Important juncture: Thailand-BRN

Don Pathan
Special to Thai PBS World

Thailand’s negotiation with the rebel Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) has reached a critical juncture as both sides continue to struggle to identify common ground on how to move the peace talks forward.

To complicate the matter even further, this peace process has produced two competing tracks — the official one with Malaysia as the designated Facilitator and the not-so-secretive backdoor channel that not only leaves Malaysian officials in the dark but deepened the existing mistrust between Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur.

Malaysian officials said the incoming Facilitator, Gen. Tan Sri Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, will not tolerate Thailand’s two-track approach. Malaysia’s disapproval of the two-track is not just about protocol; a narrative has been built around this back channel, painting Malaysia as the peace spoiler.

The unwillingness of the outgoing Facilitator, Tan Sri Rahim Muhammad Noor, to raise this point with the Thais had created some resentment among Malaysian officers in the Facilitator’s Secretariat. Furthermore, not all Thai government agencies agree with the use of back channels on the ground that it comes at the expense of Thai-Malaysian bilateral relations.

Gen. Zulkifli’s role in the peace process is expected to bring some degree of professionalism and integrity to the current peace process that was kicked off in January 2020 in Kuala Lumpur. But peace initiatives have come and gone over the past 18 years when the current wave of insurgency surfaced in this historically contested region, and none has generated any meaningful traction as neither side was willing to make concessions or compromise. 

Nearly two decades later, the two sides have yet to move beyond confidence-building measures, or CBM, and onto something more concrete. There was a moment of hope in the Ramadan ceasefire in 2022. But that was short-lived as BRN combatants stepped up their attacks in what was billed as a “payback” for the Thai Army’s refusal to reciprocate positively to the rebel’s unilateral ceasefire that came into effect in April 2020.

More than 7,300 people have died since January 2004 when the current wave of insurgency resurfaced after a decade of relative calm.

For the time being, Thai and BRN negotiators are struggling to find a common ground for the three key issues on the table: public consultations, reduction of violence, and political solutions to bring this conflict to an end.

BRN’s request to enter the Patani region to conduct public consultation — discussions with residents — was shot down by the Thai Army who is afraid of a public relations nightmare; an outpour of support for the BRN delegates from the locals would destroy the Thai government’s long-standing narrative that says the Malays of Patani are with the Thai State.

Indeed, one only has to look at the funerals of the combatants on the ground, not to mention the various social media platforms, to understand the extent of support BRN enjoys in Thailand’s far South.

Regarding the reduction of violence, more work has to be done on the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA). The same goes for the so-called Road Map, a guideline for future talks.

But while the text of the public consultation and other items on the table is still being negotiated, BRN has begun to reach out to local Buddhists and Muslims in Thailand’s far South for a series of discussions that took place inside Malaysia.

Technicalities and negotiated texts aside, the burning issue for BRN is whether the movement is willing to settle for something less than complete independence. Since BRN negotiators have indicated that they are willing to negotiate under the Thai Constitution and in line with the principles underlining the Unitary State of Thailand, many observers, including combatants, have interpreted this willingness to be a compromise for something less than independence.

“BRN can no longer claim to be a revolutionary outfit fighting for the independence of Patani if the movement is to negotiate under the Thai Constitution,” said Asmadee Bueheng, the communication officer for The Patani. This political action group promotes self-determination for the people of this historically contested region.

BRN leadership was led to believe that if they negotiated under the Thai Constitution, their organization would be a “legitimate” movement in the eyes of the Thais and the international community.

But there are other ways to obtain legitimacy and acceptance, argued Artef Sohko, president of The Patani. BRN’s actions on the ground, as well as the agreements that the group has or is planning to make with members of the international community, will bring about the recognition they desired.

“But if BRN is willing to settle for something less than complete independence, they have to make it clear to their fighters on the ground,” said Artef. “And if they let go of their original goal of independence, then the Thai government shouldn’t be surprised if a splinter group emerges from the ground. You can be sure that negotiation will not be on their mind,” Artef added.

Dropping the clause on the Thai Constitution does not necessarily mean killing the peace process. There are many outstanding issues for BRN negotiators can raise — issues such as state-minority relations, the historical narrative of Patani, and greater cultural space for the Malays of this region, Asmadee said. As for the conflict itself, the two sides can talk about code of conduct, civilian protection, and rules of engagement, among other things, Asmadee added.

About their quest for legitimacy, BRN is planning to expand its strategy to include a “foreign focal point”. An office in Europe is in the pipeline. It would make it easier for BRN representatives to meet and explain their cases to members of the international community.

Don Pathan, is a Thailand-based security analyst and a former reporter with various media outlets and publications.

Thai PBS World

BRN rebels deal blow to Thai hopes for Buddhist Lent ceasefire

Commentary by Don Pathan
BenarNews

Yala, Thailand

BRN rebels deal blow to Thai hopes for Buddhist Lent ceasefire

A Thai officer stands beside a burnt-down oil tanker at a gas station in Pattani province after an overnight wave of arson and bomb attacks in Thailand’s southernmost provinces that authorities have blamed on Muslim separatist rebels, Aug. 17, 2022. Sumeth Panpetch/AP Photo

It wasn’t long ago that Thai officials spoke optimistically about building upon the success of a Ramadan ceasefire when government forces and BRN Muslim Malay rebels refrained from violence during the entire Islamic holy month across the Deep South.

