Wednesday, 16 April 2025

Myanmar junta chief to meet ASEAN chair after years of being kept at a distance


Don Pathan
Mizzima News

Tomorrow’s meeting between Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and Chairman of the State Administration Council (SAC), Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, in Bangkok will mark the first time that the chair of the ASEAN Standing Committee meets with the Myanmar junta chief after years of keeping him at a distance.

“The meeting comes at a time of uncertainty, and at the same time provides opportunities for Myanmar stakeholders to work and converge on the common objective of humanitarian support for the quake victims. Thailand and Malaysia will work closer on this and both would like to see progress on the ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus,” said Kavi Chongkitavorn, a veteran journalist and an expert on ASEAN affairs.

Anwar insists that he is not abandoning ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus as the basis for the regional grouping’s engagement with Myanmar, but maintains that the meeting is being held purely on humanitarian grounds. He will be looking to advance the ceasefire between rebel forces and SAC troops.

“With just one phone call, he (Min Aung Hlaing) agreed to meet in Bangkok, despite April 17 being a major religious holiday in Myanmar. This reflects both respect for Malaysia and their willingness to engage in dialogue,” Anwar said.

Instead of thanking Min Aung Hlaing, it makes more sense that the Myanmar junta chief thanks Anwar for the invitation. After all, this is something that the junta chief has been looking for and something that the resistance movements have been dead against — legitimizing the status of this junta chief who pay lip service to humanitarian issues but continue to bomb civilians, not necessary as part of a military strategy but to terrorize them into submission.

SAC’s decision to renege on the promise to halt offensives to facilitate humanitarian aid to the areas affected by the earthquake reflects the fragility of Anwar’s peace initiative.

If nothing concrete comes out of the meeting, Min Aung Hlaing can always say that he did not hesitate to engage with regional leaders to address Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis.

Indeed, one cannot overlook the political underpinnings of tomorrow’s meeting in Bangkok. It is not clear if Thaksin Shinawatra and his daughter, Prime Minister Paetongtarn, will join the meeting. Thaksin was appointed advisor to Anwar.

Malaysia may be the chairman of ASEAN. But it doesn’t mean its policy and strategy are confined to humanitarian initiatives. Thousands have lost their lives because of the earthquake and the ongoing conflicts. Access to medical support is extremely limited.

But with the current humanitarian drive following the massive earthquake, ASEAN members and Myanmar’s neighbouring countries may have just found a new way to work toward resolving the crisis inside the country. Min Aung Hlaing is using it to heighten his standing internationally. There is no reason why Thailand and other ASEAN member states cannot do the same thing — using the crisis to reach out to Myanmar’s resistance forces and EAOs to push for a more robust ceasefire and conflict resolution.

Thailand employed the same humanitarian argument when it pushed through the humanitarian coordination effort to bring aid across the border to villagers in Karen State. Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) warned against it, saying the effort did more to help legitimize the SAC. They said the design was flawed as it reached only a handful of people. Such concerns still exist today.

Anwar said the ceasefire was crucial as it allows humanitarian aid to reach victims of the recent earthquake in Myanmar. Yes, that may be true. But one has to keep in mind that much of the areas along the Myanmar border are controlled by EAOs and resistance forces. The question is whether Malaysia, Thailand, and ASEAN will have the political courage to engage these forces or will they stick to the status quo for fear of offending the SAC, the fancy name that the Myanmar junta has given itself.

Anwar said assistance would only be offered if military operations were suspended. “The people are suffering… so I asked for a ceasefire. Two days later, Myanmar announced a truce in place until April 22. Although not solely due to our efforts, Malaysia has at least taken a clear stand on behalf of ASEAN. Insha-Allah, during my meeting with him on April 17, I will push for the ceasefire to be extended,” he added.

The Red Cross Society of Thailand, an outfit that coordinates its humanitarian efforts with state agencies, has consistently provided aid and medical supplies to Burmese internally displaced persons (IDPs) through civil authorities closely aligned with EAOs such as the Karen National Union (KNU) and Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA). Perhaps the government could learn from their examples.

Indeed, the fragmentation in Myanmar has forced bordering countries to adjust their stance and policy. But balancing engagement with Naypyidaw and the opponents of the regime has not been easy. There have been suggestions in Thai government circles that Thailand should become a place where discussions and debates about Myanmar can be conducted safely. But such ideas have not gained serious traction at the policy level. Again, for fear of offending the SAC, Thailand does not seem to want to be too open about their interactions with opposition forces and prefers to keep them as local, unofficial arrangements.

