By Supalak Ganjanakhundee, Don Pathan
Armed Forces supreme commander General Chaisit Shinawatra has never been so honest about his shortcomings.
In a recent interview on Radio Thailand, the military chief admitted candidly that one year after Muslim insurgents had decided to take their fight directly to the country’s security forces when they raided an Army battalion in Narathiwat, he still doesn’t know what they want.
Chaisit pointed to the ongoing upsurge of violence that over this past year has expanded from traditional targets – police and military officers – to innocent victims, including students and local villagers. Other “soft targets” – such as noodle shops, school buses and small eateries and street vendors – have also been caught up in the violence.
“I see no reason for them to attack innocent targets, nor do I understand what they hope to gain,” Chaisit said. “I don’t detect an ideology in any of this.”
One reason why Chaisit and government security planners cannot understand their adversaries, say analysts, is that they have failed to acknowledge the magnitude of the resentment of the local Muslim community in the Malay-speaking South towards the state. Likewise, they have failed to recognise the new political context in which the militants are working.
Unlike in previous decades – when separatists were positioned in remote hills and carried out their fight through the actions of conventional warfare – members of the new generation see themselves as holy warriors inspired by religion and fuelled by age-old anger towards the state. Their preferred method seems to be drive-by assassinations of security officials and their informants, though security officers have also blamed them for the recent spate of bomb attacks on restaurants frequented by government officials.
Despite the obvious changes in the style of the militants’ activities, the government has continued to respond in a very conventional manner. In the aftermath of the January raid, for example, the Thai-Malaysian border was sealed off and much of the three southernmost provinces were placed under martial law. About 4,000 troops were mobilised to the restive region with loosely defined rules of engagement permitting them to carry out search-and-destroy operations, and if necessary, shooting to kill. But one year later, these short-term measures have more or less become the norm. While the government boasts about its progress, security officials are still being assassinated on a daily basis, while innocent bystanders are quickly becoming the targets themselves.
Unable to come up with a new way of thinking and not knowing what to make of the bits and pieces of information they have obtained through interrogation and intelligence sources, security planners continue to deal with the violence the only way they know how – with brute force, as seen in the April stand-off at the Kru Se Mosque and the mass deaths during and after the Tak Bai incident last October.
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s all-or-nothing attitude towards the problems in the Muslim South have placed Thailand in a bad light in the eyes of the international community, while locally the Tak Bai tragedy has pushed many resentful locals into the arms of the insurgents, said a former Barisan Revolusi Nasional member.
Internally, rivalries among security agencies have taken their toll on the overall efforts to bring peace and stability to the region. The latest humiliating episode ended in the transfer of assistant police chief Lt-General Wongkot Maneerin because he stated that the current structure had given the military too much power.
But disputes between the military and the police are only the tip of an iceberg, and such quarrels are seen as an integral part of Thailand’s bureaucracy because of its overlapping duties and unclear divisions of labour.
Indeed, just about every security agency and office has established some sort of presence in the Malay-speaking South, but their mandate and operating procedures are still very unclear, resulting in some serious loggerheads between individuals and their respective agencies.
Last year a report from the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) alleging that the police had been carrying out extrajudicial killings of Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani members resulted in a group of police kicking down the door of the NIA office in Narathiwat.
Moreover, reports about the leader of the separatist Bersatu group, Wan Kadir Che Man, wanting to return to Thailand and work with the authorities on reconciliation have split the country’s top brass into two camps.
Aware that the Thais can be unforgiving in the face of any challenge to their notion of Thailand’s sovereignty and national identity, Deputy Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh has started lashing out at those who have supported the idea of Wan Kadir’s return. The issue has become so heavily politicised that it has had to be taken off the state’s agenda indefinitely to avoid further embarrassment.
Another cause of dispute within the intelligence community concerns a well-known Middle Eastern-trained cleric, Ismail Lutphi Japakiya, the rector of the Islamic College of Yala.
Certain sections of the intelligence community have gone out of their way to identify him as the Thai link to certain international terrorist organisations, while a number of Muslims and non-Muslims alike see his orthodox and puritanical outlook on Islam as promoting instability. Chavalit has repeatedly made public references equating Lutphi’s puritanical approach – commonly referred to as Wahabiism – to extremism.
Some feel that putting too much pressure on Lutphi could invite unwanted complaints from the governments of Muslim countries and mullahs in the Middle East, who have been very generous with his education projects in southern Thailand.
Regardless of the attempts by certain parties to single Lutphi out, the country’s political elite still seeks his endorsement for all kind of activities.
The cleric continues to lend his name to various organisations under the title of consultant or adviser to these organisations’ boards. The verdict, it seems, is still out on what kind of man Lutphi should be made out to be, as well as on whether the country’s security agencies will ever be able to sing to the same tune.
DON PATHAN - Thailand-based security analyst/development consultant (Photo: Anjaman Pass, Afghanistan, with two Northern Alliance fighters, October 2001)
Thursday, 27 January 2005
Monday, 22 November 2004
BUDDHISTS SAY ‘WHAT ABOUT US?’
Don Pathan
The Nation
Narathiwat
Published on Nov 22, 2004
Sipping tea and speaking in a low voice at a small coffee shop at the downtown fresh market in this southern capital, Weeraphong accused the government of being too soft on the Muslims in this Malay-majority region and talked about how the authorities needed to teach them a good lesson.
Weeraphong, who asked that his last name not be used, said governments had been too lenient on the Muslims here. The current government’s policy to bring the ethnic Malays on a par with the rest of the country in the areas of education and employment, particularly in the civil service, was an outright discrimination against people like him, a Thai Buddhist, he said.