The 40-day ceasefire, which both sides agreed to at peace talks in Malaysia in early April, lasted throughout Ramadan and into mid-May. It encompassed Buddhist observances of Visakha Bucha, arguably the most important holy day for members of Thailand’s religious majority, as a gesture of goodwill.

Some saw this as a turning point for an armed separatist insurgency that has seen peace initiatives come and go since the conflict in Thailand’s southern border region reignited nearly 20 years ago. The gesture went beyond the usual confidence-building measures discussed at the negotiations table.

Unfortunately, the optimism of the Thai officials was short-lived.

The reality kicked in hard when, within two weeks of the Ramadan ceasefire expiring, BRN combatants launched a vicious attack on a Marine Police outpost in Tak Bai, a border town along a river that separates Thailand from Malaysia.

It was not your typical assault by Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National Revolutionary Front) insurgents involving a roadside IED explosion followed by a gunfight lasting no more than three minutes.

This time around, the insurgents wanted people on both sides of the frontier to hear it. An intense gunfight went on for 15 minutes, and shots could still be heard an hour after the first round rang out.

And then last week, late at night on Tuesday and into Wednesday morning, the militants carried out simultaneous arson and bomb attacks targeting 17 convenience stores, mostly located at gas stations throughout the far south.

As in the Tak Bai operation in late May, the combatants avoided casualties by instructing the store clerks to step out. In the Tak Bai case, the vendors were told to take cover before the shooting started. However, in last week’s attack, a 21-year-old clerk at a 7-Eleven store in Narathiwat province was killed when he got trapped in a blaze when the shop was firebombed as part of the coordinated attacks, officials said.

And, as was the case in the Tak Bai incident, BRN officials neither confirmed nor denied that their group carried out last week’s coordinated attacks. BRN, a highly secretive organization, has a long-standing policy of not commenting on or claiming responsibility for specific incidents or operations.

This is partly because the group has no identifiable public representation through a political body or party in the same manner as the Irish Republican Army had through the Sinn Fein party in Northern Ireland. BRN has negotiators representing it but the movement has not set up a “political wing” that can fully engage with the general public and members of the international community.

Anas Abdulrahman (center), the head of the panel representing Barisan Revolusi Nasional rebels in peace talks with Thailand who is also known as Hipni Mareh, and fellow BRN delegates take part in a post-meetings press conference at a hotel in Petaling Jaya, near Kuala Lumpur, Aug. 3, 2022. [S. Mahfuz/BenarNews]

Observers with working relations with BRN operatives said the combatants were itching for a fight for some time but had been held back by the talks of a ceasefire.

Moreover, BRN combatants are still upset at the Thai Army for belittling a unilateral ceasefire announced by the rebel group in April 2020. It was a humanitarian gesture, in line with a global appeal from U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, so that health workers would not have to worry about getting caught up in any crossfire as they worked to deliver medical aid and curb the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, which hit the Deep South hard at the time.

Not only did the Thai Army give the rebels the cold shoulder by dismissing the gesture as insignificant as well as ignoring pleas from local activists to stand down, the Thai military unleashed its wrath on the BRN combatants, saying the law was on its side.

During the year between the unilateral declaration of the pandemic-related ceasefire and the start of this year’s Ramadan in early April, Thai security forces killed 64 BRN combatants, taking out one to two at a time in a lopsided standoffs in remote villages throughout the border region.

The combatants were laying low, obeying orders from their commanders to stand down during the unilateral pause in operations.

Villagers believed that informants had tipped off the authorities in return for rewards. One point of concern for the authorities was that in all of the standoffs, only one person surrendered. The rest fought to their deaths even though the chances of them making it out alive – that is, to escape – were next to nothing.

Moreover, senior BRN figures felt their negotiators were getting “too comfortable” with their Thai counterparts. They pointed to the audacity of the Thais to ask for the ceasefire only when it would serve their political interests.

At a technical-level meeting in June 2022, Thailand decided to push their luck and ask for another ceasefire. This time they were asking for a ceasefire that would last more than three months and cover the period of Buddhist Lent, which goes until Oct. 10 in Thailand.

BRN political officers surprised everybody when they succeeded in persuading the military wing to go along. Again, they gave the Thais more than they had bargained for; BRN even tacked on another month to the requested ceasefire by extending it until the end of November 2022.

But there was one condition: the Thai would have to sign the General Principles of the Peace Dialogue Process, a blueprint setting the terms for future talks.

The Thais did not object to the content, which includes a point stipulating that both sides must agree to negotiate under the Thai Constitution, and that the principle underlying the Unitary State of Thailand must be embraced.

Not signing anything has long been the standing tradition of the Thai government, perhaps out of fear that inking any document would unnecessarily enhance the legitimacy of the BRN – thus upsetting hardliners in the country. BRN officials, for their part, said that a signature from the Thai chief negotiator would enhance their acceptance and legitimacy as an organization.

Disagreement over the General Principles grew.

At the last round of in-person peace talks brokered by Malaysia near Kuala Lumpur on Aug. 1-2, it all came crashing down on the peace process.

