Outrage over hospital raid reveals military hypocrisy

Insurgents are accused of violating humanitarian principles; meanwhile Thai security forces continue to place monks and children in line of fire

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

Sunday's raid by militant separatists on a Joh I Rong hospital in Narathiwat couldn't have come at a better time for the Thai side.

The incident has provided a much-needed pretext for the military to attack armed insurgents who continue to discredit the government's peace effort with MARA Patani, the umbrella organisation of six longstanding separatist organisations that the militants say does not represent them.

Bangkok is struggling to justify talks with MARA Patani whose lack of traction is being underscored by a spike in violence in the far South. The Thai side is also facing ill-feeling among the local community over a Bangkok court's decision to seize the 14-rai grounds of an Islamic boarding school, Jihad Withya pondok, in Pattani's Tambon Tha Dan, Yaring district, which was used as an insurgent training facility a decade ago.

The land belongs to the family of Abduloh Waemanor, a local cleric and suspected Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) member who fled the region back in 2005.

Thai military officers have quietly requested that the Waemanor family appeal the court's decision, but they refuse to do so, saying they are unable to come to terms with the state's action.

Some in the separatist movement are suggesting the decision not to appeal was a deliberate move to drive a bigger wedge between local Malay Muslims and the state. Judging from the reaction of local residents - an outpouring of support and sympathy - the alleged strategy appears to have worked.

The seizing of the Jihad Withya pondok - part of a venerable institution that forged the cradle of Islamic civilisation in Southeast Asia - reinforces a notion that the Thai state has never dealt fairly with the Malays of Patani.

The court decision sent shock waves through the region, serving as a warning of what the future could hold. Thai authorities see the pondoks as a hotbed for recruitment and indoctrination of the current generation of insurgents.

Local residents take a different view, pointing out that the Patani historical and cultural narrative is ingrained in their society, making it unfair to single out any institution.

The Thai side has made it clear that the raid on the Narathiwat hospital was a gross violation of humanitarian and international norms for which the militants should be condemned in the strongest terms.

This is not the first time that insurgents have targeted a medical facility, however. In May 2014, three people were seriously wounded when militant separatists detonated a bomb in the parking lot of Pattani's Khok Pho hospital, damaging at least 50 vehicles.

Yet the militants consider the Thai military's ongoing efforts to demonise them via references to humanitarian principles a case of the pot calling the kettle black. The security forces' underhand tactics in managing a decade or so of conflict in the Malay-speaking South are well documented, as is the culture of impunity among its personnel.

The Thai military has been criticised for positioning outposts in the grounds of temples and schools, thereby placing monks and students in line of fire. Such decisions not only violate international humanitarian norms, they are also made without consulting local residents.

Insurgent attacks against schools and temples were a regular occurrence a decade ago but now take place less frequently, and only as retaliation for instances in which the Thais are deemed to have "crossed the line" and/or violated unwritten rules of engagement.

Separatist sources say the scores of militants behind the recent attacks were aware that using the hospital as a staging point for an attack on Paramilitary Rangers was a violation of international norms. Accordingly, they made a concerted effort not to harm the people inside the hospital.

But they didn't foresee that the Thai side would "milk" the situation to such a degree, even rounding up local imams to carry out a "prayer for peace" at the hospital. Observers outside the region likely saw the prayer event as a slap in the face for the insurgents. But locals know that the clerics would have been under pressure to go with the flow or else risk being accused by the military of being uncooperative.

Claims by the authorities that a nurse was tied up were discredited by the nurse in question, who told reporters that while she was tied to her chair to prevent her from moving she quickly realised the insurgents weren't out to harm people in the hospital.

The vast majority of separatist militants operate under the BRN, whose leadership continues to keep a distance from the Kuala Lumpur-facilitated peace initiative between the Thai government and MARA Patani.

Although MARA Patani claims to have BRN members on board, militants and sources in the movement dismiss any suggestion that the movement's ruling council endorses the peace initiative.

The raid on the Paramilitary Ranger unit, which is situated next to the hospital, was part of an ongoing spike in violence after more than a year of relative quiet.

Don Pathan is a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a Thailand-based freelance security and development consultant.

