Arson Attacks Signal Breakdown in Peace Talks

Petrol stations under attack in Thailand's far South. Credit: Royal Thai Army

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com

Electoral Ambitions vs Security Realities

At the beginning of this year, 11 PTT petrol stations in Thailand’s southernmost border provinces came under simultaneous arson and bombing attacks in the wee hours of Sunday, 11 January 2026.

The country was undergoing preparations on that day for a nationwide poll to elect local administration organisation officials.

Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul said the attacks might have been connected to the local elections in this region, which has a history of political violence. Success at the local level can shape national party strategies for the upcoming general election scheduled for 8 February.  

But by afternoon, the National Security Council (NSC) issued a statement saying the spate of attacks had “disrupted the peaceful co-existence of people of all races and faiths in the region, and that it was a clear indication that the responsible party has no legitimacy and is not qualified to claim representation of the people of this area.”

NSC stopped short of directly blaming Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN), the long-standing separatist movement that controls virtually all of the fighters on the ground. NSC maintained that such violence undermined the ongoing peace process and has conveyed its concerns to BRN through the Malaysian government, the designated facilitator for the peace talks.

Official peace talks between Thailand and the Patani Malay separatist movements started in February 2013. The two sides have never moved beyond what they called “confidence-building measures”.

Divergent Visions

A leap of faith was taken at the high-level official meeting in December 2025, in Kuala Lumpur, when chief negotiators of the two sides, after nearly two years of no talks, discussed this flimsy notion of “end state”. It is a loaded term that is supposed to encapsulate how this century-old conflict should be resolved.

The previous government under Paetongtarn Shinawatra refused to engage in any official talks with BRN until the movement ceased violence on the ground. Moreover, her government insisted that BRN must send their military leaders to the table.

The current Thai government resumed the talks. Following the Deember high level official meeting, technical representatives of the two sides came together from  6 to 8 January to continue with the discussion on the end state.

Thailand was not prepared to put all its cards on the table, but BRN spelled out in real terms what this notion means. For the rebels, it means the right to self-government and a mandate to establish a regional assembly so the people of Patani can make their own laws, collect taxes, and run their own schools, although sovereignty will continue to rest with the Kingdom of Thailand.

Obviously, the Thai representatives at the table did not have the kind of mandate to negotiate such a matter. It is way above the negotiators’ pay grade.

Demands for Autonomy

BRN went on to say that agreement on power and resource-sharing will have to be worked out between the two sides; the most disturbing clause is the right to secession. Until then, this historically contested region should be placed under an interim government, a BRN source said.

A Thai government official from the Office of the Prime Minister, speaking on condition of anonymity, said granting BRN – or anybody for that matter – an interim status, or granting the Patani region full autonomy, would require legislation that could be initiated with 10,000 signatures of eligible voters.

But there is no guarantee that Parliament would pass such a law, as it would be political suicide. Political and administrative powers in Thailand are extremely centralised.

Moreover, the Thai public in general is not sympathetic to the plight and grievances of the Malays of Patani.

Thai officials at the January meeting suggested that the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC), a bloated multi-agency body that focused on development – particularly pilot projects to be handed back to line ministries – could be an entry point for BRN. Needless to say, BRN rejected the offer. The January meeting ended badly.

The Signalling Power of Arson

Three days later, 11 PTT petrol stations and the attached convenience stores across the region were attacked. All fingers pointed to BRN, the usual suspect. 

It is worth noting that BRN does not confirm or deny operations on the ground. BRN fighters operate on autopilot; combatants act independently of their political leaders, who intervene when they deem the fighters have violated ground rules or when coordination is needed. Such an arrangement allows the movement’s political leaders and negotiators plausible deniability.

Thai officials said that instead of reverting to violence to pressure the Thais, BRN needs to think about their long-term goal. They can start with conducting a proper public consultation to gauge whether people in the Patani region support their governance model, which the movement often refers to as “self-government”.

They need to be certain if their model of governance is what the people want, Thai officials said.

The current wave of insurgency violence resurfaced in mid-2001 after a decade of relative calm but was not officially recognised until 4 January 2004, when scores of BRN combatants raided an army battalion and made off with about 350 pieces of military weaponry.

Civilian and soft targets, including public schools and sometimes Buddhist monks and teachers, were targeted in the early phase of this wave of insurgency until local civil society organisations and community leaders stepped up their criticisms against BRN, calling for greater respect for civility and rules of engagement.

Attacks against civilian targets have virtually disappeared, but do happen once in a long while, usually as a stern warning to the Thai security forces. A case in point was the brief but dramatic spike in violence against civilian targets in May 2025, in response to the shooting death of Abdulroning Lateh, a key BRN leader from the military wing. As expected, Thai security forces denied killing Abdulroning.

