Southern insurgency: Islamic schools next in firing line?

Bangkok ruling over renowned ponok in Pattani could be a bleak precedent for the peace process

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
Pattani

Two weeks ago a Bangkok court ruled that the 14-rai grounds of Jihad Withya School at Tha Dan village be confiscated as state property - an order that dismayed local Muslims in Pattani.

The school is a renowned ponok (or pondok in standard Malay), a traditional boarding school where just about every local Muslim boy is sent to learn about Islam and what it means to be Malay. Each ponok is run by a headmaster, known as a tok guru, who is held in high esteem by his community.

Jihad Withaya School. Court ruled a state property.

Historians say this longstanding institution helped forge Patani as the cradle of Islamic civilisation in Southeast Asia.

Even today, the mystique of the ponoks and the Islamic education they provide continues to attract students from across of Southeast Asia. Jihad Withya was one of several hundred traditional boarding schools that dot this historically contested region.

Citing the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the court ruled that the state had the right to seize Jihad Withya's land since, according to two testimonies, it was being used to support insurgency activities.

The state's definition of "support for insurgency activities" is ambiguous since almost every form of social gathering or forum in this region appears to feature talk of independence.

Local tok gurus have tried in vain to convince state security agencies that the ponoks do not teach separatism. That topic is woven into public discourse in the far South, which makes it unfair to single out any one single institution.

In one case, for example, 19 suspected insurgents who were executed extrajudicially at a restaurant in Saba Yoi, Songkhla, during an uprising on April 28, 2004, were members of a local football team. And they all came from different schools.

If a football team can provide the forum for separatist militants to come together, then just about any social gathering can do the same, provided that its members share the same cultural and historical narrative of Patani as a homeland occupied illegitimately by the Thai state.

A petition from the state prosecutor on behalf of the Anti-Money Laundering Office claimed two insurgents had confessed to being trained at the school by, among others, the then-tok guru Abdulloh Waemanor.

Abdulloh, also known as Poksu Loh, fled Southern Thailand 10 years ago to escape arrest. His whereabouts are unknown, but Thai security officials believe he is in Malaysia.

Poksu Loh is reckoned to be one of the key leaders in the secretive ruling council of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), which controls the vast majority of insurgents in the South.

Jihad Withya was ordered closed in May 2005. For the past 10 years, authorities have kept a close watch on the school, questioning those going in and out.

The close monitoring reflects their conviction that Poksu Loh has great influence over the course of the conflict in this historically contested region, where more than 6,000 people have died in insurgency-related violence since January 2004.

The timing of the decision to seize the school also raises many questions. Why did the state wait so long when it could have moved 10 years ago, separatist sources have asked.

Thai military and security officials confirmed they had reached out to Poksu Loh for his support in the ongoing Malaysia-facilitated peace talks, but to no avail.

Launched by the government of Yingluck Shinawatra on February 28, 2013 and reluctantly taken up by the current military-backed administration, the peace process has brought negotiators from Bangkok face to face with leaders of six longstanding separatist movements under the umbrella organisation known as MARA Patani.

Bangkok has claimed that BRN members are at the table, but it has become clear that these self-proclaimed BRN cadres in MARA Patani have no command and control over the militants.

The Yingluck government dumped international mediators who worked on "pre-talks" initiatives between 2005 and 2011, handing the role of facilitator to Kuala Lumpur.

Officially, the Thai government and MARA Patani are still in the unofficial pre-talks phase, though negotiators on both sides have been paraded before the media for public consumption.

MARA Patani has insisted that Bangkok make the talks a national agenda item, which would entail parliamentary endorsement.

It has also demanded that the Thai government grant MARA Patani legitimacy as a group negotiating on behalf of the people of the Malays' historical homeland. With that demand comes an

insistence that its negotiators be granted immunity from prosecution.

Yet Bangkok is not in the mood to grant MARA Patani much in the way of legitimacy. For the junta, said one top security adviser, the willingness to talk to separatists it regards as "criminals" represents all the legitimacy they are likely to get.

In fact, Bangkok even refuses to use the name MARA Patani, fearing it would entail acknowledgement of the Malays' historical homeland. Instead it refers to the separatist umbrella organisation by the neutral moniker "Party B".

Other security officials say Bangkok's half-hearted attitude towards MARA Patani stems from the fact that it is not convinced the umbrella organisation has genuine influence over the militants.

