Did Thailand Just Hand Cambodia a Legal Windfall?

UN Security Council Meeting in New York (file photo)

 

Don Pathan

www.stratsea.com 

Battle in New York

Almost immediately after the bloody cross-border clashes erupted along the Thailand-Cambodia border on 24 July 2025, Prime Minister Hun Manet reached out to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) requesting an emergency meeting to discuss what he called “unprovoked and premeditated aggression” by the Thai military.

More than 100,000 villagers on both sides of the border were abruptly displaced on the first of four bloody days of cross-border clashes.

Just the first day alone, Cambodia’s BM-21 Grad rockets smashed into a Thai public school and a 7-Eleven convenience store in Sisaket; a hospital in Surin Province was also hit. The multiple rocket launcher system (MRLS) used by Cambodia is an inherently imprecise, unguided weapon system.

Cambodia denied deliberately targeting civilians, arguing that any civilian infrastructure caught in the crossfire was either a result of proximity to the conflict zone or unavoidable collateral damage during a heavy artillery exchange.   

Nevertheless, on the following day in New York, members of the UNSC at the emergency meeting did not share Phnom Penh’s framing, said one official whose government was observing the discussion. He spoke on condition of anonymity. 

Cambodia’s position was undermined – fairly or unfairly – by the shelling of the Thai hospital and other soft targets, such as the public school and convenience store. Regardless of the facts, that episode loomed large in the minds of many in New York, the official said.

Cambodia asked that the UNSC refer the border dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for final adjudication, but the council rejected the request.

However, it was not only collateral damage that influenced the UNSC decision; credit must also be given to the Thai team, said the official. 

“The quality of the delegation matters a lot at critical times like this. It was observed by a number of countries that Thailand’s more polished and better-staffed delegation made a difference at the UNSC meeting. The Thais were sophisticated and technical in their messaging, citing the Geneva Conventions and the breach of anti-mine and anti-cluster munitions obligations. They looked like the good guys despite being the ones who kept insisting on handling this bilaterally,” the official said.

As in any dispute, the issue of credibility becomes central when there is no impartial third party available to ascertain the facts. In such circumstances, the outcome often depends on the parties’ ability to articulate and present their arguments effectively. This raises a legitimate question regarding the existence of objective truth within such contexts.

Thailand may have walked out of the New York meeting as the victor over this one specific battle with Cambodia, as Bangkok can claim credit for dissuading the UNSC from forwarding the case to the ICJ. But Thailand is not out of the woods; the Royal Thai Army’s optics are not at all great, the Bangkok-based diplomats said.

Furthermore, members of the international community are still asking: why is it Cambodia that keeps asking for observers? By demanding outside observers, Cambodia is sending a clever, indirect message to the world: that Thailand cannot be trusted to act fairly or tell the truth on its own.

Losing Optical War 

And then came the photo ops. In October 2025, a ceasefire was brokered by the Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and the United States President Donald Trump, who dropped by to witness the signing of an expanded peace agreement between the two countries. Days later, Thailand suspended the implementation of the ceasefire pact, following a landmine blast that maimed one of its soldiers.

The 22 December meeting was supposed to be more substantial as the two foreign ministers met face-to-face in Kuala Lumpur. The event, aimed at de-escalation and enforcing a sustainable ceasefire, was facilitated by Malaysia, the ASEAN chair for 2025.

The situation on the ground leading to the 22 December ministerial meeting was not very promising, as Thailand and Cambodia traded blame for border clashes that killed one Thai soldier and four Cambodian civilians earlier that month. The border clashes were followed by a Thai air raid.

For the 22 December meeting, Cambodia wanted the observers – China and the United States – to be there on all three days. But Thailand restricted the observers to the plenary session, making Bangkok look like the one determined to complicate the whole thing.

Needless to say, the restrictions, along with Thailand’s long-standing position that the dispute be resolved bilaterally, cast a negative light on Thailand, while Cambodia comes across as the aggrieved party precisely because it pushes for foreign observers, which carries the subtext that they are needed to keep Thailand honest.

All along, both sides believe they occupy the moral high ground, clinging to their own narratives with equal conviction.

Nationalist Blunder

By the time Thailand conducted its February 2026 general election, border tensions had strengthened military political influence, making national security – the war with Cambodia – the main public topic to the point that a medium-sized political party, Bhumjaithai, known for its pro-cannabis legislation, secured a comfortable mandate to lead the country.

