Mulling Thailand’s approach to the Myanmar junta’s election

Don Pathan
Myanmar News

An unwanted spotlight will be placed on Thailand when the government explains its stance as to why the country should or should not support the upcoming General Election in Myanmar planned for later this year or early next, knowing that it will be a sham as the Myanmar junta no longer controls the majority of the country.

Credit: Mizzima News
To do so would not only help whitewash the much-condemned State Administrative Council (SAC), the name the Myanmar junta had given itself for the 2021 coup. Endorsing the election could also isolate Thailand even further from the rest of the international community whose progressive values and commitments on humanitarian principles every Thai government professed to embrace but always lacked the political will to do so. The deportation of Burmese migrant workers back to Myanmar, where the junta forcibly conscripts them, is a case in point.

When it comes to trouble-plagued Myanmar, also known as Burma, the international community tends to look to Thailand as an entry point. The number of self-proclaimed personal connections over the past decades by Thai generals, prime ministers, and foreign ministers that often translated to lucrative business deals gives members of the international community the idea that Thailand could use its charm to convince the Tatmadaw or Myanmar military to improve its act. 

In late 1988, for example, then army chief Gen. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh led a delegation to Rangoon to break
international isolation. Senior Gen. Saw Maung, the then leader of Burma, called the Thai general a “true friend” of Myanmar. To show their gratitude, lucrative logging contracts, fishing rights, and deals in the hotel business were awarded to Thai companies. 

Myanmar activists today still recalled vividly the August-September 1988 brutal suppression of student-led pro-democracy protestors, known as the “8888 Uprising,” that resulted in the death of more than three thousand people. 

Besides isolating itself from the international community, relations between Thailand and Myanmar ethnic armed organizations (EAO) fighting the SAC could also take a downturn, as could the long-standing practice of using them as a buffer between the Thai Army and the Myanmar troops. 

For a very long time, any EAOs fighting the Myanmar government were always deemed a friend of Thailand, while those with a ceasefire pact with the Tatmadaw are a threat to Thai national security. Engaging and strengthening ties with the EAOs along Thailand’s northern border was one school of thought for Thai defense planners. The second school calls for direct engagement with the Myanmar military government, but critics often equate this approach as economic opportunism. 

Economic cooperation was what Thaksin Shinawatra had in mind when he came to power in February 2001, a time when there were cross-border shellings in response to Myanmar’s intrusion, as well as the detention of Thai Paramilitary Rangers on the Pang Noon hill in Chiang Rai. The two leading military figures at the time were Army chief Gen. Surayud Chulanont and commander of the Third Army Area, Lt. General Wattanachai Chaimuanwong; these two weren’t going to let the Tatmadaw push them around. They would be sidelined by Thaksin for obvious reasons.

Besides the relentless production of methamphetamines by a pro-Rangoon outfit, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), that find its way onto the streets of Thailand and other parts of Southeast Asian cities, the Thai Army was also frustrated with the Wa’s mass relocation of over 100,000 people from its traditional stronghold along the Sino-Burma border and resettled them in newly built towns and villages adjacent to Thailand’s Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai. 

Eventually, the bickerings between the two sides gave way to an all-out assault by the Thai troops. On May 20, 2002, Thai infantry units and armoured personnel carriers (APC) supported by light and heavy artillery launched an all-out offensive to take out positions manned by the UWSA.

Shan State Army – South provided some guidance on the ground and, naturally, pointed to the positions where the Tatmadaw officers were posted. Thai soldiers had been seen taking up positions along the northern border in Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, and Mae Hong Son provinces for weeks, awaiting instruction. It was supposed to be a military training exercise, Surasri 143. But in reality, it became one of the biggest military operations since the Vietnam War. The incoming government was in over its head, but Thaksin was determined to patch things up with Burma. 

For a man with quirky ambitions, Thaksin would soon contradict himself. One of the first orders of business was countering narcotics. As his controversial drug war claimed 3,000 lives in three months, his government conveniently pointed to the UWSA as the source of the problem. Nothing was hardly said about the social-economic situation of the users. 

The problem with his approach was that the Wa has powerful allies, namely the Myanmar government. As a result, Thaksin was outsmarted by the then-powerful intelligence chief, Gen. Khin Nyunt, who succeeded in getting Thaksin to endorse the Yongkha Development Project in a UWSA-controlled area, thinking this will help the Wa kick the opium habit. While no one in the international community put any money in it, Khin Nyunt succeeded in achieving his goal, which was to whitewash the UWSA, an outfit that has been dubbed the world’s largest armed drug trafficking army by the US State Department. 

Relations with Burma improved steadily with Thakin in power while democracy and human rights took a backseat. The bilateral ties were interrupted when Thaksin was ousted in September 2006. Coup leader and then army chief Gen. Sonthi Boonyaratglin appointed Gen. Surayudh, hero to Burmese exile and ethnic armies because of his tough stance against the Tatmadaw, as Thailand’s prime minister. But Surayud was committed to a timeline to return the mandate to the Thai people and the junta government that he led was around for only 16 months. 

Like Thaksin, the incoming Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej, an ultranationalist with a checkered past in Thai politics, was more interested in stability, not confrontation with Myanmar. During his first visit to Myanmar, Samak did relay the message from the US and British governments, as well as the UN head, about the need to allow international aid groups entry to the country devastated by a cyclone, which had left 34,273 persons dead, 1,403 injured and 27,836 missing according to figure released by Myanmar state media.

The following government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, who came to power after a shifting alliance in the Parliament that made him the majority, said his “flexible engagement” policy for Burma called for more open dialogue on issues such as human rights.

“ASEAN to be strong it has to have the credibility and respect from the international community,” he said. “So what’s happening in Myanmar clearly affects the rest of the region – and I would just point out that it’s time for change. As far as we are concerned, we need to get ASEAN to become more proactive – it’s not easy but I’ve seen changes and I’ve seen progress.”

The July 2011 general election saw Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck, becoming the prime minister. During his visit to the country, Snr. General Min Aung Hlaing, the commander-in-chief, said relations between Thailand and Myanmar are at their most cordial in the history of ties between the two countries. 

Yingluck continued with the promotion of the Dawei Special Economic Zone project in southern Myanmar, seeing it as a legacy of her fugitive brother Thaksin. Located on the Andaman coast, the project aims to be Southeast Asia’s largest industrial zone. 

Yingluck was ousted in a coup in May 2014 by a Thai junta that would stay in power for the next nine years. A firm bond between the two sides was reassured under the leadership of Prime Minister Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha, the junta chief. Min Aung Hlaing visited Thailand two months after the coup, becoming the first foreigner of significant rank to visit the country. It was nothing less than a display of brotherhood. 