“It’s never enough for them. You give them one thing but they will always want more,” whispered the primary school teacher.
Less than two blocks down the street from this shop is a Chinese-owned restaurant where the entire front was blown to shreds the night before. The fertiliser bomb sent 16 people to the emergency room and kicked off a growing fear that more attacks on “soft targets” are on the way.
Early the next morning in front of what’s left of this restaurant, as two men put up banners accusing Senator Chirmsak Pinthong and other rights campaigners of being cowards for only speaking up for the Muslims but not the “innocent victims”, a local Thai-Chinese businessman screamed at the top of his lungs when a TV reporter stuck a camera in his face.
“It has been eleven months and what is Thaksin doing?” fumed the beefy Thai-Chinese, who sported a golden amulet on his chest to show that he was a proud Buddhist.
“He [Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra] keeps talking about all kinds of strategies but innocent people continue to die every day. This is the only government I know that gives money to family members of criminals,” he shouted.
Residents of this street of Chinese shophouses clapped, while Muslim onlookers stood expressionless.
The so-called “criminals” the man was talking about were the 85 Muslim demonstrators who died at the Tak Bai protest or were in custody immediately thereafter, an incident that has been described by many as an attempt to teach the Muslims a lesson. Thaksin later announced that the family of each victim would receive Bt700,000.
Autopsies showed that six of them died from gunshot wounds and the rest apparently from suffocation while being transported in military trucks stacked one on top of the other to an Army camp in Pattani. The trip usually takes an hour and a half but, for whatever reason, most of the transport vehicles arrived four hours or more after leaving Tak Bai.
Thaksin said he regretted the loss of life but would not apologise for the deaths. Instead, the premier, who appeared to be more concerned with his political rating than getting to the bottom of the tragic incident, played up his nationalistic card, accusing the demonstrators of being Muslim separatists.
In a speech that was supposed to be a tell-all, it was 10 minutes before the word “regret” came out of Thaksin’s mouth. It was the closest to an apology that anybody was going to get. The rest of his speech was about how he was not going to allow an inch of the country be taken away by any separatist group.
Violence in this Muslim-majority region is nothing new. But unlike in earlier decades when clashes were largely between security forces and armed separatist groups in remote hills of the three southernmost provinces, the violence now appears to have divided the region more than ever.
Locals said that even at the height of the armed separatist movement two decades ago, local Buddhists – most of whom are ethnic Chinese – and Muslims co-existed peacefully.
Back then there was no real resentment and it didn’t really matter that Buddhists were richer or better connected economically and politically, they said.
“We grew up together like brothers and sisters,” said a Narathiwat native who entered the monkhood 10 years ago and currently resides at a temple in Joh I Rong district, one of the most violence-prone spots in the region.
It’s a different story nowadays, however.
The monk blasted Thaksin for not having the political will to bridge the psychological divide between the two communities. “He thinks money can cure everything,” he said.
Hama Mayunu, a leading member of the Narathiwat chapter of the Local Community Development Association, said that as the violence began affecting innocent civilians, voices of reason had also begun to disappear.
He said there was a growing perception that all Muslims were in the same boat and were collaborating to drive out the Buddhists from the Malay-majority region.
“A Chinese opened the biggest shop in my neighbourhood and none of us feel threatened or that he is taking advantage of us,” said Hama, who also operates a community radio service that broadcast in the local Malay dialect.
“If the Muslims wanted to chase the Buddhists out they would have done it a long time ago. In fact, we elected a Thai-Chinese as our mayor,” Hama said.
Since the beginning of the year, Thailand has witnessed an increasing number of civilians being killed, including Buddhist monks, four of whom were hacked to death. The scope of victims has expanded from armed troops to non-security personnel, as well as innocent Buddhist villagers.
Among the Muslims, talk of disappearances and extrajudicial killings echoed in just about every community but few were willing to say anything openly to outsiders for fear that they could be next for speaking out or just making an observation.
Security officers blamed the ongoing spate of violence against the security forces on a new generation of home-grown insurgents who took matters into their own hands, partly in response to abuses by the authorities and partly due to inspiration from abroad, namely the global jihad phenomenon.
“But the killings of innocent civilians, women and children – there is nothing there in Islam to justify it,” said Hama.
For the local Buddhists, there is no distinction between an attack against state officials and an attack against innocent civilians. Many believe the local Muslims are colluding against them.
Sitting under a shed watching Marines making sandbags and nervous-looking young Muslims stroll through the checkpoint, Penporn Suranatakul, the village chief of Ban Thung Kha in Yi-ngo district, accused the Muslims of collaborating with insurgents to drive out the Buddhists to buy cheap land.
“These teenagers drive up in their motorbikes and point out which house they are going to take if and when we move out,” said Penporn, as she tried hard to hold back her tears.
“And now these academics and human rights people in Bangkok are saying the troops have to be punished. What about their wives and children? Who is going to look after them?” asked Penporn, adding that she supported harsh measures regardless of the outcome.
Thaksin said the attacks were tearing the fabric of the country apart and added that the violence against civilians was designed to provoke harsh responses from the security forces.
But judging from the way the authorities dealt with the unarmed protesters at Tak Bai police station, “harsh response” is an understatement.
While the Muslims killed by security forces over the past year, including the protesters who died in the Tak Bai incident, were buried as Muslim martyrs, there is nothing here to suggest that the local Muslims here are supportive of the insurgency.
No one here wants to think their sons had died in vain, regardless of whether they were part of the 106 machete-wielding youths shot dead by security forces on April 28 or among the unarmed demonstrators who died following the Tak Bai protest on October 25.
