in Saba Yoi district. Separately, just before the New Year, on December 28, a group of separatist militants entered a community hospital in Rangae district of Narathiwat to use it either as a launching pad to attack the Army unit next door or to take cover from return fire.
As expected, the incidents triggered another round of debate about civility and rules of engagement in a 15-year-old conflict that still has no end in sight. Local Malay villagers sympathetic to the insurgents’ struggle (though not necessarily in agreement with their tactics) said the militants were merely dodging gunfire from a Thai Army unit that shares the same fence as the Rangae community hospital.
Thai officials, meanwhile, predictably seized on the incident for public relations gain. A small public protest was organised, and the separatist militants accused of using hospital staff and patients as a human shield.
Sending a message One senior Thai Army officer in Narathiwat offered a different reading: the insurgents knowingly entered the hospital, but not to use its occupants as a shield. “I think they wanted to make couple points,” said the officer, who spent much of the past decade in the far South.
“First, they wanted to see what kind of reaction this would generate from the Thai side. And second, they wanted to highlight the fact that the community hospital and the Army unit share the same fence.” The positioning of security units in and around civilian facilities such as schools, hospitals and places of worship has long been a sore point between locals and the military.
Local Thai Buddhists want the military around, but not so close that they risk getting caught up in the crossfire. Patani Malays, on the other hand, see the presence of the soldiers as intimidation, made worse by a culture of impunity within the ranks. For many, the presence of government troops is a constant reminder that the historical homeland of the local Malays is now occupied territory. International norms prohibit military bases being located amid civilian communities, much less next to sensitive landmarks such as places of worship, schools, and medical facilities.
In March 2016, Narathiwat’s Cho Ai Rong district was rocked when some 30 militants seized a hospital and used it as a base to attack the paramilitary outpost next door. An unusually high number of militants were mobilised resulting in an especially lengthy battle which saw bullets flying back and forth for about 30 minutes. Nobody was killed since this was not the aim of the attack.
The idea, it seems, was to put on a “performance” via the scores of security cameras placed in and around the medical facility. Insurgency is largely a communicative action, and in Cho Ai Rong the message of the militants’ capability was loud and clear. The militants thought that by first making efforts to place hospital and staff out of harm’s way, they could legitimately use the hospital to launch the attack. But the loudest condemnation came afterward from the local Muslim villagers, who accused the insurgents of recklessly placing them in the line of fire.
Thai authorities often exploit attacks such as this for publicity. But at the same time, they know well that such incidents can place an unwanted spotlight on their conduct in this historically contested region. It’s natural for locals to question why a military unit, however small, has to be situated right by a community hospital.‘Bandits, not guerrillas’ In an effort to deny the separatist Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) movement the recognition and legitimacy that it craves, Thai authorities continue to classify the southern violence as “disturbances” rather than armed conflict. In the view of many Thai policymakers, these Patani Malay insurgents are nothing but a bunch of criminals.
But BRN cadres insist they are more than just “jone” (bandits) – the term that Thai authorities like to apply to the outfit that controls virtually all the combatants in the Malay-speaking South.
The militants operate with loose guidance but no strict code of conduct for their attacks. Decisions on what to target and how to carry out attacks are made at the cell level by operatives who don’t always think about rules of engagement, international norms or humanitarian principles. Recent attacks are part of an ongoing spike in violence including a bombing spree from December 26-29 that began with the destruction of an iconic mermaid sculpture on a Songkhla beach.
The spike is in response to efforts by Thailand, and talks facilitator Malaysia, to pressure BRN leaders to come to the table and meet General Udomchai Thamsarorat, the newly appointed chief negotiator for Bangkok’s peace initiative for the far South.BRN not ready to talk BRN sources said their leaders are not yet ready to talk and have other priorities – like enhancing the understanding of international norms across their whole organisation.
Udomchai was supposed to meet BRN leaders Abdulloh Waemanor and Deng Awaeji on November 24 in Malaysia. But the two refused to show up and went into hiding. One Thai Army source said the two leaders had decided on December 5 to step down from the BRN ruling council “in order to save the movement”.
“If they do come to the table and meet Udomchai, it will be in a personal capacity,” said the Army officer. But another Army officer, from a military intelligence unit, said rumours the pair had resigned were a ploy generated by the BRN to get the Thais off its back.
Artef Sohko, an activist from The Patani, a political action group promoting rights to self-determination for the locals in this predominantly Malay-speaking region, said: “The idea of a BRN figure stepping down or leaving the organisation to save the movement is not far-fetched. It has been done before.” Unlike other Patani Malay movements, the BRN is not ruled by any one particular person but by a secretive council of elders who have strong religious credentials.