The Human Cost

While the attackers may not have been after body counts in these recent arson attacks, the 11 petrol stations are nevertheless civilian targets. A local political action group, The Patani, issued a statement calling on all sides to embrace humanitarian principles and to end attacks on civilian targets.

BRN sympathisers often cite economic injustices whenever private businesses come under attack. Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, said the corporate brands of these petrol stations and convenience stores may belong to PTT and 7-Eleven, but the people who suffer most from these attacks are the franchisees, not the corporations themselves. BRN said they felt the Thai side treated them as a “plaything”—throwing out some fancy words, like “end state”, but refusing to elaborate or act on it. They felt the current government resumed talks just for political points. The ongoing violence is a reminder that nothing comes easy in this restive region, where more than 7,700 people have died from insurgency-related violence since January 2004.

Tags: Thailand

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The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require 1) credit authors and their institutions, and 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD  and include a link back to either our home page or the article URL.

Author

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  Don Pathan

  Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

The “End State” Deadlock

From left to right, Gen. Sosak Rungsita, Thailand's chief negotiator, Mohd Rabin bin Basir, Malaysian facilitator, and Anas Abdulrohman, lead negotiator of the BRN, at the end of a two-day official meeting in Kuala Lumpur, on Dec. 8, 2025.

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com

The Deadlock of Divergent Aspirations

On the surface, the statement by the designated Malaysian facilitator for the peace talks sounded promising: Thailand and the rebel Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) agreed to work towards an “end state”.

The term emerged from decades of establishment officials asking one persistent question: how will this all end?

For BRN, however, the end state means self-government through a regional assembly empowered to draft its own laws and manage local affairs, including taxation, education and power sharing with the central government. Most controversially, they seek the right to secede from the Thai state.

For the Thais, the end state is something that has to be negotiated.

But after more than two decades of on-again, off-again peace talks, the two sides can still find a common ground to guide the peace process toward a meaningful end. The furthest they have progressed is establishing a framework – the so-called Joint Working Group on Peace Process (JCPP) – under which both sides identified three priorities. These are the reduction of violence, public consultation, and a political solution to end the conflict.

Little progress has been made on concrete details, however.

The previous government, under the then prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatr,a refused to resume talks unless the BRN stopped attacking Thai targets. They also insisted on negotiating only with BRN’s military wing—those who supposedly control combatants on the ground.

BRN countered that violence reduction must be negotiated, and any ceasefire would require monitoring by the international community

Within days of taking power, the government under Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul announced the resumption of peace talks. No one was certain what he hoped to achieve, given that he agreed to serve only three months before cutting his term even shorter by dissolving the Parliament to avoid a potentially embarrassing no-confidence debate.

Thai and BRN chief negotiators met briefly in November 2025 to prepare for a high-level official meeting on 8 December in Kuala Lumpur. This time, the term “JCPP” was dropped and replaced with the Peace Dialogue Plan Implementation Framework (PDPIF). The content is more or less the same, but the rebranding creates an impression that Anutin’s camp is pursuing something fresh and new.

Rebranding the Stagnation

“But nothing fundamentally has changed,” said Asmadee Bueheng, a local writer and a close observer of the conflict. “Youth activists still face legal persecution for speaking out, and the controversial Emergency Law remains in place.”

This short-lived new beginning saw the end of the role of five international observers who had been brought in to monitor high-level talks but were never permitted to do much beyond observing. For the December talks, a German conflict expert was brought in as a monitor.

The press statement from Malaysia’s Office of the Facilitator for the southern Thai peace talks contained some promising words. But considering the background and context – how this high-level meeting suddenly materialised after nearly two years of no official talks – it is difficult to feel excited about any claims of success.

There were secret meetings, facilitated by Malaysia, to get BRN to stand down during last year’s Ramadhan (from 1 to 30 March), but Bangkok did not have anything to offer.

While a regional assembly may be too controversial at this juncture, other issues such as the Patani Malay ethno-religious identity, historical narrative and cultural space could have been pushed through to demonstrate the country’s willingness to meet BRN halfway. 

Instead, the Thai side offered nothing new beyond a different chief negotiator and fancy words that confused more than clarified any meaningful intent.

The Living Memory of Tak Bai

BRN combatants, who have been operating on an autopilot mode in which a set of broadly defined rules of engagement are normally observed, are reminded of the Tak Bai massacre in 2004 when 85 young Malay men died at the hands of Thai security forces. As many as 78 of them died from suffocation because they were stacked on top of one another, and seven were shot dead at the protest site.

Tal Bai detainees.

Thailand never made a closure on this incident, as the statute of limitations expired 20 years after the incident, but the security forces continue to pay the price for the incident. The massacre became an important part of the rebels’ narrative.