And so, Thai authorities continue to reach out behind the scenes to exiled leaders like Sapae-ing Basor, the former principle of Thamvithya Mulnithi School in Yala, who is regarded as one of the region's top spiritual leaders, with influence over the militants.

But the seizing of Jihad Withya has brought an end to the quiet charm offensive, at least with Abdulloh Waemanor.

BRN militants along with observers of the conflict have said that, while these men are important in their own right, the conflict is about much more than them. It concerns the historical mistrust and an absence of justice in dealings between the state and the Malays of Patani. These are beyond the control of any one spiritual or insurgent leader, they said.

Local activists said the seizing of the ponok has worked in the separatists' favour as it drives an even bigger wedge between the government and the Pattani residents it has been trying to win over.

Others are concerned that the ruling could set an unwanted precedent for the confiscation of other ponoks and local institutions, grounded in allegations of insurgency activity.

Don Pathan is a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a Thailand-based freelance security and development consultant.

Bomb exposes fatal flaw in far South security plan

Transfer of defence responsibilities is pushing local residents further into the line of fire

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation
Ban Khok Khilek, Pattani

Security forces inspect the scene of a bomb attack on a village defence post that killed four volunteers in Ban Khok Khilek, Pattani province, on November 12.

The stacks of tyres and cement barricade at this temporary outpost were meant to protect the half-dozen village defence volunteers, known locally as Chor Ror Bor, from attacks by intruders.

But when a powerful home-made bomb exploded from within, killing four of the volunteers, injuring five others and ripping apart the makeshift structure, the impact was felt through the entire region.

For outsider observers, the details are all-too familiar: Malay Muslim insurgents killed Buddhist militiamen with an explosive hidden inside their makeshift outpost.

But for officials and observers on the front line of this conflict, the November 12 incident was far from a routine attack by insurgents bent on carving out a separate homeland for the Malay Muslims.

It was directed at a group of village defence volunteers who are normally left alone because they pose little or no threat to the insurgents.

Chor Ror Bor receive shotguns and weapons training at the order of the Interior Ministry. Members don't patrol beyond their village limits and only join up in the evening for guard duty. Each unit receives a small budget, enough to buy a monthly supply of coffee and other drinks to make the nights a little more bearable.

So when they were targeted in November 12's deadly attack, eyebrows were raised.

Hovering over these village defence volunteer outposts is the controversial Village Protection Force, also known as the Or Ror Bor, a network of exclusively Buddhist militiamen that stretches across the Malay-speaking region of the three southernmost provinces and four districts in Songkhla province.

While the Chor Ror Bor is a village-based outfit, the Or Ror Bor has a much higher degree of mobility and commands a bird's-eye view of the situation in this historically contested region.

But Cha-ont Bualern 52, a local Or Ror Bor militiaman, was speechless, unable to make sense of the attack on the Chor Ror Bor outpost at Ban Khok Khilek.

"What happened here was unprecedented," Cha-ont said, as fellow Buddhist villagers stood silently observing what was left of the security outpost.

Unlike the Chor Ror Bor, members of the region-wide Or Ror Bor have been declared targets by insurgents.

Thai military officials have quietly expressed concern over the kind of flexibility that the Or Ror Bor enjoy, and the group's tendency to take matters into their own hands.

Local observers - both Muslim and Buddhist - have been cautious about drawing conclusions from the November 12 attack, though there's general agreement it was meant as a "strong message" from insurgents that local militia would pay a price for going beyond their traditional, non-threatening role.

In other words, it was a direct attack on the Army's so-called Thung Yang Daeng Model, a half-baked strategy to outsource security responsibilities to local villagers via the Chor Ror Bor, village chiefs and Defence Volunteers, all of whom fall under the Interior Ministry's line of command.

Authorities believe insurgents had planted the bomb while the outpost was deserted. Nevertheless, it was a daring raid considering the prominence and visibility of the fortification.

The community in and around Ban Khok Khilek is a mix of Muslims and Buddhists, with the latter in the slight majority. The outpost was manned in the evening by a group of local Buddhist volunteers. A separate, all-Muslim Chor Ror Bor unit is based just a kilometre away.

The two groups continue to mingle with one another, but local Muslims say the November 12 incident has driven a psychological wedge between the two sides because the attack had singled out one ethnic group.