In short, the BRN decision-making process is not led by one person; decisions are made collectively. As such, Abdulloh and Deng could be easily cast aside by the BRN should they change their minds, for whatever reason, and come to the negotiating table.
That fate befell Sukri Hari, a well-known and respected figure in the far South who surfaced in August 2014 to join negotiations on the side of MARA Patani. The separatist umbrella group still has very little control over militants in the far South, but it remains the only group with whom Bangkok is negotiating.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based development and security consultant and a founding member of Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation dedicated to critical discussion of the conflict in Thailand’s far South.
Special to The Nation
(www.nationmultimedia.com)
Treating insurgents as criminals only pour fuel on a conflict underpinned by historical grievances
This past Tuesday, a group of separatist militants killed a retired schoolteacher in Songkhla, stole his pickup truck and used it for a car-bomb attack on a military target. Investigating officers found him hanging from his neck in the bathroom of his home in Saba Yoi district. Separately, just before the New Year, on December 28, a group of separatist militants entered a community hospital in Rangae district of Narathiwat to use it either as a launching pad to attack the Army unit next door or to take cover from return fire.
As expected, the incidents triggered another round of debate about civility and rules of engagement in a 15-year-old conflict that still has no end in sight. Local Malay villagers sympathetic to the insurgents’ struggle (though not necessarily in agreement with their tactics) said the militants were merely dodging gunfire from a Thai Army unit that shares the same fence as the Rangae community hospital.
Thai officials, meanwhile, predictably seized on the incident for public relations gain. A small public protest was organised, and the separatist militants accused of using hospital staff and patients as a human shield.
Sending a message One senior Thai Army officer in Narathiwat offered a different reading: the insurgents knowingly entered the hospital, but not to use its occupants as a shield. “I think they wanted to make couple points,” said the officer, who spent much of the past decade in the far South.
“First, they wanted to see what kind of reaction this would generate from the Thai side. And second, they wanted to highlight the fact that the community hospital and the Army unit share the same fence.” The positioning of security units in and around civilian facilities such as schools, hospitals and places of worship has long been a sore point between locals and the military.
Local Thai Buddhists want the military around, but not so close that they risk getting caught up in the crossfire. Patani Malays, on the other hand, see the presence of the soldiers as intimidation, made worse by a culture of impunity within the ranks. For many, the presence of government troops is a constant reminder that the historical homeland of the local Malays is now occupied territory. International norms prohibit military bases being located amid civilian communities, much less next to sensitive landmarks such as places of worship, schools, and medical facilities.
In March 2016, Narathiwat’s Cho Ai Rong district was rocked when some 30 militants seized a hospital and used it as a base to attack the paramilitary outpost next door. An unusually high number of militants were mobilised resulting in an especially lengthy battle which saw bullets flying back and forth for about 30 minutes. Nobody was killed since this was not the aim of the attack.
The idea, it seems, was to put on a “performance” via the scores of security cameras placed in and around the medical facility. Insurgency is largely a communicative action, and in Cho Ai Rong the message of the militants’ capability was loud and clear. The militants thought that by first making efforts to place hospital and staff out of harm’s way, they could legitimately use the hospital to launch the attack. But the loudest condemnation came afterward from the local Muslim villagers, who accused the insurgents of recklessly placing them in the line of fire.
Thai authorities often exploit attacks such as this for publicity. But at the same time, they know well that such incidents can place an unwanted spotlight on their conduct in this historically contested region. It’s natural for locals to question why a military unit, however small, has to be situated right by a community hospital.‘Bandits, not guerrillas’ In an effort to deny the separatist Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) movement the recognition and legitimacy that it craves, Thai authorities continue to classify the southern violence as “disturbances” rather than armed conflict. In the view of many Thai policymakers, these Patani Malay insurgents are nothing but a bunch of criminals.
But BRN cadres insist they are more than just “jone” (bandits) – the term that Thai authorities like to apply to the outfit that controls virtually all the combatants in the Malay-speaking South.
The militants operate with loose guidance but no strict code of conduct for their attacks. Decisions on what to target and how to carry out attacks are made at the cell level by operatives who don’t always think about rules of engagement, international norms or humanitarian principles. Recent attacks are part of an ongoing spike in violence including a bombing spree from December 26-29 that began with the destruction of an iconic mermaid sculpture on a Songkhla beach.
The spike is in response to efforts by Thailand, and talks facilitator Malaysia, to pressure BRN leaders to come to the table and meet General Udomchai Thamsarorat, the newly appointed chief negotiator for Bangkok’s peace initiative for the far South.BRN not ready to talk BRN sources said their leaders are not yet ready to talk and have other priorities – like enhancing the understanding of international norms across their whole organisation.