BRN gave the Thais the cold shoulder. One Thai official described the meeting as a “setback” and another said a “reset button” had been pushed.

“It was as if the BRN didn’t want to be there,” said the officer. The two sides did not dine with each other and there was no mingling during coffee breaks either.

A senior BRN official dismissed the term “setback” but admitted that the meeting was a bit sour and it did not end on a good note. BRN was just being “firm with our stance,” he said.

Both sources spoke to this columnist on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to go on the record about issues discussed during the last round of talks.

Conservatives in Thailand believe that inking any agreement with the BRN would set the stage for the internationalization of the conflict, where the United Nations or other countries or members of the world community could intervene.

‘Getting too comfortable’

Meanwhile, there appears to be some kind of disagreement between the BRN negotiators, the group’s senior leadership, and its fighters in the field.

The field-level combatants believe their leaders should explore other ways to generate acceptance and legitimacy. The combatants don’t like the General Principles because of two stipulations about the Thai Constitution and the Unitary State of Thailand. The first article in the Thai Constitution says the kingdom is inseparable.

BRN leaders, however, have insisted that the political objective – independence for the people of Patani – which they equate as a “sacred value,” has not changed.

“Legitimacy and acceptance will depend on BRN living up to the commitments they made or plan to make with members of the international community. It also depends on their actions on the ground,” said Artef Sohko, the president of The Patani, a political action group that supports the right to self-determination for the people of the historically contested border region.

BRN leaders have expressed a desire for a better understanding of international norms and humanitarian principles.

In Artef’s view, the Thai government and the Malaysian facilitator, Abdul Rahim Noor, should appreciate and welcome this because it could mean greater civility in the conflict zone.

Commenting on the sour atmosphere at the recently concluded talks in Kuala Lumpur, Artef said, “BRN distancing themselves from the Thai negotiators is a good thing.”

“The Thai side was getting too comfortable,” said Artef, pointing to their “audacity” to request a 108-day ceasefire for Buddhist Lent while ignoring the “all or nothing” attitude of the government security forces deployed in the theater of operations.

Artef said the Thais conveniently ignored that BRN combatants in the field reluctantly went along with the Ramadan ceasefire. They didn’t want to humiliate their negotiators, he explained, so that’s why they gave in and stood down during the entire whole month of Ramadan.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

English:  https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/far-south-view/brn-attacks-08212022123508.html
Thai:  https://www.benarnews.org/thai/commentary/th-my-pathan-deep-south-08222022104414.html 

Southern Thailand glimpses hope for peace after lengthy ceasefire

Don Pathan
BenarNews

Yala, Thailand

Southern Thailand glimpses hope for peace after lengthy ceasefire

A glimpse of hope has emerged for Thailand’s far south: A ceasefire has been in place since April 1 without any violent confrontation between government troops and rebel forces.

Yala Central Mosque after the morning Eid al-Fitr prayer on May 2, 2022. Photo by Don Pathan

Observers said the ceasefire, announced that day at the end of a two-day, in-person meeting between the Thai negotiators and Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) representatives, was a leap of faith that stayed aloft as both sides kept their promises to put a lid on the violence.

The deal was pretty straightforward – the Thai military vowed not to go after cell members, while the rebel BRN agreed not to carry out attacks during Ramadan and through Visakha Bucha Day, a Buddhist holiday observed this year on May 15.

A bigger leap of faith was the move to declare all mosques in this conflict-affected region a sanctuary where combatants could meet their family members during the last 10 days of Ramadan, which ended on May 1. That did not happen.

Artef Sohko – president of The Patani, a political action group that advocates self-determination for the people of this historically contested region – said coming into an open public space like a community mosque was too big a security risk for combatants.

Mistrust is still high, he said.

In the past, the idea of standing down didn’t appeal to the Thai Army, which was bent on using military means to take down BRN combatants. Even after the BRN announced a unilateral ceasefire in April 2020, following a call for a global ceasefire from U.N. chief António Guterres at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Thai security forces relentlessly crushed BRN operatives, going after cell members one by one as they lay low in remote villages.

For 24 months, Thai forces killed nearly 60 BRN operatives, according to my own tally based on media reports. Military sources told me they found it astonishing that all but one of these combatants chose to fight to the death instead of surrendering, even though their chances of making it out alive were slim to none.

“It’s their way of showing their commitment to merdeka (independence),” said Asmadee Bueraheng, an executive member of The Patani, in reference to the fight-to-the-death attitude of the combatants.

The attitude caught the attention of a leading Thai security expert, associate professor Panitan Wattanayagorn, the chairman of the Prime Minister’s Security Advisory Committee, whose team of counter-violent extremism (CVE) researchers said these qualities would continue to pose tremendous challenges to Thailand’s counterinsurgency programs.\

Sermon at the Yala Central Mosque, May 2, 2022. Photo by Don Pathan

Speaking at a recent event at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand, Panitan said Thai security officials can take comfort in the fact that the overall number of violent incidents has gone down steadily over the past decade.

But the level of commitment among activists and combatants should be a wake-up call about the nature of the conflict and what qualifies as counterinsurgency success, he said.

Getting BRN negotiators to agree that future talks will be in line with the “Unitary State of Thailand in accordance with the Constitution” may be an achievement, but many officials and militants don’t see it that way.