The bombing wasn't the first time the Tung Yang Daeng Model has come under the spotlight. Shortly after midnight on July 31, a group of about 20 insurgents armed with machine guns opened fire on a Defence Volunteers' camp in Yala's Yaha district, injuring 18 men, all of whom were local Malay Muslims.

Local observers and sources in the separatist movement said the insurgents had shown restraint in the Yaha attack, with the militants deliberately stopping short of killing the Defence Volunteers because they merely wanted to send the Thai government, as well as local residents, a stern warning of what they could do to counter the Thung Yang Daeng initiative.

Sources in the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the longstanding separatist movement that controls the vast majority of insurgent militia, say the routine work of locally elected officials and village defence volunteers had never posed a threat to insurgency activities.

But any government move to arm them and push them into the front line would make them targets, BRN sources say.

One component of the strategy governing the Thung Yang Daeng Model is to slowly phase out regular Army patrols and replace them with Paramilitary Rangers, preferably hired locally so they know the terrain.

One village chief in Narathiwat reports that two young Malay Muslim men from his community have joined the Paramilitary Rangers. Their local knowledge is helping reconnaissance patrols search for insurgents' training sites and makeshift camps.

But the task is not easy: the insurgents are mobile and have sympathetic local villagers to serve as their eyes and ears.

The two Rangers are making decent money - about Bt15,000 a month - but they are afraid to visit their parents because they know the insurgents now consider them fair game. Meanwhile relations between the Rangers' parents and their community have become somewhat awkward, said the chief. "They walk past one another but won't say anything or look at each other's faces," he said.

Nevertheless, Malay Muslim villagers in the far South think the Thung Yang Daeng Model will backfire because they doubt that many in this region are willing to put their lives on the line for the state.

The fact that most local residents share the insurgents' mistrust of the state does not help the situation.

Security officials are aware of this sentiment, said the village chief.

"They [the military] are taking it slow. They are asking us to go on joint patrols with them but they are only asking us to man certain positions at certain times," he said.

Local Army officials say they are fully aware that public mistrust of the state and its security officials poses a tremendous challenge for the Thung Yang Daeng Model.

But that's life in the far South, say locals and government officials, where the reality on the ground continues to be a world apart from policy coming out of Bangkok.

Don Pathan is an independent security consultant based in Yala, and a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com)

EDITORIAL: An inconvenient truth in the deep South opinion

The Thai state's propaganda machine cannot win the battle for hearts and minds

The Nation

Citizens and activists who take a more critical view of the government’s policy and actions in the Malay-speaking South have not only been subjected to harassment by the authorities but also nasty propaganda often referred to as “IO”, or information operations.

The idea of IO is to discredit those perceived by the authorities to be obstructing the effort to win hearts and minds among the local residents, about 90 percent of whom are Muslims of Malay ethnicity.
The authorities believe that if they can win over the locals, they can quell the armed separatist movements by denying them support and legitimacy.
One group now bearing the brunt of the government’s IO machine is the Federation of Patanian Students and Youth, or PerMAS, a network of university and high-school students.
Though the group’s stronghold in the deep South, PerMAS membership stretches throughout Thailand and even into neighbouring countries.
Because of their outspoken stance against the culture of impunity among government security officials, PerMAS has been consistently accused of collaborating with separatist organisations, particularly the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), believed by Thai officials to control vast majority of the insurgents on the ground. Thailand’s IO paints PerMAS as the “political wing” of the BRN, a label that members strongly reject.
Though 11 years have passed since the current wave of insurgency first emerged, regular and cordial dialogue between Thai security officials and PerMAS has not resolved the differences.
Undermining the efforts is the government’s semi-secret IO machine, which continues to churn out propaganda attacking and harassing these activists.
Whether a deliberate strategy or not, this double-faced approach only makes the authorities look bad. If anything, it illustrates a lack of unity of purpose and strategy on the government side.
Intelligence and security officials need to ask themselves whether such propaganda tactics against groups like PerMAS are even necessary. And if they continue to insist that IO is a legitimate approach, they should be more truthful about the information they dish out.
Rallies organised by PerMAS and associated groups like Lempar, Nusantara, Perwani and Wartani draw upwards of 10,000 people. The criticism voiced at such large public events is no doubt uncomfortable for the authorities.
But attacking these groups with distorted information won’t help the situation. For many locals, it only enforces a longstanding lack of trust in state officials.
Positive change won’t be achieved by the state reaching out to them with an olive branch in one hand while holding a whip in the other.
There are far more productive ways to engage these activists.
First, actions speak louder than words. Acting to end the culture of impunity among security forces by clamping down on dubious tactics such as torture and extrajudicial killing would be a crucial step in the right direction. The best way to show local residents that the state cares deeply about their concerns would be to take up their grievances and look into them with an open mind.
The authorities must ask themselves why local residents have diverted their hope and trust towards these youth activists. Is it perhaps that they have good reason to believe no one else will stand up for their rights?
Like it or not, an “us versus them” mentality still prevails in the deep South, where the “Siamese” are more often than not seen as outsiders.
The authorities need to grasp this inconvenient truth. It may not fit neatly into their official explanation of the situation, but if we are to get to the bottom of this longstanding and deadly conflict, we must stop fooling ourselves with our own propaganda.