Udomchai was supposed to meet BRN leaders Abdulloh Waemanor and Deng Awaeji on November 24 in Malaysia. But the two refused to show up and went into hiding. One Thai Army source said the two leaders had decided on December 5 to step down from the BRN ruling council “in order to save the movement”.
“If they do come to the table and meet Udomchai, it will be in a personal capacity,” said the Army officer. But another Army officer, from a military intelligence unit, said rumours the pair had resigned were a ploy generated by the BRN to get the Thais off its back.
Artef Sohko, an activist from The Patani, a political action group promoting rights to self-determination for the locals in this predominantly Malay-speaking region, said: “The idea of a BRN figure stepping down or leaving the organisation to save the movement is not far-fetched. It has been done before.” Unlike other Patani Malay movements, the BRN is not ruled by any one particular person but by a secretive council of elders who have strong religious credentials.
In short, the BRN decision-making process is not led by one person; decisions are made collectively. As such, Abdulloh and Deng could be easily cast aside by the BRN should they change their minds, for whatever reason, and come to the negotiating table.
That fate befell Sukri Hari, a well-known and respected figure in the far South who surfaced in August 2014 to join negotiations on the side of MARA Patani. The separatist umbrella group still has very little control over militants in the far South, but it remains the only group with whom Bangkok is negotiating.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based development and security consultant and a founding member of Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation dedicated to critical discussion of the conflict in Thailand’s far South.
Wednesday, 2 January 2019
Friday, 21 December 2018
Bangkok battles to bridge trust gap with insurgency’s controlle
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
YALA, Thailand
Barisan Revolusi Nasional remains wary of peace talks after years of Thai military-backed ‘trickery’
Talk of another Bt50 million grant to bridge the trust gap between local civil society organisations (CSOs) in the far South and state agencies, namely the Army, has been in the air for some time. But if it’s anything like the first grant delivered earlier this year, the money will not be worth the hassle.
The fund created bitter division among the local CSOs, some of whom now see the grant aid as a Trojan horse, pitting friends against friends in arguments over the very idea of receiving money from the military, especially when strings are attached.
The Army said driving a wedge among CSOs was not its intention and suggested more money was on its way. They insisted it was meant to help boost the capacity of local CSOs and instil progressive ideas among groups like the Federation of Patani Students and Youth (PerMAS) and the Civil Society Assembly for Peace (Kor Por Sor). As expected, these organisations rejected the offer.
Promoting rules of engagement
There is also talk of asking international non-government organisations (INGOs) to do more work with local CSOs and, if possible, with the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the separatist group that controls virtually all of the combatants in the decades-old insurgency.
The idea is to promote concepts such as International Humanitarian Law, and the Geneva Convention. Privately, Thai officials hope these ideas will cause a split between the more progressive faction and the hardliners in the BRN.
Yet it’s not entirely clear where the Army is going with the idea of strengthening the capacity of civil society. General Udomchai Thamsarorat, the new chief negotiator for the peace initiative, said he would like to see southern CSOs come together to mediate relations between the government and the BRN. That could be a forlorn hope, given that local CSOs are split over issues like peace talks.
BRN sources said getting the CSOs to play a mediation role is a pipe dream and, worse, a cynical strategy aimed at pitting civil society against the BRN movement. BRN operatives argue that, in many ways, they are closer to the people than the CSOs can ever be. They claim to have cells in just about every tambon, with eyes and ears constantly testing the mood of their constituency.
Combatants say they always listen to the concerns of villagers, especially over how the war is fought. The arson attacks on Buddhist temples and schools and the mutilating of Thai soldiers’ bodies that were frequent in 2006 have since given way to “legitimate” attacks on security apparatus, while restraint is being shown when “soft” targets are occasionally chosen.
The brutality in 2006 came to a halt after local residents, including religious leaders, protested it violated Islamic principles. The conflict with the Thais is still very much ethno-nationalist in nature, but the voices of local Muslims at the grassroots had to be respected, BRN operatives conceded.
By contrast, locals remain somewhat indifferent on the subject of negotiations with the state, said BRN operatives. For what it’s worth, chief Thai negotiator Udomchai has been saying all the right things, telling the Malaysian government and the CSOs that he does not believe in forcing BRN leaders to come to the table. While Thailand’s negotiators would like nothing more than to talk with the BRN ruling council, the Dewan Pimpinan Parti (DPP), they are reluctant to support harsher measures promoted by Malaysia that might force BRN leaders further underground.
If they did go to ground, BRN chiefs would disappear from everybody’s radar, making it more difficult to construct a channel of communication with the insurgency’s controllers. Udomchai also ditched plans for a Safety Zone and the ceasefire that came with it, suggesting the scheme was dead.