Based on the public statement released after the December meeting, it appears that the Thai representatives could have taken this chance to respond to the longstanding grievances expressed by BRN and the people of Patani.

In short, the recent high-level meeting itself represents progress only because peace talks had been put off for some time.

But the meeting’s modest output risks creating false hope among local people who want to see meaningful talks resume. It came at a time when Anutin was facing a desperate political situation following poor handling of flooding in the South.

Moreover, his unchecked support for the army over the border clashes with Cambodia could backfire against his mid-size party if the current frantic nationalism loses steam and his base in the northeast begins demanding attention to bread-and-butter issues – or, in their case, rice and fish – as the cost of military operations takes a toll on their livelihoods.

As with the far south conflict, allowing the army to define “national threats” limits the scope of solutions. For more than two decades, this threat perception has confined the peace process to a tiny box of confidence-building measures. It has merely served as a talk shop that never advances because bureaucrats cannot agree on the nature of the violence, much less the needed concession for peaceful coexistence with the Malays of Patani.

Calling it a “conflict” means recognising the historical grievances of the Malay people and legitimising BRN. But calling the combatants anything other than criminals invites counterattacks not just from the hawks but from a public that has long believed official claims that these Melayu fighters are drug-crazed youths who embraced a distorted version of Islam.

The “Criminal” vs “Conflict” Narrative

Yet, even after security officials came to the realisation that they had been barking up the wrong tree – that religion is not the driving force of the struggle, but Malay nationalism – they lacked the political will to explore terms for peaceful coexistence with the Malays. Instead, they relied mainly on military-led counterinsurgency measures.

According to Asmadee, nothing has changed under the current Thai government. The controversial Emergency Law and Martial Law remain in place, and political activists continue facing harassment from security agencies and through judicial channels. Mistrust between the two communities remains high, and an end to the conflict is nowhere in sight.

Moreover, five youth leaders from The Patani, a political action group, face charges of promoting separatism for participating in a public seminar at Prince of Songkhla University’s Pattani Campus, where the issue of rights to self-determination (RSD) was discussed and a mock referendum was conducted.

The participants were asked if they would support a formal referendum on RSD – not independent Patani – if the law permits it. The Fourth Army Area, the command in charge of Thailand’s counterinsurgency in this restive region, was displeased and directed the police to press charges.

Ironically, The Patani is often the group security officials consult – and at times ask to intervene – when addressing extremely sensitive issues with BRN. The Patani criticises all sides – Thai authorities and BRN – when rights are violated, and rules of engagement, civility and humanitarian norms are disrespected.

Anutin will certainly go to the polls in February 202,6 claiming to have accomplished something for the far south—more than the previous government, at least. If his Bhumjaithai Party becomes a coalition member of the next government, the current negotiating team could receive another mandate. Whether they can develop the political courage to be more creative than their predecessors – or convince the conservative establishment to open space for critical dialogue – remains to be seen.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require 1) credit authors and their institutions, and 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD  and include a link back to either our home page or the article URL.

• Don Pathan

  Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

  

Safe space amid border tensions: Cambodian Muslims in Thailand’s Deep South

By Don Pathan
Prachatai

Korean diplomats visiting Thamvithya Mulnithi School in Yala, Aug. 2023. The school is where the three Cambodian students are studying. (Credit: Don Pathan)

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When cross-border fighting erupted between Thailand and Cambodia in late July, Hamad Sos received urgent messages from his family in Cambodia encouraging him to come home immediately.

They feared for his safety as anti-Khmer sentiment swept through Thailand during the clashes between the two Buddhist kingdoms over disputed ancient Hindu temples along their undemarcated border.

Yet after eight years of living and studying in Yala, the 20-year-old considers this city his second home. A student at Thamavitya Mulniti School, Hamad is nearing completion of the Tahfiz Science Programme, the rigorous and systematic process of memorizing the entire Quran.

His academic journey will next take him to Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt, one of the world's premier institutions for Islamic scholarship.

Though his Tahfiz Science classes are taught in Arabic, Hamad found learning the local Malay dialect surprisingly easy. His native Cham language and Bahasa Melayu belong to the same Malayo-Chamic language family. Cham and Malay share a more recent common ancestry than they do with other Austronesian languages such as Javanese or Tagalog.

Hamad returns home annually to see family in Kracheh, an eastern Cambodian province along the Vietnamese border. Still, Yala feels equally like home. Muslims comprise about three percent of Cambodia's population, predominantly from the Cham ethnic group. Throughout his time in Thailand's Malay-speaking South, Hamad says he has never experienced discrimination. "Some people asked about the border conflict out of curiosity, but the overwhelming majority made sure I knew I was welcome here," he explains.