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/An-inconvenient-truth-in-the-deep-South-30271893.html

BRN call for foreign observers at peace talks a key test for Bangkok

Insurgent group says it is willing to negotiate if Thailand follows international norms

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

For an organisation whose leadership is very secretive, Barisan Revolusi Nasional is drifting into uncharted territory as its "Information Department" reaches out to foreign media to make their case about Thailand's questionable effort to secure peace in its southernmost provinces.

Bomb squad inspecting scene in Narathiwat earlier this month following attack.

Reaching out to foreign media may have come out of a desire to remind the world that BRN's leadership has yet to endorse Thailand's current peace initiative.

Nevertheless, it was a step in a more conventional direction - one that could force the Thai government to rethink its own information strategy, according to a Thai government official working on the conflict in the southernmost provinces.

What was interesting, noted the Thai official and Artef Sohko, a youth activist and member of a political action group, the Academy of Patani Raya for Peace and Development (Lempar), was that the BRN Information Department had reached out to Anthony Davis, a veteran writer who has for decades written on security issues and conflicts around Asia for Jane's Defence Weekly and other major publications.

For years, much of the information about the conflict in Thailand's southernmost provinces had been provided by the state, making any reporting lopsided.

But the Thai government will no longer enjoy a monopoly on the flow of information should groups like the BRN, which controls a vast majority of the insurgents on the ground, begin to seriously exercise their communication strategy.

A BRN source said the leadership in the movement, namely the Dewan Pimpinan Party, or DPP, agreed to the interview because they wanted to set the record straight regarding the peace initiative of Thailand, the Malaysian government and MARA Patani, the recently established umbrella organisation.

Whether this was a one-time thing remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it was enough to get Thais to seriously think about what the future holds in the realm of communication strategy.

Besides the recent interview with Davis, BRN's leadership also issued a four-page statement slamming Thailand for deceiving the world with the initiative but not being willing to make any meaningful concession.

BRN said they are willing to negotiate for peace but the process must be carried out along international norms and the talks must be witnessed by foreign states.

As expected, Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwan rejected the demand that foreign governments observe the peace talks.

Bangkok has never liked the idea of foreign mediation for fear of "internationalising" the conflict, which they feel would give too much legitimacy to the separatists.

BRN sources said the DPP would only endorse the peace talks if their negotiators are properly prepared and their political wings receive the needed immunity.

Earlier last month, just 10 days after the August 27 launch of MARA Patani in Kuala Lumpur, the DPP reminded the world about their feeling about the Thai state through a statement read out by Abdulkarim Khalid, a member of the movement's youth wing who's also part of the BRN Information Department.

In the video statement, he criticised the Thai state for being insincere and lacking legitimacy in Malays' historical homeland, which is today's southern border provinces.

It was hard to dismiss Abdulkarim's statement as irrelevant because he was not an unknown entity. The man was at the negotiating table at the previous round of talks launched by the Yingluck government in February 2013.

Abdulkarim was sent to the talks by the DPP under a very strict mandate. He could not negotiate - as the BRN's DPP did not officially endorse the Yingluck initiative - but would observe and report back to the top leaders.

That initiative ended in late 2013 when the designated "BRN liaison", Hasan Taib, threw in the towel and went incommunicado. Street protests in Bangkok also sent the Yingluck government into survival mode until her administration was ousted in May of last year by a military coup.