Outrage over hospital raid reveals military hypocrisy

Insurgents are accused of violating humanitarian principles; meanwhile Thai security forces continue to place monks and children in line of fire

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

Sunday's raid by militant separatists on a Joh I Rong hospital in Narathiwat couldn't have come at a better time for the Thai side.

The incident has provided a much-needed pretext for the military to attack armed insurgents who continue to discredit the government's peace effort with MARA Patani, the umbrella organisation of six longstanding separatist organisations that the militants say does not represent them.

Bangkok is struggling to justify talks with MARA Patani whose lack of traction is being underscored by a spike in violence in the far South. The Thai side is also facing ill-feeling among the local community over a Bangkok court's decision to seize the 14-rai grounds of an Islamic boarding school, Jihad Withya pondok, in Pattani's Tambon Tha Dan, Yaring district, which was used as an insurgent training facility a decade ago.

The land belongs to the family of Abduloh Waemanor, a local cleric and suspected Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) member who fled the region back in 2005.

Thai military officers have quietly requested that the Waemanor family appeal the court's decision, but they refuse to do so, saying they are unable to come to terms with the state's action.

Some in the separatist movement are suggesting the decision not to appeal was a deliberate move to drive a bigger wedge between local Malay Muslims and the state. Judging from the reaction of local residents - an outpouring of support and sympathy - the alleged strategy appears to have worked.

The seizing of the Jihad Withya pondok - part of a venerable institution that forged the cradle of Islamic civilisation in Southeast Asia - reinforces a notion that the Thai state has never dealt fairly with the Malays of Patani.

The court decision sent shock waves through the region, serving as a warning of what the future could hold. Thai authorities see the pondoks as a hotbed for recruitment and indoctrination of the current generation of insurgents.

Local residents take a different view, pointing out that the Patani historical and cultural narrative is ingrained in their society, making it unfair to single out any institution.

The Thai side has made it clear that the raid on the Narathiwat hospital was a gross violation of humanitarian and international norms for which the militants should be condemned in the strongest terms.

This is not the first time that insurgents have targeted a medical facility, however. In May 2014, three people were seriously wounded when militant separatists detonated a bomb in the parking lot of Pattani's Khok Pho hospital, damaging at least 50 vehicles.

Yet the militants consider the Thai military's ongoing efforts to demonise them via references to humanitarian principles a case of the pot calling the kettle black. The security forces' underhand tactics in managing a decade or so of conflict in the Malay-speaking South are well documented, as is the culture of impunity among its personnel.

The Thai military has been criticised for positioning outposts in the grounds of temples and schools, thereby placing monks and students in line of fire. Such decisions not only violate international humanitarian norms, they are also made without consulting local residents.

Insurgent attacks against schools and temples were a regular occurrence a decade ago but now take place less frequently, and only as retaliation for instances in which the Thais are deemed to have "crossed the line" and/or violated unwritten rules of engagement.

Separatist sources say the scores of militants behind the recent attacks were aware that using the hospital as a staging point for an attack on Paramilitary Rangers was a violation of international norms. Accordingly, they made a concerted effort not to harm the people inside the hospital.

But they didn't foresee that the Thai side would "milk" the situation to such a degree, even rounding up local imams to carry out a "prayer for peace" at the hospital. Observers outside the region likely saw the prayer event as a slap in the face for the insurgents. But locals know that the clerics would have been under pressure to go with the flow or else risk being accused by the military of being uncooperative.

Claims by the authorities that a nurse was tied up were discredited by the nurse in question, who told reporters that while she was tied to her chair to prevent her from moving she quickly realised the insurgents weren't out to harm people in the hospital.

The vast majority of separatist militants operate under the BRN, whose leadership continues to keep a distance from the Kuala Lumpur-facilitated peace initiative between the Thai government and MARA Patani.

Although MARA Patani claims to have BRN members on board, militants and sources in the movement dismiss any suggestion that the movement's ruling council endorses the peace initiative.

The raid on the Paramilitary Ranger unit, which is situated next to the hospital, was part of an ongoing spike in violence after more than a year of relative quiet.

Don Pathan is a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a Thailand-based freelance security and development consultant.