BRN sources meanwhile said negotiations with the Thais were not on their priority list. The fact that MARA Patani is already at the table doesn’t help. MARA Patani is an umbrella group of long-standing separatist movements that no long control militants in the insurgency zone. BRN sources said they would like to reach a better understanding of international norms and strengthen their capacity before they even begin to consider negotiating with Bangkok.
The movement sees the various peace initiatives over the years as part of a shrewd strategy to trick their leaders into surfacing and then forcing an agreement without addressing the historical grievances of their people. Raising the bar to peace even higher is that more and more BRN operatives now see full independence for the far South as a moral obligation.
Nevertheless, Thai officials are trying hard to establish a channel of communication with the DPP, either through Malaysia or friends and relatives of the leaders.
“Already, Thai authorities have been leaning on friends and family of known DPP figures, trying to use them as intermediaries,” said Artef Sohko, a political activist from The Patani, a local CSO aimed at promoting rights to self-determination for the people in this region.
Patani Malay activists are now being approached by Bangkok to act as go-betweens. But these individuals said they are concerned they may become targets for violence by “spoilers” in the peace process or those with different agendas.
They point to the shooting death of Pattani Islamic cleric Ustaz Waesumae Suden, in September 2014, and the murder of Yala Imam Abdullateh Todir, in November 2012, as examples of what can happen to civilians who get too involved in the peace initiative.
Sadly, just about every senior Thai figure assigned to the far South, either as a commander or negotiator, has believed they had a trick up their sleeve that would magically break the deadlock. Needless to say, none of their plans has worked, each falling victim to their over-eagerness to get things done on their watch.
They refuse to see the conflict in generational terms, and each and everyone has gone home empty-handed by the end of their mission.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based freelance security consultant and a founding member of Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation dedicated to critical discussion of the conflict in Thailand’s far South.
Special to The Nation
YALA, Thailand
Barisan Revolusi Nasional remains wary of peace talks after years of Thai military-backed ‘trickery’
Talk of another Bt50 million grant to bridge the trust gap between local civil society organisations (CSOs) in the far South and state agencies, namely the Army, has been in the air for some time. But if it’s anything like the first grant delivered earlier this year, the money will not be worth the hassle.
The fund created bitter division among the local CSOs, some of whom now see the grant aid as a Trojan horse, pitting friends against friends in arguments over the very idea of receiving money from the military, especially when strings are attached.
The Army said driving a wedge among CSOs was not its intention and suggested more money was on its way. They insisted it was meant to help boost the capacity of local CSOs and instil progressive ideas among groups like the Federation of Patani Students and Youth (PerMAS) and the Civil Society Assembly for Peace (Kor Por Sor). As expected, these organisations rejected the offer.
Promoting rules of engagement
There is also talk of asking international non-government organisations (INGOs) to do more work with local CSOs and, if possible, with the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the separatist group that controls virtually all of the combatants in the decades-old insurgency.
The idea is to promote concepts such as International Humanitarian Law, and the Geneva Convention. Privately, Thai officials hope these ideas will cause a split between the more progressive faction and the hardliners in the BRN.
Yet it’s not entirely clear where the Army is going with the idea of strengthening the capacity of civil society. General Udomchai Thamsarorat, the new chief negotiator for the peace initiative, said he would like to see southern CSOs come together to mediate relations between the government and the BRN. That could be a forlorn hope, given that local CSOs are split over issues like peace talks.
BRN sources said getting the CSOs to play a mediation role is a pipe dream and, worse, a cynical strategy aimed at pitting civil society against the BRN movement. BRN operatives argue that, in many ways, they are closer to the people than the CSOs can ever be. They claim to have cells in just about every tambon, with eyes and ears constantly testing the mood of their constituency.
Combatants say they always listen to the concerns of villagers, especially over how the war is fought. The arson attacks on Buddhist temples and schools and the mutilating of Thai soldiers’ bodies that were frequent in 2006 have since given way to “legitimate” attacks on security apparatus, while restraint is being shown when “soft” targets are occasionally chosen.
The brutality in 2006 came to a halt after local residents, including religious leaders, protested it violated Islamic principles. The conflict with the Thais is still very much ethno-nationalist in nature, but the voices of local Muslims at the grassroots had to be respected, BRN operatives conceded.
By contrast, locals remain somewhat indifferent on the subject of negotiations with the state, said BRN operatives. For what it’s worth, chief Thai negotiator Udomchai has been saying all the right things, telling the Malaysian government and the CSOs that he does not believe in forcing BRN leaders to come to the table. While Thailand’s negotiators would like nothing more than to talk with the BRN ruling council, the Dewan Pimpinan Parti (DPP), they are reluctant to support harsher measures promoted by Malaysia that might force BRN leaders further underground.