Seven months after the putsch, the junta decided to pick up where the Yingluck team had left off, but with conditions. Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha demanded that the separatist leaders develop a common platform and implement "a period of peace".

Thai officials said "the period of peace", or ceasefire, was to demonstrate that MARA Patani members had adequate command-and-control over the militants on the ground.

Bangkok did not get their "period of peace" but the separatists did form the MARA Patani, a platform for their common strategy and for dealing with the Thais collectively.

Prayut rejected the idea of granting MARA Patani formal recognition and legal immunity but said talks could continue - in an unofficial capacity.

MARA Patani was a sideshow, or Track 1.5, to the Yingluck official Track 1 initiative that has Malaysia as designated facilitator.

Today, with Hasan and Abdulkarim abandoning the initiative, the sideshow was elevated to a formal Track 1. But being on Track 1 does not guarantee MARA Patani members formal or meaningful recognition as Bangkok does not want to give away too much too soon to the Patani Malay groups.

But if MARA Patani could secure a buy-in from the DPP, Bangkok just might take them more seriously and grant them the recognition they want, security officials said.

For the time being, MARA Patani, Thailand's dialogue panel (negotiators) and the Malaysian facilitators are pinning their hopes on a small group of young BRN members who broke ranks and joined the peace talks.

Two of these individuals - Sukree Hari and Ahmad Chuwo - were paraded to the press in Kuala Lumpur with other MARA Patani representatives. They still called themselves "BRN" but combatants on the ground said, "Who cares?" What matters, in today's context, is who has command-and-control on the ground.

The Thai negotiators, MARA Patani and Kuala Lumpur were hoping that these former teachers from Thamvithya Mulnithi School in Yala could bridge the gap between them and the BRN ruling council.

But the recently released four-page statement, along with Abdulkarim's statement on YouTube, not to mention the interview with Davis, was BRN's way of telling all stakeholders that there is no shortcut to peace.

Thai officials have quietly acknowledged that parading the pair to the media in late August along with the MARA Patani may have been a premature move.

Perhaps all sides should have waited until they are certain that these former teachers have secured the needed endorsement from the BRN's ruling council, he said.

Don Pathan is an independent security consultant and a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com)

Myanmar's mighty narco armies refuse to surrender the fight

The ceasefire deal being signed today with ethnic rebels will not cover the badlands bordering Thailand

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

The nationwide ceasefire agreement set to be signed today by the Myanmar government and eight ethnic armed groups has thrown a spotlight on notorious rebel groups who have refused to make peace.

Thai border security officials who monitor insurgency activity in the Myanmar sector of the Golden Triangle say they are not surprised that the United Wa State Army and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which is still at war with the Myanmar government, are refusing to sign the peace agreement.

Wa soldiers in Panghsang, UWSA's HQ. Photo by: DON PATHAN

With 20,000-strong combat force plus reserves, the UWSA refuses to be placed in the same category as far smaller armed ethnic groups, who are not in a position to dictate terms to the government.

Moreover, reports that China is meddling in the ceasefire talks suggest the giant communist neighbour wants to maintain its dominant longstanding influence over the Wa, said one officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The UWSA inked a ceasefire deal with the Myanmar government in 1989 but it had virtually no impact on the group's relations with China, its main backer.

Armed Wa rebels served as China's entry point into Myanmar during the days of communist insurgency, when they acted as foot soldiers for the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). The CPB fell apart along ethnic lines in 1989.

The Wa State Army came into being in the aftermath of the CPB's disintegration, with a vow to keep on fighting for another 10 years.

Fearing that the UWSA would forge alliances with neighbouring rebel groups such as the Karen National Union, Myanmar's security tsar, Lt-General Khin Nyunt, moved quickly to secure a ceasefire.

In exchange for agreeing to sign, the UWSA was permitted self-rule in the so-called Special Region 2. Other groups operating in areas adjacent to the UWSA stronghold - the Kokang Chinese and the Mong La group - were given similar semi-autonomous status.

While the ceasefire with these groups halted military confrontations, it also allowed the ethnic armies to grow both militarily and economically. The trade of choice for these groups was, of course, opium.