State Councilor Aung San Suu Kyi paid a visit to Thailand in June 2016, during which she signed three MOUs with Prayuth that touched on employment protection and improving working conditions for the millions of Myanmar migrant workers in the country. As expected, the two leaders referred to the Dawai project on how bilateral economic cooperation could be enhanced. 

Suu Kyi was ousted in a coup in February 2021. As expected, Prayuth stepped up to Myanmar’s rescue even at the expense of upsetting fellow ASEAN members who had shunned the Tatmadaw for the coup by barring high-level meetings with the junta or SAC, ASEAN drew up a five-point concensus that includes dialogue, humanitarian aid, and an end to violence. Myanmar’s generals ignored the bloc’s initiative. 

As foreign governments condemned the coup and the military’s brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters, Thailand attended the Armed Forces Day in Naypyidaw, a month after the coup.  

Thailand’s Deputy Prime Minister Don Pramudwinai sponsored a meeting on Myanmar in June in Pattaya, giving veteran diplomat Than Swe a platform to repeat the Burmese junta’s justifications for the 2021 coup. Foreign Ministers from key ASEAN countries – Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia – shunned the Pattaya meeting, insisting that the five-point consensus must be the only guiding principle. 

FM Don insisted that Thailand has much at stake because of its geographical proximity, thus the need to take a more direct, i.e., bilateral approach to helping get Myanmar back on track. 

The next Thai government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Srettha Tavisin, a real estate tycoon handpicked by Thaksin, didn’t have time for Myanmar, much less national security, including insurgency in the Muslim-majority southernmost border provinces. The utmost importance for the government was economic recovery to win back the constituency that they lost after the Faustian deal with Thaksin and junta leaders that ousted his sister from power in 2014. 

But slowly, Foreign Minister Parnpree Bahiddha-nukara and Vice Ministre Sihasak Puangketkaeo patched things up with ASEAN members on Myanmar policy and pushed through the so-called humanitarian corridor. The transfer of humanitarian supplies crossed from Mae Sot to Myawaddy. Not long after that humanitarian initiative that was supposed to expand to areas affected by the battles inside Myanmar, Pranpree resigned from his post, following disagreement with party leadership. Sihasak followed him. 

Pranpree was replaced by a career diplomat, FM Maris Sangiampongsa, a long-standing supporter of Thaksin who stuck with this telecommunication tycoon through thick and thin since his ouster by a coup in 2006. But Thailand needed more than another “yes man” in the Cabinet as the situation inside neighbouring Myanmar was getting too dire. More than ever before, there was a sense that the revolutionary forces could defeat the Myanmar military government. 

And when it was time for Maris to do something, it was a platform for the SAC to pitch the upcoming general election. Speaking in Bangkok to a group of neighbouring countries in December 2024, Myanmar FM Than Swe said SAC would permit international observers for the upcoming election. He said nothing about how polling would be carried out in states such as Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, and Rakhine, where EAOs and PDF are very much in control on the ground. 

In line with his ambition to be recognized as a regional statesman, Thaksin stepped in, thinking that he had the clout to pull this off. He travelled up to Chiang Mai with a prepared document appointing him the peace maker for the Myanmar conflict. But no one from the Burmese ethnic armed organizations would sign it. He doesn’t seem to understand that he is not exactly an honest broker, given his close connection with the Myanmar military. 

Fierce fighting inside Myanmar dimmed so many things, including hope to revive the Dawei SEZ mega project. A recent commitment from Russia on the development of this project may give a new lease on life for this dying project. But if the opposition People’s Defence Forces (PDF) continue to gain ground in this region, the horse is likely to remain dead. 

For the time being, Myanmar is under the control of the EAOs and the PDFs, the armed wing of the exile government – the National Unity Government (NUG) of Myanmar. 

A massive earthquake hit Myanmar on March 28, but that didn’t stop the Tatmadaw from carrying out air strikes, something the military had been doing since the coup. Security experts such as Prof. Zachary Abuza of the US National War College said the air war is used to terrorize the Myanmar people and does not serve any strategic purpose.

It is not clear if the upcoming general election will be pushed back because of the earthquake. Nevertheless, it is clear that the junta is looking towards the election as a seal of approval, a new beginning for them and for key allies, such as China and possibly Thailand. 

Min Aung Hlaing will be coming to Bangkok to attend the BIMSTEC, a mostly South Asian region grouping, summit meeting from April 3-4. The SAC will try to make the best out of it, but whether this means anything in the long term, on the other hand, remains to be seen. 

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

Can the massive scam industry on China's doorstep be stopped?

 Caught between Myanmar's militias and Beijing's demands, thousands face an uncertain fate


Don Pathan
March 28, 2025 05:05 JST

A soldier of the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) burns Myanmar's national flag at a military base at Thingyan Nyi Naung village on the outskirts of Myawaddy, the Thailand-Myanmar border town under the control of a coalition of rebel forces led by the Karen National Union, in  April 2024. © Reuters

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

Until recently, twice a day, two plane loads of Chinese tourists on commercial flights from Bangkok would land here at Mae Sot, a border town in Thailand not known for much other than cross-border trade with Myanmar.

https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Can-the-massive-scam-industry-on-China-s-doorstep-be-stopped

Tensions Rise in Southern Thailand as Ramadhan Ceasefire Talks Stall

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com

The Thai Government was hoping to secure a ceasefire with the Patani Malay separatist rebels for this year’s Ramadhan. However, after over two weeks since the start of the holy month, the two sides still have yet to find middle ground.

A Defence Volunteer miraculously survived an explosion from a bomb hidden under her vehicle in Pattani.

Worse, violence has not only spiked – the recent attacks have been extremely daring. As seen on 8 March 2025, a group of about 10 combatants raided the compound of the Sungai Kolok District Office in Narathiwat just before midnight, killing two and wounding seven security officials in a brief but fierce gunfight.

The combatant arrived in two vehicles, one of which was packed with explosives, parked near the district office building. It was set off shortly after they retreated from the vicinity. 

The same evening, in Sai Buri District of Pattani, a smaller explosive lured Paramilitary Rangers to the scene, where they were hit with a much more powerful bomb. Insurgents commence fire immediately upon explosion, killing three Rangers at the scene. This was not an isolated incident. 

Warning to all Defence Volunteers: Stop serving Siam.

Earlier in the week, suspected insurgents threw pipe bombs at security officials near the train station in Yala, wounding four bystanders. And on Monday morning (March 17), a security officer from the Ministry of Interior barely survived a blast from a bomb that was hidden underneath her personal vehicle that went off as she was driving to work. Words have been out for some months now about rebel forces urging MOI’s security officials, locally known as Defense Volunteers, to quit their job and to refrain from acting as spies or agent for the Thai security apparatus.

Aftermath of a bomb blast on the personal vehicle belonging to a Thai security officer.

