The Gaza Conflict Has Stirred Thailand’s Far South, Mildly

Part of an ongoing article series on the impact of the Middle East conflict on Southeast Asia.

Don Pathan
stratsea 
(www.stratsea.com)

Introduction

Israel’s war on Gaza has sparked concern of a rise in insurgent activities in Thailand’s southern provinces.

Protesters at Pattani Central Mosque with Palestinian flag.

The potential threat is significant: An active insurgency is destabilizing the contested region of Pattani, a Malay historical homeland encompassing Thailand’s three border provinces. There is a concern that anti-Israel protests in various parts of the globe would also galvanize Muslims in these Thai provinces to launch their anti-establishment activities.

Approximately two million people inhabit the Pattani region, with about 85% identifying as Malay, or Melayu, rather than Thai. These Malays vehemently reject Thailand’s policy of assimilation, which calls upon the Malays to adopt a Thai identity. For Muslims in this region, Islam and Malay identity are inextricably linked – changing one aspect inevitably impacts the other.

On the state level, Thailand’s relationship with Israel has never been the central defining factor in the interaction between the state and its Malay minority. However, when issues arise – whether related to the ongoing war or other events in the Middle East – the stance of Thai Muslims is unmistakably clear, as will be explored below.

Like other ASEAN Member States, Thailand also calls for an end to hostilities in Gaza and urges all sides to respect humanitarian norms and principles. However, Thailand would not take a strong political stance on the conflict. This is despite some Thai falling victims to this ongoing conflict.

Prior to Hamas’ 7 October attack that killed more than 1,200 people, including 39 Thai nationals, there were nearly 30,000 Thais in Israeli farms just kilometers from the Gaza border. These individuals went to work there under a government-to-government arrangement. Of the 240 taken hostage by Hamas, 32 were Thai nationals, some of whom have died.

Thailand has issued statements regarding developments on the warfront. However, its rather mild response could be explained by the fact that its bilateral ties with Israel are nowhere near as robust as its relationship with other Western governments. Besides, Israel has never featured prominently on any Thai political party’s agenda.

This, however, does not mean that Thailand’s security apparatus is not concerned about the possible spillover effect that Israel’s war has on its southern provinces.

Demonstrations and Parades in Southern Thailand

Not long after the onset of the war in Gaza, Thai military officials began visiting villages in these provinces, urging local chiefs and elders to keep the communities subdued. The last thing they needed was to witness unruly Malay demonstrators jeopardizing Thailand’s long-standing relations with Israel.

It did not take long for news of the officials’ activities to reach the youth activists in the region’s cities. Feeling compelled to respond to this perceived interference, these activists organized a march from the Pattani City Hall to the provincial central mosque in December 2023.

Palestinian flags flew high as local Muslims seized the opportunity to defy the state security apparatus, the very forces leading the government’s counterinsurgency strategy, which has yet to secure the loyalty of the local Malays.

The December 2023 march in downtown Pattani set off a small spark in Thailand’s Malay-speaking south. Palestinian flags, along with symbols and narratives of the Malays’ past and narratives, became a common sight in just about social and cultural activities, particularly among the youth.

This is the region that has been wracked with separatist problems and witnessed more than 7,500 deaths from insurgency-related violence since January 2004. Thus, the emergence of symbols and narratives that glorify the Malayness would rightfully raise anxiety on the part of the authorities.

The problem did not stop there. In May 2024, teachers at an Islamic preschool (locally known as tadeka)in Narathiwat pushed the line by dressing the children in military fatigues and led them in a march with toy guns, carrying Hamas and Palestinian flags to display solidarity with the people in Gaza.

Within days, the Ministry of Culture instructed the provincial governor to issue a public statement warning all tadeka in the region – about 1,660 altogether – that such demonstrations could lead to a halt in the government’s financial support for their school.

Unsurprisingly, the directive was met with discontent from the local Muslims, who have long felt alienated in this predominantly Buddhist kingdom, which embraced a separate set of narratives, heroes and myths from the Malays in the far south.

The tit-for-tat between the two sides seems to be a never-ending episode, however. Later still, in early September 2024, a paramilitary unit in Narathiwat broke up a village parade organized by a group of young people to remove Palestinian flags and portraits of Patani’s Malay historical figures and religious leaders. The unit’s reasoning was that these items have nothing to do with local culture.

Seizing Palestinian flag in a Narathiwat parade.

As expected, social media and political activists responded ferociously. Narathiwat lawmaker Kamonsak Leewamoh even went on the parliament floor to demand a public apology from the local military unit for the alleged interference and called on the Royal Thai Army to investigate the incident.

The Dichotomy

Despite these concerning developments, we need to remember that the challenges facing the Muslims in Thailand bear little connection to the outside world, as the tensions are rooted in local dynamics. However, simply because the Malays’ response has been relatively muted, this does not mean they are apolitical.

