Did Myanmar Just Outmanoeuvre ASEAN and Thailand?

Secured enough: The thigh-high strand of barbed wire at the Rim Moei Market in Mae Sot, Tak province, serves as the physical border between Thailand and Myanmar. This unusual barrier creates a unique "no-man's land" trading strip along the edge of the Moei River. (Credit: Don Pathan) 

Don Pathan
Stratsea.com

Whither Consensus?

Myanmar’s coup leader-turned-president, Min Aung Hlaing, has been touring Asia to build international recognition and legitimacy for his new government.

Despite a widely disputed election last year that brought him to power – one ASEAN refused to formally recognise – the warm reception he received in China and India gave him the confidence to resist ASEAN’s calls to honour the regional grouping’s Five-Point Consensus (5PC).

For ASEAN, access to Aung San Suu Kyi and the release of political prisoners remain the benchmarks of measurable progress. Granting the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to her just days before Min Aung Hlaing visited Thailand was a cleverly calculated political move to show transparency. ASEAN leaders welcomed the gesture, even though it fell well short of the grouping’s demands.

Myanmar Pres. Min Aung Hliang and PM Anutin Charnvirakul (Thai Gov.)

Responding to the meeting, ASEAN chair, the Philippines, issued a statement reiterating the bloc’s demand for the “complete and unconditional release” of Suu Kyi – who is serving an 18-year sentence – along with all other political detainees.

Myanmar shot back, calling the push for Suu Kyi’s release “interference in Myanmar’s judicial process”. It went further, declaring the ASEAN special envoy role redundant and no longer required, arguing that the general election had successfully transitioned the post-coup junta to a civilian-led presidency and that, in its view, the 5PC had therefore expired.

By unilaterally shutting the door on the ASEAN envoy, the junta is signalling to the international community that outside oversight is no longer needed and that any domestic political transition will happen on its own terms—not those of outsiders.

Today, the 5PC’s future is defined by a bitter diplomatic deadlock and internal fracturing within ASEAN; a pivot toward alternative regional strategies looks inevitable, though no one is certain how it will play out.

Why Thailand Matters

Thailand, because of its long and porous border with Myanmar, sees itself as carrying greater responsibility than other ASEAN Member States and has agreed to act as a bridge between Myanmar and the bloc.

But for that role to work, Myanmar needs to show Thailand it is willing to make concessions. These include: 1) respecting Thailand’s territorial integrity by keeping Myanmar jet fighters and combat drones out of Thai airspace; 2) clamping down on drug trafficking by pro-Myanmar ethnic armed organisations (EAOs); 3) reining in the scam centres operating a stone’s throw from the shared border; 4) halting the flow of toxic chemicals from gold and rare-earth mines in Shan State into Thailand, and; 5) ending airstrikes on civilian targets.

Thailand secured no meaningful commitment on any of these issues during Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Bangkok. Instead of addressing ASEAN’s demands, Myanmar turned the tables and called on Thailand to block the flow of weapons to the EAOs operating along the shared border. In some way, it was a direct challenge to Thailand’s dual-track policy.

Myanmar has quietly raised this issue before, asking Thailand to clamp down on weapons and drones smuggled to EAOs for battlefield use. This time, with Min Aung Hlaing leading the delegation, Myanmar made clear it was no longer willing to speak quietly about a subject Thailand would rather avoid.

Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul was caught off guard. Unable to articulate or defend the country’s long-standing engagement with the EAOs inside Myanmar, he quickly agreed to Min Aung Hlaing’s request and, lost for words, instructed Thai agencies to tighten border inspections to ensure no weapons reach EAO hands.

That request cuts against decades of quiet policy. Historical mistrust between Myanmar and Thailand gave rise to an unspoken buffer logic: whichever EAO is fighting Myanmar is a friend of Thailand, and whichever EAO is friendly with Myanmar is a threat to Thailand.

Thailand will now have to think hard about how to explain its relationship with the EAOs—long-standing ties between communities and people on both sides of the border that cannot be erased by one prime minister’s order, one issued while he was caught off guard.

