New Government, New Team

The National Security Council (NSC) of Thailand organized a seminar in Bangkok on 29 October 2025, bringing together the chief negotiators for the southern peace process to share their experiences. Credit: Don Pathan

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com

Resumed Talks

After nearly two years of stagnation, peace negotiations between the Thai government and the rebel Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) are getting back on track. Leaders from both sides met recently to acquaint themselves and prepare for a high-level official meeting next month, facilitated by Malaysia.

Thailand’s newly appointed chief negotiator for the conflict, Gen (rtd) Somsak Rungsita, along with National Security Council (NSC) Secretary-General Chatchai Bangchuad, met with BRN chief negotiator Anas Abdulrohman in Kuala Lumpur on 11 November 2025.

According to a press statement from the Office of the Malaysian Government Facilitator, the meeting was “cordial and constructive”, with both parties committing to resume official and technical dialogues in December 2025. The meeting was facilitated by retired Malaysian NSC chief Mohd Rabin Bashir.

A BRN officer from the negotiation team said the organisation acknowledges the short time the current government of Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has in office but pledged the movement would do its utmost to ensure continuity.

The last high-level talks with the BRN – the longstanding separatist group that controls combatants in Thailand’s far south – were held in Kuala Lumpur on 6-7 February 2024.

Past Setbacks

As for the meeting next month, the two sides will pick up where they left off—discussing the Joint Comprehensive Plan toward Peace (JCPP). This framework identifies three key items: reduction of violence, public consultation and a political solution to end the conflict, which has claimed over 7,700 lives since the current wave of insurgency resurfaced in January 2004. The region is the historical Malay homeland known as Patani.

Initially, they had planned to delve deeper into these three items. However, fierce criticism from insiders of the then-ruling Pheu Thai Party, particularly Prof Surachart Bamrungsuk, sidelined the negotiators and effectively put formal talks on hold for nearly two years.

Surachart was upset that the Thai team had not made the reduction of violence a binding commitment and lashed out at international donors for not pressuring the BRN to end its violent tactics; he said their role in the peace process has helped to legitimise BRN.

Still, quiet discussions between BRN and Thai representatives continued outside the formal track. During a meeting at the beginning of this year, the Thai side requested a temporary ceasefire during the holy month of Ramadhan, which ran from 1 to 30 March 2025.

BRN agreed on the condition that international observers be permitted on the ground and an unspecified number of detainees be released. The then-defence minister Phumtham Wechayachai rejected the proposal, insisting the government would only negotiate if BRN ended its campaign of violence and that they would only talk with those who have command-and-control over militants on the ground.

When political discussions hit a brick wall, BRN’s military wing took charge to map out the next move. On 9 March, a 10-strong BRN unit attacked the Sungai Kolok district office in Narathiwat, killing two Defence Volunteers (security details for the Ministry of Interior officials) and wounding eight others.

The combatants left behind a car packed with explosives that detonated during their retreat. The car bomb ripped through the district office compound, sending a stern message to Bangkok that it does not get to decide who represents BRN at the negotiating table.

Differing Definitions of “Peace”

Today, with Pheu Thai and Surachart out, NSC has returned to the fold. A public event was organised by NSC on 29 October where all former chief negotiators were invited to share their experiences. They largely echoed the same points: that there is continuity despite political instability, a commitment to peace and that Thailand’s territorial integrity remains paramount.

But academic and peace expert Mark Tamthai, who led the negotiation team under former premier Abhisit Vejjajiva, said Thailand has yet to understand the nature of the conflict in the far south and therefore has not developed the necessary tools to extinguish it.

“At first, there is the simplistic view that people take up arms because they are upset with the state. But the reality is more complicated than that,” said Mark, a retired professor of peace studies at Chiang Mai’s Payap University.

Mark believes there must be a better way to involve the public because their participation could help strengthen the peace process and generate traction.

“My other question is why the peace process doesn’t seem to be going anywhere. We take a step forward and then take a step back. Why is that?” he asked.

One reason the process seems circular is that both sides define peace differently.