Bombs, bullets fly as ‘peace’ message fails to reach South

Upsurge in deadly violence suggests neither insurgents nor security officials are willing to put down their guns just yet

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

Insurgent attacks this past weekend have prompted speculation galore on why violence in the far South has spiked after months of relative calm.

Some officials believe insurgents carried out the region-wide attacks in retaliation for a February 10 assault by security forces on a small base camp hidden in the mangroves of Pattani's Nong Chik district.

It remains unclear why the operation was deemed a "success" when five militants deployed at the camp succeeded in escaping after a brief gunfight with the security officials.

Gas cylinders and bomb making materials were seized, though, and one local resident detained for questioning.

Improvised explosive devices are locally made and the material to make them is legally available in the region. But the fact that authorities were able to identify the location of this small camp suggests that intelligence on the ground has improved over the year. Tracking down the militants, however, is another matter. They are proving to be as elusive and slippery as ever, thanks in part to the strong support they enjoy among local residents.

Some officials also suggested that the spike in violence was a means for insurgents to commemorate fallen comrades, namely the 16 militants who walked into a hail of gunfire at a marine base camp in Narathiwat's Bacho district on February 13 three years ago.

That operation was led by well-known militant Mahroso Jantarawadee, who according to separatist sources ignored warnings from his superiors about the danger of attacking a base where reinforcements were close by.

Last Friday night, four blasts shook Narathiwat's Bacho district, while a petrol station in Pattani's Nong Chik district was set on fire. The same evening saw a group of assailants in Pattani's Muang district spray bullets at a police-military checkpoint in Tambon Lulor.

Earlier that day, two soldiers were killed and five injured when a roadside bomb exploded in Yala's Krong Pinang district. It was aimed at a seven-strong foot patrol passing through the hilly Ban Sa-ae village. A 100-metre-long detonating wire was found bundled up under a nearby tree.

More deadly violence followed on the same morning when a resident of Tambon Tam Masu in Pattani's Yaring district was found shot in the head on a well-travelled road. Locals said he had a good working relationship with security officials in the area.

Elsewhere, an arson attack was carried out at the Ban Khai School in Pattani's Nong Chik district at about 4am on Friday morning. It was the first incident of what was to become a very long day for local authorities.

Perhaps the most disturbing attack over the weekend was the point-blank shooting death of a cargo truck driver, whose two colleagues were spared. Initial reports said the victim was singled out because he was not able to speak Malay.

A Barisan Revolusi National source insisted that the movement had no policy of singling out innocent people but admitted that "collateral damage" was still a problem. The murder of the truck driver in Narathiwat's Rangae was perhaps a one-off incident in which emotion got the better of the assailant.

Cargo trucks are part of the economic lifeline on which the local residents, regardless of race and religion, depend for their livelihood. Hence, said the BRN source, it is a policy that this lifeline goes untouched.

The same policy applies to businesses such as rubber factories and auto showrooms, though these have been caught in the crossfire as part of retaliatory actions against Thai security officials accused by the militants of grossly abusing their power.

Separatist sources say militants have been told to scale back their campaign of violence over the last 12 months unless the situation calls for retaliation - which the militants are encouraged to do on a massive scale.

Militant attacks should be carried out on "legitimate targets" (security officials) with consideration given to "collateral damage" (to civilians). The aim should be to demoralise government troops, as well as discredit the security apparatus and associated measures such as the Thung Yang Daeng Model - an attempt to outsource security to local village officials.

The raid at the mangrove camp on Wednesday last week was in line with these unofficial rules of engagement and did not merit retaliation. Neither did the third anniversary of Mahroso's death, the BRN sources said.

What set off the spate of violence at the weekend was the February 6 shooting death of a community leader in Tambon Yupo in Yala's Muang district. One local resident said authorities had accused the victim of turning a blind eye to insurgent activity in his area, particularly the December 13 killing of a Paramilitary Ranger who was described by government and separatist sources as a "high value" target because of his local intelligence work.

The Ranger was on leave visiting the grave of his recently deceased mother when he was killed by a bomb buried at the site. His father was injured by the blast.