Anutin Charnvirakul was the accidental prime minister at the time. His sudden rise to the premiership in September 2025 was the direct byproduct of political crises rather than a popular electoral mandate for him to lead the country.

Bhumjaithai rode on the back of public sentiment and vowed to terminate the 2001 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU 44), which had governed maritime boundary talks for over two decades.

For a country that had insisted all along on bilateral mechanisms to resolve the dispute, terminating the document that was aimed to do just that does not help Thailand’s international standing very much. This shows how Bangkok’s diplomacy has become entangled with politics influenced by toxic nationalism.

Thailand’s official excuse was that MoU 44 had been in place for more than two decades without producing results. Left unsaid was the lack of political will – and the infighting among political factions, including street battles – that held border resolution, among so much else, hostage.

If anything, the move played into Cambodia’s hands. On 2 June 2026, Phnom Penh officially triggered “Compulsory Conciliation” under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to break the maritime deadlock with Thailand.

This sudden shift transforms their resource competition over a US$300 billion overlapping claims area (OCA) from an active military risk into an institutional, legal battle overseen by the UN.

US$300b Energy Trap

Hun Manet announced that because bilateral channels had been exhausted, Cambodia had no choice but to take this step to “protect its sovereignty and maritime rights” under international law.

Cambodia’s energy ministry also noted that the global oil shocks from the ongoing Iran conflict have made unlocking the OCA’s estimated 12 trillion cubic feet of natural gas a matter of immediate economic survival.

Trying to put on a brave face, Anutin said Thailand is “unfazed” and confident in its legal position. He said nothing about how the termination of MoU 44 had played right into Cambodia’s hands.

Article 298 of UNCLOS is applied in situations where “no agreement has been reached in negotiations between the parties within a reasonable period of time.” Twenty-five years is a very long time by any standard.

Under UNCLOS, the process relies on an independent panel rather than a binding courtroom. The commission will review the dispute and issue a non-binding report with recommendations. Neither country is legally forced to accept the terms, but it creates a heavy international diplomatic framework for them to work within.

Thailand is insisting that the UN framework focus strictly on drawing the physical boundary line and not serve as an attempt to settle joint resource development and revenue sharing.

Thailand’s habit of kicking the can down the road is evident across many other issues. The peace process in the far South has never progressed beyond confidence-building exercises to anything concrete. Meanwhile, scores of Uyghur asylum seekers were held in immigration detention for nearly a decade before Thaksin Shinawatra used them as political pawns with Beijing to bolster his daughter’s standing with China.

Consequently, the more Thailand emphasises that the MoU 44 produced no progress over a quarter of a century, the more it strengthens Cambodia’s justification for seeking compulsory conciliation in the first place.

It is therefore difficult to see the logic of repeatedly stressing the failure of 25 years of negotiations while simultaneously criticising Cambodia for turning to a dispute-settlement mechanism designed precisely for situations where prolonged negotiations have failed to produce an agreement. Both Thailand and Cambodia are signatories to this convention.

Ever since the Preah Vihear temple dispute of 2008-2011, Cambodia has tried to bring ASEAN and the UNSC in as mediators. When negotiations failed and nationalist sentiments on both sides intensified, Cambodia brought the case back to the ICJ for reinterpretation of its earlier ruling, which resulted in Thailand having to retreat from the vicinity of the temple.

Had the nationalist faction and the Democrat-led government stopped trying to strip Preah Vihear of its World Heritage status, Cambodia might not have been able to bring the case back to the ICJ at all.

But that is what happens when a government fails to think things through and when bureaucrats lack the courage to disagree with the political leaders.

 

Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand’s far south.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.  

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require: 1) credit authors and their institutions, and; 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD and include a link back to either our home page or the article’s URL.

Shinawatra’s End

Thai PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra (Credit: Facebook posting)

Leaked Phone Call

Thailand’s Shinawatra political dynasty faces its gravest crisis yet as Prime Minister Paetongtarn finds herself trapped in a political firestorm that threatens to end her family’s decade-long dominance in Thai politics.

At 38, the inexperienced leader has become the centre of a scandal that exposes not only her political naivety but also the fragile foundations upon which her administration rests.

The crisis erupted when a private phone conversation between Paetongtarn and Cambodian strongman Hun Sen was leaked on social media platforms. In the recording, the Thai prime minister referred to her own military commanders as “opponents” and dismissed the Thai regional commander responsible for northeastern security as someone who “just wanted to look tough”.