These incidents, caught on CCTV from various angles, reinforced the understanding that insurgency is a form of communicative action in which a non-state actor uses violence to send political messages to the state security apparatus.

Indeed, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) has not been pleased with the Thai government’s foot dragging with the peace negotiation. In December 2024, Nikmatullah Bin Seri, the head of BRN technical team, issued a public statement saying the group was prepared to walk away from the process and take back their commitment to negotiate under the Thai Constitution if Bangkok is not serious about the talk. The peace process was supposed to resume once a new government came to power after the 2023 general election.

The following month, Thai Defense Minister Phumtham Wechayachai called on all relevant agencies to draft an “actionable solution” to resolve the conflict. Days later, Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra made her first visit to the far South. Incidentally, she visited the Thamvithya Mulnithi school, where several BRN political figures and the chief negotiator, as well as the late spiritual leader of the movement and the Patani region, Sapae-ing Basor, had worked as teachers and principal before fleeing Thailand to avoid arrest.

Phumtham’s directive and the PM visit may suggest that the government was giving in to BRN’s demands. But in fact, Bangkok was setting rigid terms for future talks. According to a government source, Phumtham has demanded that BRN curb their violence before he would appoint a negotiating team.  He is also considering doing away with foreign mediation, which would mean an end to all back-channeling, and axed the position of the five international conflict experts who function as observers for the high-level talks. Malaysia, the designated facilitator, will be the sole mediator for the talks, according to one Thai official who spoke on condition of anonymity.

It is not clear if Phumtham will scrap the Joint Comprehensive Plan Toward Peace (JCPP), the so-called road map for peace. Thailand and BRN, with the help of foreign NGOs and Malaysia working in separate and often competing tracks, spent the past three years going back and forth on the JCPP. They identified three items to be on the negotiating table: reduction of violence, public consultation, and a political solution to the conflict. Specific details are to be negotiated in the following phase.

BRN leaked the draft of the JCPP to the public early last year to test the water; the result was a big stir among government security officials and the military, who never liked the idea of talking to the rebels in the first place. They still think military option is the best way forward.

Because of the outpour of criticisms from the public and top government advisors, the Thai negotiating team was badly isolated; they were accused of giving in too much to the BRN. What Phumtham does not understand is that for the BRN, the peace process is the beginning of a very long journey that will not rest until the movement achieve either independence or a form of “self-government”. Under the latter arrangement, sovereign remained with Bangkok but regional Parliament makes the law for this historically contested region. According to a report released by The Patani on the peace process, BRN maintained that even under a “self-government”, the people of Patani must retain the right to succession. 

These are tall order, indeed, considering that after two decades of off-and-on peace initiatives, Thailand has never permitted the talks to move beyond confidence-building measures. Even with direct engagement with BRN, the one group that control virtually all the combatants on the ground, Phumtham continue to sound like a broken record – suggesting that the government is still doubtful of working directly with BRN or if BRN is truly the party that the government should work with. While this suggests a need for the government to verify that it is talking with the right people, such verification may not amount to anything in light of the government’s high level of distrust to BRN.

Stalled Negotiation

In line with past practices, the Thai side – remnants of the now-defunct Peace Dialogue Panel, the official negotiators – tried to push for a ceasefire during this year’s Ramadhan, which started on 1 March 2025.

Malaysia’s facilitator for the peace process, Mohd Rabin Basir, tried hard to help the Thais push this request through but was not able to do so. This was because BRN refused to budge on their demand that the ceasefire include a monitoring mechanism by international peace and conflict experts and that local civil society organizations be given a role in observing the process as well. Other demands include the release of BRN prisoners and the appointment of a negotiating team for the peace talks.

Observers of the peace process said they are not surprised why BRN refused to give in to the Thai government’s call for separate unilateral ceasefire during the month of Ramdan. First, said Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, a political action group dedicated to the right to self-determination for the southern people, Thailand has always tried to use the reduction of violence for short-term political gains.

“BRN can see through Thailand on this and that’s why they are not going along with it this time around,” Artef said.

BRN still recalled how the Thai Army belittled their unilateral ceasefire during the Covid-19 pandemic following a call for a global ceasefire from the UN Secretary General António Guterres. It was an opportunity missed as the Thai side could have reciprocated BRN’s gesture of goodwill and build on it. Instead, the Thai Army in the far south unleashed search and destroy operations, taking down combatants who were laying low in and around the home village in a series of lob-sided standoffs.

What was astonishing in the mind of the many security officials was the fact that, despite being outnumbered by 60-70 to one, all but one of the combatants chose death, or rather, fight to death, instead of surrendering, even though their chances of making it out alive were slim to none. A total of 60 BRN combatants were killed in the standoffs during this window.

Despite the grave disappointment because the Thai Army’s refusal to stand down, BRN did give Thailand the benefit of the doubt. The agreement for Ramadhan 2022 was pretty straightforward – the Thai military vowed not to go after cell members, while BRN agreed not to carry out attacks during the Muslim holy month and through Visakha Bucha Day, a Buddhist holiday observed this year on 15 May. A bigger leap of faith was the move to declare all mosques in this region a sanctuary where combatants could meet their family members during the last 10 days of Ramadan, which ended on May 1.

It is Not (Just) Religion

Local activists who observed the conflict warned against bringing religion into the equation could complicate things because the root causes of this conflict are political in nature as it has to do with the Malays’ rejection of Thai policy of assimilation that comes at the expense of their ethno-religious identity. For Muslims in this historically contested region, it is already a big turn-off when this predominantly Buddhist state tries to use Ramadan for its political gain.

Every now and then, Islamic religious leaders have been called upon to issue fatwa, or religious edict, to condemn the rebels on religious grounds. Needless to say, this effort made Muslim clerics in this region extremely uncomfortable as it would pit them against the separatist combattants. Moreover, separatist insurgency between the Thai state and the Malays of Patani does not have the support of the Thai Muslims who live outside the Malay-speaking South.

It has always been the Patani Malay cultural-historical narrative, not religion, that keep on producing generation after generation of fighters. While the banner of the struggle is rooted in Malay nationalism, words and actions are often expressed in religious terms. All Patani Malay fighters are buried as shahid, or martyr, for example. For the Malays of Patani, identity and religion are two sides of the same coin. Thus, when Thailand pushed through its policy of assimilation that required the Malays to deny their own identity and embrace the Thai one, they rejected it violently.

Today, the battle over the narrative between the Malay activists and the Army has reached the court. Patani Malay activists feel that they should be able to talk about referendum in a public forum, while the Army insisted that such discussion is not negotiable. Sadly, said Artef, the Army appeared to have the support of the so-called pro-democracy movements in Thailand when it comes to Thai nationalism.