BRN sources suspected that the community leader from Tambon Yupo accused of turning a blind eye to the attackers had been killed by a pro-government death squad.

Despite the upsurge of violence, the Thai government is determined to show that it is making progress on its "Track I" peace negotiations with a group of six longstanding separatist organisations who call themselves MARA Patani.

Bangkok is set to push for the implementation of a "safety zone" - a fancy term for "ceasefire".

The designated Malaysian facilitator of the peace talks, Dato Ahmad Zamzamin Hashim, and MARA Patani representative Awang Jabat, have been invited to speak at a conference in Pattani later this month. Sources in the Thai government said the idea is to assure members of MARA Patani that they have immunity from prosecution or other government action.

But such display of half-baked openness may not be enough, as men like Awang Jabat have no legal charges pending against them.

The umbrella organisation is likely to make immunity one of its demands before the dialogue process becomes official negotiation between the two sides.

The real challenge at this informal stage of negotiations is to demonstrate that MARA Patani has influence over the insurgents who are actually doing the fighting.

The BRN, the group that controls the vast majority of militants, has repeatedly declined to take part in the current peace initiative.

The spike in violence over this past week is a reminder that nothing comes easy for this historically contested region, where militants, security officials and other stakeholders play for keeps.

Don Pathan is an independent consultant based in southern Thailand. He is also a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).

Southern insurgency: Islamic schools next in firing line?

Bangkok ruling over renowned ponok in Pattani could be a bleak precedent for the peace process

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
Pattani

Two weeks ago a Bangkok court ruled that the 14-rai grounds of Jihad Withya School at Tha Dan village be confiscated as state property - an order that dismayed local Muslims in Pattani.

The school is a renowned ponok (or pondok in standard Malay), a traditional boarding school where just about every local Muslim boy is sent to learn about Islam and what it means to be Malay. Each ponok is run by a headmaster, known as a tok guru, who is held in high esteem by his community.

Jihad Withaya School. Court ruled a state property.

Historians say this longstanding institution helped forge Patani as the cradle of Islamic civilisation in Southeast Asia.

Even today, the mystique of the ponoks and the Islamic education they provide continues to attract students from across of Southeast Asia. Jihad Withya was one of several hundred traditional boarding schools that dot this historically contested region.

Citing the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the court ruled that the state had the right to seize Jihad Withya's land since, according to two testimonies, it was being used to support insurgency activities.

The state's definition of "support for insurgency activities" is ambiguous since almost every form of social gathering or forum in this region appears to feature talk of independence.

Local tok gurus have tried in vain to convince state security agencies that the ponoks do not teach separatism. That topic is woven into public discourse in the far South, which makes it unfair to single out any one single institution.

In one case, for example, 19 suspected insurgents who were executed extrajudicially at a restaurant in Saba Yoi, Songkhla, during an uprising on April 28, 2004, were members of a local football team. And they all came from different schools.

If a football team can provide the forum for separatist militants to come together, then just about any social gathering can do the same, provided that its members share the same cultural and historical narrative of Patani as a homeland occupied illegitimately by the Thai state.

A petition from the state prosecutor on behalf of the Anti-Money Laundering Office claimed two insurgents had confessed to being trained at the school by, among others, the then-tok guru Abdulloh Waemanor.

Abdulloh, also known as Poksu Loh, fled Southern Thailand 10 years ago to escape arrest. His whereabouts are unknown, but Thai security officials believe he is in Malaysia.

Poksu Loh is reckoned to be one of the key leaders in the secretive ruling council of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), which controls the vast majority of insurgents in the South.

Jihad Withya was ordered closed in May 2005. For the past 10 years, authorities have kept a close watch on the school, questioning those going in and out.

The close monitoring reflects their conviction that Poksu Loh has great influence over the course of the conflict in this historically contested region, where more than 6,000 people have died in insurgency-related violence since January 2004.

The timing of the decision to seize the school also raises many questions. Why did the state wait so long when it could have moved 10 years ago, separatist sources have asked.

Thai military and security officials confirmed they had reached out to Poksu Loh for his support in the ongoing Malaysia-facilitated peace talks, but to no avail.