Some Thai top brass see BRN embracing the Thai Constitution as a calculating move – part of a long-term strategy to get national acceptance and international legitimacy.

According to this theory, BRN believes that it can achieve acceptance if it is no longer branded an organized crime group – and that in time, the international community will respond positively to its legitimate grievances. In other words, independence is still their ultimate aim.

Meanwhile, combatants on the ground want to know if embracing the Thai Constitution means an end to their quest for independence. If this political goal is compromised, a splinter group could be in the pipeline. Article 1 of the Thai Constitution says the country is inseparable.

Secret movement

There were plenty of local and international NGOs interested in working with both the Thais and the BRN on conflict resolution and mediation. But accessing the key decision-makers – the supreme leaders of the movement – has proven virtually impossible.

BRN is a secret movement and anyone who surfaces into public space is considered “expendable,” military sources say. There is disagreement on whether that extends to the seven BRN negotiators – and whether they can actually deliver on their promises, much less control the powerful military wing of the movement.

Meanwhile, the decision by BRN negotiators to talk under the Thai Constitution has given needed ammunition for other long-standing Patani separatist movements to reassert themselves by appealing to those who disagree with the move.

To demonstrate this point, the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO), in the early morning of April 15, carried out a double-tap strike that killed one villager and wounded three Army ordinance officials while the BRN and Thai security forces were observing the ceasefire. PULO President Kasturi Mahkota was quick to credit the movement’s military wing, which he called G-5, and stated that he is willing to return to the negotiating table, but not under the Thai Constitution.

PULO, along with other long-standing movements that came under the umbrella of the MARA Patani organization, was sidelined from the peace talks after the Thais secured a buy-in from the BRN to come to the table under the current process, which was launched in January 2020.

And while PULO is contemplating its next move, MARA Patani’s chief negotiator, Sukree Hari, also resurfaced to issue a public statement on YouTube on May 1. While his statement merely marked the end of Ramadan, it was also a reminder to the Thais that MARA Patani, too, should be invited back to the negotiation table.

For the PULO to regain its old status and strength – which peaked in the 1980s – the movement would have to complete its organizational blue print and fill up the slots, particularly the military and political wings.

On the other hand, BRN went into hibernation for about 10 years in the 1990s and caught the Thai security apparatus off guard when it resurfaced with a bang on Jan. 4, 2004, raiding an army battalion in Narathiwat and making off with more than 350 Thai military weapons.

While many Thai officials say they don’t see a PULO military wing in the making, it doesn’t mean that it’s not in the pipeline. Thai officials were caught off guard when the BRN reactivated its cells 18 years ago. No one wants to be humiliated with the same shock-and-awe scenario with the return of PULO.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

Latest Deep South Peace Talks: Too Far Too Fast?

Don Pathan
BenarNews

Anas Abdulrahman (also known as Hipni Mareh), the head of a panel representing BRN rebels at Malaysian-brokered peace talks with Thailand, speaks during a press conference as other BRN officials sit beside him at a hotel near Kuala Lumpur, April 1, 2022. S. Mahfuz/BenarNews

On the surface, the latest peace talks between Thai government negotiators and representatives of the BRN rebel group seem promising for people in Thailand’s far south, where violence linked to a separatist insurgency has claimed more than 7,300 lives since 2004. But it is not clear if Barisan Revolusi Nasional combatants will embrace the direction of the talks.

Just last Wednesday, on the eve of the talks, a powerful roadside bomb and gunfight left two police officers dead and wounded two others in Yala province – a reminder that the end is nowhere in sight in this predominantly Malay-speaking region.

The March 31-April 1 negotiations picked up where they had left off in January when the two sides agreed to work towards greater public consultations, reduction of violence, and finding political solutions to this separatist insurgency.

Meanwhile, it has emerged that in the course of secret discussions since late last year, a working paper came out that outlined the General Principles for future talks. Both sides agreed that future discussions would be conducted “under the Unitary State of Thailand in accordance with the Constitution.”

The clause showed up again in a press statement issued by Thailand’s negotiating team to mark the end of the latest round of in-person talks.

“It sounds like a breakthrough but in reality, it is a cheap and pretentious effort that has no bearing on reality on the ground,” said Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, a political action group that promote rights to self-determination for Thailand’s Malay-speaking Deep South.

The first article of the Thai Constitution stipulates clearly that the kingdom is inseparable. For the BRN combatants – or any ordinary person on the street, for that matter – BRN negotiators embracing Thailand’s Constitution means an end to the quest for independence.

When reporters asked them about this after the two-day meeting in Malaysia, neither rebel nor Thai negotiators would confirm or deny that BRN, which controls virtually all of the combatants in the field, is willing to settle for something less than independence.

For the past 18 years, since the violence in this historically contested region surfaced, combatants have been told that their fight is nothing less than a moral obligation and sacred duty to liberate a historically Malay homeland from invading Siamese/Thai forces.

Fighters in the field are now learning about the move to “embrace the Thai Constitution.” BRN leadership has advised them to remain calm, saying the engagement with Thai negotiators is part of a “diplomatic exercise,” said a source with knowledge of such conversations.

Artef believes the BRN military wing could splinter if combatants believe their political goal and “sacred” values have been compromised. Like any other splinter groups in a sub-national conflict, a splinter group in Thailand’s far south would want to demonstrate their capability.