If they did go to ground, BRN chiefs would disappear from everybody’s radar, making it more difficult to construct a channel of communication with the insurgency’s controllers. Udomchai also ditched plans for a Safety Zone and the ceasefire that came with it, suggesting the scheme was dead.
BRN sources meanwhile said negotiations with the Thais were not on their priority list. The fact that MARA Patani is already at the table doesn’t help. MARA Patani is an umbrella group of long-standing separatist movements that no long control militants in the insurgency zone. BRN sources said they would like to reach a better understanding of international norms and strengthen their capacity before they even begin to consider negotiating with Bangkok.
The movement sees the various peace initiatives over the years as part of a shrewd strategy to trick their leaders into surfacing and then forcing an agreement without addressing the historical grievances of their people. Raising the bar to peace even higher is that more and more BRN operatives now see full independence for the far South as a moral obligation.
Nevertheless, Thai officials are trying hard to establish a channel of communication with the DPP, either through Malaysia or friends and relatives of the leaders.
 |
| Artef Sohko, The Patani |
“Already, Thai authorities have been leaning on friends and family of known DPP figures, trying to use them as intermediaries,” said Artef Sohko, a political activist from The Patani, a local CSO aimed at promoting rights to self-determination for the people in this region.
Patani Malay activists are now being approached by Bangkok to act as go-betweens. But these individuals said they are concerned they may become targets for violence by “spoilers” in the peace process or those with different agendas.
They point to the shooting death of Pattani Islamic cleric Ustaz Waesumae Suden, in September 2014, and the murder of Yala Imam Abdullateh Todir, in November 2012, as examples of what can happen to civilians who get too involved in the peace initiative.
Sadly, just about every senior Thai figure assigned to the far South, either as a commander or negotiator, has believed they had a trick up their sleeve that would magically break the deadlock. Needless to say, none of their plans has worked, each falling victim to their over-eagerness to get things done on their watch.
They refuse to see the conflict in generational terms, and each and everyone has gone home empty-handed by the end of their mission.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based freelance security consultant and a founding member of Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation dedicated to critical discussion of the conflict in Thailand’s far South.
Thursday, 6 December 2018
Malaysian Broker to Push BRN Rebels toward Southern Thai Peace Talks
Commentary by Don Pathan
BenarNews
Yala, Thailand
National Revolutionary Front (BRN) insurgents in Thailand’s Deep South have been under tremendous pressure lately to join Malaysia-brokered peace talks. But leaders of the rebel group are holding their ground and refusing to do so, even if this could mean grave consequences.
The newly designated Malaysian facilitator for the negotiations, Abdul Rahim Noor, informed the Thai side during a recent visit to Thailand that he would give BRN leaders an ultimatum – join the talks or leave Malaysia, according to a senior Thai security official who spoke on condition of anonymity.
The feeling among the Malaysian leadership is that BRN can no longer take Kuala Lumpur for granted, the Thai official said.
The BRN is the southern border region’s largest and most heavily armed separatist organization. Its top leaders are believed to be hiding out in next-door Malaysia.
Hardliners within Thai security circles, on the other hand, said Abdul Rahim’s strategy should be given a chance, but others viewed the ultimatum as counterproductive. Ideally, as the latter group sees it, BRN leaders should come to the negotiating table willingly.
While Thailand’s negotiating team would like nothing more than to talk with leaders in BRN’s ruling council, they will not support any harsh measure that could force the leadership to go underground.
However, according to a senior Thai military officer who is familiar with both Abdul Rahim and Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, there is a real possibility both men “will employ some stern measures to get what they want.”
It is not clear where the BRN operatives would go if ordered to get out of Malaysia. Some think they might go to Indonesia to join a key member of the organization’s youth wing, Abdulkarim Khalid, the only BRN figure who speaks publicly.
Another option is to return to their historical homeland, Thailand’s far South, and operate from there.
Either way, they would be off the authorities’ radar screen, thus making it that much harder to construct a channel of communication.
“In some ways, this juncture is the moment of truth for the movement,” said Artef Sohko, a political activist from the Deep South, referring to BRN’s leadership.
“Will they continue to resist the pressure from Malaysia to come to the table or make a concession, on the other hand, remains to be seen,” Artef added.
Sitting out current talks
BRN sources said negotiations with the Thais was not on the list of things for them to consider, especially if it meant joining MARA Patani, an umbrella group made up of a number of long-standing separatist movements that no long control insurgents on the ground.
BRN sources said they would like to obtain a better understanding of international norms and strengthen their capacity before they even begin to think about joining the Thais at the negotiating table.