For the bridging role to be worth the effort, Thailand needs to be clear-eyed about its own interests even where that clarity does not sit well with Naypyidaw.

Mighty China

By comparison, cross-border ties between China and the EAOs along the Sino-Myanmar border run deeper and carry more historical weight than those in the frontier shared by Thailand and Myanmar.

The bigger difference, though, is that China is willing to wield that influence to get what it wants from the Wa, Ta’ang, Kachin, Kokang and Shan groups alike—pressuring EAOs along its border to hand back hard-won territory being a case in point. In contrast, Thailand has no comparable leverage over the Shan, Karen, Karenni or Mon groups, and as Bangkok moves closer to Naypyidaw, EAOs along the Thai border increasingly feel neglected.

Thailand also wants Myanmar to press the United Wa State Army (UWSA) harder on cleaning up contamination from gold and rare-earth mining near the Thai border. Bangkok understands Myanmar’s limitations here: Myanmar soldiers cannot even enter Wa territory without being disarmed and escorted. Yet for public consumption, government statements keep framing the issue as a bilateral matter between Thailand and Myanmar, alongside other bilateral cooperation raised at the visit, such as the transfer of agricultural knowledge, something Myanmar badly needs.

Public attention has focused mostly on gold extraction some 25 kilometres from the Thai border in UWSA territory, but the Shan Human Rights Foundation reported that satellite imagery also showed rare-earth mining sites in Mong Yawn, located in southern Mong Hsat opposite Chiang Mai’s Mae Ai district.

The contamination has triggered protests in Bangkok, Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai demanding that both the Thai and Chinese governments act against Myanmar and the Wa.

Thai NGOs, on their part, have taken their case directly to the Chinese Embassy and Consulate in Thailand since the mining companies involved are Chinese. The logic is simple: if China is willing to pressure EAOs to play nice with Myanmar, Beijing can extend Thailand the same courtesy by pushing the UWSA and Chinese firms to clean up the toxic runoff before it reaches the Kok and Sai rivers on the Thai side.

No one expects the government to pursue full-throttle microphone diplomacy to bring in the Chinese, but there is no denying the environmental NGOs are barking up the right tree.

Thailand needs to think outside the box in dealing with the UWSA. Wariness toward its drug-trafficking pedigree is warranted, but Thailand should also recognise that the UWSA will not budge on border demarcation or water contamination without getting something in return. Like any non-state actor, recognition and legitimacy matter to it.

Bangkok’s Next Move

Myanmar has been in political turmoil since well before the coup Min Aung Hlaing led five years ago, which turned an already war-torn country upside down as street protests and fighting spread into newly contested areas populated by ethnic Burmans. Nearly all EAOs, together with the newly formed People’s Defence Force, made real gains on the ground during this period, rolling up town after town.

But the resistance was never able to translate its battlefield victories into meaningful political gains. Chinese intervention – framed as mediation at first but driven by concerns over border stability and cross-border trade – turned the tables, pressuring EAOs to hand back some of the territory they had won using the trade lifelines many of them depend on as leverage.

China’s role in this has been clear, however controversial.

Thailand, by contrast, has yet to spell out in real terms – and more to the point, the consequences and measures – what it is willing to do if Myanmar refuses to meet ASEAN, or Bangkok, halfway. Critics have argued that Bangkok’s red-carpet welcome for Min Aung Hlaing was unnecessary, given that his government was never prepared to make any concessions on anything to anybody.

It is against that backdrop that Thailand’s dual-track approach to Myanmar will be tested in the months ahead.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD. This article is published under Creative Commons Licence.

 

Thailand in damage-control mode after deadly attacks threaten to derail the peace process

Moving car bomb attack at the Khao Thanyong police station in Narathiwat.

Don Pathan
Prachatai English

Royal Thai Army Chief of Staff Gen Chaiyapruek Duangprapat, did not mince words. Visiting Narathiwat the day after six Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) combatants gunned down five Paramilitary Rangers at close range, he warned: “Those who provide hiding places, and any country that provides hiding places, should know that we will pursue them to the ends of the earth.” He told the perpetrators to watch their backs when they eat, sleep, or walk. “The time has come for you to become the hunted.”