Subnational groups like the Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) took years to develop a narrative acceptable to their combatants before they went to the negotiating table. Conflict resolution for southern Thailand, abnormally, is the opposite.

The recent annual Ramadan statement posted on YouTube in mid-March 2022 by Abdulkarim Khalid, a member of BRN’s Information Department, expressed hope that the year’s holy month would be peaceful.

The Thai Army, meanwhile, says it will stand down during this year’s Ramadan if combatants do the same, as part of confidence-building measures. All mosques in the region will become a sanctuary ground during the last 10 days of Ramadan so combatants can meet with their families.

In the current atmosphere, a ceasefire during Ramadan is a big leap of faith.

BRN fighters have been targeted in relentless search-and-kill operations over the past two years, after the group declared a unilateral ceasefire in April 2020 so that public health officials wouldn’t have to worry about getting caught in crossfire while working to contain the spread of COVID-19. Since then, at least 50 combatants have been killed by Thai security forces, who did not reciprocate the BRN goodwill gesture.

With that in mind, Artef and other activists in his circle believe the Army has a long way to go to earn the trust of the BRN.

Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that Thai security forces will not resume their search-and-kill operations after Ramadan.

At the same time, BRN leaders and negotiators don’t seem to have the courage to tell their fighters that their original political objective may have been compromised.

What is needed is a new narrative to explain and justify the course of actions taken by the BRN leaders and the Thai negotiators.

They don’t need to explain or convince the public and the donor community that they are moving in the right direction. But both the Thais and the BRN negotiators need to think about how to get their soldiers and fighters on board this peace process and move forward as one.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

English: https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/far-south-view/don-pathan-analysis-04042022131041.html?fbclid=IwAR2myRVD_5WyyAs742hbdtN5qtza6WOW-8xaMxhUF2hTtd9IAN9bT8WnMJY

Thai: https://www.benarnews.org/thai/commentary/th-deep-south-don-pathan-analysis-04042022165342.html?fbclid=IwAR0GaPKUZiVbGd3mre8v8nhtCY8gF1X3RTYy-Kdng18MYYzYI7cHLhqV8ZE  

Junta’s three-year peace effort in South fizzles to embarrassing end

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

Peace talks with separatist insurgents have hit a snag after longstanding tensions between Thai negotiators and MARA Patani, an umbrella organisation of separatist movements in the Muslim-majority South, came to the boil.

The first sign of trouble came in the middle of last year when Bangkok refused to ink an agreement on a pilot Safety Zone, a high-profile initiative before it was ditched by the new chief negotiator, General Udomchai Thamsarorat.

Udomchai saw the Safety Zone project and its ceasefire as unrealistic because MARA Patani has little or no control over the insurgent combatants.

 With faith in the umbrella group draining, the Thai side decided to seek direct contact with Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the longstanding separatist movement that controls virtually all of the rebel combatants.

BRN is not currently part of the Malaysia-facilitated talks and Kuala Lumpur has had no success in convincing the movement’s leadership to endorse the peace initiative.

The latest hiccup came during a February 2 visit to Kuala Lumpur by Udomchai and his team, for a meeting with technical officials from MARA Patani. Udomchai said he went along just to meet Abdul Rahim Noor, the designated Malaysian facilitator for the talks.

But out of nowhere, Malaysia insisted the meeting constituted high-level talks, which would require Udomchai and Rahim Noor’s participation.

Udomchai refused but suggested compromise: an informal meeting with Shukri Hari, a senior MARA Patani negotiator.

The following day, Shukri appeared in a YouTube video calling on the Thai government to replace Udomchai with someone “more credible”. The group also said they would not talk to the Thais until a new government was formed in Bangkok.

Why all the drama over protocol? According to Artef Sohko, chair of The Patani, a local political action group dedicated to promoting self-determination for the people of Patani, the tension stems from a feeling among Malaysia and MARA Patani that Udomchai may be moving away from them to establish a separate back-channel with BRN.

“MARA Patani is concerned that they will become irrelevant. The drama in Kuala Lumpur and Shukri’s statement on YouTube afterward stemmed from that fear,” Artef said.

For some in the international community, Udomchai’s appointment  was a breath of fresh air for the peace push. After all, he broke with tradition to seek their views – although foreign mediation is still out of the question.

For mediation, he instead turned to local political activists and civil society organisations in the hope they might help bridge the divide or perhaps even mediate the talks. However, local activists with access to BRN leaders are not rushing to take up the offer.

Udomchai may have the mandate from Bangkok but no one is convinced he can deliver on agreements made at the negotiation table. There are too many “players” in power and none of them appears to be singing from the same hymn sheet. 

Continuity is another concern; each change of Thai government has brought a new negotiating team. And with a general election scheduled for March 24, no one is certain how the new administration will treat the far South.

Moreover, the junta has little to show in terms of a legacy in the far South. The Safety Zone that peace negotiators had been working on over the past three years has proved a leap of faith too far.

Delivering a new initiative at this point in time appears unrealistic given the impending general election. But Bangkok is still hoping it can open a channel of communication with the BRN, with or without MARA Patani’s participation.