Before we continue with this point, a dichotomy must be made. In this article, the “Malays of Patani” refer to traditionalist Muslims in the southernmost border provinces (the Patani region). Outside that, Muslims are referred to as “Thai Muslims.”

While Thai Muslims have to contend against anti-Islam sentiment and find themselves in a constant struggle to show the rest of the country that they are very much part of Thailand nationhood, the Malays of Patani, on the other hand, reject the Thai state-constructed narrative and constantly look for ways to assert their historical-cultural identity. For the latter, Malay identity and Islam are inseparable.

Thai Muslims, both Sunnis and Shiites, are patriotic and extremely loyal to the state. This explains their resentment towards the Malays of Patani for challenging Thailand’s nationhood and embracing separatism.

Despite their patriotism, Thai Muslims’ loyalty to the state is constantly questioned. They do what they can to avoid confrontation with the Thais, particularly the Buddhist nationalists who believe that Thainess is synonymous to being a Buddhist of the Theravada school.

Compared to heavy protests elsewhere in the world – the kind that is seen on US colleges – responses from the Malays of Patani and the Thai Muslims to the war in Gaza seem rather tame. As local writer and political activist Asmadee Bueheng explained, the lack of response must be understood in a proper context.

The vast majority of the Malays in the border provinces are traditionalist Muslims who embrace local culture and turn to the village ulema (religious scholars) for answers to personal and theological, sometimes political, questions. Conversely, they see the reformists as a bunch of globalized religious movements that compete among themselves to establish a modern identity at the expense of local culture. Groups like Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi, Wahhabi and Tablighi Jamaat are all considered reformists by the Malays of Patani.

Moreover, said Asmadee, local Malays have never been comfortable with “political Islam” as a concept. But being traditionalists does not mean they are not political. Their resistance to Thailand’s policy of assimilation has translated into an armed struggle for independence that keeps resurfacing generation after generation ever since the region was conquered by Siam in the late 18th century.

However, not all reformists embraced political Islam: many Salafists, for example, take a “purist” or “quietist” approach and withdraw themselves completely from political affairs, while so-called “jihadists” take up violent actions to advance their political agenda in the name of religion.

The traditionalists among the Malays of Patani see the war in Gaza as very much a byproduct of political Islam. On the other hand, the reformist Muslims are calling for a more active response to the war in Gaza but fall short of calling on the government to make stern and concrete measures. They are concerned that their loyalty to the state would be questioned.

In spite of these differences, however, there is no open hostility between the two groups, as both keep to themselves.

The absence of major outbursts against Israel’s genocidal tendency in Gaza does not mean that the Malays of Patani or the Thai Muslims have shut themselves out of the affairs of the Islamic world or that they are indifferent to the suffering of fellow Muslims elsewhere.

Both groups have consistently engaged Muslim communities abroad on various platforms and on occasions. Many of these families continue to send their children to universities and madrasa in the Middle East and South Asia, where they are exposed to other schools of thought and competing ideas.

In the 1980s, for example, more than 1,000 Pattani Malays combatants joined fighters from Aceh and Mindanao in training camps in the Middle East and North Africa.

This is where they come to know fellow “revolutionaries” from other parts of the world, including Palestinian leftists who made a huge contribution to the development of the Palestinian national movement back in the day but no longer feature in today’s conversations.

In fact, Patani itself, prior to its defeat by Siam in 1786, was a flourishing commercial center where East Asian traders met and carried out business with their counterparts from Europe. This is the historical precedence of the region’s openness and willingness to engage others from the outside world.

Explaining the Authorities’ Anxiety

Two decades ago, when the current wave of Patani Malay separatists resurfaced to pick up what the previous generation had left off a decade earlier, several so-called security experts were quick to label the southern Thai conflict a new front in the global war on terrorism.

Such a label was convenient. After all, various factors at the time made it easier to do so. These include the political climate, the prevailing mood and narrative, the emergence of a new set of vocabulary, and a booming industry under the banner of a global war on terrorism that came to life following 9/11.

However, in the case of Southeast Asia, it did not take long to see that lumping ethno-nationalist struggles in the same basket as radical jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda or Jama’ah Islamiyah has no merit.

Separatist movements such as Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National Revolutionary Front – BRN), Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement – GAM) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) would eventually come to the negotiating tables with the government that they had been fighting. Today, the GAM and the MILF have signed a peace agreement with their respective governments. The BRN, on the other hand, is still negotiating with the Thai government.

Unlike radical jihadists, these Southeast Asian separatist groups never established the kind of global network because the banner of their struggle has always been centered on liberating their homeland from outside forces.

