Myanmar’s New Thailand Pivot

Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow (right) with his Myanmar counterpart U Than Swe in Phuket, Thailand, on 18 February 2026. Credit: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Thailand

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com

Introduction

In the wake of a general election widely dismissed by the international community as a sham, Myanmar will once again look to Thailand to serve as its window to the wider world.

The vote was held amid widespread armed conflict and limited territorial control. The result, nonetheless, helped the government and further consolidated its power.

Far from easing the political crisis, it bolstered the Tatmadaw position even as violence, displacement and illicit economic activity persist. With over 3.5 million people internally displaced, an end to the conflict is not in sight.

This escalation in Myanmar is fuelling growing concern in Thailand that its neighbour’s instability could harm its own interests and security. Officials at the planning and operational levels indicate that Bangkok must recalibrate its strategy towards Naypyitaw and take up a more active approach.

The complex challenges spilling over from Myanmar include increased border security risks, volatile cross-border trade, a surge in transnational crime – especially online scams – and environmental threats like air pollution as well as water contamination from mining activities near the frontier.

Evidently, these issues have imposed a mounting humanitarian and public health burden.

“Myanmar poses a systemic risk to Thailand’s security, economy and social stability, not merely a foreign policy concern,” said Supalak Ganjanakhundee, a Thailand-based security and political analyst. “But Thailand’s response is still reactive, fragmented and inadequate for the ongoing challenge.”

Moreover, it has become increasingly clear that ASEAN’s collective mechanisms – namely the Five-Point Consensus (5PC) – have made no meaningful progress on any of its five points: cessation of violence, constructive dialogue, mediation, humanitarian access and appointment of a special envoy. Though Thailand will not abandon ASEAN, it will assume a more active unilateral role in Myanmar.

New Diplomatic Tone

International relations expert Kavi Chongkittavorn thinks Thailand’s Myanmar policy will become more solid; the overwhelming electoral mandate has given to the Bhumjaithai Party (BJT) of Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul enough confidence to break from the past.  Moreover, the support from Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow, a career diplomat adept at articulating Thai narratives, will come in handy.

“Notice how friendlier Myanmar has become since the two foreign ministers met?” remarked Kavi, in reference to their 18 February 2026 meeting in Phuket.

Just over two years ago, BJT was a medium-sized regional outfit, primarily known for its pro-cannabis stance. However, the border conflict with Cambodia gave the party a renewed direction and purpose, which it leveraged effectively. Nationalist sentiment significantly influenced the electoral outcome, propelling BJT to 193 seats in the 500-seat parliament.

For decades, Thailand has handled its Myanmar border using practical tolerance, quick decision-making and strategic vagueness. The country has responded to waves of displaced people, dealt with armed groups, maintained refugee camps, processed migrant workers and kept up relations with various Myanmar governments.

However, it has never developed a unified national strategy that ties these efforts together.

This flexible approach worked well after 1988: costs stayed reasonable, crises were occasional and international donors who supported humanitarian needs lessened Bangkok’s financial burden from managing the border.

Historically, on the government-to-government level, Thailand was generally helpful—lending a hand to the Myanmar government by ending the international isolation after the Burmese junta killed some 3,000 of the student-led protestors in 1988.

Drugs, Mining, Arsenic and Scam Centres

Relationship soured briefly in the late 1990s as the Tatmadaw permitted the United Wa State Army (UWSA) – a 30,000-strong ethnic armed organisation – to expand their home turf on the Chinese border down to the northern border of Thailand, stretching from Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai to Mae Hong Son provinces. The US State Department called the UWSA one of the most powerful non-state armed groups and the primary driver of the Southeast Asian drug trade.

Kavi believes the new Thai government will not rule out military action against the UWSA. Others believe Thailand has too much to lose to pick a fight with a battle-hardened outfit like the Wa. Bangkok has sought help from the Tatmadaw, but there was nothing Myanmar could do as they, too, are not permitted to enter UWSA territory without an armed escort and permission.

Thai generals said they do not want to turn the clock back and use military means against the UWSA. But no one is taking the initiative to establish a serious discussion with the Wa about what kind of trade-offs they are looking for in exchange for cleaning up the pollution and moving back some of its outposts.

Indeed, the water contamination from unregulated mining by Chinese companies (with concessions from the Wa authorities) in Shan State – about 39 kilometres from the Thai border – has complicated the UWSA issue even further. The extraction of gold has surged since the 2021 coup, and rare earth mining has also rapidly expanded in the UWSA-controlled area. Elevated arsenic levels have been found at the Kok and Sai Rivers that flow from these mines.