While many may support the idea of a separate Malay Muslim state, no one would openly say it publicly as it would invite nasty retaliation from the Thai government. So far, more than 40 youth activists have been charged by the police, at the request of the Army, with instigating a separatist state because they had used words like “Bangsa Patani”, “referendum” and “shahid” in relation to the conflict resolution and the combatants killed in a gunfight against the Thai security forces. In the local context, Bangsa can be translated as community, nation or even narrative.

History Stings Still

While Ramadan carries a religious significance for Muslims worldwide, the Malays of Patani are reminded of the Tak Bai massacre – an incident in October 2004 – in which 78 young Malay Muslims were smoldered to death on the back of Thai military trucks; seven others were shot dead at the protest site.

However, just a month before the 20-year statute of limitation expired, a Narathiwat court decided to try to cases on murder charges against 14 men linked to the death of the unarmed demonstrators. Officials were not able to bring any of the accused to the court and the case was permitted to expire. For some, it was their last attempt for justice. For others, it was an opportunity for some kind of closure with the hope that the country could move on as a nation. Obviously, that did not happen.

https://stratsea.com/tensions-rise-in-southern-thailand-as-ramadhan-ceasefire-talks-stall/ 

Author

• 
  Don Pathan

  Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

Efforts to bring about Ramadan ceasefire fall apart in Thai Deep South

 A new spate of violence began days after a Malaysian peace broker relayed counter-demands from BRN rebels to the Thai side, analyst Don Pathan writes.

A soldier walks a sniffer dog along train tracks following a deadly explosion in Songkhla province, southern Thailand, Dec. 6, 2022.

Commentary by Don Pathan
BenarNews
Bangkok

When it comes to the conflict in Thailand’s far South, there may be no peace talks in sight but there’s been plenty of action.

A spike in violence in the border region in recent days was a jolting reminder that the Thai government’s uncompromising position on the peace talks with Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) rebels comes with a cost. 

Starting on the night of March 8, Separatist combatants launched a spate of attacks that left six people dead through March 10. 

The violence occurred just days after Malaysian Facilitator Mohd Rabin Basir forwarded BRN counter-demands for a Ramadan ceasefire to the Thai side. Some of the demands included the release of BRN prisoners, reducing the number of days for a truce to 15, appointing a team of international experts to monitor the truce, and permitting local NGOs to have a role in working on this initiative. 

Deputy Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai rejected all of them, insisting that BRN should display their goodwill gesture by standing down during Ramadan. 

The shuttle diplomacy to get the two sides to embrace a ceasefire started in mid-February when the National Security Council chief Chatchai Bangchuad met with BRN chief negotiator Anas Abdulrahman in Malaysia to discuss an NSC proposal that included a Ramadan-time ceasefire.

Anas Abdulrahman (center), the head of the panel representing Barisan Revolusi Nasional rebels in peace talks with Thailand, and fellow BRN delegates take part in a post-meetings news conference at a hotel in Petaling Jaya, near Kuala Lumpur, Aug. 3, 2022. (S. Mahfuz/BenarNews) 

Chatchai was appointed the chief negotiator for the peace talks by the government of Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin. But his position was automatically terminated after the Constitutional Court removed Srettha and his government from power. 

On Feb. 28, NSC issued a public statement saying their agency and the regional Internal Security Operation Command would do their utmost to create an atmosphere conducive for peace during this Ramadan. 

“The government will adjust its work missions to focus on peaceful operations and facilitations as the main principle so that the people can fully practice their religious activities in the area,” the NSC said in the statement. 

According to a BRN source, who spoke on condition of anonymity, Thailand equates the Feb. 28 statement as their proclamation of a unilateral ceasefire for this year’s Ramadan. The source suggested that it was in BRN’s best interest to do the same. 

But this shuttle diplomacy didn’t start with the mid-February meeting in Kuala between Chatchai and Anas but through a December 2024 public statement by Nikmatullah Bin Seri, a senior member of the BRN’s negotiating team who criticized the Thai government for dragging its feet on the peace talks. Nikmatullah said BRN was prepared to walk away from the peace process and take back the group’s decision to negotiate with Bangkok under the Thai constitution.

The BRN official said conflict resolution, including Ramadan ceasefire, needed to be discussed with a new government chief negotiator, which the Thai government has yet to appoint.

However, Phumtham told reporters on March 12 that the new chief negotiator for the peace talks with BRN would not be appointed until a comprehensive strategic plan for the restive southern provinces was finalized.

According to a Thai official working on conflict resolution for the far South, the government will not appoint a new negotiating team until BRN curbs the violence. BRN said that demanding them to put down their weapons before coming to the negotiation table was like putting the cart before the horse. Reduction of violence is something that has to be negotiated, preferably with a government-appointed negotiator, BRN said, according to the Thai official.

Phumtham also plans to stop international peace and conflict experts from other countries from continuing to observe the high-level negotiations between Thailand and BRN, the Thai source said. Moreover, back channels will be eliminated, thus ending the role of international NGOs. 

Observers of the peace process said they were not surprised about why BRN refused to give in to the suggestions made to them by Thailand on Feb. 18. 

First of all, said Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, a political action group dedicated to the right to self-determination for the people of this historically contested region, Thailand has always tried to use a Ramadan ceasefire for short-term political gains. BRN feels that Thailand is using the peace talks as an intelligence-gathering exercise so they can go after these BRN leaders at a later date, Artef told me.

commentary deep south 3.jpeg

An official and a member of an explosives disposal team inspect a crater left by a bomb planted under rail tracks that killed at least three railway workers in Songkhla province, southern Thailand, Dec. 6, 2022. (BenarNews)

BRN said they still recalled how the Thai Army belittled their unilateral ceasefire during the COVID-19 pandemic in response to a call for a global ceasefire from U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres. It was an opportunity missed; the Thai side could have reciprocated BRN’s gesture of goodwill and built on that, Artef said. 

Instead, the Thai Army in the far South unleashed search-and-destroy operations, taking down combatants in a series of lopsided standoffs as they were laying low in the home village during the unilateral ceasefire. 

What was astonishing in the view of the many security officials was that, despite being outnumbered by 60 to 70 to one, all but one of the combatants chose to fight to the death rather than surrender, even though their chances of making it out alive were slim to none. A total of 60 BRN combatants were killed in the standoffs during that 2-year window, which covered early 2020 to early 2022.

But not much came out of this brief episode during Ramadan 2022. Since then, BRN has refused to entertain Thailand’s proposals for a Ramadan ceasefire because they see it as purely for Thai public consumption.  

While Ramadan carries a religious significance for Muslims worldwide, the Malays of Patani are reminded of the Tak Bai massacre, an incident during Ramadan in October 2004, when 78 young Malay Muslims died in the back of Thai military trucks, where they were bound and stacked up like logs after being rounded up during a protest. Another seven were shot dead by Thai security forces at the protest site in Tak Bai district, Narathiwat province. 