Launched by the government of Yingluck Shinawatra on February 28, 2013 and reluctantly taken up by the current military-backed administration, the peace process has brought negotiators from Bangkok face to face with leaders of six longstanding separatist movements under the umbrella organisation known as MARA Patani.

Bangkok has claimed that BRN members are at the table, but it has become clear that these self-proclaimed BRN cadres in MARA Patani have no command and control over the militants.

The Yingluck government dumped international mediators who worked on "pre-talks" initiatives between 2005 and 2011, handing the role of facilitator to Kuala Lumpur.

Officially, the Thai government and MARA Patani are still in the unofficial pre-talks phase, though negotiators on both sides have been paraded before the media for public consumption.

MARA Patani has insisted that Bangkok make the talks a national agenda item, which would entail parliamentary endorsement.

It has also demanded that the Thai government grant MARA Patani legitimacy as a group negotiating on behalf of the people of the Malays' historical homeland. With that demand comes an

insistence that its negotiators be granted immunity from prosecution.

Yet Bangkok is not in the mood to grant MARA Patani much in the way of legitimacy. For the junta, said one top security adviser, the willingness to talk to separatists it regards as "criminals" represents all the legitimacy they are likely to get.

In fact, Bangkok even refuses to use the name MARA Patani, fearing it would entail acknowledgement of the Malays' historical homeland. Instead it refers to the separatist umbrella organisation by the neutral moniker "Party B".

Other security officials say Bangkok's half-hearted attitude towards MARA Patani stems from the fact that it is not convinced the umbrella organisation has genuine influence over the militants.

And so, Thai authorities continue to reach out behind the scenes to exiled leaders like Sapae-ing Basor, the former principle of Thamvithya Mulnithi School in Yala, who is regarded as one of the region's top spiritual leaders, with influence over the militants.

But the seizing of Jihad Withya has brought an end to the quiet charm offensive, at least with Abdulloh Waemanor.

BRN militants along with observers of the conflict have said that, while these men are important in their own right, the conflict is about much more than them. It concerns the historical mistrust and an absence of justice in dealings between the state and the Malays of Patani. These are beyond the control of any one spiritual or insurgent leader, they said.

Local activists said the seizing of the ponok has worked in the separatists' favour as it drives an even bigger wedge between the government and the Pattani residents it has been trying to win over.

Others are concerned that the ruling could set an unwanted precedent for the confiscation of other ponoks and local institutions, grounded in allegations of insurgency activity.

Don Pathan is a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a Thailand-based freelance security and development consultant.

Bomb exposes fatal flaw in far South security plan

Transfer of defence responsibilities is pushing local residents further into the line of fire

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
Ban Khok Khilek, Pattani

Security forces inspect the scene of a bomb attack on a village defence post that killed four volunteers in Ban Khok Khilek, Pattani province, on November 12.

The stacks of tyres and cement barricade at this temporary outpost were meant to protect the half-dozen village defence volunteers, known locally as Chor Ror Bor, from attacks by intruders.

But when a powerful home-made bomb exploded from within, killing four of the volunteers, injuring five others and ripping apart the makeshift structure, the impact was felt through the entire region.

For outsider observers, the details are all-too familiar: Malay Muslim insurgents killed Buddhist militiamen with an explosive hidden inside their makeshift outpost.

But for officials and observers on the front line of this conflict, the November 12 incident was far from a routine attack by insurgents bent on carving out a separate homeland for the Malay Muslims.

It was directed at a group of village defence volunteers who are normally left alone because they pose little or no threat to the insurgents.

Chor Ror Bor receive shotguns and weapons training at the order of the Interior Ministry. Members don't patrol beyond their village limits and only join up in the evening for guard duty. Each unit receives a small budget, enough to buy a monthly supply of coffee and other drinks to make the nights a little more bearable.

So when they were targeted in November 12's deadly attack, eyebrows were raised.

Hovering over these village defence volunteer outposts is the controversial Village Protection Force, also known as the Or Ror Bor, a network of exclusively Buddhist militiamen that stretches across the Malay-speaking region of the three southernmost provinces and four districts in Songkhla province.

While the Chor Ror Bor is a village-based outfit, the Or Ror Bor has a much higher degree of mobility and commands a bird's-eye view of the situation in this historically contested region.