Conclusion

While the end to the southern Thai conflict is still nowhere in sight, there is nothing to suggest that the political context of the conflict in Patani will evolve from an ethno-nationalist to violent jihadist where the banner of the struggle becomes a religion. Nevertheless, local and foreign counterterrorism officials are on a constant lookout for any possible incursions of radicalism, the kind that Southeast Asia had witnessed in the early 2000s when violent extremist groups had penetrated the Mindanao region of the Philippines and in the various pockets of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.

The thinking among these officials is that one cannot afford to be complacent. Hence the anxiety of the Thai officials following the eruption of Israel’s war on Gaza, despite the rather mild response by the Malays of Patani so far.

Author: Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

Time runs out for justice in Thailand’s Tak Bai massacre

Statute of limitations in the case expired on Friday, but memory of the 2004 atrocity lives on in the Thai Deep South.

Commentary by Don Pathan
BenarNews

It was always a long shot but Malay Muslims in Thailand’s southern border region never gave up hope that the government would amend the criminal code to extend the 20-year statute of limitations in the infamous Tak Bai massacre.

Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, protested in front of the Thai Army camp in
Yala, Thailand, on Oct. 24, 2024. 

They hoped that all 14 suspects, now retired government officials, could be brought to justice for the deaths of 85 unarmed protesters in Tak Bai on Oct. 25, 2004. The statute expired on Friday without any of the suspects being taken into custody, although there were warrants out for their arrest.  

During the past weeks, there were relentless demonstrations and seminars about the incident. These included a Senate hearing and a public protest in front of a military base in Yala province, where people demanded that the government amend the criminal code and demonstrate its commitment to justice. 

Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and her Cabinet members sought comfort in the legal procedures, saying these requests must be examined thoroughly and that due process must be observed. While apologizing to victims’ relatives on Thursday, she said it would be constitutionally impossible to extend the statute of limitations in the Tak Bai case beyond Oct. 25.

No one wanted to acknowledge the political underpinnings of the incident, or how the country’s justice system and international standing were at stake. 

Of the 85 victims, seven were shot dead at the protest site. The rest suffocated to death while stacked up like logs in the back of military trucks, after being rounded up and detained. 

They were among nearly 1,400 demonstrators calling for the release of six village security personnel, who were accused by police of willingly handing their government-issued weapons to separatist insurgents.The massacre happened during the holy month of Ramadan, considered sacred by Muslims. 

Gen. Pisarn Wattanawongkiri, the region’s highest military commander who was at the demonstration site, was quickly reassigned. He would retire from the Royal Thai Army honorably some years later. 

Shortly after the killings, a shaky video clip of the incident circulated widely. It showed protesters being kicked and struck with the butts of rifles, as they were forced to crawl into the trucks. 

The message to them and to the Malay Muslims, who make up about 85% of the 2 million residents of this historically contested region, was clear: You’re a defeated people, and there isn’t much you can do but learn how to live with this reality; don’t forget that challenging the authorities comes with a heavy price. The message was rejected outright, of course.

The Tak Bai massacre became part of a powerful narrative, not only for the local Malay Muslims because it reinforced their historical mistrust of the Thai state, but for the separatist insurgents who would use it in their recruitment drive.

In what was billed as a gesture of goodwill, then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra launched a “peace bombing” campaign to assuage the fury of the Malays in the border region.

He asked the country’s people to fold origami birds, which were dropped from the military planes across the far south. Collecting 20 paper cranes entitled one to a carton of milk. 

Despite the intention, the peace bombings baffled both the militants and the Muslims, who offered an entirely different interpretation of the birds. 

The Islamic understanding of dropping birds is battle, the late opposition MP Surin Pitsuwan, a Muslim, told the Parliament floor. He pointed to Sura 105 of the Quran, (Al-Fil, the Elephant), in which God sends down “birds in flocks” on his enemies to flatten them like blades of grass. 

Leaflet of one of the 14 wanted suspects posted in Bangkok

Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont, who was installed by a junta after Thaksin was toppled in a 2006 coup, apologized to the family members of the Tak Bai victims during a town hall meeting in Pattani province in 2007. 

But the Thai state and society didn’t feel the need to build on Surayud’s apology. There was no public monument or official event to commemorate the tragic event. 

In May 2009, the Songkhla Provincial Court ruled that security officials who were sent to break up the Tak Bai protest had acted within their duties and that 78 of the victims had died from suffocation. In other words, they died as a result of unfortunate circumstances rather than intentional acts.  Nothing was said about the seven others who were shot dead on site. 

In 2012, the then-government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra – Thaksin’s younger sister – provided compensation of 7.5 million baht (U.S. $ 222,028) to the families of each of the victims.

However, financial compensation was not the same as justice, no matter how hard the Thai officials and Thaksin’s political allies wanted it to be. 