She also addressed Hun Sen as “uncle”, a term of endearment that reflects the long-standing friendship between the Shinawatra and Hun families.

What Paetongtarn characterised as a “negotiation tactic” has been condemned by critics as a betrayal of national security and dignity. The leaked conversation has triggered mass protests demanding her resignation and thrown her government into chaos, threatening the fragile coalition that brought her Pheu Thai Party to power.

The phone call centred on resolving escalating tensions along the Thai-Cambodian border, specifically around the disputed Emerald Triangle where Thailand, Cambodia and Laos converge.

The standoff intensified after several provocative incidents: 1) a Thai-built friendship pavilion was burnt down in March 2025; 2) Cambodian forces dug trenches that Thai officials claimed extended 200 metres into the Thai territory and; 3) the shooting incident on 28 May 2025 that resulted in the death of a Cambodian soldier, with both sides claiming self-defence.

Despite an agreement reached on 8 June 2025 between border task force commanders to withdraw troops and fill the disputed trenches, implementation stalled. Thailand failed to restore normal operating hours at border checkpoints as promised, prompting Cambodia to reduce its own checkpoint hours in retaliation. The tit-for-tat escalation continued, creating the volatile atmosphere that led to the fateful phone conversation.

Outstanding Dispute

Thai-Cambodian border disputes have been a recurring feature of the bilateral relations since the colonial period, with boundaries drawn by French colonial powers through gunboat diplomacy. The two nations have long used these territorial disagreements as convenient sources of nationalist sentiment when domestic political legitimacy wanes.

The irony is particularly sharp given that both countries share cultural traditions – including martial arts known as Muay Thai in Thailand and Kun Khmer in Cambodia – practised throughout the Theravada Buddhist region.

As French orientalist Ernest Renan observed, nation-building requires people to forget certain things while remembering others. The problem for Thailand and Cambodia is their selective memory focuses on grievances rather than shared heritage.

The 1962 International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling awarding the Preah Vihear temple to Cambodia continues to rankle Thai nationalists, while discussions of joint maritime resource exploration in the Gulf of Thailand sparked fears about compromising Thai sovereignty over Koh Kood Island. Historical mistrust consistently undermines cooperation efforts between the two nations.

Power Struggle

The leaked call exposed deep rifts between Paetongtarn’s civilian government and the Royal Thai Army. Military leaders withheld information about the Cambodian trenches from the foreign affairs and defence ministries, releasing details to the media only after the 8 June 2025 shooting incident. This breach of the standard operating procedure, which typically requires diplomatic channels to be informed first, suggests a deliberate attempt by the military to achieve political gain.

The army appears to have emerged as the primary beneficiary of this crisis. They avoided scrutiny over their information handling, secured budget allocations from the parliament and positioned themselves as patriotic defenders of national sovereignty.

Even the opposition People’s Party, typically critical of military overreach, has remained notably silent, unwilling to risk being labelled unpatriotic.

The tit-for-tat continued with both refusing to discuss the overlapping dispute bilaterally and making a formal request to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to resolve the territorial disputes around the Emerald Triangle. On 23 May 2025, for example, Paetongtarn – speaking to the media following a meeting on transnational crime with all of the government’s security bigwigs – called on the international community to join Thailand in cracking down on Cambodia-based scam centres.

Cambodia’s suggestions that the border dispute with Thailand around the Emerald Triangle be brought to the ICJ irked Thailand badly, as it placed Cambodia on a legal and moral high ground. In reality, however, both sides undermined their own narrative of peace as they continuously beat the war drums and spin things unabashedly to round up domestic support.

Two Intertwined Families

For years, Thaksin and Hun Sen were courting each other. When Thaksin’s camp was in trouble, Hun Sen extended hospitality to Thaksin’s supporters fleeing arrest after the 2006 coup that ousted him from power.

Their children, Paetongtarn and Manet, also enjoyed cordial relations. Their governments went as far as reviving a two-decade-old MoU on overlapping maritime claims in the Gulf of Thailand and talked about profit sharing from the exploration of natural resources in the overlapping area.

Today, like Thaksin, Hun Sen is experiencing difficulties in making sure that Prime Minister Hun Manet governs the country without much obstacles and that his family continues to reign over Cambodia for the unforeseeable future. Hun Sen stepped down as the prime minister in August 2023 after four decades of rule, leaving Manet a big shoe to fill.