Barely had the ink on the ceasefire deal dried when clandestine factories brewing high-grade heroin began to pop up in remote areas controlled by the narco-armies.

Government efforts at getting the Wa to kick the habit in 2001 didn't do much good, even with Thailand's help.

In a strange twist of diplomacy, the Thaksin Shinawatra administration was working with Rangoon to set up the Yongkha Development Project in UWSA-controlled territory near the Thai border. It was supposed to be a comprehensive crop-substitution project for Wa villagers who had been forcibly relocated from the China-Myanmar border in the late 1990s.

The Thai government injected Bt20 million into the project with the hope that others in the international community would follow. But the world knew that Thai and US authorities had already convicted half a dozen Wa leaders on charges of heroin trafficking, so no funds were forthcoming.

The USWA declaration that it would end opium cultivation in June 2005 didn't fool anybody. The Wa army was already churning out methamphetamine (yaba), which was flooding into Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries.

Bao Yu-xiang (left) , chairman of the UWSA, with Don Pathan
centre) in Panghsang, Wa's capital on the Sino-Burma border, 2003.

Not only had Thaksin failed to whitewash the UWSA through the development project, his efforts had also angered many in the Thai military, whose Third Army Area troops were engaged in frequent skirmishes with Wa drug caravans along the border.

For China, the UWSA presence along the Thai border was an opportunity to extend its long reach even further. But the Thai military and security agencies were not willing to let bygones be bygones and refused to play along.

Reeling from the flood of drugs into the country, Bangkok was further humiliated when top Wa commander Wei Hsueh-kang escaped after being granted bail on drug trafficking charges by a Thai court. So upset was Washington that it decided to raise the bounty for his capture to US$2 million. Nevertheless, Wei continues to control one of the three UWSA regiments near the Thai border.

Though security tsar Khin Nyunt tried hard to build on the ceasefire with the UWSA, the Wa leaders continue to enjoy strong ties with Chinese authorities in Yunnan.

UWSA-owned casinos on the border with Yunnan province are open 24 hours a day, even though gambling is illegal. Cars with Wa licence plates travel deep inside Yunnan freely, while Wa leaders can be seen walking in and out of banks there with wads of dollars.

Nay Pyi Taw officials visiting UWSA-controlled Special Region 2 often quip that the area seems more like an extension of China than a semi-autonomous region of Myanmar. The preferred choice of currency and cellphone or landline operators add to that impression.

Meanwhile, credible reports that China is selling weapons, including helicopters and surface-to-air missiles, to the UWSA are keeping a spotlight on longstanding relations that Chinese officials would prefer not to talk about.

Myanmar is well aware of the strong ties between Chinese authorities and rebel groups like the Kokang, Kachin and the Wa. But they also feel that these relations should not come at the expense of national security.

To show the Chinese that they mean business, Myanmar troops attacked the Kokang in August 2009, forcing thousands of Chinese citizens to flee back over the border.

Ousted Kokang leaders also took refuge in China and used Wa-controlled territory to regroup.

Thai officials believe Myanmar will refrain from using military means to force the Wa to comply and come under the command of the country's army. Indirect pressure, such as the need to integrate economically with the rest of Myanmar, will be the main factor that pushes the UWSA closer to the state, they say.

Meanwhile the so-called nationwide ceasefire agreement will be signed with only about half of the 15 groups the government has been negotiating with over the past couple of years. For President Thein Sein, who wants to cement a legacy as the leader who ended decades of civil war - in which he himself played a battlefield role - this is not the ideal scenario.

Major rebel powers like the Wa and their allies, the Mong La and the Kokang, will have to be engaged with on their on terms, in separate negotiations.

Don Pathan is an independent security analyst and consultant based in Thailand.

Persecuting the peacemakers: A dismal tale from the South

The systematic harassment of men like Artef Sohko has shut down grass-roots activism and blocked the path to lasting peace in this contested region

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

Artef Sohko says he is fed up with being constantly harassed by unnamed government or pro-government entities, but he's not sure what he can do about it.

Since 2007, when he became the first ethnic Malay to be elected president of the Student Federation of Thailand, Artef says Thai security agencies have routinely persecuted him because of his outspoken demands for justice and equality for ethnic Malays in the historically contested deep South.

Artef Sohko (right) speaking at the FCCT. 