This past August and September, a Thai court decided to try the cases and bring murder charges against 14 men, from military Gen. Pisarn to the drivers of the transport trucks. For some it was a chance for justice; for others, it was an opportunity for closure, to heal the wound and move on as a nation.

The militants had resurfaced in mid-2001, after a decade-long hiatus. But their presence was not officially recognized by Thaksin’s government until they pulled off a major arms heist from a military weapons depot in Narathiwat province, where Tak Bai is located, in January 2004.

Twenty years later, more than 7,500 people have been killed from insurgency-related violence, and the end is still nowhere in sight despite several attempts at negotiations with the rebels. 

Peace initiatives have never moved beyond confidence-building measures. With the military and conservative establishment in a firm place after a Faustian deal with the ruling Pheu Thai Party, the peace negotiation is likely to be even more difficult than in the past. 

As the 20th anniversary of the incident approached, violence in the far south spiked. But this year’s attacks were much more vicious, perhaps because the statute of limitations in the Tak Bai incident was going to expire, and because separatist militants needed to remind the country – particularly Thai security forces in the heavily militarized Deep South – the case was far from being closed. 

Today’s ruling party, the Pheu Thai, an offshoot of Thai Rak Thai, is headed by 38-year-old Thaksin’s daughter, Paetongtarn. Pisarn became a senior member of the party and an MP until his resignation on Oct. 14, seemingly to distance the ruling party from the case. 

Like others who have been charged by the Thai court in August, Pisarn is nowhere to be found. The same could be said about national reconciliation. 

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst. The views expressed in this column are his own and do not reflect the position of BenarNews.

https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/time-runs-out-for-justice-in-thailand-tak-bai-massacre-10252024122934.html

What’s next for southern Thai peace talks after abrupt govt change?

The appointment of the first civilian to lead Thailand in negotiations with BRN rebels is up for renewal as a new government comes into being.

Commentary by Don Pathan

The sudden change in the prime minister at the top of Thailand’s government will have little impact on southern peace talks because the ruling party has never made this a priority.

The Pheu Thai Party returned to power in September 2023 through a post-electoral Faustian deal with civil-military political parties, even though it had promised not to work with them. Since taking office last year and before Srettha Thavisin was removed as PM through a court order on Aug. 14, Pheu Thai’s focus has consistently been on the economy, an issue with which it still struggles.  

Justice Minister Thawee Sodsong (red shirt) in front of bombed-out
 police flat in Yala, on June 30, 2024. (Photo: Royal Thai Police) 

Meanwhile, efforts are being made to replace the chief Thai negotiator. Under existing regulations for the peace talks, the mandate of Chatchai Bangchuad, the civilian who serves as the chief Thai negotiator, is expected to end after the cabinet of new Prime Minister Paetongtarn “Ung Ing” Shinawatra is installed. 

Chatchai, who is also deputy secretary-general of the National Security Council, has been leading Thailand’s negotiating team for about seven months in talks with the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the most powerful of insurgent groups in the far south. 

He has succeeded in getting the BRN to agree to a framework for the peace process, known officially as the Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace (JCPP).

Agreeing on the framework for the talks may not be as difficult as negotiating on the nitty-gritty of three substantive issues: A cessation of hostilities and reduction of violence; a public consultation process; and discussions toward realizing a political solution in settling the conflict in the majority-Muslim southern border region that has claimed at least 7,400 lives since 2004. 

The agreement, nevertheless, is a step in the right direction. In late June, the then-Malaysian facilitator for the talks, Gen. Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, issued a press statement to welcome this move. A formal endorsement of the framework by all the parties is expected in September. 

Thailand's Chatchai, Facilitator Zulkifli, and BRN's
Anas Abdulrahman, Feb. 7, 2024 (BernaNews)

However, the ouster of Prime Minister Srettha by the Constitutional Court has disrupted that. In a 5-4 vote, it ordered him removed from office immediately for having committed what the court deemed was a gross ethical violation through appointing a convicted felon, Pichit Chuenban, to his cabinet.   

The removal of Srettha and his ministers means the JCPP will have to wait until the new cabinet reinstates Chatchai or appoints a new chief negotiator.

Because Srettha and his replacement, Ung Ing, are from the same party, one would assume that the government’s transition and the agenda for the peace talks would go uninterrupted.

But nothing comes easy in the far south. Chatchai’s Peace Dialogue Panel has been facing criticism from government advisors and hardliners, many of whom never liked the idea of talking to the rebels in the first place. They see the peace talks as “unnecessarily” giving BRN the legitimacy they don’t deserve. 

Unfortunately for Chatchai and his team, the harshest criticism came from one of the most trusted voices in the Pheu Thai circle.

The recent blasting of the JCPP by Professor Surachart Bamrungsuk, a security expert from Chulalongkorn University jolted not only Chatchai and his team, but members of a parliamentary ad hoc committee tasked with coming up with recommendations on how to improve the peace talks. Surachart is not a Pheu Thai member but has close ties to the party and has the ear of Pheu Thai officials.