But Cha-ont Bualern 52, a local Or Ror Bor militiaman, was speechless, unable to make sense of the attack on the Chor Ror Bor outpost at Ban Khok Khilek.

"What happened here was unprecedented," Cha-ont said, as fellow Buddhist villagers stood silently observing what was left of the security outpost.

Unlike the Chor Ror Bor, members of the region-wide Or Ror Bor have been declared targets by insurgents.

Thai military officials have quietly expressed concern over the kind of flexibility that the Or Ror Bor enjoy, and the group's tendency to take matters into their own hands.

Local observers - both Muslim and Buddhist - have been cautious about drawing conclusions from the November 12 attack, though there's general agreement it was meant as a "strong message" from insurgents that local militia would pay a price for going beyond their traditional, non-threatening role.

In other words, it was a direct attack on the Army's so-called Thung Yang Daeng Model, a half-baked strategy to outsource security responsibilities to local villagers via the Chor Ror Bor, village chiefs and Defence Volunteers, all of whom fall under the Interior Ministry's line of command.

Authorities believe insurgents had planted the bomb while the outpost was deserted. Nevertheless, it was a daring raid considering the prominence and visibility of the fortification.

The community in and around Ban Khok Khilek is a mix of Muslims and Buddhists, with the latter in the slight majority. The outpost was manned in the evening by a group of local Buddhist volunteers. A separate, all-Muslim Chor Ror Bor unit is based just a kilometre away.

The two groups continue to mingle with one another, but local Muslims say the November 12 incident has driven a psychological wedge between the two sides because the attack had singled out one ethnic group.

The bombing wasn't the first time the Tung Yang Daeng Model has come under the spotlight. Shortly after midnight on July 31, a group of about 20 insurgents armed with machine guns opened fire on a Defence Volunteers' camp in Yala's Yaha district, injuring 18 men, all of whom were local Malay Muslims.

Local observers and sources in the separatist movement said the insurgents had shown restraint in the Yaha attack, with the militants deliberately stopping short of killing the Defence Volunteers because they merely wanted to send the Thai government, as well as local residents, a stern warning of what they could do to counter the Thung Yang Daeng initiative.

Sources in the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the longstanding separatist movement that controls the vast majority of insurgent militia, say the routine work of locally elected officials and village defence volunteers had never posed a threat to insurgency activities.

But any government move to arm them and push them into the front line would make them targets, BRN sources say.

One component of the strategy governing the Thung Yang Daeng Model is to slowly phase out regular Army patrols and replace them with Paramilitary Rangers, preferably hired locally so they know the terrain.

One village chief in Narathiwat reports that two young Malay Muslim men from his community have joined the Paramilitary Rangers. Their local knowledge is helping reconnaissance patrols search for insurgents' training sites and makeshift camps.

But the task is not easy: the insurgents are mobile and have sympathetic local villagers to serve as their eyes and ears.

The two Rangers are making decent money - about Bt15,000 a month - but they are afraid to visit their parents because they know the insurgents now consider them fair game. Meanwhile relations between the Rangers' parents and their community have become somewhat awkward, said the chief. "They walk past one another but won't say anything or look at each other's faces," he said.

Nevertheless, Malay Muslim villagers in the far South think the Thung Yang Daeng Model will backfire because they doubt that many in this region are willing to put their lives on the line for the state.

The fact that most local residents share the insurgents' mistrust of the state does not help the situation.

Security officials are aware of this sentiment, said the village chief.

"They [the military] are taking it slow. They are asking us to go on joint patrols with them but they are only asking us to man certain positions at certain times," he said.

Local Army officials say they are fully aware that public mistrust of the state and its security officials poses a tremendous challenge for the Thung Yang Daeng Model.

But that's life in the far South, say locals and government officials, where the reality on the ground continues to be a world apart from policy coming out of Bangkok.

Don Pathan is an independent security consultant based in Yala, and a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com)

EDITORIAL: An inconvenient truth in the deep South opinion

The Thai state's propaganda machine cannot win the battle for hearts and minds

The Nation

Citizens and activists who take a more critical view of the government’s policy and actions in the Malay-speaking South have not only been subjected to harassment by the authorities but also nasty propaganda often referred to as “IO”, or information operations.