But on the other hand, government’s harsh measures and questionable tactics appear to be creating more martyrs as both Muslims and officials agree that violence will breed more violence.
“It is believed that for every martyr, a thousand more will replace him,” Hama said.
Meanwhile, Weeraphong said he constantly watched his rear-view mirrors while riding his motorcycle, wondering if he would be the next victim in this spate of violence that has claimed more than 450 lives since the beginning of the year.
“It’s terrible to be living in fear,” Weeraphong said.
But moving out of this region is out of the question, he said – at least for the time being.
Thursday, 9 September 2004
Confessions of an Islamic assassin
Don Pathan
The Nation
Pattani
Sitting on a bed in a hospital where he was recovering from bullet wounds, 31-year-old Islamic teacher Abdullah Akoh spoke passionately about the need to right wrongs.
Facing a possible life sentence for killing an on-duty soldier, Abdullah spoke vividly about the hatred he felt for the state under which he was born.
He said that government officials were responsible for rapes, abductions, assassinations and brutality. He added that in this atmosphere his resentment had grown continuously over the years.
Beyond these wrongs, Abdullah cited several others that he wanted to make right.
But for now despite his grievances Abdullah is traveling around the country at the request of the Army to address fellow Islamic teachers, or uztas, and government officials about the need for the people of the Muslim-majority South and the state to reconcile. His message is that violence should not be the means to achieve this end.
The Army is banking on the notion that men like Abdullah can help with the reconciliation process and heal the historical wounds that so trouble the people of the South.
Sitting on his hospital bed, to which he is normally handcuffed, Abdullah talked about the resentment he felt towards the state, saying that his ill feelings had gotten the better of him.
About five years ago, an ustad by the name of Ismail Rayalong asked him to join a movement whose mission was to one day liberate the Malay-Muslim region from the ìinfidelsî.
Abdullah said that Ismail, also known as Ustad Soh, was charismatic and persuasive.
"We played football together and shared desserts and became friends very quickly," Abdullah said.
"Three weeks later he asked me to join his organisation. I agreed," Abdullah said.
According to Abdullah, Ustad Soh claimed to have supernatural powers. He told Abdullah that after a man had reached a certain state of reverence, he could make himself disappear at will or become impervious to bullets and knives. Abdullah decided to give his new friend the benefit of the doubt and to pursue the courses he was advocating. For more than four years, Ustad Soh moved from village to village, singling out young men of good standing in their communities and, after planting the seeds of trust, recruiting them into an outfit that Abdullah called Talekat Hikmahtullah Abandan (Direction from God Towards Invincibility).
Abdullah said that there were four other men in his cell, all from the same village. The team kept to themselves and were not permitted to know who was in the other cells. During military training, which included low crawls and simulated assaults using branches in place of guns and knives, Ustad Soh would make sure that each participating cell came from villages that were as far apart as possible in order to avoid further contact.
April 28, 2004, was just around the corner. The date was to mark Hikmahtullah's first strike against the state that its members so despised. But for Abdullah, the price of this assault was too high. He said he was not willing to walk into certain death no matter how committed he was to the group cause.
"I asked Ustad Soh for guns, but he said we would only use knives," Abdullah said.
"He said that what he had been teaching us would be enough to keep us out of harmís way and that we would be able to take a knife wound or a gunshot [without being hurt]," he added.
By the end of the day, 106 Muslim insurgents lay dead. Most, if not all, had been armed with nothing more than a knife when they attacked 11 police outposts across the region.
But if the aim of the raid was to instill a sense of fear within the country's security apparatus and political leaders, the group went beyond its expectations.
Abdullah said he was shocked and saddened by the deaths of his comrades and blamed Ustad Soh for their deaths.
In spite of his falling out with his mentor, Abdullah said he was still committed to the idea of seeing Pattani liberated.
Three weeks after the bloody incident, Ustad Soh came around again, claiming to have a new set of instructions from his higher-ups. This time guns and bombs could be used, Abdullah said. In July, Ustad Soh showed up with a 9mm handgun.
"Something has to be done in this area. There has to be an incident, make some noise," Abdullah quoted Ustad Soh as saying.
The nature of the attack would be similar to many previous hits; a security officer was to be shot with a handgun at close range by a gunman riding on the back of a motorbike. Abdullah said he spent a week monitoring the soldier at a nearby outpost, observing how the soldiers moved to and from the nearby markets.
On July 22, Abdullah was prepared to take a life. The target would be a young Thai soldier. To him it was just a target he had been observing for the past week or so. The act was for a noble cause, the liberation of Pattani from the infidels, Abdullah told himself. Abdullah said he drove up to the young soldier that he had been monitoring and pumped three or four shots into him -- he doesnít remember the exact number -- at pointblank range. But he wasn't about to get away with this attack so easily. A soldier in the vicinity grabbed his rifle and shot Abdullah as he was speeding away on the back of his motorbike.
"I donít know how many rounds hit me but I was in tremendous pain," Abdullah said.
The two sides entered into a fierce gunfight that lasted several minutes. Abdullah was able to catch a quick breath of air when the soldier had emptied his magazine. It was also at this moment that his driver decided to flee, leaving him lying on the roadside in a pool of blood, where he was taken into the custody of security forces.
Five weeks later after the shooting, Abdullah broke his silence and began to speak to a military counselor.
"There are many people out there who continue to think and feel the way I used to. There are people who would be willing to take up arms against the state if they were approached," said Abdullah.
"Today we see a bomb go off here, police officer gets shot there. It's not going to end any time soon. There are many insurgents still out there," he added.