Thailand takes pride in its ability to contain the Myanmar crisis within Myanmar’s borders, preventing direct spillover onto Thai soil. However, internal issues in Myanmar continue to impact Thailand, including the influx of refugees that places strain on Thai resources – particularly the public health system – and the transit of illicit drugs through Thailand en route to major international cities.

Additionally, some areas along the Thailand-Myanmar border, guarded by 7,000-strong pro-Myanmar Karen Border Guard Forces, have become hotspots for cyber scams targeting individuals worldwide. These scam complexes along the Myanmar border are notorious for trafficking victims under horrific working conditions, which involve constant surveillance, threats of physical punishment and beatings.

The scam crisis shows how crimes connected to Myanmar negatively impact Thailand’s economy, mainly investment and tourism. After the trafficking incident involving Chinese celebrity Wang Xing, Chinese tourist arrivals fell by 33%, causing a major economic hit. Thai officials are particularly worried about Chinese tourism, which remains below pre-pandemic numbers but is crucial to Thailand’s slow-moving economy.

Peace Corridors

Regarding Myanmar’s international standing, a group of technocrats from Naypyidaw working on de-escalation said the incoming government will ask Thailand to go beyond “calibrated re-engagement” and act as a “bridge” for Myanmar’s return to ASEAN.

Myanmar will be turning to Thailand to help with the peace corridor initiatives to facilitate humanitarian initiatives with the hope that this will lead to peace talks between the government and the resistance forces.

Some in the security sector said Thailand is willing to consider taking up the role of a mediator, but this would mean Thai government agencies could no longer work in silos when it comes to Myanmar. This is in line with Bangkok’s desire to continue with the humanitarian corridor. The initiative, supported by ASEAN, was carried out by then Vice Minister Sihasak in early 2024.

On paper, Myanmar is transitioning from one-man dictatorial rule to governance under a constitution, with the Tatmadaw – in theory at least – subordinate to the government. The president will have to work on political agreements once the state of emergency ends.

Engagement with ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) will be high on the new government’s agenda, and talks of negotiations and concessions could reach the Parliament floor by October 2026, said the Myanmar technocrats from Naypyidaw.

Moreover, the new political reality in Myanmar will see more rigorous feedback from the regional commanders to the central government. In the past, these commanders’ recommendations were often diluted before reaching the policy level, they said.

Also according to them: expect positive feedback from these local commanders who are on friendly terms with their Thai counterparts.

Don Pathan

Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

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Myanmar’s Drone War: An Escalation

A Myanmar passenger plane was hit in a drone strike at the Kachin State capital on Feb. 20, 2026. (Credit: Myanmar Government)

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com

Targeting the Northern Hub

Myanmar resistance forces are pushing the line with the latest drone attack against a civilian aircraft that was about to take off for Mandalay from Kachin State’s Myitkyina Airport. On 20 February 2026, a suicide drone struck a Myanmar National Airlines (MNA) ATR-72-600 aircraft, causing damage to its nose, fuselage, and tail.

As expected, nobody claimed responsibility, given the likelihood of blowback from the international community—much of which is cheering for the rebels, not the military-backed Myanmar government. The latter recently concluded a general election that is neither accepted nor endorsed by much of the world, including ASEAN Member States (AMS).

According to one theory, the drone was targeting the adjacent Northern Command headquarters but was shot down by airport security, causing it to crash into the passenger plane. The military headquarters shares the same border fence with the airport.

Nevertheless, it was too close for comfort by any measure. The attack marked a significant step up in escalation, given that rebel forces have generally left civilian targets – much less commercial passenger aircraft – alone.

Myitkyina Airport serves as a critical air transport hub for the northern Kachin State, facilitating the movement of people and goods to major cities like Yangon and Mandalay. Attacks on such infrastructure are intended to undermine governance and disrupt regional stability.

While the airport remained operational, 2025 saw resistance forces successfully using FPV drones against other high-value military targets in the region. For example, in May 2025, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) used a drone to down a military Mi-17 transport helicopter in nearby Shwegu.

The 12 February 2026 FPV drone strike on the airport was intercepted, resulting in no damage to infrastructure, though it did cause flight cancellations.

Resistance forces in the region had already been using similar drone technology in other operations, such as the 8 February strike that destroyed a radar station at the nearby Nant Paung Air Base.

The lack of direct hits on Kachin airport in 2025 suggests that the more recent attacks in February 2026 – including the FPV drone strike on 12 February – represent a “significant escalation” in the resistance’s ability to penetrate the capital’s high-security airspace.