“For the government, peace is the absence of violence, as well as the people of Patani living within the framework set by the government. They are not allowed to make too many demands, such as self-determination rights, and there can also be no seminar on a public referendum,” Mark said. “If these demands continue to surface, in the state’s view, then the fire in the south has yet to be put out.”

Mark said BRN and local civil society agree with the state on the first point—that regional violence must end. But the second point involves opening a political space where no issue is off-limits. This is where the two sides differ greatly, as demonstrated by the ongoing court case against political activists in the far south.

“I’m glad that the new chief negotiator (Gen [rtd] Somsak) wants to hear what the local people are saying. But you must be serious about wanting to listen; you can’t let them speak and then turn around and charge them with whatever law is at hand.”

Mark also pointed to JCPP as an example of progress that can only go so far. “But when the issue of public consultation comes up, some people retreat. Why? Because public consultation doesn’t fit their definition of what is politically permissible,” he said.

Hurdles

The upcoming high-level meeting will not be a walk in the park. It comes at a time when flimsy charges are being levied against five civic actors, scheduled to appear in the Pattani Criminal Court on 20 November 2025, to face charges of advocating separatism during a 2023 seminar that they had participated in.

From left to right: Artef Sohko – President of The Patani; Hussen Bue-nae – Former President, Student Organization of Yala Rajabhat University (YRUSO); Irfan Umar – Member of The Patani; Sareef Salaeman – Patani–Malay cultural youth activist, Student at PSU Pattani, Member of The Patani; and Hakim Pongtigor – Deputy Secretary-General, Fair Party at the time of the seminar, currently senior member of The Patani. Photo taken in front of the Office of the Attorney  General in Pattani. (Photo Credit: The Patani)

What got on the nerves of the region’s military command was the mock referendum, which asked participants a hypothetical question on whether they would support the idea of a referendum on rights to self-determination if Thai law permitted it. They did not advocate independence or encourage political mobilisation to call for separatism. But a hypothetical question was enough for the military to push for legal action against the activists.

Moreover, old issues like public consultation under the framework of JCPP remain far from resolved. BRN has informed Thailand that its representatives should be permitted to enter the far south to conduct in-person public consultations.

This request was rejected by the Thai army, whose leaders feared a public relations nightmare. One military intelligence officer, speaking on condition of anonymity, asked to imagine an outpouring of public support for BRN delegates; such a scene would not only embarrass the Thai side but also shatter its long-standing claim that the Malays of Patani side with them.

Making the Most of Limited Time

After nearly two years of a halted formal process, BRN considered the setting up of a negotiating team as somewhat pretentious, considering the government has only less than four months in office before a general election is called. Yet, it could set a precedent for the incoming administration, especially if the ruling Bhumjaithai Party is part of the coalition and tasked with conflict resolution in the far south.

“We are looking to make the most of it given the limited time in office of this government,” one BRN operative said.

BRN has already stated it is willing to settle for something less than full independence. The ball now seems to be in Thailand’s court to reciprocate.

For Artef Sohko, president of The Patani – a political action group that often acts as an interlocutor between BRN and Thai government agencies – the clock is ticking. The next wave of BRN leaders might not be as accommodating as the current ones.

If the Thai government continues to kick the can down the road, the next generation of BRN leaders could retreat from their commitment to work within the Thai Constitution. Artef is one of the five civic actors being charged with advocating separatism for participating in a mock referendum.

The challenge for the current and incoming government is enormous. It is unclear if Bhumjaithai has the appetite or the mindset for a challenge that demands creative policy and serious thought about what aspects of Thailand’s nation-state construct must be revised for the sake of peace and peaceful coexistence with the Malays of Patani.