It's not known what kind of leniency the court will show for his assistance to the Army. Whatever the outcome, a young wife and a newborn child await him at home.
Don Pathan
The Nation, Pattani
Monday, 12 January 2004
Battle is on for hearts and minds in the South
Govt walking a fine line between security and sensitivity
Don Pathan
The Nation
Last August a team of police officers headed by then Pattani police chief Colonel Manit Rattanawin marched confidently into Ban Banna village to arrest a suspect believed to have been behind a spate of killings of security officials in Thailand's deep South over the previous year.
A team of journalists was permitted to come along to videotape and photograph what Manit thought would be a simple surrender by a suspected Muslim separatist.
The photo-op that developed turned out to be rather different than the one the journalists had expected. Instead of surrendering, Mahama Mae-roh, a former Army rifleman, grabbed his assault rifle and ran into a nearby house. He positioned himself, took aim, and fired, killing Manit, another senior police officer, and a sergeant.
Ten minutes later a team of reinforcements arrived and within half an hour Mahama was killed.
Intelligence sources said the information on Mahama's whereabouts had come from his associate, Manase Jeh-da, also known as Nasae Saning, who was nabbed in Malaysia's Terengganu State and quietly handed over to Thai officials just days before the shooting in Ban Banna. Manase, on Thailand's wanted list for years, had a Bt200,000 bounty on his head.
On the same day Manase, having mysteriously escaped custody, was shot dead by police in Pattani's Nong Chik district, some 28 kilometers from Ban Banna.
In the following days, subsequent sweeps through the region netted two more associates of the dead Muslim separatists.
This display of swift and deadly justice did little to comfort the local Muslim community, who still remember the heavy-handed tactics of previous decades when Thai security forces used questionable means to take down local Muslim separatist groups such as Barisan Revolusi Nasional and the Pattani United Liberation Organisation.
National media reported the harsh words of Manase's wife and other family members, who claimed Manase was the victim of extra-judicial killing. They pointed to the bruises on his wrists and other parts of his body, saying he had been beaten before he was shot dead in what they believed was an evening of the score.
Authorities described both Mahama and Manase as operation chiefs of the Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Movement, known in the Bahasa Malaysia language as Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP).
GMIP has been on the radar screen of security agencies in the deep South since the mid-1990s but authorities generally dismissed them as bandits involved in extortion and killings.
But last Sunday, when a group of about 60 armed men stormed an Army base in Narathiwat, killing four soldiers on guard duty and making off with some 300 weapons, Thailand's political leaders realized they could no longer deny the GMIP's ideological influence.
The GMIP has been singled out as the main group behind the attack, which came as a slap in the face to the country's political and military elite, who had repeatedly dismissed any suggestion that a Muslim insurgency might be brewing in the South.
The attack made a mockery of the "ordinary bandit" label that political leaders had placed on those behind the violence in the region.
Many officials here dismissed outright the age-old "dirty business" theory that attackers steal weapons only so they can sell them to Malaysian or Indonesian insurgents to make money. It would have been far less risky for the GMIP to go to the Cambodian border, like the Burmese rebel groups do, to buy their weapons, local officials said.
What impressed many military commanders and observers of the South was the tactical competence of the assault.
Traps were set up on the roads to prevent troops from going after the attackers and both relay poles for wireless telephone communications in the area were taken out.
Security officials on the ground have said for years, albeit quietly, that the GMIP is more than just a bunch of "ordinary bandits", or "jone kra-jok" in Thai.
Security officers admitted that the GMIP is as well known for its criminal ambitions as for its religious convictions, but said the group has conveniently found a new "political context" in the global Jihadi movement, which arose in the early 1990s in the aftermath of the war against the Russians in Afghanistan.
Though GMIP leader Nasori Saesaeng – also known as Ae Wae Keleh after his home village of Keleh in Bachoh district of Narathiwat – may not have fought against the Russians troops, he did gain a wealth of experience when he went there in the early 1990s to take part in the civil war.
Which Afghan factions or warlords he fought under remains unclear but sources believe that his experiences in the war-torn country inspired him to return to southern Thailand to carry out insurgencies.
It has been reported that while in Afghanistan, Nasori befriended Nik Adli Nik Aziz, the son of the spiritual leader of Parti Islam se-Malaysia, a Malaysian opposition party with a stronghold in the northern part of the country bordering Thailand.
Thai intelligence sources said Nik Adli, who has been detained since late 2001 under Malaysia's draconian Internal Security Act, maintained close relations with Nasori after the two returned to their respective countries from Afghanistan. The two men helped set up an organization on their respective sides of the border – the underground Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia as well as the GMIP.
Since the attack against the Army battalion last Sunday, the government has submitted a list of names, most of them suspected GMIP members, to Malaysia requesting their arrest.
It is not certain to what extent the Malaysian authorities will stick their necks out for Thailand, said one Army intelligence source, saying Kuala Lumpur wants to be extremely certain of the consequences of its actions before it moves.
Nevertheless, in Thailand, the admission by political leaders of the existence of a home-grown separatist group has brought some relief to officials because it permits them to speak more openly about the problem and deal with it accordingly.
However, they insist that the heavy-handed tactics of the previous decade are a thing of the past. The catchphrase, for the time being, is how to "win the hearts and minds of the local Muslim community".
"In the old days they used to go after family members of the separatists to put a squeeze on them," said one local politician who spoke on condition of anonymity.
Today, military and police officers on the ground have been told to be extremely careful when dealing with suspects who are community or religious leaders. This may explain why those who have been brought in by the authorities are merely being "detained" and not formally charged with any crime.