Just months before the 20-year statute of limitation expired, a Narathiwat court charged a group of Thai military officials for the death of unarmed demonstrators. But law enforcement officials were not able to bring any of the suspects to court and the statute of limitation for the case was permitted to expire. 

More than two weeks have passed since the start of Ramadan 2025. A truce is still nowhere in sight as the rebels crank up their campaign of violence to get the Thais back to the negotiating table. 

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst. The views expressed in this column are his own and do not reflect the position of BenarNews.

https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/deep-south-peace-pathan-03142025144022.html

Bordered by History: Tension in The Thailand-Myanmar Frontier (Part I)

Part I

Don Pathan
(www.stratsea.com)

Introduction

Along the Thailand-Myanmar border, remnants of China’s lost army persist, transforming into tourist attractions where visitors sample Yunnanese cuisine and traditional Chinese tea.

Ban Rak Thai, locally known as Mae Aw, exemplifies one of the numerous villages where descendants of the Nationalist Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) forces established settlements in the 1960s.

Author, Don Pathan at Shan State Army camp.

Forced out of the Shan State of Myanmar – also known as Burma – after several failed attempts to stage attacks against Communist China, these communities represent a complex geopolitical legacy

“Between 1950 and 1952, the Kuomintang army in Burma’s Shan States tried no fewer than seven times to invade Yunnan but was repeatedly driven back across the border. The Burmese Army then entered the Shan States to rid the country of its uninvited guests, and that in turn led to an unprecedented militarization of the Shan States,” wrote Chiang Mai-based Swedish journalist Bertil Lintner in his book, “The Wa of Myanmar and China’s Quest for Global Dominance,” published in 2021.

“But the areas east of the Salween River were too remote to be affected by the buildup. There, the Kuomintang reigned supreme through alliances it had established with local warlords, most of them from Kokang and the eastern Shan States, but some of whom were also Wa,” Lintner added. One of the few cash crops in the Wa Hills and other mountainous areas where the KMT had established bases was opium, which they used to finance their campaign against the communists.

By 1961, the combined forces between Burma and the People’s Liberation Army began to push back against the KMT. A turning point came in January 1968 when the China-trained Communist Party of Burma (CPB) militias crossed the border from Yunnan into Shan State and went straight to the KMT bases.

Eventually, it was time for the KMT to move. Some were evacuated to Taiwan while others crossed into Thailand to form communities like the one here in Ban Rak Thai, a 90-minute drive north of Mae Hong Son provincial seat.

The Thai government convinced the KMT leaders as well as the hill tribes in the region to kick the opium habit in exchange for tea and other cash crops. Thai citizenship was gradually given first as a reward to those fighting against the Communist Party of Thailand and gradually to KMT descendants.

Warlords and Militia Leaders

With the KMT gone, it did not mean Shan State was at peace. New warlords and militia groups would emerge in the Myanmar sector of the Golden Triangle to continue with the opium and heroin business, sending it halfway around the world to the streets of New York.

One such person was Chang Shi-fu, who, incidentally, started as a young government village militia to fight the CPB.

Born in 1933 to a Chinese father and a Shan mother in northern Shan State, Shi-fu rose from a young government militia to become the head of his own outfit. He was convicted of high treason in 1973 by the Burmese government and released the following year after his supporter kidnapped two Soviet doctors and ransomed them for his freedom. His release was brokered by a Thai Army general.

From 1974 onward, Shi-fu directed his fight against the Burmese Government, proclaiming himself a Shan nationalist, and adopted the name Khun Sa, or “Prince Prosperous”, in the Shan/Tai language.

Another figure was Wei Hsueh-kang, an ethnic Chinese who fled Yunnan after the Communist victory and relocated to northern Shan State to do business with the local soapha, or chaofah in Thai, which means “lord of the sky”, a royal title used by the hereditary Tai rulers in mainland Southeast Asia.

Wei and his two brothers would relocate to an area near Thailand’s border, where they joined Khun Sa and his outfit. A fallout with Khun Sa forced him out of the Shan circle. They then reconnected with his old network in Shan State and later linked this newly formed alliance with the powerful United Wa State Army (UWSA) when it was established in 1989. Afterwards, they gained access to the vast poppy field in the Wa Hills where raw opium could be refined into heroin.

In 1993, the United States indicted Wei with heroin trafficking and offered a US$2 million reward for information leading to his arrest. Three years earlier, in March 1990, Khun Sa was indicted by the United States for the same crime, with the same amount of bounty placed on his head.

By mid-1990, relentless assault on Khun Sa’s Mong Tai Army (MTA) by its arch-rival the UWSA and the Burmese government troops forced him to surrender in exchange for amnesty.

After Khun Sa’s defeat, the Burmese Government told the UWSA to return to the Sino-Burma border in the north. They refused and instead mobilised more than 100,000 villagers from its Special Region 2 along the Sino-Burma border to newly built towns along the Thai border that stretches from Chiang Rai to Chiang Mai and southward to the northern part of Mae Hong Son province. Special Region 2 is an autonomous area secured from the Myanmar Government in 1989 in exchange for an unwritten ceasefire agreement.

UWSA forced migration from north to south. 

About 10,000 UWSA troops control this so-called UWSA southern command under the leadership of Wei and his brothers. Border outposts and camps along the border once under Khun Sa were immediately taken over by the UWSA. Wherever possible, the UWSA set up a volleyball court on hard-dirt plains – daily matches were supposed to bring them and the Thai troops closer together.

The turning point came one morning in February 1999 when authorities found nine Thai villagers from Chiang Mai’s Fang district beaten to death, with their hands tied behind their backs. Authorities said it was a drug deal gone bad. All fingers pointed to the UWSA.

Deteriorating Relationship

Closing the border leading to Wa’s towns built by Thai contractors was the next logical thing. Thai contractors were told to pull out. For the Thai troops along the border, it meant their daily volleyball game with the Wa soldiers had to come to an end.

Clashes between the two sides became frequent as drug caravans carrying Wa’s methamphetamines make their way into Thailand.

Don athan in Panghsang, UWSA HQ on the Sino-Burma border, 2003

An all-out offensive occurred on 20 May 2002. The battles took place well within Myanmar’s territory and went on throughout the day. Artillery fire supported the advancing Thai soldiers carrying out search-and-destroy missions against the UWSA’s outposts several kilometers inside the Myanmar border.

Thai Army’s armored personnel carrier, along with soldiers from Special Forces, cavalry squadrons and artillery units had been seen taking up positions along the northern border in Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, and Mae Hong Son provinces for the past weeks to await instruction.

The mobilisation was called Surasri 143, supposedly a military training exercise. One elite unit was tasked with capturing Wei but could not find him as he had fled deeper into Myanmar.