The July 22 ambush, in which gunmen riding in the back of a pickup truck opened fire, also wounded six civilian bystanders, including a three-year-old girl and a ten-year-old boy. It came just 24 hours after a car bomb tore through the Khao Tanyong police station in Narathiwat’s Muang district; the driver jumped clear before it detonated. 

Footage of the Rangers being shot spread rapidly on social media, triggering both public outrage and renewed criticism of the armed forces’ enormous budget, which critics say has done little to change the course of the conflict.

Chaiyapruek, already known for his hard line on the Cambodia border dispute, stopped short of naming Malaysia as a possible haven for the gunmen. But given the scale of media attention, his remarks read as much as a soundbite for public consumption as a statement of policy.

For a military establishment more accustomed to being at the receiving end of guerrilla-style, hit-and-run tactics, the July 22 killings were a humiliation. 

“This was not your average hit-and-run incident. The insurgents took the fight to us and took out our troops,” said one Thai military intelligence officer who spoke on condition of anonymity. 

In response, the government paused high-level official talks and demanded that BRN explain the spike in violence just as the peace process appeared to be gaining momentum.

Long-time observers say the demand was less a genuine search for answers than a face-saving measure for a military caught off guard; whatever BRN says in their reply will almost be beside the point. Bangkok is buying time and managing optics while the public calls for revenge, even as talks at the technical level between BRN and Thai officials continue. BRN supporters say there is no need for the movement to “overreact or get bent out of shape” over the demands from the Thai side. 

Instead, a counter demand from BRN includes opening up the cultural space in Patani to accommodate Malay identity and language and scrapping the Southern Economic Corridor (SEC) project, in exchange for a temporary cessation of violence (TCOV) — the centrepiece of the current horse-trading. This message was also passed through the Chair of the Prime Minister’s advisory board, Wan Muhamad Noor Matha, during a recent meeting in Jakarta.

BRN has for years consistently signalled openness to a reduction in violence provided certain conditions are met, including international and local monitors on the ground. 

Complicating matters today, a BRN negotiation-team official said, is the fact that Malaysia’s current facilitator is on his way out, with a replacement, expected to be a retired general, yet to be named. For Bangkok, the transition came in handy as it provides a convenient excuse as to why a pause is needed. 

In response to the July 22 daring attack, the Army abruptly reversed its recent posture of security relaxation, invoking the Martial Law Act across Narathiwat and granting security forces the authority to search vehicles and homes linked to separatist elements without a warrant. 

A monkey wrench from within

If the Army’s response was aimed outward, the peace process had already been damaged from within even for the July 21 car bomb and the July 22 killing of the five Rangers. Three days before Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul’s two-day official visit to Malaysia on July 9-10, Defence Minister Lt Gen Adul Boonthamcharoen was quoted by Isra News questioning whether the government needed to talk to BRN at all. 

“The government has no business talking to the BRN,” Adul said, before appearing to contradict himself in the same breath: “And we will not elevate the status of the dialogue any more than necessary” — suggesting he is aware of the process but unhappy with it.

The timing could hardly have been worse. Anutin was due in Kuala Lumpur to meet his counterpart Anwar Ibrahim and discuss, among other things, conflict resolution in Patani. Adul’s comments were, by several accounts, humiliating for the prime minister, and indirectly gave BRN a measure of justification for the violence that followed. 

It remains unclear whether Adul’s scepticism was connected to a mystery caller who separately telephoned Isra News claiming to be a BRN commander in Narathiwat, offering to surrender more than 100 combatants in exchange for an Army withdrawal from the “area.” One veteran observer suspects the call was a ploy by the old guard of the Fourth Army Area, resentful at being replaced by commanders from the Second Army Area, and was meant to provoke their replacements — who, the observer said, kept their cool.

Adul’s own rebuttal of Chaiyapruek — noting that BRN combatants are also Thai nationals and that dialogue remains the best option — drew a harsh reaction on social media, forcing a teary-eyed defence minister to clarify he had been misunderstood. 