Regardless, many officials acknowledge that there is a lot of hard work ahead of them. Corruption and interagency rivalries, along with the inability of state agencies to deal with the cultural and economic gap between the South and the rest of the country, have obstructed the process of healing between the predominantly Muslim region and the central government.
One senior security official said today's insurgents have split into small cells, many of which have penetrated local communities. This makes it extremely difficult for authorities to take the organizations down, he said.
Moreover, resentment and hard feelings between the local population and government officials have again resurfaced following the declaration of martial law in the three southernmost provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani, and the imposition of curfews has drawn a strong reaction from the communities here.
Heavy-handed methods may be a thing of the past, but winning the hearts and minds of the local Muslim population, it seems, remains as difficult as ever.
Sunday, 4 January 2004
Shan State Army kicks the habit but gets little respect
Monday, 1 December 2003
Tocsins for Thaksin and His War on Drugs
Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra declared his controversial war on drugs a victory. But the battle may have just begun.
Don Pathan
The Irrawaddy
Just when he thought he was flying high, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was quickly brought back down to earth when former Thai Third Army Commander Gen Wattanachai Chaimuangwong insisted that the war on drugs is far from over.
On the very day that Thaksin boldly declared the war on drugs a victory, Wattanachai quickly pointed out that millions of methamphetamine pills, known locally as yaa baa, are sitting on the Thai-Burmese border awaiting transport into the kingdom.
Another setback for the poised Prime Minister came two days later. In his annual birthday speech, His Majesty the King raised the question of accountability regarding the deaths of some 2,500 suspected drug dealers. The government had claimed that all but 30 of the deaths were merely a matter of "bad guys killing bad guys."
The King called on the government to investigate these deaths and explain them to the Thai people as well as to the international community, including the European Union and the United States.
Throughout both phases of the heavy-handed campaign, which officially began on Feb 1, human rights groups and members of the international community, including the EU and the US, have raised concerns over the extrajudicial killings.
Observers said that Thai-US relations could be at risk because of America’s Leahy Amendment, which prohibits the US government from giving aid to any foreign agency responsible for gross violations of human rights, including extrajudicial killings.
Should the amendment become law, it could very well damage the cozy relationship between the two countries, especially in the area of counterterrorism. The passing of the amendment may also effect Thailand’s decision to join the US-led war in Iraq, where about 450 Thai troops are helping coalition forces rebuild the country. Another tocsin for Thaksin came just days ago, when Narumi Yamada, senior program management officer for the UN Office of Drug and Crime, said that the rise of amphetamine-type substances (ATS) in Southeast Asia could become the world’s most severe drug problem.
"The region faces the threats of ATS, which has turned into an alarming epidemic in Southeast Asia, drawing younger consumers, offering large profit margins," Yamada said.
"Whilst law enforcement alone cannot control this menace," she told the gathering, held annually to exchange ideas with law enforcement agencies, "law enforcement agencies have an undoubtedly critical and indispensable role to play—and urgently."
According to figures released before the war on drugs, Thailand was the world’s largest per capita consumer of methamphetamines, with five percent of its 63 million people thought to be users. The war was aimed primarily at the amphetamines flooding into Thailand from the Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle, where drug warlords and their armies operate with impunity.
The current administration believes the war was won. But the key factors that have enabled the illicit industry to prosper for decades remain intact. Many see the campaign as a calculated effort to please voters, who are tired of seeing drugs in playgrounds and on the streets.
Indeed the level of public frustration over the drug problem resulted in overwhelming support for Thaksin’s harsh measures, while issues such as transparency, accountability and due process went by the wayside. Observers say that there has been a clear psychological impact on the illicit drug industry in Thailand, but that it’s just a matter of time before the industry recuperates.
Chinese business associates of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), a 20,000-strong pro-Rangoon outfit considered by the US government to be the world’s largest armed drug trafficking group, said Thaksin’s campaign caused a drop in methamphetamine orders coming from Thai dealers during the height of the killing spree in the first stage of the campaign. Despite the slowdown, Wa commanders and other Golden Triangle drug lords are still in business.
Though income from drugs still accounts for a sizeable portion of their income, they have begun to diversify. In their respective domains, as well as on the Chinese side of the border, the drug lords have invested in fisheries, hotels, casinos and telecommunications. Regarding supply, the chemicals needed to produce methamphetamines are still plentiful and readily available.
Traffickers take advantage of the porous border linking Laos and Burma with China, where these chemicals are legally produced. Under the second stage of Thaksin’s war, the government was supposed to pursue big-time distributors and their political backers. US authorities reportedly provided Thai officials with a list of Thai nationals allegedly involved in drug trafficking.
And the Thaksin government claimed to have a blacklist of its own. But judging from the growing number of shoot-outs between drug caravans intercepted by Thai soldiers as they cross from Thailand into Burma, the war’s psychological effect may be waning.
Over the past three years, Thaksin has twice witnessed strains in Thai-Burmese relations. The border between the two countries erupted in February 2001, as both sides traded shells and rockets following disputes over territorial rights. And in May of last year, the Thai Army crossed what they considered to be an un-demarcated border area and then destroyed scores of labs belonging to the Wa and other drug armies. Recriminations came from the top brass of both countries as a result.
Since then Thaksin has worked hard to mend ties with Rangoon. His strategy is to push trade with Burma in the hope that the country’s drug-infested northeast frontier would say no to drugs if the area was more developed. But so far he has not demanded that trade be linked to improved narcotics suppression by Rangoon.
Meanwhile old Burma hands believe that the drug war is doomed to fail without an adequate political settlement between the military junta and the ethnic nationalities, some of whom have signed ceasefire agreements but remain armed. Until a settlement is reached, they say, Thaksin’s "victory" will only be a temporary one.