When the dust settled, the UWSA began to build nine outposts that sit smack on the Thai fence. Three of these crossed into Thai territory, according to Google Map. Thai conservative media and right-wing press decided to play this up, calling on the government to take action against the UWSA, giving both the government and the Army that much more headache.

The Current Landscape

Today, no one in Thailand wants to turn back the clock to 2002. Thai troops and UWSA soldiers at the local level are talking to one another in a much calmer atmosphere; local troops described their conversations as friendly but Wa’s crystal meth and methamphetamines continue to find their way into Thai soil.

No one is turning a blind eye to the drug caravan as massive drug bust along the border demonstrated but the Thai government has retreated from politicising the drug issues, as it was not worth the cost.

Talking is better than shooting one another, said a Thai Army unit commander on the border.

For years, the Thai Army in the region has wrecked their brain on how to get the UWSA to move the nine outposts, particularly the three that allegedly crossed into the Thai side, just a little bit back to avoid any possible confrontation. The UWSA has had a presence there since the fall of Khun Sa in the late 1990s.

UWSA Chairman Bao Yuxiang with author, 2003

The Thai Army even asked Myanmar’s supreme commander, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing during his visit to Thailand in 2014, to intervene on Thailand’s behalf. Still, the UWSA refused to pull back.

Thai Army has held several face-to-face meetings with the local command, including with senior UWSA officials in Mong Hsat back in November 2024, but no solution has been reached. Wa soldiers at the Thai border said they are not authorised to pull back without an order from Panghsang, their main headquarters located on the Sino-Burma border.

According to Thai Army sources, Panghsang has suggested the Thais take up any allegation of territorial dispute with the Myanmar Government. Interestingly, the UWSA treats territory under their command as a country within a country; this is despite Myanmar soldiers and officials being required to disarm and be escorted when entering the Wa territory.

Many critics, especially those on social media, appear to want the Thai Army to use force to push the UWSA back. Officials on the border said a military victory would not be difficult. However, no one wants to turn the clock back to the old days when clashes between the two sides were all too common.

The hard parts are obviously an all-out offensive and its aftermath. There are just too many tourist attractions and foreign visitors along the northern border; the stakes are just too high for Thailand, particularly the tourism industry, Thailand’s golden goose.

https://stratsea.com/bordered-by-history-tension-in-the-thailand-myanmar-frontier-part-i/

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Part II

Bordered by History: Tension in the Thailand-Myanmar Frontier (Part II)

Don Pathan
(www.stratsea.com)
March 21, 2025

Thai security planners are concerned that the Thailand-Myanmar border could fall under China’s sphere of influence as highlighted in the banner. 

Introduction

A 30-minute walk from the glamour and glittering of Ban Rak Thai village is a quiet border crossing that divides Thailand from a nameless checkpoint. It is manned by a lone soldier from the Wa National Army (WNA), a small outfit that came into being in 1973 under the leadership of Maha Sang, the son of Sao Maha, the saohpa of Vingngun, a region in Shan State just north of Panghsang.

They sided with the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang – KMT) against the China-backed Communist Party of Burma (CPB) back in the day. Like other warlords, Maha Sang survived the rugged Golden Triangle through deals and alliances with militia groups and their warlords.

His ailing brother, Maha Ja, took over Khun Sa’s Hua Muang stronghold immediately after his surrender and assumed the role of the town’s mayor with his own militia that functioned more like his personal security details.

Following the death of Maha Sang in 2007, the WNA placed itself under the United Wa State Army (UWSA) command and control. The group was permitted to keep their flag and uniform, as Thai authorities along the border are much more comfortable dealing with the WNA.

There are just too many histories with the UWSA, a senior Thai Army officer on the border said.

Thorny Relations

The UWSA and the Myanmar government established a ceasefire in 1989, but this was a far cry from a peace treaty. Thus, getting Myanmar to “talk sense” to get the UWSA to pull back – so that Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra does not have to look weak and bad in the eyes of the critics – is still a pipe dream.

UWSA and Thai soldiers talking on the border (Credit: RTArmy) 

In fact, said sources on the border, the Myanmar junta wants Thailand to “teach the Wa a lesson.” Myanmar’s State Administration Council (SAC) could not do it, as it would open a new can of worms that the Tatmadaw may not be able to handle.

A Thai think tank Center for Strategic Policy presented its report “Myanmar and Thailand: Strategic Pathways to Regional Peace and Stability” at a December 2024 seminar. Author Supalak Ganjanakhundee said Thailand should not rule out the idea of strengthening cooperation with the UWSA as well as other ethnic groups on cross-border management that could facilitate trade, movement of people and humanitarian responses.

The question is this: why does Thailand want to be seen courting the UWSA?

Like any other organisations, the UWSA wants acceptance and recognition. Having demonised the group over the years, presenting the Wa as a trusted partner of the Thai government will not be an easy sell. The two sides have had several rounds of face-to-face talks between unit commanders on the ground, but these were not negotiations, as the Thai side did not go there with anything to offer.

Ethnic armed organisations along the Thai border are similarly disturbed by the UWSA southward expansion. These include the Shan State Army-South, the Karen National Union, the Karenni National Progressive Party, the Karen National Army and the Kawtoolei Army. Wa flags have been planted at locations where the Three Brotherhood Alliance scored victory.

Chinese Presence

The UWSA is presenting itself as a “peacekeeping force” in places like Lashio, the largest town in northern Shan State that was captured by the Three Brotherhood Alliance in late June 2024. This current role and newly conquered territories left open the question of what exactly constitutes a Wa state.

Moreover, will this arrangement become permanent and serve as a link between the UWSA in the north on the Chinese border and its southern command on the Thai border?

The UWSA and Chinese officials have always insisted that their relationship is more nuanced and based on mutual interest and respect. Thai security planners, on the other hand, are concerned that the Thailand-Myanmar border could fall under China’s sphere of influence.

Beside the UWSA, Thai authorities are not comfortable with the presence of Chinese law enforcement officers poking around the Tak province and the adjacent areas. These are where militia-protected cyber scam centres operate freely in Myawaddy Township, opposite from the Mae Sot district.

In early 2024, dozens of Chinese police operated out of a resort that they had rented out for months. Royal Thai Police HQ in Bangkok instructed local officers to assist their Chinese counterparts to make their stay worthwhile.

But there was no sharing of intel. The Chinese police handled the investigation all by themselves, including their engagement with the Chinese crime syndicates behind the scam centres in and around the Myawaddy border town, adjacent to Mae Sot.

Things heated up in early February 2025 during the visit of Vice Minister Liu Zhongyi to Thailand. Pressured by China to do something, the government ordered a power cut to several towns on the Myanmar side of the border, including areas where the scam centres were operating.

Similar actions were taken two years ago, but the scam centres made up for it with powerful generators and a Starlink Internet connection.

