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Targeting the Northern Hub
Myanmar resistance forces are pushing the line with the latest drone attack against a civilian aircraft that was about to take off for Mandalay from Kachin State’s Myitkyina Airport. On 20 February 2026, a suicide drone struck a Myanmar National Airlines (MNA) ATR-72-600 aircraft, causing damage to its nose, fuselage, and tail.
As expected, nobody claimed responsibility, given the likelihood of blowback from the international community—much of which is cheering for the rebels, not the military-backed Myanmar government. The latter recently concluded a general election that is neither accepted nor endorsed by much of the world, including ASEAN Member States (AMS).
According to one theory, the drone was targeting the adjacent Northern Command headquarters but was shot down by airport security, causing it to crash into the passenger plane. The military headquarters shares the same border fence with the airport.
Nevertheless, it was too close for comfort by any measure. The attack marked a significant step up in escalation, given that rebel forces have generally left civilian targets – much less commercial passenger aircraft – alone.
Myitkyina Airport serves as a critical air transport hub for the northern Kachin State, facilitating the movement of people and goods to major cities like Yangon and Mandalay. Attacks on such infrastructure are intended to undermine governance and disrupt regional stability.
While the airport remained operational, 2025 saw resistance forces successfully using FPV drones against other high-value military targets in the region. For example, in May 2025, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) used a drone to down a military Mi-17 transport helicopter in nearby Shwegu.
The 12 February 2026 FPV drone strike on the airport was intercepted, resulting in no damage to infrastructure, though it did cause flight cancellations.
Resistance forces in the region had already been using similar drone technology in other operations, such as the 8 February strike that destroyed a radar station at the nearby Nant Paung Air Base.
The lack of direct hits on Kachin airport in 2025 suggests that the more recent attacks in February 2026 – including the FPV drone strike on 12 February – represent a “significant escalation” in the resistance’s ability to penetrate the capital’s high-security airspace.
This highlights a shift toward precision-guided, low-cost technology that is difficult for traditional security to detect.
The Rise of the “Autonomous” PDF
Attacking a heavily fortified site guarded by approximately 20 junta troops at every entrance and protected by Air Defence Operation Commands requires a level of coordination.
The Myanmar government immediately accused the KIA and the People’s Defence Force (PDF), the latter of which is officially the armed wing of the National Unity Government (NUG), formed in response to the 2021 military coup.
But over the years, the term PDF has become a catch-all for newly emerged militia groups taking up arms against the junta. Not all PDF units fall under the NUG’s command and control.
A report released in May 2025 states that while the “Integrated” and the “Allied” PDFs are part of the NUG’s formalised military structure, the “Autonomous” and “Localized” PDFs operate without direct oversight from the NUG. These last two categories each have their own networks and generate their own funding through donations as well as small-scale business activities.
For the long-standing resistance forces, such as the KIA and the NUG, both of whom seek global support against the military-backed government of Myanmar, civility and international norms must be respected. But when it comes to the actions of autonomous and localised PDFs, these long-standing organisations enjoy plausible deniability.
As Myanmar reaches a new threshold, such as the recently concluded general election, fighting on the ground will have to be understood in a post-election context. While the 20 February attack was widely seen as an escalation, no one can predict where this leads.
The “Lone Wolf” Threat to Chinese Interests
Some in the resistance community are not ruling out attacks on the Chinese pipeline that runs from the Rakhine State to Kunming in Yunnan province. While China has an agreement with the Myanmar government and long-standing ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) such as the Arakan Army (AA) to provide protection for the pipeline, independently organised PDF units who do not report to any long-standing groups could become that “lone wolf” behind such an attack.
In May last year, the PDFs’ highly coordinated offensive – Operation 9/A Nyar Myae – overran four Mandalay townships, forcing government troops to abandon a key off-take station for the Chinese gas and oil pipelines.
Approximately 50 government troops were killed during this one-day coordinated offensive targeting 12 government positions in the Mandalay region. The operation involved around 12 distinct resistance groups operating within the region. In response, government forces launched several days of intermittent clashes and conducted retaliatory airstrikes.
Beijing’s Heavy Hand: Relinquishing the Gains
By late 2025, Myanmar troops retook most positions; Chinese intervention played a key role in the resistance's surrendering territory.
During the campaign to recover previously lost territories, there was no evidence indicating that the PDFs were utilising the pipeline as collateral. This demonstrates a shared recognition by both resistance forces and government troops of the strategic significance of the Chinese pipeline. Furthermore, any direct intervention by China could result in adverse consequences for all parties involved.
Beyond the PDFs in Mandalay, approximately 245km east, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) was compelled to return Lashio, which is the junta’s main defensive position in northern Shan State.
About the same time, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) was pressured to relinquish recently secured territories, including Mogok, a world-famous ruby mining centre, back to the junta.
The return of Nawnghkio, Kyaukme, and Hsipaw allowed Myanmar to reopen the critical trade highway between Mandalay and the Chinese border. These handovers were made possible through China-mediated negotiations in October 2025, during which Beijing abandoned any pretence of acting as an impartial mediator.
The resistance forces’ setbacks at the hands of China were a stark reminder that nothing comes easy in Myanmar’s rugged conflict zones, where EAOs, PDFs, and regime forces all play for keeps. The PDFs likely felt jaded after retreating from the Mandalay positions they had seized in May 2025. They were also frustrated with the TNLA, which had ordered them to do so. Hard feelings aside, one thing the resistance can agree on is that they cannot withstand Chinese pressure.
But has China crossed the line—no one in the resistance forces would say. There is little choice but to absorb the blow, regroup, and continue fighting even if the playing field is an uneven one.
So why seize territory only to return it to the junta under Chinese influence? Groups like the MNDAA, the TNLA, and the PDFs may not be willing to confront China directly about their objection. These groups understand fully the diplomatic and strategic costs if they choose to upset China. But the autonomous PDFs operate under no such constraint. For them, it becomes a matter of timing and opportunity, not principle.
Resistance forces in Myanmar have shown their objections in actions such as attacks on Chinese interests in Myanmar following the 2021 coup. Chinese-owned factories in Yangon’s industrial zones were burnt, as protesters accused Beijing of backing the coup. Frustration exists, indeed; the question is whether and through whom it finds an outlet.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.
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