Don Pathan is a journalist based in Bangkok.
Tuesday, 29 July 2003
Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) Special 4-part series
Part I: Bangkok plays terror cards close to its chest
The Nation
July 29, 2003
More than a month after Thailand announced the arrest of four suspected members of the militant Islamist organisation Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), it's still wait-and-see as to which direction the government will take Thailand in the war against global terrorism.
The authorities insist they have enough evidence to convict the four suspects and that the crackdown was the result of a lengthy investigation. Yet they continue to play their cards close to their chests, keeping everybody guessing about what kind of evidence they have against these men. There have been growing calls for a clearer picture of what Thailand is really up against.
At the same time, there is growing pressure from Thailand's Muslim community, with calls on the government to provide the evidence against the four suspects.
The community sees the arrest of the four suspects as a direct challenge against them and a big dent to national reconciliation between the Muslim region and the predominantly Buddhist state.
Reactions to the arrests from local media and the public have been mixed, with conspiracy theories and vicious accusations making headlines in some local dailies.
There were allegations that Thaksin was selling Thailand out to Singapore, which in turn is accused of being an American vassal. Singapore supplied Thailand with information that led to the arrest of the four suspects.
It has even been suggested that the arrests were an attempt to keep Southeast Asia's Muslim community on its knees because the US sees Malaysia as an economic threat. One writer pointed to Malaysian cell-phone companies making headway in Iran as if American companies were lining up to invest there.
Such arguments overlook the fact that many Muslim countries, like Malaysia - a verbose critic of Washington - Indonesia, Pakistan and Persian Gulf states, were rounding up terrorist suspects in their respective territories years before Thailand jumped on the boat.
The Southeast Asia-based terrorist organisation is seeking to carve out an Islamic state stretching from southern Thailand through Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and several islands of the Philippines.
Some local officials have even suggested that if we continue to turn a blind eye to possible terrorist activities, everything will turn out okay.
Nevertheless, Thailand's decision to join the war on terror was welcomed by the US as well as other Asian countries.
Many said the decision made a lot of sense because international cooperation was the only way to go. But other observers have questioned whether Thai intelligence agencies - who don't have a strong tradition of cooperation, even among themselves - are not in over their heads.
Some said Thaksin had done the right thing by admitting that Thailand was just as vulnerable as any other country in the region. The fact that the announcement came on the eve of his meeting with US President George W Bush, however, raised the question of whether the prime minister was doing the right thing for wrong reasons.
Political agendas aside, Thailand's decision to commit itself in this war did not come out of a vacuum. Soon after the Bali attack that killed more then 200 people, Singapore and Malaysia launched an all out hunt for al-Qaeda and JI operatives on their soil.
Scores of suspected terrorists rushed across the border into Thailand, while others fled to Indonesia. The archipelago is the world's fourth most-populous country and an ideal place to lie low.
Thailand received warning that some suspected terrorists could flee into the country, but unsure of what to do, the government decided to stick to the old familiar line, insisting Thailand was safe and that no terrorist cells were operating here.
At stake was the country's massive tourism industry that serves as the nation's economic engine. About 10 million visitors come to Thailand annually.
Thaksin stubbornly clung on to his position, dismissing the claims that terrorist cells might be operating in Thailand as "ridiculous" and fabricated by "crazy people".
But in spite of the lack of guidance and a clear mandate from the top, Thai security agencies were not taking any chances. The consequences would have been too costly if the allegations were proven true. Besides, said one senior intelligence officer, it was a just matter of time before the government had to come clean.
So the agencies began to exchange lists of names with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. The end result was a rough sketch of the movements of suspected operatives and a pattern of their cash flow.
Two names that emerged from these lists were Mas Selamat Kastari and Arifin bin Ali, also known as John Wong and Ah Hung, both Singaporean nationals.
Kastari, an alleged JI operations chief who authorities said had masterminded a foiled plan in 2001 to hijack an aircraft and crash it into Singapore's Changi Airport, was reported to have entered Thailand with Ali nearly two years ago.
Alleged JI operative Arifin bin Ali was arrested in Bangkok last May following a tip-off from the Singaporean authorities, while Kastari was nabbed in February in Indonesia.
Thai police say Ali was working with the four arrested Thai nationals, planning a series of attacks on foreign embassies.
Kastari, on the other hand, admitted recently at the Indonesian trial of alleged JI spiritual leader Abu Bakar Bashir that he and Riduan Isamuddin, an al-Qaeda point man in the region known as Hambali, had made plans to blow up a US naval facility in Singapore.
Thaksin accused Kastari of planning bomb attacks to coincide with the upcoming Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in October.
Thailand's deputy police chief, General Sunthorn Saikwan was reported as saying that Ali was also linked to an alleged terror cell in Cambodia where two Thai nationals and one Egyptian teaching at an Islamic school near Phnom Penh were arrested last month.
So for the time being it's still wait and see. Security officials said the recent arrests in Thailand and Cambodia were a sign of more to come. Some even admit that they may be in over their heads and that a major overhaul of national security policies and mandates is needed in order to work effectively in dismantling terrorist cells in the country.
On the other hand, it remains to be seen whether the officials can live up to the commitments of political leaders in this country and the region.
This is the first part of a four-part series on Jemaah Islamiyah in Thailand and its long-term implications.
Part II: Thailand joins the global war on terrorism
The Nation
July 30, 2003
The announcement of the arrest on June 10 of the three Thai nationals accused of being members of the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist organisation amounted to a declaration of war on global terrorism by the Thai government.