Moreover, violence in this historically contested region has been on the rise, with combatants (who are operating quite freely) straying outside the normal theatre of conflict. Last month’s gold heist in Narathiwat, where over 36.5 million baht worth of gold was stolen, as well as a botched bombing operation in major tourist spots on the Andaman coast in June 2025, are examples of how the absence of a political platform has allowed violence to morph and spread. BRN made no public statement about the 11 bombs unearthed in Krabi and Phuket provinces, but it did say that without a formal peace process, increased violence and attacks outside historically contested areas are inevitable.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require 1) credit authors and their institutions, and 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD  and include a link back to either our home page or the article URL.

Author

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  Don Pathan

  Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

Thailand’s million-dollar gold heist reveals costly price of peace in insurgency-hit south

The robbery in Sungai Kolok, near the Thai-Malaysian border, bore the hallmarks of a rebel-led operation, the defence minister said

The suspects are caught on CCTV fleeing the scene after grabbing bags of gold on October 5. Photo: Thai police

Don Pathan

www.scmp.com 

A million-dollar gold heist in Thailand’s far south by armed robbers who blocked roads with spikes and set explosives to seal their escape across the Malaysian border has rattled the Thai security establishment, as efforts to reignite peace talks in an area roiled by insurgency continue to fall flat.

Around 20 men working in three teams carried out the October 5 theft from a gold shop in Sungai Kolok, bordering Malaysia’s Kelantan State.

The theft of hundreds of gold ornaments and jewellery valued at over 36.5 million baht (US$1.13 million) came as prices for the precious metal spiked to historic highs of over US$4,200 per 28 grams (one ounce) earlier this month.

Using two stolen getaway trucks, the robbers planted road spikes and explosives to obstruct police pursuit in a heist so well-oiled that Thai authorities immediately attributed it to the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN).

FULL ARTICLE

New Thai appointments for the Deep South

The then Thailand's chief negotiator, Chatchai Bangchuad, Malaysian facilitator Gen Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, and Anas Abdulrahman, BRN chief negotiator, talked to the press after the February 6-7, 2024, high-level negotiation in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. (Credit: Peace Dialogue Panel)

Don Pathan
Prachatai 

In one of his first moves as newly appointed Prime Minister, Anutin Charnvirakul has named a new chief negotiator for the peace process in Thailand's far South, a region gripped by a conflict that has claimed over 7,700 lives since 2004.

The decision has been met with scepticism, however, as Anutin’s government is set to serve only four months before Parliament is dissolved. Since the negotiating team is mandated by the Cabinet, any new government will be free to appoint its own officials.

The immediate aim of Anutin's Bhumjaithai Party is widely seen as building political capital for the upcoming general election. By appointing retired Gen Somsak Rungsita, a former Secretary-General of the National Security Council (NSC), as chief negotiator, Anutin can claim an achievement that he will argue his predecessor, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, failed to secure during her year in office.

To be fair to the previous administration, a negotiating team was being assembled, but Paetongtarn was removed by the Constitutional Court just before a public announcement could be made. Her proposed list included top security figures from her party, a former head of the Parliament-funded Prajadhipok’s Institute, a village chief from Narathiwat, and a retired diplomat.

Under her administration, delays stemmed from a refusal to resume talks until the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN)—the primary longstanding separatist movement—ceased its violent operations. The BRN countered that any reduction of violence must be negotiated, questioning the baseline and monitoring mechanisms. The then-government was unwilling to entertain this. A nudge from Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, the designated facilitator for the off-and-on talks since 2013, finally prompted a response from Paetongtarn, just before the court removed her from power.

Political insiders say the choice of Gen Somsak is a safe bet for Anutin. The former NSC chief is a close associate of Defence Minister Gen Nattaphon Narkphanit and former PM Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, now a Privy Councillor. The Thai Army is also comfortable with him.

Gen Somsak's appointment marks the NSC's return to the peace process after being sidelined by the previous administration. Insiders from the Pheu Thai Party government had accused the NSC-led negotiators of exceeding their mandate and giving the BRN too much leeway by not making a reduction of violence a binding condition.

A senior BRN member on the negotiating team questioned Thailand's commitment to peace, stating that Gen Somsak’s appointment does not signal sincerity in seeking a peaceful outcome.