The July violence was not the first military confrontation between Thailand and Cambodia, though it proved the most devastating in human and economic terms. Following fighting that displaced more than 500,000 people on both sides, a second ceasefire was established on December 27, 2025.

According to Razi Bensulong, the school's director, Cham students integrate seamlessly into the local community due to cultural similarities and because Patani Malays look past nationalist narratives promoted by Thai and Cambodian state institutions, focusing instead on their shared identity.

“The Patani region is their safe-space, away from the nation-state construct and the toxic nationalism that comes with it,” said Asst Prof Ekkarin Tuansiri of the Faculty of Political Science at Prince of Songkhla University, Pattani Campus.

"Malays of Patani possess their own distinct identity and historical-cultural narrative that sets them apart from the rest of Thailand," explains Artef Sohko, President of The Patani, a political action group advocating self-determination rights for people in this historically disputed southern region.

Thai Muslims—those outside the Malay-speaking South—face anti-Islam sentiment but constantly look for ways to demonstrate their deep patriotism and loyalty to the country.

They resent those who challenge the state-constructed narrative and are upset at the Patani Malays for rejecting Thainess or “khwam pen Thai” and for taking up arms against the government in pursuit of a separate state.

The Malays of Patani, conversely, reject state-constructed narratives and continuously seek ways to affirm their historical-cultural identity. For Patani Muslims, their Malay identity and Islam are intrinsically linked. Embracing a Thai identity as put forth by the policy of assimilation would automatically undermine their ethno-religious identity.

Patani Malays and Cambodian Chams are both ethnic minorities within two different Buddhist kingdoms. While Malays in Thailand's far South are locked in conflict with a state that views their identity and narrative as threatening national unity, Cambodian Muslims generally maintain a low political profile, concentrating on preserving religious and cultural practices rather than challenging state authority.

Champa was a group of independent Cham polities along the central and southern part of Vietnam from the 2nd century AD to 1832. Known for its maritime power, trade, and culture, the kingdom was influenced by Indian Shaiva Hinduism and built notable temples such as Mỹ Sơn. Muslim traders arrived in the area in the 8th century, and conversion to Islam started around the 15th century. Waves of migration to Cambodia started in the late 15th century following the capture of Cham’s capital, Vijaya, in 1471, by the Vietnamese kingdom’s southward expansion.

For centuries, Muslim students from the Malay Peninsula have travelled to Patani for Islamic education. The region has produced internationally renowned scholars such as Shaykh Dawud al-Fatani and Shaykh Ahmad al-Fatani, whose 19th-century writings remain foundational to Islamic studies across Southeast Asia.

While Thamavitya is classified as a private religious school that incorporates a Thai curriculum with Islamic studies, Muslim students from neighbouring countries are attracted to the region’s traditional Islamic boarding schools known locally as ponoh. They operate informally with minimal or no government regulations and oversight. As an institution, ponoh remain central to Malay-Muslim life in the far South and essential for preserving the cultural heritage along with religious studies.

Shahida Ly-zakariya, a 16-year-old second-year Islamic studies student at Thamavitya's secondary school, comes from Phnom Penh. An avid traveller who has explored the Andaman coast multiple times, she hopes to attend flight school in the United States or Australia after graduation. "I think Phuket is just so beautiful," she says.

"My father has visited Yala several times and loves everything about this place—the people, the schools. He holds the religious institutions here in high regard because of their standardized teachings," Shahida notes.

Her 16-year-old cousin Riduan, also studying at Thamavitya's secondary level, believes unfounded fear surrounds Thailand's Malay-speaking South, particularly among those who have never visited or made efforts to understand local people and their way of life.

All three students learned about Patani through friends and relatives who studied there, returned to Cambodia, and encouraged them to pursue their religious education in this region. Separatist insurgency violence in the Patani region is not an issue for them as they keep to themselves and focus on their studies.

Razi notes that local hospitality extends beyond Muslims. "People here appreciate visitors and migrant workers. “The people who built the school mosque were Buddhists from Myanmar, Cambodia and Thailand's Northeast. Three different languages filled the air as they worked around the clock to complete the mosque construction in time for our annual cultural event," he recalls.

Artef contends the Thai state has never attempted to understand this region's people. "By fixating on assimilation, the Thai state overlooks the strategic value of existing human connections, which could serve as powerful soft-power tools for regional diplomacy, particularly with Cambodia," he argues.

Armed insurgency in this historically contested region reemerged in mid-2001 after a relatively peaceful decade. Since January 2004, separatist violence has claimed more than 7,700 lives, with no resolution in sight, despite intermittent peace talks that have never progressed beyond preliminary discussions.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst specializing in the Myanmar/Burma conflict and insurgency in Thailand's Malay-speaking South.