Meanwhile, Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG) and other opposition groups have issued a statement expressing their concern about the planned meeting between the Myanmar junta chief and the ASEAN chair. The statement warned about the dangers of the meeting being held under the guise of trying to help with humanitarian aid. The junta has not adhered to the Five-Point Consensus and continues to attack civilians, despite the desperate need to help quake victims.

The statement points out that players other than the military junta need to be engaged during the humanitarian aid drive. They point out the dangers of unilateral engagement with a player who is considered a “terrorist”. Such an approach undermines the core humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence and fails to ensure aid is delivered according to need.

“Rather than supporting the people of Myanmar, these actions risk legitimizing the illegal military coup and reinforcing the regime responsible for their suffering. Therefore, we firmly reject any such decisions,” the statement says.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst

https://eng.mizzima.com/2025/04/16/21353 




Tuesday, 15 April 2025

Thailand: Of Uyghur Deportations and Backlash

Don Pathan
(www.stratsea.com)

Uyghur protesters in front of the Thai Embassy in Washington, DC, following the deportation of 40 detainees.

Introdduction

In late October 2024, rumours circulated in Bangkok’s diplomatic circle that Thailand would hand over the remaining 48 Uyghurs in a Thai prison and Immigration Detention Centers to China in February 2025. Despite strong objections from the international community and human rights groups, this was seen as a “gift” from Thailand to China to commemorate the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations.

Former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra was the brain behind this idea. As the father of the current prime minister and the nominal head of a powerful political machine dominating Thailand’s political scene for more than two decades, nobody stood in his way. Reasons as to why the previous government led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha did not deport the Uyghurs did not seem to matter.

If anything, Prayuth was in a better position to do so. Being the chief of the junta behind the 2014 coup that ousted Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck, from power, his government was at first isolated by the West, particularly the United States. The isolation pushed Thailand closer to China, leading to, among others, an important submarine deal.

What Happened to the Detainees?

The Prayut administration did not know what they were waiting for, but they played that waiting game and kept the Uyghurs in Thai detention centres. They knew that a deportation would invite the wrath of the international community, potentially isolating Thailand further.

Adding to the drama was a jailbreak (some said it was assisted by officials) at the Songkhla detention centre in November 2017, where 25 Uyghurs escaped to make their way to Malaysia. The Malaysian government later resettled them in Turkey. Beijing raised a stink, but bilateral ties normalised quickly because China needed Malaysia’s support for its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Besides, no Malaysian leader was about to compromise his standing in the Muslim world.

Thailand, on the other hand, was not exactly a champion of anything.

The 40 Uyghur who were sent back to China on 27 February 2024 by the Thai government were part of some 220 men, women and children who were caught on the Thailand-Malaysia border in March 2014 as they were about to cross into Malaysia (scores of others were arrested in separate occasions around the same time period).

Shortly afterwards, about 170 women and children were resettled in Turkey, but around 100 men were transferred to the Chinese authorities a week later.

Worse, the following month (17 August 2015) saw suspected Uyghur terrorists bomb the Erawan Shrine in the heart of Bangkok, killing 20 and injuring 125. The shrine is popular among Chinese visitors, who make up the majority of the dead and wounded.

The remaining 50 or so Uyghurs were charged with illegal entry and served their jail time; afterward, they remained in Thailand’s detention centres under no clear justification other than the lack of political will to take decisive action on the leaders’ part. Some had passed away due to illness, while five were serving prison time for attacking security guards as they were escaping detention.

China never let up with its demand for Thailand to deport the rest. To avoid further headaches, Thai law enforcement was told not to detain any Uyghur coming through the country. They were told to direct any incoming Uyghurs to Malaysia.

“Thailand is a very strong US partner, a strong historical ally,” Rubio said during his Senate hearing on 15 January 2025. “That is an area where I think diplomacy could really achieve results because of how important that relationship is and how close it is.” Or so he thought.

Rubio, a leading critic of Beijing, co-sponsored the 2021 Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which bans imports from Xinjiang unless free of forced labour. His stance on human rights in China has subjected him to Chinese sanctions since 2020.

It appeared that the Thailand government did not care about what Rubio had to say. Even if they did, it probably would not matter, as Thaksin was already set on his effort to please the Chinese.

On 14 March 2025, Rubio hit back and announced “visa restrictions on current and former officials from the Government of Thailand responsible for, or complicit in, the forced return of 40 Uyghurs from Thailand on February 27.”

One day before the US order on visa restrictions, the European Parliament condemned the deportation and “urges Thailand to halt any further forced returns to countries where people’s lives are at risk.”