The move is a U-turn on the path pursued by Udomchai’s predecessor as chief negotiator, General Aksara Kherdpol. Aksara depicted himself as having the upper hand and the moral high ground because of the mandate handed to him. He forgot that the BRN couldn’t care less about the current talks, meaning the brutality continued.

Yet Bangkok’s bid to establish communications with the BRN leadership hit trouble from the start.

Udomchai was supposed to meet BRN leaders Abdulloh Waemanor and Deng Awaeji on November 24 for talks arranged by Malaysia. But the two BRN men refused to show up and have been in hiding ever since.

Thai sources say Malaysian authorities have pinpointed the location of the pair, who unlike other Patani separatist leaders have no travel documents and thus are dependant on being granted asylum.

Malaysian facilitators decided that it was best to leave Abdulloh and Deng at their “safehouse” until Kuala Lumpur decided on its next move.

Frustrated with having virtually nothing to show for its near three-year peace effort with MARA Patani, Bangkok decided to lower its sights. It declared talks with BRN did not have to be at the leadership level as long as they had the blessing of separatist movement’s ruling council, the Dewan Pimpinan Parti.

But with BRN leaders keeping their heads down as they await Malaysia’s next move in this big “game of chicken” between them and Kuala Lumpur, meeting Udomchai is the last thing on their minds.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based development and security consultant and a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation dedicated to critical discussion of the conflict in Thailand’s far South.

Thai Authorities Struggle to Understand a Conflict They Have Been Fighting for Decades

A string of deadly standoffs with Malay rebels strains an already shaky peace process.

Monday, September 13, 2021 / BY: Don Pathan

In May 2021, Thai security forces were in a three-hour standoff with two Malay-Muslim separatist insurgents in a small remote village in the southernmost border province of Yala. As they stood their ground, the two combatants made video calls to family and friends to bid farewell. Someone began recording one of the calls on another cellphone. Soon, footage of the two men, who were killed in the operation, was circulating on social media. 

The video and outpouring of support jolted security officials whose stated goal is to win the hearts and minds of the local Malay Muslim population. The officials wanted to know if the two insurgents had deliberately pursued their own deaths as a publicity stunt and if the making of video calls would be the start of a new strategy in the conflict.

Days later, a similar situation arose in the Bacho district of Narathiwat province. Outnumbered and outgunned, four insurgents tried to fight their way out of a standoff with security forces. One escaped, one was killed and two were arrested. Then, in late June 2021, security forces surprised two insurgents in a pre-dawn raid on a seaside resort in Pattani province. Again, authorities attempted to convince the insurgents to surrender, using a village imam speaking through a loudspeaker, and again, the combatants opted to fight to the death.

 

Bullet holes pock a house in Krong Pinang, a village in southern Thailand’s Yala province, where two insurgents spent the last hours of their lives before being killed during a standoff with government forces three days earlier. (Photo by Don Pathan, May 7, 2021)

The Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the separatist movement to which these insurgents belonged, resurfaced in mid-2001 after a decade of relative quiet in a historically contested region of southern Thailand where most of the two million residents identify as Malay and reject the government’s policy of assimilation. Although the BRN is negotiating peace with the Thai government and its powerful military wing is exploring “nonmilitary means” to advance its cause, this streak of deadly standoffs has strained an already tenuous peace process. While the BRN called a unilateral cease-fire in April 2020 in response to the health emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, a relentless Thai military operation eventually forced the combatants to once again take up arms.

A Homegrown Insurgency

Many in the Malay-Muslim community in southern Thailand have long considered self-determination to be a sacred value. Unlike the previous generation of Malay nationalists and guerillas, thousands of whom trained in the Middle East and North Africa during the 1980s, the current generation of insurgents is homegrown. Today’s fighters are quite pious — they observe religious practices, including fasting and praying five times a day. In death, they are buried as shahid, or martyrs, in line with Islamic tradition. But BRN leaders refute comparisons to extremists associated with the Islamic State group (ISIS), al-Qaida or Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).

BRN leaders also refute suggestions that their combatants planned attacks with the express intent to die. While these combatants are unwilling to be captured alive, death has never been the central part of their plan. Rather, their decisions to fight to the death are driven by their fear of abuse and exploitation at the hands of Thai security forces if captured alive. Thai officials often parade combatants who have surrendered before the media, branding them as having been “misled” by the rebels. Observers and relatives of the dead insurgents say the thought of being humiliated by state personnel helps make the choice of fighting to the death that much easier.

From the look of it, the Thai government will go to great lengths to deny the BRN legitimacy — be it through a relentless assault that forced the combatants to break their unilateral cease-fire to denying them their human dignity by forcing the surrendered to recant publicly or turn on their former comrades. What the government does not see, say residents in this region, is that such actions are counterproductive. “They may have killed two insurgents but their handling of the aftermath inadvertently strengthens the BRN’s popularity and recruitment,” said one resident in Krong Pinang district, the scene of the May gunfight, on the condition of anonymity.

Jihad in the Making?

Although the BRN maintains that the conflict is an ethno-nationalist struggle, there is always a concern that the insurgency will tap into the global jihadist movement in which religion becomes the banner of struggle. So far, transnational jihadist groups like JI, al-Qaida, and ISIS have not made inroads in southern Thailand. Nevertheless, the incursion of radicalism in the Mindanao region of the Philippines and the emergence of JI cells in various pockets of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in the early 2000s are all cause for concern that outside radical ideas could penetrate Thailand as well.