According to sources close to the sub-committee, it is drafting a report said to be very progressive. It contains suggestions for the government and lawmakers to open up social, cultural, and political space for the Malays in the far south as a way to win hearts and minds of a people who continue to reject Thailand’s nation-state construct and narrative on the grounds that it undermines their ethno-religious identity.

The draft report also calls on the peace talks to go beyond confidence-building measures (CBM) and take up more substantive issues on the table. The recommendations are expected to be handed over to Parliament before the end of this Fiscal Year, Sept. 30.

Like the Peace Dialogue Panel, members of this ad hoc committee are also concerned that their recommendations will be dead on arrival. 

If Professor Surachart is not willing to give the JCPP the benefit of the doubt, then, in their view, there isn’t much hope for the committee’s recommendations.

Surachart accused the negotiators of overstepping their boundary and said that any talks with the rebels must include a demand for the reduction of violence, something that the BRN is not willing to do. 

Working towards the reduction of violence and respecting rules of engagement are fine in principle but a formal agreement on cessation of hostilities, in BRN’s view, is little more than a form of surrender.

Amid the criticism that placed the negotiators in an uncomfortable position, moves are being taken by individuals, including a retired army general, who thinks he can do a better job.

Nobody is expected to make a big fuss if the new Pheu Thai government appoints another army general as the chief negotiator, even if it means going back on their words about promoting civilian supremacy in peace talks. 

But if the excuse for Chatchai’s removal has anything to do with Surachart’s criticism, it could mean an end to the JCPP as we know it. 

Regardless of who becomes the chief negotiator, Thailand still has to overcome some serious obstacles, such as agreeing on the nature of the conflict itself. 

The actions of successive governments – dispatching negotiators to meet with BRN representatives – are a testimony that they acknowledge the political underpinnings of the conflict. But many hardliners still believe they can end the conflict via military means and come out victorious without making any concessions to the BRN or the Malays in the far south.

Separately, Malaysia has recently appointed a new facilitator, Mohd Rabin Basir, for the talks between the Thai government and BRN. Familiarity with the intricacies of the negotiations will take some time, but the new facilitator appears to be off to a good start.

Thai officials said Rabin was not too keen on protocol and that he was encouraging direct engagement between the BRN representatives and Thai negotiators. Less structured, more direct and personal appeared to be Rabin’s approach to the peace process, one Thai official said.

How this plays out in terms of deeper discussion on the JCPP, on the other hand, remains to be seen.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst. The views expressed in this column are his own and do not reflect the position of BenarNews.


Endorsement of the JCPP at the end of September 2024

 

Expect parliamentary sub-committee to make bold peace recommendations for Thai Deep South

Don Pathan
BermaNews

As it nears its conclusion, a parliamentary ad-hoc committee tasked with exploring ways to enhance the southern Thailand peace process is soon expected to submit some bold recommendations, including to confront thorny issues at the heart of the insurgency.

After extensive consultations with conflict experts and key stakeholders, including a meeting in Malaysia with negotiators representing the Barisan Nasional Revolusi (BRN) rebels, the committee will submit its recommendations to Parliament for review next month before it will likely be disbanded.

Elders at the Don Rak Mosque distribute money to children to celebrate the Eid-ul-Adha holiday in Nong Chik, a district of Pattani province in southern Thailand, June 17, 2024. [Yostorn Triyos/BenarNews]

The committee, which was set up by Thailand’s new legislature, was also tasked with providing recommendations on improving the public consultation process – a platform for residents of the Muslim-majority and historically contested far South to engage with Thai and BRN negotiators.

Some members of the 35-member ad-hoc committee – particularly those with progressive views – are expected to advocate for moving the peace talks beyond confidence-building measures (CBMs) and taking up topics that go to the root causes of the decades-old conflict.

However, such a call for substantial changes may face resistance as some bureaucrats, including a few on the committee, are inclined to maintain Thailand’s highly centralized structure. They are wary of granting the far South any special status that could set a precedent for other regions.

BRN, a longstanding Patani Malay armed separatist group that controls virtually all of the combatants in the field, commenced direct talks with Thailand’s Peace Dialogue Panel in January 2020. The negotiation process has been challenging, with disagreements between the Thai army and BRN over the preferred approach.

While some progress has been made, there are underlying tensions about the legitimacy of the negotiations and political motives behind violence in the southern border region.

For one, the process from the start didn’t have the full endorsement of the army, which still preferred using military means to quell the insurgency. 

Thai political elites and the army have never liked the idea of talking to the separatists, and see this as unnecessarily legitimizing the BRN. They prefer not to acknowledge the political underpinnings of the violence in the southern border region.