This highlights a shift toward precision-guided, low-cost technology that is difficult for traditional security to detect.

The Rise of the “Autonomous” PDF

Attacking a heavily fortified site guarded by approximately 20 junta troops at every entrance and protected by Air Defence Operation Commands requires a level of coordination.

The Myanmar government immediately accused the KIA and the People’s Defence Force (PDF), the latter of which is officially the armed wing of the National Unity Government (NUG), formed in response to the 2021 military coup.

But over the years, the term PDF has become a catch-all for newly emerged militia groups taking up arms against the junta. Not all PDF units fall under the NUG’s command and control.

A report released in May 2025 states that while the “Integrated” and the “Allied” PDFs are part of the NUG’s formalised military structure, the “Autonomous” and “Localized” PDFs operate without direct oversight from the NUG. These last two categories each have their own networks and generate their own funding through donations as well as small-scale business activities.

For the long-standing resistance forces, such as the KIA and the NUG, both of whom seek global support against the military-backed government of Myanmar, civility and international norms must be respected. But when it comes to the actions of autonomous and localised PDFs, these long-standing organisations enjoy plausible deniability.

As Myanmar reaches a new threshold, such as the recently concluded general election, fighting on the ground will have to be understood in a post-election context. While the 20 February attack was widely seen as an escalation, no one can predict where this leads.

The “Lone Wolf” Threat to Chinese Interests

Some in the resistance community are not ruling out attacks on the Chinese pipeline that runs from the Rakhine State to Kunming in Yunnan province. While China has an agreement with the Myanmar government and long-standing ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) such as the Arakan Army (AA) to provide protection for the pipeline, independently organised PDF units who do not report to any long-standing groups could become that “lone wolf” behind such an attack.

In May last year, the PDFs’ highly coordinated offensive – Operation 9/A Nyar Myae – overran four Mandalay townships, forcing government troops to abandon a key off-take station for the Chinese gas and oil pipelines.

Approximately 50 government troops were killed during this one-day coordinated offensive targeting 12 government positions in the Mandalay region. The operation involved around 12 distinct resistance groups operating within the region. In response, government forces launched several days of intermittent clashes and conducted retaliatory airstrikes.

Beijing’s Heavy Hand: Relinquishing the Gains

By late 2025, Myanmar troops retook most positions; Chinese intervention played a key role in the resistance's surrendering territory.

During the campaign to recover previously lost territories, there was no evidence indicating that the PDFs were utilising the pipeline as collateral. This demonstrates a shared recognition by both resistance forces and government troops of the strategic significance of the Chinese pipeline. Furthermore, any direct intervention by China could result in adverse consequences for all parties involved.

Beyond the PDFs in Mandalay, approximately 245km east, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) was compelled to return Lashio, which is the junta’s main defensive position in northern Shan State.

About the same time, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) was pressured to relinquish recently secured territories, including Mogok, a world-famous ruby mining centre, back to the junta.

The return of Nawnghkio, Kyaukme, and Hsipaw allowed Myanmar to reopen the critical trade highway between Mandalay and the Chinese border. These handovers were made possible through China-mediated negotiations in October 2025, during which Beijing abandoned any pretence of acting as an impartial mediator.

The resistance forces’ setbacks at the hands of China were a stark reminder that nothing comes easy in Myanmar’s rugged conflict zones, where EAOs, PDFs, and regime forces all play for keeps. The PDFs likely felt jaded after retreating from the Mandalay positions they had seized in May 2025. They were also frustrated with the TNLA, which had ordered them to do so. Hard feelings aside, one thing the resistance can agree on is that they cannot withstand Chinese pressure.

But has China crossed the line—no one in the resistance forces would say. There is little choice but to absorb the blow, regroup, and continue fighting even if the playing field is an uneven one.

So why seize territory only to return it to the junta under Chinese influence? Groups like the MNDAA, the TNLA, and the PDFs may not be willing to confront China directly about their objection. These groups understand fully the diplomatic and strategic costs if they choose to upset China. But the autonomous PDFs operate under no such constraint. For them, it becomes a matter of timing and opportunity, not principle.

Resistance forces in Myanmar have shown their objections in actions such as attacks on Chinese interests in Myanmar in response to the 2021 coup. Chinese-owned factories in Yangon’s industrial zones were burnt, as protesters accused Beijing of backing the coup. Frustration exists, indeed; the question is whether and through whom it finds an outlet.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

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  Don Pathan

  Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.