The year 2007 saw a peak in violence as allegations of rape and torture were made against security forces in the region. Artef and other student leaders felt they had enough and they decided to seize the Pattani Central Mosque in protest.

"There were allegations that a [Paramilitary] Ranger had raped a woman in front of her mother in [Yala's] Yaha district. We also heard about other rape incidents, but the victims and their families were too ashamed to speak out," Artef said.

Senior military commanders agreed to set up a joint working group to look into the allegations. But like every other ad-hoc committee set up by authorities in this region, it slowly slipped from the agenda and out of the minds of government officials.

Meanwhile relations between ethnic Malays and Thai Buddhist communities in the South took a nosedive as innocent bystanders became the targets - often as part of tit-for-tat vendettas between security forces and insurgents.

International watchdogs such as Amnesty and Human Rights Watch have condemned actions on both sides, but they consistently criticise Thai security forces for a "culture of impunity" and have urged the government to punish wrongdoers. But such requests have fallen on deaf ears and quickly slipped from public consciousness - even in high-profile cases like the beating to death of Imam Yapa Kaseng. A full seven years after the Muslim religious leader's killing, the National Anti-Corruption Commission last week suggested that the accused, Army Sub-Lieutenant Sirikhet Wanitbamrung, face disciplinary and criminal action.

Artef says he has never been tortured, but he describes how a security official once beat a person in front of him as a way of demonstrating his unrestrained power.

"The idea was to demoralise me. He wanted to show what he could do and that there was not a thing that I could do about it," he said.

The persecution also took on a devious, personal angle. An elaborate flowchart was faked-up showing him, his wife and her father linked in a crime syndicate and drug trafficking ring. It was released via the social media, making it difficult to trace without help from the authorities. But given that no Thai government in the last decade has taken legal action against an official in the deep South, Artef said it would be a pipe dream to expect help in this case.

"The attitude of many Thai officials is you are either with us or you are with the insurgents. And if you're with the state, you shouldn't criticise us even when the conduct of an official is wrong or illegal," Artef said.

He is not the only activist to face harassment. Others both in and outside of his network have faced similar trouble, being detained or having their DNA taken on flimsy pretences, or have their residences searched without probable cause or warrant.

Zawawee Zawawee Jujur, a 26-year-old local activist and former member of Media Selantan, a Pattani-based community radio station, says he has been DNA tested three times already. When he refused a fourth test earlier this year, police threatened him at the point of a gun.

The authorities' action is based, Zawawee says, on the assumption that he will eventually commit an illegal act, at which time "they will already be prepared to charge me".

Security officials even visited his village in Narathiwat's Tak Bai district and told the headman there to keep an eye on this "young man who has joined an anti-state organisation".

Artef's outspokenness has won a great deal of support not just from the grass roots in this majority-Malay Muslim region but also from foreign governments, who have often sought his insights into the ongoing conflict and the peace process. He doesn't think very highly of the latter, explaining that the participants lack any real influence over the insurgent combatants.

Thailand's approach to peace has always been very short-sighted, usually seeking quick gains while avoiding asking the central question of how the two sides can coexist peacefully and with mutual respect.

On the public front, Artef is often the key speaker at the Bicara Patani, a political rally that draws crowds of up to 10,000, mostly villagers - which gives an idea of his popularity with local people.

Many of these events are documented by Wartani, a grass-roots media organisation run by local Patani Malay activists closely associated with Artef. Wartani reporters say that they too have been harassed by Thai security officials.

Artef refuses to tar all Thai officials with the same brush, though, explaining that many have a great working relationship with him and the youth network.

Yet many others in authority continue to insist that Artef and his activist colleagues are either part of the separatist movement or inspired by the political wing of its umbrella group, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) - a claim he vociferously denies. But he does admit that Thai authorities, both security and political, have asked him to act as a go-between with the BRN and other separatist leaders.

"It's a fine line to walk and the best way to go about it is to maintain your integrity. I don't take sides or support any particular [separatist] organisations," Artef said.

When asked if his agenda includes independence for the Malay-speaking region, Artef said: "It's not my decision to make. It's up to all the people of this region. But I do want to see peace and justice for all sides."

Artef says that though he is often followed by plainclothes officials, the authorities can never pin anything on him because he hasn't done any wrong. "Nevertheless, it is still irritating," he adds.