The resolution also urged Thailand to reform its lèse majesté law (Article 112) and called on the European Commission to “leverage free trade agreement negotiations to press Thailand to reform the country’s lese-majesty law, release political prisoners, halt the deportation of Uyghur refugees, and to ratify all core International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions.”

China was quick to hit back but directed its comment to Washington. “On the one hand, the US engages in indiscriminate deportations of illegal immigrants, yet, on the other, it points fingers at and smears other countries’ legitimate law enforcement cooperation, imposes sanctions, and pressures others,” said China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Mao Ning, describing the United States’ actions as “typical bullying”.

While the fear among human rights activists that the remaining Uyghurs would be deported to China did not subside, it was not until January 2025 that everybody sensed something was not right; a group of Thai government officials visited the Uyghur detainees and politely asked them if they would like to return to China voluntarily. They were asked to sign the deportation paper, which they rejected outright.

Words of the meeting got out and the activists as well as opposition parties responded in full force, demanding an explanation from the government. Some of the detainees staged a hunger strike to protest what they saw as a ploy to get them to agree on the deportation.

The situation had gone quiet and the Uyghurs ended their hunger strike. Then, on 27 February 2025, it was rumoured that the Immigration Police were preparing to deport the Uyghur detainees. Reporters and activists went to the detention centre in Bangkok where they were held, but as the vehicles pulled out of the station, reporters were blocked. The rest was history.

Dumbstruck by Rubio’s harsh responses, Thailand insisted that the deportation was voluntary despite evidence to the contrary.

Raised Questions

A trip was organised for a group of journalists to tag along with Thai ministers to Xinjiang to visit the returnees. Observers said it was a sham, but the government insisted that it was not.

According to photos released by the government, the deportees were united with their relatives, but their immediate family members were sent to Turkey by Thai authorities over a decade ago.

Defense Minister Phumtham Wechayachai and Justice Minister Thawee Sodsong display photos showing that the Uyghurs returned by Thailand arrived safely in Xinjiang and were reunited with their waiting relatives on Feb. 27, 2025.

Critics and activists came out in full force, particularly the Malay Muslims in the southernmost provinces who had looked up to Justice Minister Thawee Sodsong and considered him to be one of their own, especially as one of the leaders of a political party from the region. They had hoped that he would stand up against the deportation of the Uyghur detainees.

Asmadee Bueheng, a writer from Pattani, said that for Thai and Malay activists, deportation was about human rights. However, for local Islamic leaders, it was about Muslims being mistreated.

Moreover, many Thais wrongly assumed that the government, being democratically elected, would be more sympathetic to the voices of human rights activists. They felt let down, especially those who had given the government the benefit of the doubt for changing their words on military and constitutional reforms.

Concluding Thoughts

For the time being, officials in Bangkok are putting on a brave face, playing down Washington’s sanctions on government officials. However, it was nothing less than a major embarrassment, considering the fact that the two countries are treaty allies. This is not to mention the fact that Washington was quick to point out to Bangkok the repeated offers to resettle the Uyghur.

The United States has in the past imposed sanctions on Thailand, suspending military aid after coups. This marked the first time that the sanction targeted government officials, although the United States has not identified these individuals. How this will affect the bilateral ties between these so-called longstanding allies, on the other hand, remains to be seen. However, there is no indication that the sanction will slow down Thaksin and his quest to steer Thailand in the direction that serves his personal and political ambitions.

Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD. 


Saturday, 12 April 2025

Thai PBS: ฟังเสียงประเทศไทย I โต๊ะเจรจาสันติภาพหายไปไหน ? ฟังเสียงที่ 3 ชายแดนใต้

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6PBobltJQdE

[UNCUT] ฟังเสียงประเทศไทย I โต๊ะเจรจาสันติภาพหายไปไหน ? ฟังเสียงที่ 3 ชายแดนใต้

...ก้าวเข้าสู่ปีที่ 21 ของสถานการณ์ความไม่สงบในพื้นที่ชายแดนใต้ มีผู้เสียชีวิตไปแล้ว กว่า 7,600 คน งบประมาณที่ภาครัฐทุ่มลงไปสำหรับการดับไฟใต้ตลอดช่วง 20 ปีที่ผ่านมากว่า 5 แสนล้านบาท ถูกตั้งคำถามว่า ประสบความสำเร็จแค่ไหน ?



...ก้าวเข้าสู่ปี






าท ถูกตั้งคำถามว่า ประสบความสำเร็จแค่ไหน ?