The idea of IO is to discredit those perceived by the authorities to be obstructing the effort to win hearts and minds among the local residents, about 90 percent of whom are Muslims of Malay ethnicity.
The authorities believe that if they can win over the locals, they can quell the armed separatist movements by denying them support and legitimacy.
One group now bearing the brunt of the government’s IO machine is the Federation of Patanian Students and Youth, or PerMAS, a network of university and high-school students.
Though the group’s stronghold in the deep South, PerMAS membership stretches throughout Thailand and even into neighbouring countries.
Because of their outspoken stance against the culture of impunity among government security officials, PerMAS has been consistently accused of collaborating with separatist organisations, particularly the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), believed by Thai officials to control vast majority of the insurgents on the ground. Thailand’s IO paints PerMAS as the “political wing” of the BRN, a label that members strongly reject.
Though 11 years have passed since the current wave of insurgency first emerged, regular and cordial dialogue between Thai security officials and PerMAS has not resolved the differences.
Undermining the efforts is the government’s semi-secret IO machine, which continues to churn out propaganda attacking and harassing these activists.
Whether a deliberate strategy or not, this double-faced approach only makes the authorities look bad. If anything, it illustrates a lack of unity of purpose and strategy on the government side.
Intelligence and security officials need to ask themselves whether such propaganda tactics against groups like PerMAS are even necessary. And if they continue to insist that IO is a legitimate approach, they should be more truthful about the information they dish out.
Rallies organised by PerMAS and associated groups like Lempar, Nusantara, Perwani and Wartani draw upwards of 10,000 people. The criticism voiced at such large public events is no doubt uncomfortable for the authorities.
But attacking these groups with distorted information won’t help the situation. For many locals, it only enforces a longstanding lack of trust in state officials.
Positive change won’t be achieved by the state reaching out to them with an olive branch in one hand while holding a whip in the other.
There are far more productive ways to engage these activists.
First, actions speak louder than words. Acting to end the culture of impunity among security forces by clamping down on dubious tactics such as torture and extrajudicial killing would be a crucial step in the right direction. The best way to show local residents that the state cares deeply about their concerns would be to take up their grievances and look into them with an open mind.
The authorities must ask themselves why local residents have diverted their hope and trust towards these youth activists. Is it perhaps that they have good reason to believe no one else will stand up for their rights?
Like it or not, an “us versus them” mentality still prevails in the deep South, where the “Siamese” are more often than not seen as outsiders.
The authorities need to grasp this inconvenient truth. It may not fit neatly into their official explanation of the situation, but if we are to get to the bottom of this longstanding and deadly conflict, we must stop fooling ourselves with our own propaganda.

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/An-inconvenient-truth-in-the-deep-South-30271893.html

BRN call for foreign observers at peace talks a key test for Bangkok

Insurgent group says it is willing to negotiate if Thailand follows international norms

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

For an organisation whose leadership is very secretive, Barisan Revolusi Nasional is drifting into uncharted territory as its "Information Department" reaches out to foreign media to make their case about Thailand's questionable effort to secure peace in its southernmost provinces.

Bomb squad inspecting scene in Narathiwat earlier this month following attack.

Reaching out to foreign media may have come out of a desire to remind the world that BRN's leadership has yet to endorse Thailand's current peace initiative.

Nevertheless, it was a step in a more conventional direction - one that could force the Thai government to rethink its own information strategy, according to a Thai government official working on the conflict in the southernmost provinces.

What was interesting, noted the Thai official and Artef Sohko, a youth activist and member of a political action group, the Academy of Patani Raya for Peace and Development (Lempar), was that the BRN Information Department had reached out to Anthony Davis, a veteran writer who has for decades written on security issues and conflicts around Asia for Jane's Defence Weekly and other major publications.

For years, much of the information about the conflict in Thailand's southernmost provinces had been provided by the state, making any reporting lopsided.

But the Thai government will no longer enjoy a monopoly on the flow of information should groups like the BRN, which controls a vast majority of the insurgents on the ground, begin to seriously exercise their communication strategy.