BRN combatants, on the other hand, have wondered if independence is still part of the movement’s goal now that their political leaders have agreed to negotiate under the Thai constitution. 

The movement’s leaders will rely on the public consultations to sort this matter out. If the constituency wants independence, so be it.

Combatants, meanwhile, are not letting up on their campaign of violence. More than ever, attacks have become an essential part of the rebels’ political messaging.

The increase in violent incidents is the highest in the past six years, and the intense nature of some of these high-profile, often coordinated, and simultaneous attacks involve scores of operatives and at times, last up to 30 minutes. Targets include security units patrolling the region and government installations in towns and cities.

This is a far cry from the usual roadside bombing followed by a three-minute gunfight before retreating into the woods.

Besides the increase in violence, the reaction to a leaked copy of the Joint Comprehensive Plan Towards Peace (JCPP) reflects the fragility of the peace process. 

The usual talking heads came out to voice their opinion but it was comments by Surachart Bamnrungsuk, a faculty member of the Department of International Relations at Chulalongkorn University, that rubbed many people the wrong way. He had remarked that the Peace Dialogue Panel was going about it the wrong way, and he asked whether the Thai negotiators were exceeding their mandate with this so-called road map for peace.

The document, leaked by the BRN, contained specific points about reducing violence; it also talked about a timeline for releasing detainees, as well as guidelines for ceasefire monitoring.

The JCPP was not a political statement in itself, but critics of the peace process could not bring themselves to see it any other way. For many Thai policy makers and conservative elites, everything in the Malay-speaking far South, and every dealing with the BRN is in essence political.

The ad hoc committee for the far South is headed by veteran lawmaker

Chaturon Chaisang, who is well respected by the Malay Muslims in Thailand’s far South.

When he served as education minister two decades ago, Chaturon urged the government to support local identity and grant the Malays greater cultural space as a way to bridge the trust gap between the state and the local population. 

His recommendations were quickly shot down by the army.

Today, Chaturon is no longer a cabinet minister and does not have the kind of pull that he used to have with the government or the party. No one is expecting a significant breakthrough because it’s still not clear what kind of concessions the government is willing to give to the Patani Malays.

Moreover, the three-month at a time mandate given to his ad hoc committee wasn’t much of a mandate to begin with, considering that the conflict resurged 20 years ago and that more than 7,500 people have died from insurgency-related violence since then.

Committee members are a mixed bag of people, including people who advocate for serious moves to empower the Malay-speaking region so that the locals can fully embrace their cultural-religious identity and narrative. And then there are those who believe the far South can come to terms with the state if the government improves its deliverables on goods and services.

Police investigate the scene after a motorcycle-bomb attack injured nine people at Tha Phraya Sai Dam in Mueang Narathiwat, a district of Narathiwat province in southern Thailand, May 7, 2024. [Matahari Islmail/BenarNews]

Government officials, in general, continue to cling to the long-standing policy of assimilation – enhancing Thainess among the Melayu without understanding that, for the Muslims in this historically contested region, their Islamic religion and their Malay identity are inseparable.

Moreover, there doesn’t seem to be much interest among the lawmakers, including those who sit on this ad hoc committee. Many appeared to have better things to do than coming to the committee’s meetings.

In the final analysis, no matter how bold their recommendations may be, it is essentially up to Parliament and the government to act on the committee’s recommendations. 

Given the political climate of the day, combined with the lack of interest by the current crop of lawmakers and the mindset of the army and political elites who are not willing to make serious concessions to the Patani Malays beyond minor administrative adjustments, political violence in the far South will go on as usual.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst who works on conflict and insurgency in the Southeast Asia region. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of BenarNews.


Thai, BRN negotiators are ready to resume peace talks

Commentary by Don Pathan
BernaNews

Chatchai Bangchuad (left), the Thai government’s new chief negotiator for Deep South peace talks, meets with Malaysian facilitator Zulkifli Zainal Abidin. [Courtesy of National Security Council of Thailand]

High-level negotiations between Thai officials and representatives from the Barisan Revolusi Nasional rebel group are scheduled to resume next week in Kuala Lumpur after a year-long pause, as Thailand preoccupied itself with the 2023 general election followed by several months of horse-trading.

Thai negotiators and the BRN, the long-standing separatist movement that controls virtually all combatants in Thailand’s Malay-speaking far south, are expected to continue to look for a common ground on three items – public consultations, reduction of violence and political solutions to bring this conflict to an end.

In the previous round of talks that came to a halt in February 2023, BRN requested that its representatives be permitted to enter the southern Thai border provinces – the historically contested area – to carry out in-person public consultations.

But the plan was shot down by the Thai Army whose leaders were afraid of a public-relations nightmare. An outpouring of support for the BRN delegates from locals would destroy the Thai government’s old narrative that says the Malays of Patani are with the Thai State.

The two sides have yet to agree on the format. 

The Thai government wants everybody – Thai-BRN negotiators and the Malaysian mediator – to sit at every meeting under the public consultation platform while the rebels insist that could happen only after a certain level of comfort is reached on that issue. Until then, the three stakeholders at the table should conduct their consultation individually, in BRN’s view.

Reduction in violence

A cessation of hostilities agreement, or COHA, is a bit tricky, as some BRN members see it as a form of surrender. They insisted COHA must be a gradual process or BRN’s military capability will be depleted.

Besides the three items that have been on the table for some time now, the Thai side is expected to ask the BRN to agree to a ceasefire during the upcoming Ramadan – the Muslim holy month of fasting – expected to run from March 10 to April 9. 

Previously, the two sides observed a ceasefire during the 2022 holy month. The government deemed it a great success and wanted to build on it. 

BRN added 10 days as a gesture of goodwill to the Buddhist residents in the far south, extending the ceasefire to the Visaka Bucha that year.

But just days after the ceasefire ended, combatants launched a series of vicious attacks, reminding all sides that nothing comes easy in this long-standing conflict that has so far claimed more than 7,300 lives since a separatist insurgency reignited in January 2004. 

Chatchai Bangchuad (left), the Thai government’s new chief negotiator for Deep South peace talks, meets with Malaysian facilitator Zulkifli Zainal Abidin in this undated photo. [Courtesy National Security Council of Thailand]

Ahead of Ramadan in 2023, the Thai government was not able to secure a similar agreement, partly because the Thais couldn’t meet BRN’s request to allow an international monitoring team. Besides, the two sides had gone into pause mode because of the general election.

It is not clear if a deal could be reached for this year’s Ramadan less than six weeks away.  

Still, BRN is expected to reiterate the same requirements for a cease fire and call for the release of an unspecified number of prisoners. Should this happen, it would be a test case for the Thai government as any release of prisoners requires the Justice Ministry to take a stance on the matter.

Political solution – the third point on the table – is an open-ended challenge. But Thailand appeared to have taken the lead as both sides have agreed it must be carried out within the country’s constitution under the principle behind the unitary state of Thailand.

The three items are guided by the Joint Comprehensive Plan toward Peace (JCPP), the so-called roadmap. A timeline is expected to be agreed upon by April even as negotiations on the text of this roadmap are a work in progress.

Negotiated texts aside, the burning issue for BRN is whether the movement is willing to settle for something less than complete independence. 

Since BRN members have indicated that they are willing to negotiate the third item under the constitution and in line with the principles underlying the unitary state of Thailand, many observers, including combatants, have interpreted this move as a willingness to compromise for something less than complete independence. This could be a disaster for BRN if the combatants go against the idea.

Thailand’s negotiating team will be led by Chatchai Bangchuad, deputy secretary-general of the National Security Council (NSC). The fact that he is a civilian breaks with tradition as past chief negotiators who had served were Army generals. 

Chatchai has included the Southern Border Provinces Administration Center (SBPAC), a multi-agency governmental body that focuses on development in this historically contested region, in the lineup. This suggests that livelihood in the far South and peace talks must go together. 

Previous chief negotiators, including Gen. Udomchai Thamsarorat, had urged civil society organizations (CSO) to serve as interlocutors in the peace process, but not necessarily be given a seat at the negotiating table. The proposal was never given a chance to materialize as Udomchai left to take a position in the Thai Senate. 

Today, any suggestion of repeating Udomchai’s proposal will likely be shot down right away as more than 43 Patani Malay CSO leaders in the far south have been accused by the army and police of promoting separatist ideologies in recent months.

Meanwhile, youth leaders accused authorities of harassment and intimidation, saying they should be able to talk about “rights to self-determination” as a matter of principle behind free speech. BRN, on the other hand, will be hard pressed to take a stance on the alleged judicial harassment.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst who works on conflict and insurgency in the Southeast Asia region. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of BenarNews.

https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/peace-talks-02012024151310.html?fbclid=IwAR0sziFecwhFQdLkoYgrv-RaIm2GeWq9lcpzdUcuSTnX2dhNLKW8qg_P9fs

Thai peace talks: Expect new PM to appoint civilian as chief negotiator

Commentary by Don Pathan
BenarNews

Peace talks between Thailand and Barisan Revolusi Nasional rebels came to a complete stop in early 2023 when BRN said they would not return to the table until a new government took power following the May general election.

Prime Minister Srettha Tavisin and his cabinet were inducted on Sept. 5 after political wrangling and a post-polls impasse that lasted 3½ months. But nearly two months into office, Srettha’s government still has not announced who he has appointed to serve as the chief negotiator representing Thailand in the Malaysia-brokered talks. 