In the aftermath of the May 2014 coup, security officials suggested that he leave the country for about three years, which he did. For everybody's sake, he decided to leave his wife and three-year-old son behind and live in India, where he studied English. "The cost of living was affordable," he said.

The low point came late last week when a hooded man in black broke into the home of his mother-in-law in the middle of the night in Narathiwat's Joh I Rong sub-district and took all the printed documents from the bedroom where his wife and his son normally sleep.

"They didn't take any of the valuable stuff. Perhaps it was an indication of things to come," he said.

Don Pathan is a Yala-based freelance security and development consultant and a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).

EDITORIAL: Army needs to act on the fatal beating of Imam Yapa

Our indifference to the plight of the Malays of Patani brings shame on Thai society; we need to face our shared destiny

This past week the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) has recommended that the army and criminal prosecutors take legal action against Sub Lt Sirikhet Wanitbamrung over the alleged killing of a Narathiwat imam seven years ago.

Imam Yapa Kaseng was beaten to death in front of his son while he was being kept at a Narathiwat military detention site in March 2008. He was accused of being part of a local militant separatist cell bent on carving out a separate homeland for the Malay Muslims in the southernmost provinces.

According to the autopsy report, Yapa's ribs were fractured and the broken bones punctured his lungs.

Sub Lt Sirikhet was attached to the 39th Special Taskforce Unit in Rueso district in Narathiwat, an area with a high concentration of militant activity.

Yapa's death drew an outcry from the local and international community, especially human right organisations, who accused the government of turning a blind eye to the culture of impunity in this highly contested region, where more than 6,500 have been killed over 10 to 11 years, most of them Malay Muslims.

Even some foreign embassies in Bangkok inquired into this death and urged the Thai government and the Army to uphold its principles of law and order.

Many feared that the killing of Islamic leaders, be it Imam Yapa or others who have been shot dead by government or pro-government death squads, would radicalise the insurgents, who have over the past 11 years pretty much kept their campaign of violence against the state to the Malay-speaking region.

In response to the growing pressure, the Army has promised a thorough investigation into the case. Some observers said the vow from the top brass at the time was to get foreign governments off their back for the time being.

Seven years later, the NACC has got around to making a recommendation as to what legal action should be taken. The fact it took this long to come to this point reflects poorly on Thailand's justice system, which this and previous governments consistently vowed to improve and made accessible to all parties and stakeholders.

But from the look of how the state treats this and other similar cases, such promises appear to be little more than lip service.

The attitude of Thai state agencies have always been "let bygones be bygones". But can the Malays of Patani, or anybody for that matter, move on as one nation with a shared destiny with the rest of the people in Thailand without first addressing the historical wounds between the two sides?

The suggestion to let bygones be bygones is nothing less than wishful thinking on the country's part and the handling of Imam Yapa's case is a testimony of the lack of commitment on the country's part.

Sad to say, most Thai people could not care less about Imam Yapa's case because of their blind support for the government's action in the deep South. We blindly embrace nationalism to the point that we paint the Malays of Patani as an ungrateful minority who can't appreciate the goodness and generosity of the state.

That racist attitude lies at the base of Thailand’s policy of failed assimilation, which Malays in the deep South say comes at the expense of their cultural, historical and religious identity.

Because they do not want to embrace our state-constructed narrative, we become indifferent to their historic grievances and the obvious injustice and illegal action by our officers, in episodes such as the Tak Bai massacre and the fatal beating of Imam Yapa.

Seriously, did any Thai people weep with the Patani Malays when 78 of their sons suffocated to death on the back of military trucks in late 2004? And let's not forget the seven shot dead at the protest site.

Security officials and state agencies tend to see the years of tit-for-tat killings and murders as acceptable. 'They may be Thai citizens but they are not on "our side" - so what's the big deal?' That appears to be the attitude of our officials and society.

The culture of impunity and the systematic violation of human rights are not acceptable because these things have been done in the name of the state. The fact that we indifferent to this reflects poorly on our society.

We have rules, laws and regulations. And if they are going to be selective about how they are imposed, then the government should withdraw from all the international conventions against illegal killings, kidnapping and torture of suspected criminals and insurgents.

The international community and watchdog organisations have a moral obligation to remind Thailand of its commitment to these conventions and protocol.

In some countries, these obligations are legal, which would mean legal and political action must be considered and/or taken up.