A BRN source said the leadership in the movement, namely the Dewan Pimpinan Party, or DPP, agreed to the interview because they wanted to set the record straight regarding the peace initiative of Thailand, the Malaysian government and MARA Patani, the recently established umbrella organisation.

Whether this was a one-time thing remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it was enough to get Thais to seriously think about what the future holds in the realm of communication strategy.

Besides the recent interview with Davis, BRN's leadership also issued a four-page statement slamming Thailand for deceiving the world with the initiative but not being willing to make any meaningful concession.

BRN said they are willing to negotiate for peace but the process must be carried out along international norms and the talks must be witnessed by foreign states.

As expected, Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwan rejected the demand that foreign governments observe the peace talks.

Bangkok has never liked the idea of foreign mediation for fear of "internationalising" the conflict, which they feel would give too much legitimacy to the separatists.

BRN sources said the DPP would only endorse the peace talks if their negotiators are properly prepared and their political wings receive the needed immunity.

Earlier last month, just 10 days after the August 27 launch of MARA Patani in Kuala Lumpur, the DPP reminded the world about their feeling about the Thai state through a statement read out by Abdulkarim Khalid, a member of the movement's youth wing who's also part of the BRN Information Department.

In the video statement, he criticised the Thai state for being insincere and lacking legitimacy in Malays' historical homeland, which is today's southern border provinces.

It was hard to dismiss Abdulkarim's statement as irrelevant because he was not an unknown entity. The man was at the negotiating table at the previous round of talks launched by the Yingluck government in February 2013.

Abdulkarim was sent to the talks by the DPP under a very strict mandate. He could not negotiate - as the BRN's DPP did not officially endorse the Yingluck initiative - but would observe and report back to the top leaders.

That initiative ended in late 2013 when the designated "BRN liaison", Hasan Taib, threw in the towel and went incommunicado. Street protests in Bangkok also sent the Yingluck government into survival mode until her administration was ousted in May of last year by a military coup.

Seven months after the putsch, the junta decided to pick up where the Yingluck team had left off, but with conditions. Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha demanded that the separatist leaders develop a common platform and implement "a period of peace".

Thai officials said "the period of peace", or ceasefire, was to demonstrate that MARA Patani members had adequate command-and-control over the militants on the ground.

Bangkok did not get their "period of peace" but the separatists did form the MARA Patani, a platform for their common strategy and for dealing with the Thais collectively.

Prayut rejected the idea of granting MARA Patani formal recognition and legal immunity but said talks could continue - in an unofficial capacity.

MARA Patani was a sideshow, or Track 1.5, to the Yingluck official Track 1 initiative that has Malaysia as designated facilitator.

Today, with Hasan and Abdulkarim abandoning the initiative, the sideshow was elevated to a formal Track 1. But being on Track 1 does not guarantee MARA Patani members formal or meaningful recognition as Bangkok does not want to give away too much too soon to the Patani Malay groups.

But if MARA Patani could secure a buy-in from the DPP, Bangkok just might take them more seriously and grant them the recognition they want, security officials said.

For the time being, MARA Patani, Thailand's dialogue panel (negotiators) and the Malaysian facilitators are pinning their hopes on a small group of young BRN members who broke ranks and joined the peace talks.

Two of these individuals - Sukree Hari and Ahmad Chuwo - were paraded to the press in Kuala Lumpur with other MARA Patani representatives. They still called themselves "BRN" but combatants on the ground said, "Who cares?" What matters, in today's context, is who has command-and-control on the ground.

The Thai negotiators, MARA Patani and Kuala Lumpur were hoping that these former teachers from Thamvithya Mulnithi School in Yala could bridge the gap between them and the BRN ruling council.

But the recently released four-page statement, along with Abdulkarim's statement on YouTube, not to mention the interview with Davis, was BRN's way of telling all stakeholders that there is no shortcut to peace.

Thai officials have quietly acknowledged that parading the pair to the media in late August along with the MARA Patani may have been a premature move.

Perhaps all sides should have waited until they are certain that these former teachers have secured the needed endorsement from the BRN's ruling council, he said.

Don Pathan is an independent security consultant and a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com)