For Asmadee Bueheng, a Patani-based writer and long-time conflict observer, Gen Somsak's appointment—coupled with in the introduction of an outsider to lead the Fourth Army Area, which oversees security in the region—does not necessarily translate into meaningful concessions from the Thai state.

In fact, no political party in modern Thailand has ever spelled out terms for peaceful coexistence between the Malay people of Patani and the state. This refusal to make concessions has rendered the decade-old peace process a stagnant "talk shop" unable to move beyond confidence-building.

Even if the government decided to outline a real settlement, there is no guarantee that conservative elites in Thailand would permit it, as it would challenge Thailand's nation-state construct and narrative, Asmadee said.

Today, the controversial Martial Law and Emergency Law, which permits 30-day detention without legal representation, remain in effect. The Tak Bai massacre of October 2004, which resulted in 85 deaths, has yet to see closure, while harassment against local political activists continues.

For years, the Fourth Army and activists have been at loggerheads, fighting to control the narrative. At the Army's request, numerous activists have been charged with disturbing the peace and instigating separatism.

Moreover, the absence of a credible peace process gives BRN militants, who already operate with considerable autonomy, a freer hand to expand beyond their usual theatre of violence and breach unwritten rules of engagement that prohibit attacks on civilians.

Thai police inspect the scene of an attack by insurgents at Sunai
Kolok District Office, March 2025. (Narathiwat Public Relations Office)

It remains to be seen if the new chief negotiator and the recently appointed commander of the Fourth Army Area, Maj Gen Norathip Phoinok, can reverse this trend and open political space for critical discussion, no matter how uncomfortable.

For decades, commanders of the Fourth Army have been drawn from its own ranks. Their counter-insurgency strategy has leaned heavily on militaristic approaches, with little focus on winning hearts and minds or addressing the root causes and historical grievances of this Malay-speaking region.

For over twenty years, Thailand's far South has been shaped by separatist insurgency, cross-border trade (both legal and illegal), an enormous military budget, and a culture of impunity among security officials. As one Thai military intelligence officer noted, the region has too many "dark sides." Bringing in an outsider to lead may not be a bad idea.

Although the violence is widely understood as political, Thai officials often view it through a narrow lens of security and legality. Few attempt to understand the insurgents' perspective, which sees government troops as a colonial force and local businesses as part of a system of exploitation. Government policies on transmigration and assimilation are viewed as integral to this same system.

Whether Maj Gen Norathip can bridge the trust gap between the state and the Malay-speaking region is an open question.

Political insiders say his appointment reflects the internal workings of the Royal Thai Army rather than any government initiative. With less than 70 seats in Parliament, Anutin cannot afford to create friction with the Army. His aim is to use these four months to prepare for the next election, which is why he is allowing the Army a free hand on border policy, be it with Cambodia or in the far South.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based consultant and security analyst. 

Behind the Myanmar junta’s raid on KK Park

KK Park, taken from the Thai side of the border that is separated by the Moei River, Feb. 28, 2025. (Credit: Don Pathan)

Don Pathan
Mizzima News

The Myanmar military junta attempted to score a public relations victory during the recent ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur by demonstrating its willingness to crack down on scam centers operating in Karen State, adjacent to Thailand’s Mae Sot district in Tak province.

After attacking positions held by the Karen National Union’s (KNU) 6th Brigade, Myanmar troops entered portions of the notorious KK Park, a major scam hub linked to Chinese crime syndicates. They confiscated 30 Starlink devices that scammers had been using in recent years after Thailand, under pressure from both the United States and China, disrupted internet connections to these call centers by redirecting relay boxes on utility poles and ordering power lines running from Thailand to cease operations.

A turning point came in January 2025, when China intensified pressure on Thailand to take drastic action, including cutting off power supplies, fuel, and imposing stricter controls on internet connectivity. Chinese Assistant Minister of Public Security Liu Zhongy visited Mae Sot and Myawaddy twice in early 2025 to witness the crackdown firsthand.