But unlike Thailand, where a critical press and a rowdy public constantly give Paetongtarn, or any government of the day, a big headache, Cambodia has no such outlets or adequate institutions for its people to express their grievances.

The Cambodian Parliament of 125 MPs has only five lawmakers in the “opposition” bench, and Hun Sen’s children run the country’s media outlets, including the online ones. Speaking out against the family has its consequences.

For Hun Sen, the decision to leak the conversation represents a calculated political maneuver designed to elevate his son, Manet, as a national hero. The ex-leader sought Thailand’s acceptance of Cambodia’s territorial claims over the Emerald Triangle, believing this diplomatic victory would strengthen his son’s position during a challenging transition period.

When it became clear that Thaksin and Paetongtarn would not sacrifice their political survival for Manet’s political ambitions, Hun Sen decided to burn bridges with his long-time allies. The leak served his domestic political needs while demonstrating his assessment that Thaksin’s political usefulness had expired.

Manet – a West Point graduate once described by an American military officer as possessing high integrity – now finds himself defending his father’s social media diplomacy tactics, claiming such methods are common in modern governance. However, few precedents exist for using leaked private conversations.

This crisis strikes at a particularly vulnerable moment for the Shinawatra family. Thaksin returned from exile in August 2023 believing his legal troubles were resolved, only to face continued challenges, including unresolved lese majeste charges and accusations of feigning illness to avoid jail. 

His sister Yingluck, still in exile following the 2014 coup, was ordered in May 2025 to pay THB10 bn in compensation for losses from her administration’s rice-pledging scheme. Her inability to return safely to Thailand represents the family’s unfinished business.

Why is She the Prime Minister?

The Pheu Thai Party’s decision to install Paetongtarn as prime minister – following Srettha Thavisin’s removal – was driven more by loyalty to Thaksin than confidence in her capabilities. Party members acknowledged privately that she lacked the experience for the role, but her appointment made the facilitation of continued deference to her father that much easier.

Moreover, it was not clear why Paetongtarn was not coached by those veteran politicians that she surrounded herself with. Perhaps they were so occupied with the big picture that they forgot that the devil is always in the details. Perhaps they took comfort in the belief that Hun Sen and Thaksin are old friends and assumed that friends do not stab each other in the back.

Of all the people, they should know that nothing lasts forever in Thailand and Cambodia’s cut-throat politics. Perhaps the cross-border aspect of it threw them off.

But the writing was always on the wall. Party members knew full well that Paetongtarn was not cut out for the job, but they insisted that her name be put forth to the parliament to replace Srettha Thavisin, who was removed by the Constitutional Court in August 2024.

The leaked conversation provided a convenient pretext for coalition partners already seeking an exit. Bhumjaithai Party, the coalition’s second-largest member, was about to be kicked out of the coalition due to disputes over cabinet seat allocation. The border controversy gave them a face-saving opportunity to withdraw while claiming to defend national honour.

This defection threatens the stability of Paetongtarn’s government and raises questions about the viability of the Faustian bargain that Thaksin and Pheu Thai struck with conservative political elites to form the current coalition and to exclude the reform-minded Move Forward Party from power.

That arrangement, built on expedience rather than shared vision, was always destined to be temporary.

The Dynasty in Crisis

The current crisis may indeed mark the beginning of the end for the Shinawatra dynasty in Thai politics. Paetongtarn’s inexperience, combined with her father’s diminished influence and mounting legal challenges, has left the family politically isolated and vulnerable.

Sources in the Thai army suggest they could work with the opposition People’s Party, indicating that cooperation with the Thaksin camp has become untenable. However, how the so-called Orange Shirts (People’s Party supporters) and the military could coexist remains unclear, and many observers caution against counting Thaksin out entirely, given his history of political comebacks.

The tragedy of this crisis lies not only in its immediate political casualties but also in its demonstration of how quickly personal relationships and private conversations can escalate into matters of national security and international relations. For a political dynasty built on populist appeal, this episode exposes fundamental weaknesses that may prove insurmountable. As Thailand navigates this political turbulence, the broader question remains whether the country’s democratic institutions can emerge stronger from this crisis or whether it will deepen the cycle of instability that has plagued Thai politics for decades. The answer may well determine not just the fate of the Shinawatra family but the trajectory of Thai democracy itself.

Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.