Don Pathan
Myanmar News
An unwanted spotlight will be placed on Thailand when the government explains its stance as to why the country should or should not support the upcoming General Election in Myanmar planned for later this year or early next, knowing that it will be a sham as the Myanmar junta no longer controls the majority of the country.
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Credit: Mizzima News
To do so would not only help whitewash the much-condemned State Administrative Council (SAC), the name the Myanmar junta had given itself for the 2021 coup. Endorsing the election could also isolate Thailand even further from the rest of the international community whose progressive values and commitments on humanitarian principles every Thai government professed to embrace but always lacked the political will to do so. The deportation of Burmese migrant workers back to Myanmar, where the junta forcibly conscripts them, is a case in point. |
When it comes to trouble-plagued Myanmar, also known as Burma, the international community tends to look to Thailand as an entry point. The number of self-proclaimed personal connections over the past decades by Thai generals, prime ministers, and foreign ministers that often translated to lucrative business deals gives members of the international community the idea that Thailand could use its charm to convince the Tatmadaw or Myanmar military to improve its act.
In late 1988, for example, then army chief Gen. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh led a delegation to Rangoon to break
international isolation. Senior Gen. Saw Maung, the then leader of Burma, called the Thai general a “true friend” of Myanmar. To show their gratitude, lucrative logging contracts, fishing rights, and deals in the hotel business were awarded to Thai companies.
Myanmar activists today still recalled vividly the August-September 1988 brutal suppression of student-led pro-democracy protestors, known as the “8888 Uprising,” that resulted in the death of more than three thousand people.
Besides isolating itself from the international community, relations between Thailand and Myanmar ethnic armed organizations (EAO) fighting the SAC could also take a downturn, as could the long-standing practice of using them as a buffer between the Thai Army and the Myanmar troops.
For a very long time, any EAOs fighting the Myanmar government were always deemed a friend of Thailand, while those with a ceasefire pact with the Tatmadaw are a threat to Thai national security. Engaging and strengthening ties with the EAOs along Thailand’s northern border was one school of thought for Thai defense planners. The second school calls for direct engagement with the Myanmar military government, but critics often equate this approach as economic opportunism.
Economic cooperation was what Thaksin Shinawatra had in mind when he came to power in February 2001, a time when there were cross-border shellings in response to Myanmar’s intrusion, as well as the detention of Thai Paramilitary Rangers on the Pang Noon hill in Chiang Rai. The two leading military figures at the time were Army chief Gen. Surayud Chulanont and commander of the Third Army Area, Lt. General Wattanachai Chaimuanwong; these two weren’t going to let the Tatmadaw push them around. They would be sidelined by Thaksin for obvious reasons.
Besides the relentless production of methamphetamines by a pro-Rangoon outfit, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), that find its way onto the streets of Thailand and other parts of Southeast Asian cities, the Thai Army was also frustrated with the Wa’s mass relocation of over 100,000 people from its traditional stronghold along the Sino-Burma border and resettled them in newly built towns and villages adjacent to Thailand’s Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai.
Eventually, the bickerings between the two sides gave way to an all-out assault by the Thai troops. On May 20, 2002, Thai infantry units and armoured personnel carriers (APC) supported by light and heavy artillery launched an all-out offensive to take out positions manned by the UWSA.
Shan State Army – South provided some guidance on the ground and, naturally, pointed to the positions where the Tatmadaw officers were posted. Thai soldiers had been seen taking up positions along the northern border in Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, and Mae Hong Son provinces for weeks, awaiting instruction. It was supposed to be a military training exercise, Surasri 143. But in reality, it became one of the biggest military operations since the Vietnam War. The incoming government was in over its head, but Thaksin was determined to patch things up with Burma.
For a man with quirky ambitions, Thaksin would soon contradict himself. One of the first orders of business was countering narcotics. As his controversial drug war claimed 3,000 lives in three months, his government conveniently pointed to the UWSA as the source of the problem. Nothing was hardly said about the social-economic situation of the users.
The problem with his approach was that the Wa has powerful allies, namely the Myanmar government. As a result, Thaksin was outsmarted by the then-powerful intelligence chief, Gen. Khin Nyunt, who succeeded in getting Thaksin to endorse the Yongkha Development Project in a UWSA-controlled area, thinking this will help the Wa kick the opium habit. While no one in the international community put any money in it, Khin Nyunt succeeded in achieving his goal, which was to whitewash the UWSA, an outfit that has been dubbed the world’s largest armed drug trafficking army by the US State Department.
Relations with Burma improved steadily with Thakin in power while democracy and human rights took a backseat. The bilateral ties were interrupted when Thaksin was ousted in September 2006. Coup leader and then army chief Gen. Sonthi Boonyaratglin appointed Gen. Surayudh, hero to Burmese exile and ethnic armies because of his tough stance against the Tatmadaw, as Thailand’s prime minister. But Surayud was committed to a timeline to return the mandate to the Thai people and the junta government that he led was around for only 16 months.
Like Thaksin, the incoming Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej, an ultranationalist with a checkered past in Thai politics, was more interested in stability, not confrontation with Myanmar. During his first visit to Myanmar, Samak did relay the message from the US and British governments, as well as the UN head, about the need to allow international aid groups entry to the country devastated by a cyclone, which had left 34,273 persons dead, 1,403 injured and 27,836 missing according to figure released by Myanmar state media.
The following government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, who came to power after a shifting alliance in the Parliament that made him the majority, said his “flexible engagement” policy for Burma called for more open dialogue on issues such as human rights.