Falling in Line

This time around, however, sensing that the Thais were serious, Colonel Chit Thu, leader of the 7,000-strong Karen National Army (KNA), the outfit that protects sizeable Chinese crime syndicates in his area, began to make moves. Starting with the press conference on 17 February 2025, he conveyed to Thai journalists that “We will take responsibility for clearing out the call centers in KK Park, Myawaddy, and Shwe Kokko and will send all foreign nationals to Myawaddy.”

“It is then the responsibility of the Myanmar police, as the Naypyidaw central government has sent officers to handle the cases. From the tripartite meeting, each country will take their people back, but how they return, I don’t know,” said Chit Thu.

He added that he was disappointed that some Thai lawmakers were calling for a warrant for his arrest, insisting that he had not broken any law. A number of Western countries beg to differ.

A much smaller outfit, the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), responded to Thailand’s request and set a 28 February 2025 deadline for all Chinese scam operators to leave Phayatongsu. This is a DKBA-controlled area (about 133 miles south of Myawaddy) opposite the Three Pagoda Pass of Thailand’s Kanchanaburi province.

On 13 February 2025, the DKBA sent 260 people of various nationalities over the border to Chong Kaeb subdistrict, 76 km south of Mae Sot. The group said another 400 of mostly Africans and South Asians were stranded with them, waiting to be sent to the Thai side of the border where they could link up with diplomats of their respective countries.

“It’s obvious that the DKBA wants to be seen as being helpful to Thailand as they depend so much on us for their survival,” said a Thai police officer with working relations with this Karen outfit.

The DKBA controlled an area opposite from the Chong Kaeb subdistrict where several casinos had been operating until Chinese scam centres moved in this past year. Obviously, however, the DKBA weighed the two options – income from the Chinese scam centres vs a long-standing relationship with Thailand – and the latter made more sense for the outfit’s survivability. The KNA’s Chit Thu, on the other hand, is still holding out, weighing his next move carefully. If the history of this rugged region tells us anything, it is that the leaders and warlords of the Golden Triangle know how to compromise if the conditions and situations are right. They may not rush to the negotiation table, as seen by Panghsang not being too eager to resolve the border dispute with Thailand. Yet it does not mean they are unwilling to make compromises.

https://stratsea.com/bordered-by-history-tension-in-the-thailand-myanmar-frontier-part-ii/

Don Pathan

Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

A fragile truce holds in Thailand's deep south

OPINION

A fragile truce holds in Thailand's deep

south

Peace talks with Malay rebels can resume after insurgents curb campaign of violence

Don Pathan

March 7, 2025 05:05 JST

An armed Thai soldier stands guard as three Thai-Muslim students stroll past the compound of Yala Islamic College in Yala province,

southern Thailand. © AP

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

In December 2024, a leading figure in southern Thailand's biggest rebel group lamented the

Thai government's lack of action on the peace process that was supposed to resume once a

new government came to power after the 2023 general election.In a video statement, Nikmatullah Bin Seri of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) -- the one

long-standing Malay Muslim separatist group that controls virtually all of its combatants on

the ground -- said the BRN was prepared to leave the peace process and take back the

group's decision to negotiate under the Thai constitution.

The following month, Thai Defense Minister Phumtham Wechayachai called on all relevant

agencies to draft an "actionable solution" for the government's counterinsurgency strategy.

He gave them 30 days.

To continue reading, subscribe today with Asia Nikkei:  https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/A-fragile-truce-holds-in-Thailand-s-deep-south

The Gaza Conflict Has Stirred Thailand’s Far South, Mildly

Part of an ongoing article series on the impact of the Middle East conflict on Southeast Asia.

Don Pathan
stratsea 
(www.stratsea.com)

Introduction

Israel’s war on Gaza has sparked concern of a rise in insurgent activities in Thailand’s southern provinces.

Protesters at Pattani Central Mosque with Palestinian flag.

The potential threat is significant: An active insurgency is destabilizing the contested region of Pattani, a Malay historical homeland encompassing Thailand’s three border provinces. There is a concern that anti-Israel protests in various parts of the globe would also galvanize Muslims in these Thai provinces to launch their anti-establishment activities.

Approximately two million people inhabit the Pattani region, with about 85% identifying as Malay, or Melayu, rather than Thai. These Malays vehemently reject Thailand’s policy of assimilation, which calls upon the Malays to adopt a Thai identity. For Muslims in this region, Islam and Malay identity are inextricably linked – changing one aspect inevitably impacts the other.

On the state level, Thailand’s relationship with Israel has never been the central defining factor in the interaction between the state and its Malay minority. However, when issues arise – whether related to the ongoing war or other events in the Middle East – the stance of Thai Muslims is unmistakably clear, as will be explored below.

Like other ASEAN Member States, Thailand also calls for an end to hostilities in Gaza and urges all sides to respect humanitarian norms and principles. However, Thailand would not take a strong political stance on the conflict. This is despite some Thai falling victims to this ongoing conflict.

Prior to Hamas’ 7 October attack that killed more than 1,200 people, including 39 Thai nationals, there were nearly 30,000 Thais in Israeli farms just kilometers from the Gaza border. These individuals went to work there under a government-to-government arrangement. Of the 240 taken hostage by Hamas, 32 were Thai nationals, some of whom have died.

Thailand has issued statements regarding developments on the warfront. However, its rather mild response could be explained by the fact that its bilateral ties with Israel are nowhere near as robust as its relationship with other Western governments. Besides, Israel has never featured prominently on any Thai political party’s agenda.

This, however, does not mean that Thailand’s security apparatus is not concerned about the possible spillover effect that Israel’s war has on its southern provinces.

Demonstrations and Parades in Southern Thailand

Not long after the onset of the war in Gaza, Thai military officials began visiting villages in these provinces, urging local chiefs and elders to keep the communities subdued. The last thing they needed was to witness unruly Malay demonstrators jeopardizing Thailand’s long-standing relations with Israel.

It did not take long for news of the officials’ activities to reach the youth activists in the region’s cities. Feeling compelled to respond to this perceived interference, these activists organized a march from the Pattani City Hall to the provincial central mosque in December 2023.

Palestinian flags flew high as local Muslims seized the opportunity to defy the state security apparatus, the very forces leading the government’s counterinsurgency strategy, which has yet to secure the loyalty of the local Malays.

The December 2023 march in downtown Pattani set off a small spark in Thailand’s Malay-speaking south. Palestinian flags, along with symbols and narratives of the Malays’ past and narratives, became a common sight in just about social and cultural activities, particularly among the youth.

This is the region that has been wracked with separatist problems and witnessed more than 7,500 deaths from insurgency-related violence since January 2004. Thus, the emergence of symbols and narratives that glorify the Malayness would rightfully raise anxiety on the part of the authorities.