The movement sees the previous and current peace initiative as a shrewd strategy to trick them to come to the table without taking into consideration their concerns and the historical grievances of Patani Malays.
Complicating matters for any peace initiative is the fact that more and more BRN operatives and combatants see independence from the Thai state as a moral obligation.
Nevertheless, Thai officials are trying to reach out to BRN’s ruling council.
Policymakers in Bangkok expressed the sentiment that the current line of communication through Malaysia’s facilitation was not adequate and the Thai government has been struggling to establish a new one that leads to the BRN leaders.
The Thai government has approached some Patani Malay activists to act as go-betweens. But these people said they worried about being killed by spoilers or others with a different agenda.
The shooting death of an Islamic cleric, Ustaz Waesumae Suden, in Pattani province in September 2014, and the murder of Imam Abdullateh Todir in Yala province in November 2012, are often cited as examples of what can happen to people who get too involved with Deep South peace initiatives.
For the past three years up until the appointment of Abdul Rahim, Ahmed Zamzamin Hashim was the one who has acted as the Malaysian go-between for Thailand and the BRN leaders – the ones who refused to come aboard with MARA Patani.
The Thai side felt that Zamzamin had not been very forthcoming and oftentimes misled them into getting their hopes up.
For example, the Thais were led to believe that a meeting between Thailand’s then-chief negotiator, Gen. Aksara Kerdpol, and a key BRN figure in the ruling council, Doonloh Wae-mano (alias Abdullah Wan Mat Noor), was in the pipeline.
Zamzamin also told Bangkok that BRN leaders would respect and observe the Safety Zone, a much talked about pilot project that was supposed to be the legacy of the current crop of the junta, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO).
BRN sources insisted that their leaders had never agreed to such commitments, and suggested that messages from Zamzamin to Bangkok may have been lost in translation.
Man with a plan
Retired Army Gen. Udomchai Thammasarorat, who replaced Aksara as the chief Thai negotiator, has ditched the Safety Zone initiative along with a ceasefire component that came with it. He sees these attempts as a lost cause and leftover baggage from the Zamzamin-Aksara era.
The new chief negotiator has a plan.
This time around, he is looking to pressure the BRN by using local civil society organizations (CSOs). He wants all the Thai CSOs working in the far South to unite under one platform to function as the mediator between the state and the BRN rebels.
It’s a long shot, given that the local CSOs don’t always see eye-to-eye over peace initiatives.
Indeed, just about every senior Thai figure who has come to the Deep South, either as a commander or negotiator, believes he has something better than his predecessor.
None of their plans ever worked because they didn’t want to see the conflict in generational terms. Instead, their aim has been to achieve peace or a major breakthrough as if they were planning some sort of physical landmark or construction project.
The idea of getting the CSOs to play a mediation role is a pipedream, BRN sources said. It’s a wicked strategy to pit the local people – that is to say, the CSOs – against the BRN movement.
But according to BRN combatants, in some ways, they are even closer to the people than the CSOs. In fact, the rebels’ network is much broader than the CSOs could ever be, given that they have cells in just about every district in the Deep South.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security and development consultant for international organizations. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/far-south-view/Don-Pathan-12062018132001.html
BenarNews
Yala, Thailand
National Revolutionary Front (BRN) insurgents in Thailand’s Deep South have been under tremendous pressure lately to join Malaysia-brokered peace talks. But leaders of the rebel group are holding their ground and refusing to do so, even if this could mean grave consequences.
 |
| Car bomb at a hotel in Pattani, August 2016. Photo by: DON PATHAN |
The feeling among the Malaysian leadership is that BRN can no longer take Kuala Lumpur for granted, the Thai official said.
The BRN is the southern border region’s largest and most heavily armed separatist organization. Its top leaders are believed to be hiding out in next-door Malaysia.
Hardliners within Thai security circles, on the other hand, said Abdul Rahim’s strategy should be given a chance, but others viewed the ultimatum as counterproductive. Ideally, as the latter group sees it, BRN leaders should come to the negotiating table willingly.
While Thailand’s negotiating team would like nothing more than to talk with leaders in BRN’s ruling council, they will not support any harsh measure that could force the leadership to go underground.
However, according to a senior Thai military officer who is familiar with both Abdul Rahim and Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, there is a real possibility both men “will employ some stern measures to get what they want.”
It is not clear where the BRN operatives would go if ordered to get out of Malaysia. Some think they might go to Indonesia to join a key member of the organization’s youth wing, Abdulkarim Khalid, the only BRN figure who speaks publicly.
Another option is to return to their historical homeland, Thailand’s far South, and operate from there.
Either way, they would be off the authorities’ radar screen, thus making it that much harder to construct a channel of communication.
“In some ways, this juncture is the moment of truth for the movement,” said Artef Sohko, a political activist from the Deep South, referring to BRN’s leadership.
“Will they continue to resist the pressure from Malaysia to come to the table or make a concession, on the other hand, remains to be seen,” Artef added.
Sitting out current talks
BRN sources said negotiations with the Thais was not on the list of things for them to consider, especially if it meant joining MARA Patani, an umbrella group made up of a number of long-standing separatist movements that no long control insurgents on the ground.
BRN sources said they would like to obtain a better understanding of international norms and strengthen their capacity before they even begin to think about joining the Thais at the negotiating table.
The movement sees the previous and current peace initiative as a shrewd strategy to trick them to come to the table without taking into consideration their concerns and the historical grievances of Patani Malays.
Complicating matters for any peace initiative is the fact that more and more BRN operatives and combatants see independence from the Thai state as a moral obligation.
Nevertheless, Thai officials are trying to reach out to BRN’s ruling council.
Policymakers in Bangkok expressed the sentiment that the current line of communication through Malaysia’s facilitation was not adequate and the Thai government has been struggling to establish a new one that leads to the BRN leaders.
The Thai government has approached some Patani Malay activists to act as go-betweens. But these people said they worried about being killed by spoilers or others with a different agenda.
The shooting death of an Islamic cleric, Ustaz Waesumae Suden, in Pattani province in September 2014, and the murder of Imam Abdullateh Todir in Yala province in November 2012, are often cited as examples of what can happen to people who get too involved with Deep South peace initiatives.
For the past three years up until the appointment of Abdul Rahim, Ahmed Zamzamin Hashim was the one who has acted as the Malaysian go-between for Thailand and the BRN leaders – the ones who refused to come aboard with MARA Patani.
The Thai side felt that Zamzamin had not been very forthcoming and oftentimes misled them into getting their hopes up.
For example, the Thais were led to believe that a meeting between Thailand’s then-chief negotiator, Gen. Aksara Kerdpol, and a key BRN figure in the ruling council, Doonloh Wae-mano (alias Abdullah Wan Mat Noor), was in the pipeline.
Zamzamin also told Bangkok that BRN leaders would respect and observe the Safety Zone, a much talked about pilot project that was supposed to be the legacy of the current crop of the junta, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO).
BRN sources insisted that their leaders had never agreed to such commitments, and suggested that messages from Zamzamin to Bangkok may have been lost in translation.
Man with a plan
Retired Army Gen. Udomchai Thammasarorat, who replaced Aksara as the chief Thai negotiator, has ditched the Safety Zone initiative along with a ceasefire component that came with it. He sees these attempts as a lost cause and leftover baggage from the Zamzamin-Aksara era.
The new chief negotiator has a plan.
This time around, he is looking to pressure the BRN by using local civil society organizations (CSOs). He wants all the Thai CSOs working in the far South to unite under one platform to function as the mediator between the state and the BRN rebels.
It’s a long shot, given that the local CSOs don’t always see eye-to-eye over peace initiatives.
Indeed, just about every senior Thai figure who has come to the Deep South, either as a commander or negotiator, believes he has something better than his predecessor.
None of their plans ever worked because they didn’t want to see the conflict in generational terms. Instead, their aim has been to achieve peace or a major breakthrough as if they were planning some sort of physical landmark or construction project.
The idea of getting the CSOs to play a mediation role is a pipedream, BRN sources said. It’s a wicked strategy to pit the local people – that is to say, the CSOs – against the BRN movement.
But according to BRN combatants, in some ways, they are even closer to the people than the CSOs. In fact, the rebels’ network is much broader than the CSOs could ever be, given that they have cells in just about every district in the Deep South.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security and development consultant for international organizations. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and not of BenarNews.
https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/far-south-view/Don-Pathan-12062018132001.html
Friday, 30 November 2018
In the South, four more WASTED YEARS
The Nation (Editorial)
The military has always set the pace in the border provinces, so it’s no surprise that peace remains elusive under a military govt
The junta is mulling the legacy it will leave behind regarding its four years of control over the troubled southern border provinces.
The generals might not be going anywhere depending on the outcome of the 2019 election, but they must be concerned that there’s so little to show for yet another block of time that’s passed with no resolution to the insurrectionist problem.
For the Malay-speaking South, the junta’s turn in power has been just more of the same as, and in fact oddly reminiscent of, the days when Yingluck Shinawatra, whom the generals ousted, fumbled though attempts at peace initiatives.
Both administrations were cultivating false hope when they knowingly talked to the wrong people to try and persuade the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), which has command over the armed militants, to participate in talks about ending the conflict.
We now know that the BRN cannot simply be dismissed as stubborn. It has indeed been smart enough to recognise that the Thai authorities’ sole intent was to draw its leaders out in the open and commit them to a process, while their concerns and grievances would continue being ignored.
Many would consider the group wise to remain underground, ready to fight on. The Thai state has not only refused to address the historical grievances of the Malays of Patani, it has failed to indicate any concessions it might be willing to make in the interest of peace.
It was only seven months after the May 2014 coup that the junta announced it would continue efforts made by the Yingluck government to revive the peace process. It said any discussions would have to include all longstanding Patani separatist groups under one representative umbrella – and the umbrella turned out to be MARA Patani. BRN, declining to participate, could be forgiven for taking offence if the Thais regarded all Patani groups as fundamentally the same.
It reflects a deep-seated prejudice towards the Malays. Before MARA Patani was formed, its future members were rubbing shoulders with foreign NGOs, the King Prachadhipok Institute and Malaysian special branch police, the aim being to enhance their legitimacy and international standing. T
oday they have nothing to show for such outreach because the people of Patani do not regard them as legitimate. Without the BRN, the peace dialogue with MARA Patani was doomed to fail. Even Thailand’s new chief negotiator, General Udomchai Thamsarorat, is now suggesting a change in course and has asked to meet BRN leaders separately.
He went as far as ditching the “safety zone” pilot project launched earlier this year, along with its requisite ceasefire, saying he wanted to start again with a clean slate. If this seems sensible and perhaps cause for optimism, beware that, to observers who monitor the conflict closely, Udomchai sounds like a broken record. Every general in charge before him has arrived on the scene with a fresh trick up his sleeve, and they all went home empty-handed.
The state and the military have always ensured there were wedges dividing civil society organisations, pitting one against another with offers of funding and laughable “information operations”.
In fact, Udomchai would be well advised to halt such operations, which aren’t so much counter-intelligence as they are counterproductive, pushing aside people and groups that might be helpful. But perhaps that’s to be left to another government.
The military has always set the pace in the border provinces, so it’s no surprise that peace remains elusive under a military govt
The junta is mulling the legacy it will leave behind regarding its four years of control over the troubled southern border provinces.
The generals might not be going anywhere depending on the outcome of the 2019 election, but they must be concerned that there’s so little to show for yet another block of time that’s passed with no resolution to the insurrectionist problem.
For the Malay-speaking South, the junta’s turn in power has been just more of the same as, and in fact oddly reminiscent of, the days when Yingluck Shinawatra, whom the generals ousted, fumbled though attempts at peace initiatives.
Both administrations were cultivating false hope when they knowingly talked to the wrong people to try and persuade the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), which has command over the armed militants, to participate in talks about ending the conflict.
We now know that the BRN cannot simply be dismissed as stubborn. It has indeed been smart enough to recognise that the Thai authorities’ sole intent was to draw its leaders out in the open and commit them to a process, while their concerns and grievances would continue being ignored.
Many would consider the group wise to remain underground, ready to fight on. The Thai state has not only refused to address the historical grievances of the Malays of Patani, it has failed to indicate any concessions it might be willing to make in the interest of peace.
It was only seven months after the May 2014 coup that the junta announced it would continue efforts made by the Yingluck government to revive the peace process. It said any discussions would have to include all longstanding Patani separatist groups under one representative umbrella – and the umbrella turned out to be MARA Patani. BRN, declining to participate, could be forgiven for taking offence if the Thais regarded all Patani groups as fundamentally the same.
It reflects a deep-seated prejudice towards the Malays. Before MARA Patani was formed, its future members were rubbing shoulders with foreign NGOs, the King Prachadhipok Institute and Malaysian special branch police, the aim being to enhance their legitimacy and international standing. T
oday they have nothing to show for such outreach because the people of Patani do not regard them as legitimate. Without the BRN, the peace dialogue with MARA Patani was doomed to fail. Even Thailand’s new chief negotiator, General Udomchai Thamsarorat, is now suggesting a change in course and has asked to meet BRN leaders separately.
He went as far as ditching the “safety zone” pilot project launched earlier this year, along with its requisite ceasefire, saying he wanted to start again with a clean slate. If this seems sensible and perhaps cause for optimism, beware that, to observers who monitor the conflict closely, Udomchai sounds like a broken record. Every general in charge before him has arrived on the scene with a fresh trick up his sleeve, and they all went home empty-handed.
The state and the military have always ensured there were wedges dividing civil society organisations, pitting one against another with offers of funding and laughable “information operations”.
In fact, Udomchai would be well advised to halt such operations, which aren’t so much counter-intelligence as they are counterproductive, pushing aside people and groups that might be helpful. But perhaps that’s to be left to another government.
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