“ASEAN to be strong it has to have the credibility and respect from the international community,” he said. “So what’s happening in Myanmar clearly affects the rest of the region – and I would just point out that it’s time for change. As far as we are concerned, we need to get ASEAN to become more proactive – it’s not easy but I’ve seen changes and I’ve seen progress.”
The July 2011 general election saw Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck, becoming the prime minister. During his visit to the country, Snr. General Min Aung Hlaing, the commander-in-chief, said relations between Thailand and Myanmar are at their most cordial in the history of ties between the two countries.
Yingluck continued with the promotion of the Dawei Special Economic Zone project in southern Myanmar, seeing it as a legacy of her fugitive brother Thaksin. Located on the Andaman coast, the project aims to be Southeast Asia’s largest industrial zone.
Yingluck was ousted in a coup in May 2014 by a Thai junta that would stay in power for the next nine years. A firm bond between the two sides was reassured under the leadership of Prime Minister Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha, the junta chief. Min Aung Hlaing visited Thailand two months after the coup, becoming the first foreigner of significant rank to visit the country. It was nothing less than a display of brotherhood.
State Councilor Aung San Suu Kyi paid a visit to Thailand in June 2016, during which she signed three MOUs with Prayuth that touched on employment protection and improving working conditions for the millions of Myanmar migrant workers in the country. As expected, the two leaders referred to the Dawai project on how bilateral economic cooperation could be enhanced.
Suu Kyi was ousted in a coup in February 2021. As expected, Prayuth stepped up to Myanmar’s rescue even at the expense of upsetting fellow ASEAN members who had shunned the Tatmadaw for the coup by barring high-level meetings with the junta or SAC, ASEAN drew up a five-point concensus that includes dialogue, humanitarian aid, and an end to violence. Myanmar’s generals ignored the bloc’s initiative.
As foreign governments condemned the coup and the military’s brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters, Thailand attended the Armed Forces Day in Naypyidaw, a month after the coup.
Thailand’s Deputy Prime Minister Don Pramudwinai sponsored a meeting on Myanmar in June in Pattaya, giving veteran diplomat Than Swe a platform to repeat the Burmese junta’s justifications for the 2021 coup. Foreign Ministers from key ASEAN countries – Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia – shunned the Pattaya meeting, insisting that the five-point consensus must be the only guiding principle.
FM Don insisted that Thailand has much at stake because of its geographical proximity, thus the need to take a more direct, i.e., bilateral approach to helping get Myanmar back on track.
The next Thai government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Srettha Tavisin, a real estate tycoon handpicked by Thaksin, didn’t have time for Myanmar, much less national security, including insurgency in the Muslim-majority southernmost border provinces. The utmost importance for the government was economic recovery to win back the constituency that they lost after the Faustian deal with Thaksin and junta leaders that ousted his sister from power in 2014.
But slowly, Foreign Minister Parnpree Bahiddha-nukara and Vice Ministre Sihasak Puangketkaeo patched things up with ASEAN members on Myanmar policy and pushed through the so-called humanitarian corridor. The transfer of humanitarian supplies crossed from Mae Sot to Myawaddy. Not long after that humanitarian initiative that was supposed to expand to areas affected by the battles inside Myanmar, Pranpree resigned from his post, following disagreement with party leadership. Sihasak followed him.
Pranpree was replaced by a career diplomat, FM Maris Sangiampongsa, a long-standing supporter of Thaksin who stuck with this telecommunication tycoon through thick and thin since his ouster by a coup in 2006. But Thailand needed more than another “yes man” in the Cabinet as the situation inside neighbouring Myanmar was getting too dire. More than ever before, there was a sense that the revolutionary forces could defeat the Myanmar military government.
And when it was time for Maris to do something, it was a platform for the SAC to pitch the upcoming general election. Speaking in Bangkok to a group of neighbouring countries in December 2024, Myanmar FM Than Swe said SAC would permit international observers for the upcoming election. He said nothing about how polling would be carried out in states such as Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, and Rakhine, where EAOs and PDF are very much in control on the ground.
In line with his ambition to be recognized as a regional statesman, Thaksin stepped in, thinking that he had the clout to pull this off. He travelled up to Chiang Mai with a prepared document appointing him the peace maker for the Myanmar conflict. But no one from the Burmese ethnic armed organizations would sign it. He doesn’t seem to understand that he is not exactly an honest broker, given his close connection with the Myanmar military.
Fierce fighting inside Myanmar dimmed so many things, including hope to revive the Dawei SEZ mega project. A recent commitment from Russia on the development of this project may give a new lease on life for this dying project. But if the opposition People’s Defence Forces (PDF) continue to gain ground in this region, the horse is likely to remain dead.
For the time being, Myanmar is under the control of the EAOs and the PDFs, the armed wing of the exile government – the National Unity Government (NUG) of Myanmar.
A massive earthquake hit Myanmar on March 28, but that didn’t stop the Tatmadaw from carrying out air strikes, something the military had been doing since the coup. Security experts such as Prof. Zachary Abuza of the US National War College said the air war is used to terrorize the Myanmar people and does not serve any strategic purpose.
It is not clear if the upcoming general election will be pushed back because of the earthquake. Nevertheless, it is clear that the junta is looking towards the election as a seal of approval, a new beginning for them and for key allies, such as China and possibly Thailand.
Min Aung Hlaing will be coming to Bangkok to attend the BIMSTEC, a mostly South Asian region grouping, summit meeting from April 3-4. The SAC will try to make the best out of it, but whether this means anything in the long term, on the other hand, remains to be seen.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.