It came as a big surprise to many, given the fact that Thailand has consistently dismissed mounting reports in the local and international media linking the country to global terrorism.
A closer look into the issues amid lengthy investigations by Thai and regional authorities shows the threat of terrorism in the country is very real. Like it or not, because of its proximity, Thailand can not conveniently exclude itself from the Southeast Asia terrorism theatre.
In extensive interviews with The Nation, both senior police at the Special Branch and Army generals went as far as saying JI operations in Thailand might include front companies and other commercial outlets to facilitate the transfer of money and coordinate terrorist activities, including the purchase of weapons and explosives.
"The JI group has operated in Thailand for years," said an army general.
They said Thailand's denial throughout the past year had been tactical and necessary. Given the importance of tourist money to Thailand's economic well-being, it was not timely to admit that there were regional terrorists inside the country.
Thai leaders including Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra knew the negative consequences, so they stood firm, insisting that Thailand was not a safe haven for international terrorists, following exposure in a string of Western media.
The decision to arrest the first three suspected JI members, Dr Waemahad Waedaoh, Maisuru Hajiabdulloh and Muyahid Hajiabdulloh in Narathiwat was swift, according to the general, who asked for anonymity.
It was part of a comprehensive anti-terrorism strategy known as "Burn". "We want to strike at them first, by burning them," he explained. The arrests were to jolt the terrorist networks in Thailand, including whatever plans they might have in mind. The Thai intelligence services, with assistance from their counterparts in Singapore, believed that several ploys to harm Western interests as well those of their own countries at home had been foiled.
According to Singaporean intelligence cited by Thai officials, Thailand is part of the four mantiqis, or regional divisions, with Abu Bakar Bashir as the spiritual head.
Malaysia, Southern Thailand, Burma and Singapore belong to Mantiqis No 1, while Mantiqis No 2 includes Java and Sumatra and the rest of Indonesia except Sulawesi, Kalimantan and Papua. Mantiqis No 3 covers Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Sabah, Sarawak, Brunei and the southern Philippines. Australia and Papua belong to Mantiqis No 4.
Mantiqis No 1 has at least eight branches or wakalahs. Southern Thailand, centred on Narathiwat, is in Wakalah No 7.
Thai intelligence units began to look into global terrorism as far back as late 2000 when US intelligence agencies asked them to investigate three companies - Al Jallil Trading Ltr Co Ltd, Al Amanah Enterprise Co Ltd and Sidco Co Ltd - thought to have links with Osama bin Laden. These three companies were subsequently closed down, according to a police source who did not elaborate.
Some admitted that it was like working with their hands tied behind their backs, saying the absence of a political mandate had raised the question of whether the government was willing to change tack if there was enough evidence to suggest it should.
For two years, with limited resources and the absence of a political commitment, government law-enforcement agencies more or less took it upon themselves to look into matters. The two main Thai agencies mandated with international terrorism responsibilities are the National Intelligence Agency and the National Security Centre. Besides them there are commando units set up to respond to situations on a case-by-case basis.
Apart from the absence of a full mandate, Thailand also lacks the proper legal infrastructure to assist these agencies in carrying out their duties when it comes to investigating bank transactions among suspected individuals and other forms of financial transaction.
Zachary Abuza, a terrorist expert from Simmons College in Boston, said that the porous borders between Thailand and its neighbours made the country an attractive destination for terrorists to come in and out, set up front companies and transfer funds to desired destinations.
A leading Indonesia-based researcher on terrorism in Southeast Asia, Sydney Jones, pointed out that based on interviews with suspected terrorist members in Indonesian custody, many of these suspects had visited Thailand and sought refuge there in times of trouble.
Top JI leaders such as Ali Ghufron, also known as Muchlas, have lain low in Thailand's deep South for some time and made friends with sympathetic mullahs, or tok kuru, in the predominantly Muslim region, said Jones, who works for the Brussels-based International Crisis Group.
For decades, Thailand has been a prime destination for many dissident groups from many parts of the region. Burmese, Tamils, Khmer, Laos, Vietnamese, ethnic Indians and Chinese have all established units in Thailand to carry out operations against regimes in their homelands.
Many kept a very low profile for fear that their presence would force the Thai government to clamp down on them. However, following the arrest in Cambodia on May 28 of the first three suspects and that of Abdulazi Hajicheming and Mohamad Yalarudin Mading, both Thai religious teachers, the Thai intelligence services have kept a watch on Thai-Muslim students who have graduated in Middle Eastern countries.
According to a Foreign Ministry source, at least 5,000 Thai students have graduated in Muslim countries - Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Syria, Sudan, Yemen, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Half these students finished their education in Saudi Arabia.
Thailand's concern was well reflected by Defence Minister General Thamarak Israngkura's comment that 10 per cent of the scholarship students from Thailand who studied in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt had been recruited to extremist Islamic organisations. His comment upset these countries' embassies, and they are reviewing whether to suspend scholarships to Thai-Muslims.
Dr Arong Suthasarana, director of World Islamic Studies at Chulalongkorn University, dismissed the comment, saying that these scholarship students were serious and wanted only to study religion. "It has caused a lot of misunderstanding among Thai Muslims," he said.
Thailand has hundreds of pondoks, or religious schools, where these young Thai graduates from the Middle East teach. For example, at the Burana Tohnor religious school, where the Hajiabdulloh pair were apprehended, most of the 21 religious teachers graduated from Middle Eastern countries such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya and Lebanon. They all speak Arabic fluently.
Part III: Suspects squeezed out to Thailand
The Nation
July 31, 2003
At the start of the crackdown on Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members in Malaysia and Singapore about 18 months ago, Thai authorities were warned that terrorist suspects might flee to the country.