More than 7,000 operators, mostly Chinese nationals, were released from these centers and sent across the border into Thailand for processing and repatriation. Chinese charter planes stood ready to transport their nationals back home to either face charges or, if fortunate, be treated as human trafficking victims, depending on interrogation outcomes.

The scam centers adapted to Thailand’s obstruction by acquiring massive generators capable of powering the 30 or so compounds dotting the Myanmar side of the Moei River, which serves as the natural border with Thailand. Starlink satellite systems replaced Thai internet service providers, while fuel became significantly more expensive—though nothing is truly unobtainable in this rugged corner of Southeast Asia, where warlords, drug barons, ethnic rebel militias, resistance forces, and Myanmar government troops compete for control.

Until February 2025, two commercial flights filled with Chinese tourists would arrive daily in Mae Sot from Bangkok. This border town, known primarily as a major cross-border trading hub between Thailand and Myanmar, served as the gateway to an open secret: these “tourists” were actually headed to casinos, brothels, entertainment complexes, karaoke bars, and unregulated online gambling operations on the Myanmar side. “They just have to remember to return before their Thai visas expire,” said a Thai police officer in Mae Sot.

The two flights are a thing of the past as Thai officials, in line with measures imposed on foreign nationals after Liu visited the region.

The US Institute of Peace estimated that by the end of 2023, the annual value of funds stolen worldwide by Chinese syndicates operating from Myanmar and other locations in mainland Southeast Asia reached approximately $64 billion.

In response to Chinese and Thai pressure, the DKBA and KNA/BGF quickly abandoned their profitable landlord arrangements and began rounding up scam operators. This started in February 2025 and continued for several months.

The strict measures following Liu’s two visits may have disrupted operations temporarily, but in reality they created a balloon effect: squeeze one area and activity pops up elsewhere. Phayathonezu, an area controlled by the rebels near the Three Pagodas Pass opposite Thailand’s Kanchanaburi province, exemplifies how these illicit businesses are relocating from the Myawaddy area. Other syndicates maintained low profiles temporarily, planning to reemerge once attention subsided, while others moved deeper into the country.

The deportation of approximately 7,000 individuals since March 2025 damaged the illicit operations but didn’t eliminate them. While the two daily planeloads of Chinese nationals arriving in Mae Sot may have ended, these syndicates still operate cyber scam centers generating substantial income.

“Chinese businesses rent these complexes and convert them into entertainment and gambling outlets that operate in a gray area—not exactly illegal but certainly unregulated. However, portions of these complexes are designated specifically for online scamming operations,” explained a plainclothes Thai police officer in Mae Sot who has a front-row view of these illicit activities.

“The Karen militias controlling the area—whether they have ceasefire agreements with the Myanmar government, like the Karen National Army (KNA) and the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), or the Karen National Union (KNU), which is still fighting the government—none of them want scrutiny of what these Chinese businesses are actually doing,” said the officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

“They collect substantial rent money, and villagers in areas under their control gain employment. Thai people also benefit from their presence.” He pointed to the heightening of real estate prices around Mae Sot, saying being a merely stop-over has its benefits.

Last week’s attack on a portion of KK Park failed to convince observers, despite generating some international headlines when roughly 1,000 foreign nationals fled the park into Myawaddy and across to the Thai side of the border. Unfortunately for the Myanmar government, the incident generated little interest among ASEAN leaders, who were preoccupied with hosting US President Donald Trump, who had come to Malaysia to witness the signing of a peace deal between Thailand and Cambodia.

More significantly, according to a member of the DKBA militia group, the Myanmar military’s advance into KK Park disrupted the existing arrangements between Chinese crime syndicates and their respective landlords—namely the KNA, DKBA, and KNU.

“The offensive against KK Park created considerable anxiety among these Chinese syndicates, who never move around this part of Myanmar without security details,” said a DKBA officer who spoke on condition of anonymity.

“While the Karen groups receive rent and certain benefits from these Chinese syndicates in exchange for broad protection guarantees, it’s the armed bodyguards and security personnel who provide the immediate defensive line for these Chinese bosses and managers. