Expanding the theatre of violence in the deep South

Recent attacks reveal that talks between Bangkok and the BRN hold little sway over separatists in the deep South

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

Dan Nok, Songkhla  

January 16, 2014

Photo by DON PATHAN. Carbomb attack in Don Nok, Songkhla Province of Thailand on Dec 22, 2013.

Last June, the liaison officer for the Barisan Revolusi Nasional delegation representing the separatists at ongoing deep South peace talks pointed out that the historical homeland of the Patani Malays includes Sadao district in Songkhla province. Hasan Taib called on the Thai military to pull out of this small border town, but his request was met with howls of dismay among the local business community.

Businesspeople were worried that placing the district under the spotlight would hit trade in the area, which includes the largest border crossing between Thailand and Malaysia. It also covers Dan Nok, the mini-sin city that has long served as a cash cow for prominent and politically connected local figures.

A typical Thai border town with relaxed rules and regulations, Dan Nok is a dumping ground for the things nobody wants to talk about publicly - smuggled goods, gambling and prostitution.

But the hoopla from local businessmen couldn't deter the insurgents, who were bent on extending the theatre of violence to the district. And so on the morning of December 22, insurgents used motorbike bombs against two police targets - Bedang Besar and Sadao - while the front parking lot of the Oliver Hotel in Dan Nok was hit with a car bomb.

Dan Nok was at the centre of a month-long festival of lights, a joint effort by tour operators from Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan. The event was due to stretch from Chinese New Year to Valentine's Day, but the insurgents chose to crash the party. Not only did the attacks upset the business sector, Thai security apparatus was also jolted. It was the first time Sadao had been hit since this wave of insurgency erupted just a decade ago, and the signs were of more attacks to come.

But even more startling was what appeared to be an attempted car-bomb attack on a Phuket police station the same day. Stuffed with enough explosive to devastate a 500-metre radius, the truck had been parked behind the station for at least two days. Police were alerted to the Phuket threat when the Bedang Besar bomb went off at a police station parking lot on December 22, about 10 kilometres away from Dan Nok.

The Phuket vehicle was immediately towed to the outskirts of the city, where it began to yield bits and pieces of odd information. The bomb's timer revealed it was set to go off on August 1, 2013 - nearly five months earlier.

At first, it didn't make sense to the investigating officers, then somebody reminded them of an incident in Phuket on August 1. A small home-made bomb had gone off in a garbage can at the Phuket city hall, slightly damaging five cars but injuring no one. At the time, everybody assumed local politics was at play. But the attacks on December 22 quickly changed that outlook and suggested the culprits were trying to send a message with the timer date.

While the attacks in Sadao have all the signatures of the insurgency, many are wondering why Phuket is being targeted. And if there is a link between the August 1 explosion at Phuket's city hall and the truck-bomb timer found on December 22, then one can safely assume that this plan had been in the pipeline for some time.

Some security officers have linked the Phuket and Dan Nok incidents to local business disputes. It's very possible that local kingpins used the insurgents, as they had done before, to get their message across, they said.

Others have linked the Sadao and Phuket attacks back to the May 26, 2013 attack on Ramkhamhaeng Soi 43/1 by an insurgent cell. Although political leaders maintain the Ramkhamhaeng bombing was not linked to unrest in the deep South, security officials confirmed that the attack was a bid by one of the longstanding separatist groups to enhance its leverage in negotiations.

Unlike other sub-national conflicts where insurgent groups claim responsibilty for attacks so as to enhance their leverage with the state, the conflict in Muslim-majority southern Thailand has yet to develop a proper channel of communication where claims over violent incidents can be properly verified. But a group did claim responsibility for the Ramkhamhaeng operation, stating its aim was to be at the negotiating table.

Sources among the separatist movement in exile said the situation was not conducive for representatives of any movement to go public and claim responsibility for the attacks. Ideally, such a task should be the work of a recognised political wing that could serve as a channel of communication between the movement and the Thai government and other stakeholders.

Meanwhile, BRN sources have dismissed ongoing peace talks that kicked off on February 28 last year as a futile exercise. They said the initiative did not have the blessing of the BRN leadership and that it was hastily put together by the governments in Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur in the mistaken belief it would lead to something bigger and better. Not only has the February 28 initiative failed to generate traction with insurgents, it has also upset a lot of BRN leaders and cell members.

Shan State Army kicks the habit but gets little respect

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

Myanmar's notorious narco-army is reinventing itself in the name of peace, but the govt isn't listening

Back when Shan drug baron Khun Sa reigned over the notorious Golden Triangle, there was nothing pretentious about the narcotics business in this lawless region where opium warlords play for keeps.

Opium, they said, was as good as gold. Some of the local residents were even using it in place of the official currency.

D Pathan- SSA camp near Thai border (1999)

Today, groups like the Shan State Army (SSA), which once fought alongside Khun Sa for Shan independence, are working hard to reinvent themselves as drug-free armed ethnic outfits with their own counter-narcotic policies.

The opportunity to assert their anti-drugs campaigns came after the Myanmar government decided to push for a series of political reforms and renegotiate a ceasefire deal with the armed ethnic armies, including the SSA.

Opium eradication and crop substitution became common ground on which the two sides could work together to strengthen confidence and trust. But that process has been far from easy. The government has other priorities during this transition period and cooperating with Shan rebels is not high on the list.

The SSA feels it has been shunned, but the ill-feeling is not enough to turn back the clock to when the two sides were at each other’s throats on the battlefield.

Opium has always been a part of Myanmar’s longstanding insurgencies.

For the numerous armed ethnic armies fighting the Burmese military for autonomy or independence during Khun Sa’s time, opium was main the source of income.

Residents in Thailand’s northern border provinces, as well as the ethnic Shan and other anti-Burmese junta forces, didn’t mind if men like Khun Sa were producing and trafficking opium and heroin if it was in a good cause.

In January 1996, following a relentless assault from combined forces of the Burmese and troops from the United Wa State Army (UWSA) – dubbed the world’s largest armed drug-trafficking outfit – Khun Sa decided to surrender in exchange for amnesty.

Certain factions in Khun Sa’s Mong Tai Army (MTA), like the one led by warlord Maha Ja, joined peace talks in exchange for limited self rule.

Others, like Colonel Yawd Serk, relocated his troops near the Thai border to set up the Shan State Army-South and continue the fight against the government.

Yawd Serk’s decision not to join the Burmese junta served the Thai military quite well. Burma and Thailand at the time were engaged in a quiet proxy war fought via ethnic armies.

This explains why rebel forces fighting the Burmese junta were not considered a threat to Thailand. On the other hand, those with a ceasefire agreement with Rangoon, were considered a threat by Bangkok.

Khun Sa’s MTA was slightly different because the outfit was not under “Myanmar’s legal fold” but was not exactly a Thai lackey either.

And so when his MTA fell apart, Yawd Serk’s SSA had to turn to Thailand to ensure that his security and economic lifeline remained intact.

As part of their effort to shake off the ghost of Khun Sa, the SSA pushed through an anti-narcotics campaign with drug-burning ceremonies to attract the attention of foreign and local media.

The UWSA, the world’s largest producer of heroin, was not exactly public-relations savvy, but nevertheless tried to convince the world that it, too, wanted to kick the habit.

In late 2004 the Wa leadership said they were planning to announce an end to opium cultivation in exchange for formal recognition from the Burmese government and the world community.

But in January 2005, a New York court indicted eight Wa leaders, some of whom, like the notorious Wei brothers and the Bao brothers, had already been convicted on heroin trafficking charges in the US.

Chinese security officials had hush-hush working relations with the Wa and were hoping that an “opium-free” UWSA would make their dealings with the Wa leaders easier. Nevertheless, ties between the UWSA and the Chinese authorities are as strong as ever.

Wa officials often joke about how disappointed Burmese officials are when they visit the UWSA base, Panghsang, and find “it feels like a Chinese town”. From the cellphone signal to the currency and language, the Wa-controlled area in Burma’s Shan State is very much an extension of China.

The UWSA wanted a better relationship with Thailand. Much of Khun Sa’s territory along the Thai border was occupied by Wa troops who began to build towns and small cities and pack them with villagers the UWSA had forcibly relocated from the Chinese border.

Many of these villagers died along the way, according to a report by Chiang Mai-based Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN), but the end result was the strengthening of UWSA regiments along the Thai border.

It has not been a comfortable stay for the UWSA troops. Gunfights occasionally break out between the Wa and Thai troops. Just about every border crossing leading to the Wa stronghold has been shut.

As for the SSA, the changing nature of its relationship with the Myanmar government has given it another chance to show the world it is serious about kicking the habit. But going “cold turkey” has been a rough ride.

The SSA’s political wing, the Restoration Council of the Shan State (RCSS), in October 2012 entered into a joint pilot project to eradicate drugs with the UN and the Thein Sein government. This past week, the group issued a statement accusing the Myanmar government of dragging its feet over the project.

“The experience of the RCSS in attempting to carry out the joint drug eradication project indicates that the agreement is only on paper and the government has no intention of cooperating on drug eradication,” said the RCSS, adding that the “government’s failure to adhere to its agreement is affecting trust-building in the peace process”.

The very fact that the SSA is urging the government to get moving on the project shows how things have changed in the region.

The SSA may want to turn Shan State into a drug-free area, but the reality on the ground shows it faces a long and tough road. According to a recently released annual United Nations report, opium production in Myanmar has risen 26 per cent since 2012. This year marked the seventh consecutive year poppy cultivation has increased in the country. Some 870 tonnes of opium was produced this year, the largest amount since 2002.

Until there is a meaningful political and economic alternative for the area, opium production, it seems, will continue to form a large part of the locals’ livelihood.

Don Pathan is a freelance consultant and an independent security analyst based in Thailand.

Insurgents know that Bangkok isn't serious about peace: Wan Kadir

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

PATTANI __Wan Kadir Che Man, 72, the former leader of the now defunct Bersatu, didn't mince words when he lashed successive Thai governments for their "stupid" and "insincere" actions in three decades of failed peace initiatives in the deep South.

Speaking at a packed seminar at the Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani, the ageing academic, who this year was permitted to return to Thailand after more than 50 years in exile for his involvement with separatist movements, said the failure to generate a meaningful peace process was down to Bangkok's choice of facilitators/ mediators and go-betweens whose main interest was in "exploiting" talks for personal and political gain. Meanwhile, Thai officials who have taken part in three decades of negotiations have been more concerned with enhancing their professional rank than bringing peace.

The peace initiative launched on February 28 in Kuala Lumpur between the Thai National Security Council and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) is the latest example of Bangkok's lack of sincerity, said Wan Kadir, with separatist leaders Bangkok has brought to the table having no control over insurgents active in the three southernmost provinces.

The so-called BRN cadres at the talks appear to have been handpicked by local Malay Muslim politicians and leaders allied with the Pheu Thai Party.

Wan Kadir said it was difficult for the real leaders of various separatist groups to take the Thai government seriously and that many came "just for the delicious tom yam soup".

In other words, if the peace process is credible and coherent - and if the combatants and their political leaders are prepared - then the separatist movements will produce viable representatives.

But instead of rethinking the whole approach to peace and its negotiations, Thai authorities continue to go to the same "facilitators, mediators and go-betweens, some of whom have little understanding of the region's problems, and whose sincerity is often questionable".

"How can we expect some 'white-eyed' [coward] farang or some dato [Malay local ruler] to resolve our problems? The past 20 years have shown that this same old approach does not work. Are we that stupid not to see it, or are we just pretending not to see it?"

He was making obvious reference to prominent Malaysian figures involved in various peace initiatives, and Western organisations wanting to mediate the conflict in southern Thailand.

However, Wan Kadir said he greatly appreciate the moral support of various Western governments, including the United States, Germany and Sweden, suggesting that their participation as mediators or facilitators could add legitimacy to a peace initiative.

He said that longstanding separatist movements appreciated Western countries for seeing the deep South's problem as a "conflict" as opposed to "terrorism", and added that these respective governments treated the exiled Patani Malay separatist leaders in a dignified manner. "I was a refugee in Sweden but they issued me a passport so I could travel and take part in negotiations in Switzerland."

The troubles in Thailand's Malay-speaking provinces were "unique" and thus not resolvable by textbook negotiating tactics, he said, adding that he was impressed with academics who are trying to understand the dynamics of the conflict.

He lashed out at special security laws used in the deep South and added that such a "double standard" was applied only because the Thai state sees the Malays of Patani as "colonial subjects".

He also urged the Malay Muslims in the South to come to terms with their status as Thai citizens and fight for their rights and dignity through peaceful means. However, he added that the people of the region hold the right to chart their own destiny.

Development and education in Thailand's southernmost provinces have been neglected by the state, he said, despite the fact that the region has tremendous human and natural resources.

He noted that the Patani region was once the cradle of Islamic education in Southeast Asia and saw no reason why that glorious status could not be revived.

He said many people in the region were multilingual, speaking Malay, Thai, English and Arabic, and that quite a few - especially those who have lived in exile - spoke German and Swedish.

He urged local Malay Muslims leaders to take advantage of the existing political forums to push for policy change at the national level.

He said that since the current wave of insurgency began in 2004, the Thai state had consistently used military means to address the conflict, but it had continued unabated with no end in sight.

While Thai officials blame Malay Muslim militants for virtually all the violence, he suggested they should also examine their own role in provoking clashes. "Fighting back is natural for humans," he noted.

Bersatu, the umbrella group for longstanding separatist groups Wan Kadir once led, was strictly political with no armed wing attached. During his years in exile, Wan Kadir also helped set up the Barisan Islam Pembangunan Pattani (BIPP).

Though there have been reports that Thai authorities are trying to woo the BIPP to the negotiating table, the former separatist leader said he was not aware of any approach.

The ageing academic tried to return from exile in mid-2004 to work with the Thai state to help resolve the conflict, but the then government of Thaksin Shinawatra gave him the cold shoulder.

Don Pathan is a consultant based in Yala and a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).

Editorial: Govt will do well to heed Kadir's words

The Nation

The former leader of the Bersatu, a now-defunct umbrella group for a number of long-standing Patani Malay separatist movements, was in Bangkok recently to give a talk on the ongoing conflict in the deep South.

Wan Kadir, who was educated in the US and Australia where he competed his PhD on comparisons between the separatist insurgency in Mindanao and Thailand’s deep South, spoke candidly about what needs to be done to achieve peace. 

He didn’t mince words when he said the ongoing peace talks did not include people who could influence the course of action on the ground. In other words, the so-called representatives from the Barisan Revolusi Nasional, or BRN, are not in command or in control of insurgents on the ground.

More than nine months since the peace process was launched, it is difficult to disagree with what he is saying. This has raised the question as to why the Thai government rushed into the talks, before getting solid evidence of the bona fides of the people coming to the negotiating table.

The insurgents have demonstrated – as they did on January 2004 – that they can hit just about any place and at any time. Unfortunately, instead of coming clean about the difficulties the government is facing, the authorities continue to claim that they are moving in the right direction. 

Too many lives have been lost to this conflict for our officers to be playing public-relations games and stunts.

In spite of his criticism, Wan Kadir’s remarks should be welcomed because they shed light on this long-standing conflict that has cost the country too many lives and resources. 

Wan Kadir should have been permitted to return to Thailand long ago. Back in 2004, after the Krue Se stand-off on April 28, 2004, Wan Kadir made a public statement about wanting to return to Thailand to work with authorities to counter the new wave of insurgency surfacing in the country. 

Wan Kadir is from a previous generation of insurgents that emerged in the mid-1960s and went under in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The then government of Thaksin Shinwatra thought it was too much trouble to have him back in the country of his birth and Wan Kadir was given the cold shoulder.

This time around, it seems that he is wanted here to show the exiled community and leaders that Thailand is open-minded enough to have such people back. The fact that he believes the Thai negotiating team has been barking up the wrong tree, should not be held against him. If anything, we should thank him for what can only be described as a constructive observation and go forward from there. 

Wan Kadir was head of Bersatu, which has since been dissolved, but it does not mean that he is completely out of touch about what is going on within the circles of the exiled leaders. 

Thailand should also thank Malaysia for permitting him to travel to Thailand to speak to the local media. In fact, he should come to Thailand more often. There is much to learn from a man with vast academic experience. He should be free to meet with anybody he wants, whether they are fellow academics or foreign diplomats based in Thailand. 

The fact that his thinking challenges our notion of the nation-state construct, should not be held against him. If we are serious about moving forward with the peace process, we should be open-minded enough to listen to views of those that differ with our own administration. 

Reset for peace process in Thailand's deep South

Don Pathan

Artef Sohko
Special to The Nation
October 8, 2013

A member of an explosives disposal team inspects the bomb-damaged wreck of a military truck following a roadside attack by insurgents in Krong Pinang district of Yala province on October 2.

 

The government might not be talking to the right people in its attempt to end the ongoing Malay-Muslim insurgency in the three southernmost provinces

With their backs against the wall, Thai and Malaysian officials are working harder than ever to keep alive the peace initiative in Thailand's three southernmost provinces, where the Malay-Muslim separtaist insurgency continues unabated.

Sources in the Thai government and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) - the longstanding separatist movement that "controls" the largest number of insurgents - say that while the February 28 initiative has hit a wall, it does not mean that the two sides will not talk to each other again. The BRN wants a clean slate and to move forward from there.

Since being formed in the late 1960s, the BRN has presented itself as a movement working for the independence of the Malays' historical homeland in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand and the four Malay-speaking districts in Songkhla.

February 28 was the first time that the Thai government stated publicly that it would enter into peace talks with the BRN and other separatist groups. Previously, secret talks between the Thai Army and insurgent groups were conducted in various Middle-Eastern cities throughout the 1980s. The reason for the reset button, say BRN sources, is because the current peace initiative did not have their blessing. It was hastily put together because of Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur's political needs.

"We want to talk with the Thai government, but discreetly and out of the public spotlight, to generate enough confidence before going public," said a BRN source.

The issue of mediation or facilitation should be put off for the time being, the BRN said. The selection and role of the mediator, if any, should be agreed by the two sides. BRN members said they could not understand why the government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawtra had pushed for the February 28 meeting knowing that the two sides have yet to reach an understanding on a number of issues such as immunity for members of the BRN political wing who would come to the table, and a guarantee from Malaysia that they would not be deported.

BRN members and others often point to an incident in 1998 when Malaysian authorities quietly handed over three suspected separatists - Abdul Rahman Bazo and two brothers, Ismail and Da-oh Thanam - to Thailand as one of the reasons for their mistrust of Kuala Lumpur. The three are currently in prison.

The February launch failed to generate any traction or win support from insurgents, who continue their campaign of violence. What the event did was to set the stage for microphone diplomacy that has become a political circus.

What the BRN wants right now, said sources in the movement, is to establish a legitimate and recognisable political wing that can surface publicly and engage with the international community in the same manner that negotiators from the Free Aceh Movement (Gam) or Moros leaders in Mindanao have been doing. In this respect, the BRN said it would be willing to work with international organisations that can help with capacity building and give it a better understanding of a wide range of issues such as peace negotiations, mediation, international norms, the Geneva Convention, humanitarian law and so on.

The problem with Bangkok is that the government thought it could achieve desirable results in one push by bringing in Thaksin Shinwatra, the de facto leader of the ruling Pheu Thai Party, to meet with 16 leaders from various separatist groups in Kuala Lumpur in March last year. The BRN was represented at that meeting by a member of the organisation's youth wing.

Meanwhile, the Thai government has been trying to get well known figures like Sapae-ing Basor, a respected spiritual leader and former principle of Thamvithya Multini School in Yala, to come to the table for photo ops to give credibility to the February 28 initiative. Sapaeing has been accused by the Thai authorities of being a top BRN leader. A warrant for his arrest was issued in 2005, signed by the current Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre chief, Police Colonel Thawee Sodsong.

Sapae-ing has so far refused to take part in the process because he was extremely angered by the Thai authorities demonising him. At one time, the police had even offered Bt20 million for information leading to his capture. Thai officials who read the charges against him said the allegations were too weak and that he would beat the case should it go to court. The BRN has been tight-lipped about Sapae-ing's status and whereabouts, but stated that he has long been an important spiritual leader for the Patani Malay Muslims.

The BRN said the next phase of the peace initiative could very well be without Kuala Lumpur, citing hard feelings that date back to the handing over of suspected separatist leaders in 1998. These differences would have to be overcome before Kuala Lumpur could have a seat at the table, they said.

But officials in Bangkok are not really sure how to break this impasse with the Malaysian government. Bangkok had asked for Kuala Lumpur's participation, and embarrassment could now be inevitable.

Nevertheless, other channels are being explored. In addition to the February 28 initiative, the Thai government has discreetly given a green light to a second round of talks - the so-called Track 1.5 - that include longstanding separatist groups that were not invited to Kuala Lumpur to take part in the February 28 initiative. Two meetings were held in Indonesia between Thai representatives and 15 senior leaders from these groups, and another this past week in Sweden. Moreover, earlier this year, Pheu Thai also discreetly sent a senior officer to Malaysia to meet with BRN leaders through interlocutors within the group's youth wing, but the exiled senior BRN leaders were not in the mood to talk.

If anything, these attempts show that the Pheu Thai Party is not putting all its eggs in the February 28 basket, the so-called official and visible track - or Track I.

No one in the BRN can give a clear explanation as to why its top leaders are willing to talk to the Thais at this juncture. One explanation, a mid-ranking BRN cadre said, has to do with the generation gap between the exiled leaders and the current crop of militants, the so-called post-Thak Bai generation, who could become increasingly uncompromising and/or unwilling to accept the guidance of the elders living in exile. Right now, the BRN elders believe that they have what it takes to influence the combatants and change the course of the conflict, but such a task will be increasingly difficult as time goes by.

Don Pathan is a security analyst at the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com). Artef Sohko is the former secretary-general of the Student Federation of Thailand and currently the director of Foreign Affairs at the Academy of Patani Raya for Peace and Development.