“Thai officials tend to contradict one another when it comes to the conflict in Patani. This is because the government doesn’t have a comprehensive strategy that unites all the key agencies and ministries,” said Artef Sohko, President of the political action group, The Patani.

Thailand’s domestic politics has long held the peace process hostage, and official talks — which began back in 2013 — have proceeded in fits and starts ever since. But observers agree the biggest spoiler has always been the military, many of whose generals believe that talking to the rebels unnecessarily legitimizes them. 

“It was the army who refused to accept that the conflict is political in nature and insisted all along on using military means to crush the insurgents,” Artef said. 

Artef and The Patani have often acted as the go-between for the BRN, Thai government agencies, Malaysia and members of the international community working on conflict resolution. His group was instrumental in getting the BRN to declare a unilateral ceasefire during the COVID-19 pandemic in response to the request from the UN Sec-Gen António Guterres to halt violence on the ground to give safe passage to health workers. Today, Artef is facing legal charges for promoting separatism. 

ISOC in hot water, left and right

Running parallel to the negotiating track is a long-running battle over the narrative. Two decades ago, when the current generation of separatist militants resurfaced, they were dismissed by officials as “sparrow bandits.” 

Even after BRN combatants made off with roughly 400 pieces of military weaponry in the January 2004 Narathiwat arms heist, officials for years continued to portray them as drug-crazed youths following a distorted interpretation of Islam. Today, as Adul’s comments suggest, the same scepticism persists even as the government keeps sending officials to have what it insists on calling “conversations,” rather than negotiations.

Overseeing much of this narrative battle is the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), nominally a civilian-chaired body under the Prime Minister’s Office but reliant in practice on the armed forces’ logistics, intelligence networks and personnel; in the far South, the ISOC officer and the RTA officer in the same district are often the same man wearing two hats. 

ISOC’s information operations have long targeted local activists and human rights defenders who press security agencies for accountability, and it denies wrongdoing. But on June 11, Thailand’s Court of Appeal ordered ISOC, the Office of the Prime Minister and the Army to pay a combined 210,000 baht to Senator Angkhana Neelapaijit and Anchana Heemmina, founder of the Duay Jai human rights organization, over online posts spreading false information about them. 

During recent debate over the 3.788-trillion-baht Fiscal Year 2027 budget, lawmaker Wan Muhamad Noor Matha called on the government to scrap ISOC as redundant, citing a failed assassination attempt on Narathiwat MP Kamonsak Leewamoh in which the weapon, personnel and vehicle involved reportedly belonged to ISOC — a charge that ISOC denies. Its campaigns, which began in the far South, have since expanded to target student-led reformist movements and, most recently, critics of the military’s Cambodia border policy.

Positive signs, fragile gains

For all the turbulence, the underlying negotiating architecture had, until recently, been moving in an encouraging direction under the National Intelligence Agency’s director, Thanut Suvarnananda. His team moved quickly to enlist an international NGO to facilitate discussions between Thai generals and their Indonesian and Philippine counterparts — officers experienced in the Aceh and Mindanao peace processes — while a second INGO has been facilitating talks between Thai officials and BRN negotiators, with Malaysian facilitators taking part. 

Thailand is separately weighing a BRN request to release some detainees as a goodwill gesture, a TOR for public consultation is being drafted, and the negotiating team plans to bring Thai civil society organizations to Malaysia to meet BRN leaders, with talk of allowing some to observe the official negotiations. 

The Army’s absence from the negotiating table has arguably made it easier for the two sides to reach agreements. But implementing any deal without the Army’s buy-in would be difficult. According to an informed source, the Army is considering opening a separate back channel through former Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla, reflecting a long-standing desire among Thai security agencies to speak directly with BRN’s military leadership. International best practice, however, does not allow Thailand to pick and choose its interlocutors; BRN selects its own representatives, and Thailand will have to learn to work with that.

Whether that lesson sticks may depend less on the negotiating table than on what happens next in Narathiwat. With the Army bristling over its most humiliating loss in recent memory, the coming weeks will test whether Thailand’s civilian and military tracks can speak with one voice — or whether, as Artef put it, they will simply keep contradicting each other. 

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand’s far south.