The problem did not stop there. In May 2024, teachers at an Islamic preschool (locally known as tadeka)in Narathiwat pushed the line by dressing the children in military fatigues and led them in a march with toy guns, carrying Hamas and Palestinian flags to display solidarity with the people in Gaza.

Within days, the Ministry of Culture instructed the provincial governor to issue a public statement warning all tadeka in the region – about 1,660 altogether – that such demonstrations could lead to a halt in the government’s financial support for their school.

Unsurprisingly, the directive was met with discontent from the local Muslims, who have long felt alienated in this predominantly Buddhist kingdom, which embraced a separate set of narratives, heroes and myths from the Malays in the far south.

The tit-for-tat between the two sides seems to be a never-ending episode, however. Later still, in early September 2024, a paramilitary unit in Narathiwat broke up a village parade organized by a group of young people to remove Palestinian flags and portraits of Patani’s Malay historical figures and religious leaders. The unit’s reasoning was that these items have nothing to do with local culture.

Seizing Palestinian flag in a Narathiwat parade.

As expected, social media and political activists responded ferociously. Narathiwat lawmaker Kamonsak Leewamoh even went on the parliament floor to demand a public apology from the local military unit for the alleged interference and called on the Royal Thai Army to investigate the incident.

The Dichotomy

Despite these concerning developments, we need to remember that the challenges facing the Muslims in Thailand bear little connection to the outside world, as the tensions are rooted in local dynamics. However, simply because the Malays’ response has been relatively muted, this does not mean they are apolitical.

Before we continue with this point, a dichotomy must be made. In this article, the “Malays of Patani” refer to traditionalist Muslims in the southernmost border provinces (the Patani region). Outside that, Muslims are referred to as “Thai Muslims.”

While Thai Muslims have to contend against anti-Islam sentiment and find themselves in a constant struggle to show the rest of the country that they are very much part of Thailand nationhood, the Malays of Patani, on the other hand, reject the Thai state-constructed narrative and constantly look for ways to assert their historical-cultural identity. For the latter, Malay identity and Islam are inseparable.

Thai Muslims, both Sunnis and Shiites, are patriotic and extremely loyal to the state. This explains their resentment towards the Malays of Patani for challenging Thailand’s nationhood and embracing separatism.

Despite their patriotism, Thai Muslims’ loyalty to the state is constantly questioned. They do what they can to avoid confrontation with the Thais, particularly the Buddhist nationalists who believe that Thainess is synonymous to being a Buddhist of the Theravada school.

Compared to heavy protests elsewhere in the world – the kind that is seen on US colleges – responses from the Malays of Patani and the Thai Muslims to the war in Gaza seem rather tame. As local writer and political activist Asmadee Bueheng explained, the lack of response must be understood in a proper context.

The vast majority of the Malays in the border provinces are traditionalist Muslims who embrace local culture and turn to the village ulema (religious scholars) for answers to personal and theological, sometimes political, questions. Conversely, they see the reformists as a bunch of globalized religious movements that compete among themselves to establish a modern identity at the expense of local culture. Groups like Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi, Wahhabi and Tablighi Jamaat are all considered reformists by the Malays of Patani.

Moreover, said Asmadee, local Malays have never been comfortable with “political Islam” as a concept. But being traditionalists does not mean they are not political. Their resistance to Thailand’s policy of assimilation has translated into an armed struggle for independence that keeps resurfacing generation after generation ever since the region was conquered by Siam in the late 18th century.

However, not all reformists embraced political Islam: many Salafists, for example, take a “purist” or “quietist” approach and withdraw themselves completely from political affairs, while so-called “jihadists” take up violent actions to advance their political agenda in the name of religion.

The traditionalists among the Malays of Patani see the war in Gaza as very much a byproduct of political Islam. On the other hand, the reformist Muslims are calling for a more active response to the war in Gaza but fall short of calling on the government to make stern and concrete measures. They are concerned that their loyalty to the state would be questioned.

In spite of these differences, however, there is no open hostility between the two groups, as both keep to themselves.

The absence of major outbursts against Israel’s genocidal tendency in Gaza does not mean that the Malays of Patani or the Thai Muslims have shut themselves out of the affairs of the Islamic world or that they are indifferent to the suffering of fellow Muslims elsewhere.

Both groups have consistently engaged Muslim communities abroad on various platforms and on occasions. Many of these families continue to send their children to universities and madrasa in the Middle East and South Asia, where they are exposed to other schools of thought and competing ideas.

In the 1980s, for example, more than 1,000 Pattani Malays combatants joined fighters from Aceh and Mindanao in training camps in the Middle East and North Africa.

This is where they come to know fellow “revolutionaries” from other parts of the world, including Palestinian leftists who made a huge contribution to the development of the Palestinian national movement back in the day but no longer feature in today’s conversations.

In fact, Patani itself, prior to its defeat by Siam in 1786, was a flourishing commercial center where East Asian traders met and carried out business with their counterparts from Europe. This is the historical precedence of the region’s openness and willingness to engage others from the outside world.

Explaining the Authorities’ Anxiety

Two decades ago, when the current wave of Patani Malay separatists resurfaced to pick up what the previous generation had left off a decade earlier, several so-called security experts were quick to label the southern Thai conflict a new front in the global war on terrorism.

Such a label was convenient. After all, various factors at the time made it easier to do so. These include the political climate, the prevailing mood and narrative, the emergence of a new set of vocabulary, and a booming industry under the banner of a global war on terrorism that came to life following 9/11.

However, in the case of Southeast Asia, it did not take long to see that lumping ethno-nationalist struggles in the same basket as radical jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda or Jama’ah Islamiyah has no merit.

Separatist movements such as Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National Revolutionary Front – BRN), Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement – GAM) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) would eventually come to the negotiating tables with the government that they had been fighting. Today, the GAM and the MILF have signed a peace agreement with their respective governments. The BRN, on the other hand, is still negotiating with the Thai government.

Unlike radical jihadists, these Southeast Asian separatist groups never established the kind of global network because the banner of their struggle has always been centered on liberating their homeland from outside forces.

Conclusion

While the end to the southern Thai conflict is still nowhere in sight, there is nothing to suggest that the political context of the conflict in Patani will evolve from an ethno-nationalist to violent jihadist where the banner of the struggle becomes a religion. Nevertheless, local and foreign counterterrorism officials are on a constant lookout for any possible incursions of radicalism, the kind that Southeast Asia had witnessed in the early 2000s when violent extremist groups had penetrated the Mindanao region of the Philippines and in the various pockets of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.

The thinking among these officials is that one cannot afford to be complacent. Hence the anxiety of the Thai officials following the eruption of Israel’s war on Gaza, despite the rather mild response by the Malays of Patani so far.

Author: Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.