While the country's political leaders were taking their usual wishy-washy approach as to what kind of stance Thailand should take on the matter, its security agencies went to work.
Security analysts say that like other criminal activities, terrorist organisations such as JI are subject to the so-called "balloon" effect - whereby as authorities put the squeeze on one area, another area of the same organisation, or balloon, enlarges.
So, under this kind of pressure from the authorities it would have been natural for suspects in Malaysia and Singapore to flee elsewhere. And Thailand, it seems, became a convenient destination.
The government appears to have come to terms with the fact that foreign terrorist cells have established themselves on Thai soil.
Early on, Thai intelligence officers began to exchange names with their counterparts in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.
The end result is a list of some 400 names and a money trail linking these cells to those in Cambodia and other countries, including Saudi Arabia.
For Thailand, one name stands out - Arifin bin Ali, popularly known as John Wong Ah Hung.
This Singaporean citizen of Chinese extraction converted to Islam and married a Thai.
The time of his recruitment into JI is not known but Thai officials say there are records of him coming in and out of the country going back three years.
Arifin was arrested in May in Bangkok and deported to Singapore. But the arrest was made several months after a tip-off by the Singaporean government. A Thai intelligence officer defended this apparent time delay, telling The Nation that Bangkok wanted to be certain before taking Arifin down.
Thai officials say that Arifin is cooperating with the Singaporean authorities and that the information he has provided has so far led to the arrests of six Thai nationals and an Egyptian.
Four of the six - Maisuri Haji Abdulloh and his son Muyahi, who were both teachers at an Islamic school, Waemahdi Waedao, a medical doctor, and Samarn Waekaji, a suspected JI bomb-maker who turned himself in - were arrested in southern Thailand.
The other two Thai nationals and the Egyptian were arrested at an Islamic school on the outskirts of the Cambodian capital Phnom Penh, where they were teaching.
These three Muslims, who are currently being detained in a Cambodian prison, met Waemahdi on at least seven occasions, according to Thai police.
Somchai Niraphaijit, the lawyer representing the four arrested in Thailand, said the man who introduced his clients to Arifin goes by the name Suhaimee, whose whereabouts are not known.
Some believe Suhaimee, who is said to have owned a restaurant in the Pratunam area of Bangkok, is still at large, while others say he is being kept at a "safe house" by one of the country's security agencies. Investigators have called him the missing link.
It is understood that Suhaimee was the "money man" in charge of transferring and receiving money to and from other cells through a tour company that he had been using as a front.
Somchai, for the time being, is likely to continue to play the obvious cards, demanding that police either charge his clients or set them free.
He is also likely to play up the due-process angle, pointing out that police can make a maximum of seven requests to the court for permission to detain the suspects further.
And each time, the court can only order that the suspects be held for 12 days. If there are no formal charges against the suspects, the court is obliged to set them free
Part IV: War on terrorism begs legal footing
The Nation
Aug 01, 2003
Thailand's declaration of war on terrorism has not only placed the country's international standing but also its legal system under the spotlight.
While it is clear that the decision to join the global war against terrorism was partly a political one, questions remain as to whether the nation has the will to make the necessary changes in its legal infrastructure.
The debate over the extent to which Thailand should comply with the pace and direction of the international community in an all-out war against terrorism began shortly after the September 11 attacks against the United States.
However, it was generally agreed that the threat of intentional terrorism was a distant issue.
Thailand has no enemies, officials said. And while other countries in Southeast Asia were waging war on extremists, Thailand chose to put the matter on the back burner.
But with the recent arrests of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) suspects in the south, as well as the cracking of a cell in Cambodia that led to the arrests of two Thai Muslims and an Egyptian, Thailand was pushed to the frontline, along with Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.
In formulating its own anti-terrorism law, Thailand has adopted the India-sponsored Draft of [a] Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.
Today, government whips are rushing to get the draft anti-terrorism bill through the Cabinet and on to Parliament.
However, the proposed law has attracted a great deal of criticism from humanitarian organisations that fear it would give law-enforcement agencies a free hand to wield their power in other areas.
Others are afraid that a legal definition of terrorism could have implications for members of separatist organisations, the so-called freedom fighters.
Charan Dithaapichai, a National Human Rights commissioner, said he is afraid that due process of law could be overlooked in implementing the anti-terrorism act.
His concern reflects the popular feeling that the country's police force has not been a source of comfort.
The defence lawyer for the Thai JI suspects was quick to point to the police handling of a Singaporean JI suspect, Arifin bin Ali, who was arrested in May and immediately deported to the island-state. He argued that the police had charged Arifin with a simple immigration violation in order to avoid the legal process that could have exposed the weakness of the case.
Police insiders admitted that documents were written to say that Arifin had violated immigration regulations.
But with the government's current popular support, few foresee any real obstacle. It appears that Arifin bin Ali's lawyer has scant reason to hope he will get his client released on a technicality.
Members of the Muslim community have expressed their concerns and doubts over the allegations, but generally, the public mood is supportive of the government. Many people are looking for a quick fix to a number of nagging social and security issues, be they terrorism, narcotics or corruption.
But security analysts say the intelligence community may be in over its head in this war against terror.
The mode of operation in many intelligence units is to keep their information to themselves and simply give other agencies and politicians "chicken feed".
According to one intelligence officer, this attitude prevails because of the lack of trust among the agencies.
In other words, it will take much more than political will to make the necessary adjustments. Without cooperation among all the security forces concerned, Thailand could be biting off more than it can chew.
(This is the final article of a four-part series that began on Tuesday.)
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