The JI operatives behind the 2002 Bali bombings visited southern Thailand at the height of the movement to seek out potential partners in the region. While these JI cells — most of them were in Indonesia, some in Malaysia and at least one in Singapore, but none in Thailand — have largely been crushed, the global war on terrorism is still far from over. Although transnational jihadism has yet to take root in southern Thailand, fear that it could is not irrational, and a longstanding conflict such as the one involving the BRN creates opportunities for foreign and local jihadists to flourish.

The Prospects for Peace Are Bleak for Now

The conflict in southern Thailand is unlikely to be resolved militarily or via peaceful negotiations in the near future. The fluidity of the BRN’s chain of command makes it difficult for Thai security forces to penetrate and defeat the movement. Cells are organized somewhat independently, and decisions to attack are largely made at the cell level unless the operation requires coordination. These factors help explain why southern Thailand has continued to smolder despite 18 years of constant military presence and operations. Additionally, for much of the past two decades, Thailand has been embroiled in a political crisis that has hampered conflict resolution in the far south.

Although the BRN’s leadership finally agreed to come to the table in January 2020, the pace of peace talks has been slow. The BRN lacks cohesion — the movement’s military wing has expressed concerns about direct negotiations with the Thai government. This has put additional strain on the BRN negotiators to demonstrate that something good can come out of the process. Likewise, successive Thai governments and the military have never been united on a policy for the far south. Government negotiators are caught between the politics of the government of the day and the powerful military that launched two coups in 2006 and 2014. Furthermore, the Thai army has historically opposed negotiations with the separatists as they do not acknowledge the Malays’ grievances, and the government has opposed too much external involvement out of concern that mediation or foreign assistance to the BRN could enhance the rebels’ legitimacy.

Recommendations for How to Get to Peace

A growing number of policymakers suggest that it is time for Thailand to abandon its zero-sum mentality and permit outside help to build the capacity of negotiators on both sides of the conflict. The BRN is eager to work with international organizations and foreign governments as that would help enhance its legitimacy. Such engagement would also provide it opportunities to learn more about international norms, the Geneva Conventions and humanitarian law. However, there remains a question as to who could fill this role and to what extent the Thai government and army would accept outside involvement.

Malaysia is currently “facilitating” the peace talks, but Kuala Lumpur is more of a stakeholder in this conflict as the country shares a common and porous border with Thailand. Kuala Lumpur may respect Thailand’s territorial integrity but there is a great deal of sympathy for the Patani Malays from the Malaysian citizens. As the designated “facilitator,” Malaysia has to tread carefully, as an unexpected incident has the potential to sour bilateral relations. For example, BRN rebels attacked Thai troops, killing one, in early August 2021 in Tak Bai district on the banks of the Kolok River, which marks the official border between Thailand and Malaysia. The rebels were seen in CCTV footage crossing over from the Malaysian side of the river to carry out the attack.

The United States should be concerned about the potential for radicalism to arise in southern Thailand. Thailand’s position as a treaty ally of the United States and a major non-NATO ally makes it, and the Western hotels and embassies within it, a legitimate target in the eyes of global terrorists. The fact that there are many international organizations and countries in Southeast Asia with experience in countering violent extremism may provide an effective starting point for more international actors to offer assistance. 

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/09/thai-authorities-struggle-understand-conflict-they-have-been-fighting-decades 

Thailand: Could One of Asia’s Deadliest Conflicts Be Coming to an End?

After decades of conflict, the government and southern rebels take tentative steps toward peace.

Tuesday, September 7, 2021 / By: Don Pathan

Thailand’s southernmost region is home to one of Asia’s longest-running armed conflicts. A separatist movement that emerged in the 1960s sought to carve out the Muslim-majority region as an independent state. Levels of violence have oscillated over the course of the conflict, with the most recent insurgency arising in the early 2000s. Despite decades of protracted armed conflict, there is recent cause for optimism.

A growing number of officials are talking about the need to move beyond conflict management to conflicttransformation in order to focus on the root causes of the insurgency. Moreover, government and rebel peace negotiators as well as the Malaysian facilitators of the negotiations are exploring ways to move beyond confidence-building measures and take up more concrete, substantive issues.

The Roots of the Conflict

The conflict is deeply rooted in historical tensions and mistrust. This Malay-speaking region, known as Patani, came under Siam’s control in 1785, following its defeat. Since the beginning of the 20th century, Buddhist-majority Thailand (then Siam) has aggressively pursued a policy of assimilation, which Malays reject as an infringement on their cultural and religious identity. Many in this community hold that the region belongs to the Malay people and that the community has a moral obligation to liberate it from invading Siamese/Thai forces.

As international support for the insurgency, particularly from Arab countries, waned in the post-Cold War era, violence in the region fell. In the late 1980s to early 1990s, combatants put down their weapons and returned to their villages, while the movement’s leadership remained abroad, taking up asylum and citizenship in foreign countries. Thai policymakers wrongly assumed that the absence of violence meant peace had been attained. But the Malay cultural-historical narrative of liberation continued to persist in the region.

A new generation of fighters surfaced in mid-2001 with regular attacks on Thai security outposts. The insurgency shifted into high gear in January 2004 after dozens of combatants raided an army base and made off with more than 350 weapons. The incident prompted official acknowledgement from Bangkok of renewed insurgency in the region as Thai officials could no longer deny the political underpinning of the attacks. The government responded by sealing the border, placing several districts under curfew and deploying a large number of soldiers to the region. Since then, more than 7,000 people have died from insurgency-related violence.

Thailand’s Response to the Insurgency

Thailand’s counterinsurgency operation has involved a two-pronged approach of development and security. Both have failed to win hearts and minds as neither addresses the root causes of the insurgency. The conflict is essentially about rejecting Thailand’s policy of assimilation and the Patani Malays’ quest for independence. Militants on the ground continue to enjoy support from the Malay Muslim residents, particularly those living in remote villages. Over the years, successive Thai governments have quietly approached neighboring countries and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) to mediate the conflict. None successfully generated meaningful traction, as talks were mainly held with exiled former armed separatist leaders who no longer controlled the combatants on the ground.

As for the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the armed group that controls virtually all of the combatants on the ground today, independence continues to be a sacred value and nonnegotiable goal. For years, the atmosphere was not conducive to peace, as neither side was willing to make concessions. As a country that has never been colonized, Thailand never seriously considered ceding territory over which it claims sovereignty. But in January 2020, nearly two decades after the arms heist that kicked off the current wave of the insurgency, the BRN and the Thai government decided to come to the table for talks facilitated by Malaysia. The two sides held two face-to-face meetings, focusing on technical issues, and exploring confidence-building measures. Then COVID-19 hit the region in March 2020 forcing the discussion online.

Rebels’ Leap of Faith

The peace initiative that was launched in January 2020 rests on a shaky foundation. The BRN’s powerful military wing is not convinced that the atmosphere is conducive for a formal negotiation. Moreover, it is also concerned that the movement will abandon its moral obligation to liberate the region. In late 2019, talk of a split in the BRN was rampant until a group of young political activists from The Patani, a political action group seeking self-determination in the region, convinced the BRN military wing to reconsider. Although critical of this latest peace initiative, the president of The Patani, Artef Sohko, feared that division of the movement would cause violence to escalate and risk greater harm to civilians. Artef urged the BRN’s leaders, and particularly the military wing, to take the moral high ground and explore new ideas to advance their cause, particularly through nonmilitary means. These suggestions led to two major announcements.

On February 19, 2020, representatives of the political and military councils of the BRN signed the “Deed of Commitment for the Protection of Children from the Effects of Armed Conflict” with Geneva Call, an INGO that works with armed groups around the world on rules of engagement and other humanitarian issues. In March 2020, the region became a hot spot of the COVID-19 pandemic when hundreds of people became infected after a group of Muslim missionaries returned from Malaysia and Indonesia with the disease. In response to a request from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres for a global cease-fire during the pandemic, the BRN in April 2020 announced a unilateral cease-fire to allow medical personnel and aid workers full access to the area to carry out humanitarian efforts to combat the pandemic.

While the BRN received some quiet praise from the international community for its overtures, the Thai army was not amused. Rather, the Thai army responded with serious force, sending out helicopters, drones and long-range reconnaissance patrols. It was a stern reminder to the BRN that nothing comes easily in this historically contested region. Moreover, the peace initiatives lacked the support of the then army chief Gen. Apirat Kongsompong who viewed the insurgents as nothing more than criminals.

Prospects for Peace

Though history suggests one should not bet on peace, there are reasons for optimism. Apirat retired last October, ushering in new leadership that appears to be more amenable to the peace negotiations. Additionally, the BRN’s military wing is exploring “nonmilitary means” to advance its cause. That does not mean the peace process is secure. The BRN’s military wing has yet to be convinced that there is much to be gained from the peace process, but it is willing to give the negotiators time to prove them wrong.

Though the COVID-19 pandemic had the potential to derail peace efforts, negotiators from both parties were able to maintain momentum by adapting to an online forum. The platform has proven to be somewhat awkward for the BRN negotiators who would rather discuss sensitive issues, like the cease-fire during the recent Ramadan holy month, in a face-to-face setting. Artef warned that one should not expect too much from the BRN negotiators as they do not have significant influence over the combatants. They risk making themselves irrelevant if they do anything that antagonizes the military wing, he said.

BRN and Thai negotiators are currently at a crossroads, trying to transition from confidence-building measures to a forum in which more substantial issues can be discussed. The pandemic response presents an opportunity for cooperation, as both sides recognize the need to encourage residents, particularly the Malays, to sign up for vaccinations. Separately, a growing number of senior Thai government officials in and around the policy arena are starting to talk about the need to embrace conflict transformation, a peacebuilding theory that goes beyond conflict resolution and conflict management to focus on the underlying conditions that give rise to conflict in the first place.

Whether the current or future governments in Thailand will have the political will to explicitly identify the social structures and dynamics causing the conflict and be courageous enough to reshape them remains to be seen. But the fact that the two opposing sides are finally talking to one another, even on a shaky foundation, suggests that there is hope for peacebuilding initiatives in this restive region after all.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/09/thailand-could-one-asias-deadliest-conflicts-be-coming-end