It’s also unclear whether Srettha has removed Gen. Wanlop Rugsanaoh, the incumbent, from that post. The delay is not so much a tactic but a reflection of how this administration prioritizes its policies.

Srettha has other urgent matters to attend to such as restoring the faith of his Pheu Thai Party’s support base, who felt betrayed by deals it made in forming a ruling coalition with the help of ex-military rivals who had toppled another Pheu Thai prime minister through a 2014 coup.

And so it’s important to give the impression of civilian supremacy. 

The prime minister is poised to appoint the first non-military person in years to lead the negotiating team. The past three chief negotiators for the southern peace process were retired army generals. A non-military person is expected to lead the National Security Council (NSC) as well.

Official sources said the negotiating team would report directly to Srettha, who would incorporate his own key personnel into the outfit. The NSC will not take the lead on that team but will join representatives from other government agencies and ministries in the secretariat.

While the negotiations team will come directly under the prime minister, the Prachachat Party, a local party made up of mostly ageing Malay Muslims who were members of the now-defunct Wadah Faction, will take the lead in overseeing policy for the far south. They will receive a wide mandate, from development to national reconciliation.

Anas Abdulrahman (center), the head of the panel representing Barisan Revolusi Nasional rebels in peace talks with Thailand, and fellow BRN delegates take part in a post-meetings press conference at a hotel in Petaling Jaya, near Kuala Lumpur, Aug. 3, 2022. [S. Mahfuz/BenarNews]

However, identifying the terms for peaceful coexistence between the ethnic Malays in the troubled border region and the rest of the predominantly Buddhist country will not be easy. 

Wadah politicians were given the same mandate by the then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra who, almost immediately after coming to power in 2001, dissolved the multiagency Southern Border Provinces Administration Center so that his people could have a freer hand to deal with the region. 

But the government of Thaksin, Pheu Thai’s patriarch, was caught off guard with the emergence of the new generation of Patani Malay separatist fighters after nearly a decade of relatively calm.

At first, Thaksin labeled them “sparrow bandits,” insisting that Patani Malay separatist ideology was a thing of the past. But his government could no longer deny the political underpinnings of their operations when, on Jan. 4, 2004, scores of BRN insurgents raided an army battalion and made off with hundreds of military weapons from an arms depot on base.

Since then more than 7,300 people have been killed from insurgency-related violence.

Peace initiatives have come and gone but none generated enough traction to push the talks beyond confidence-building measures, or CBM – not even after the BRN, the group that controls virtually all of the combatants in the field, came to the table, in early 2020.

As long as anyone could remember, Prachachat members like to blame the military for just about everything, from abuse of power and heavy-handedness in counter-insurgency operations, to obstructing progress and development in this historically contested region.

But it was their refusal to stand up for their own people against the then government of Thaksin and the army during two bloody incidents – the Tak Bai massacre and the Krue Se Mosque standoff in April and October 2004, respectively – that undermined their popularity with voters.  

According to Daungyewa Utarasint, an assistant professor at the New York University campus in Abu Dhabi, the so-called Wadah politicians were shunned by their constituency for nearly 15 years. They were able to make a comeback in 2018 with the help of Police Col. Tawee Sodsong, a close political ally of Thaksin. Together, these so-called Wadah politicians formed the Prachachart Party.

Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, a political action group advocating rights to self-determination for the people in the far south, said memories of the Tak Bai and the Krue Se incidents are still vivid in the minds of the locals who have yet to come to terms with these atrocities.

“Blaming the Army for all the region’s problems is Wadah’s way of excluding themselves from any responsibilities. They were more concerned about staying in power than bringing justice to their people,” Artef said.

“Justice to them is mainly about economic development. They forgot it’s also about human dignity,” Artef added.

Negotiation can be a thankless job because the Thai team was hampered by national politics that would not permit them to make any meaningful concessions to the rebels or to the Patani Malays, a people who embrace an entirely different set of historical and cultural narratives from that of the Thai State.

For the young men taking up arms against the state, said local writer Asmadee Bueheng, their political objective is non-negotiable.

“People have put their lives on the line for it and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

Thailand has to learn how to deal with this sacred value that cannot be compromised,” Asmadee said.

Today, with a civilian government in place, it is tempting to believe that changes is inevitable. It is hoped that meaningful topics would reach the negotiating table and generate greater social-political space for the Malays in the far south that could lead to reconciliation.

But this blind optimism rests on the assumption that the civilian leaders understand the nature of the conflict better than the military who had dominated the country’s national politics for much of the past two decades.

Civilian leaders may have a better rapport with civil society organizations (CSO). But if the past two decades tell us anything is that neither the political leaders nor the country’s top brass has the political will to push for real changes.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst who works on conflict and insurgency in the Southeast Asia region. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of BenarNews.

https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/thailand-srettha-thavisin-southern-peace-talks-don-pathan-10272023104732.html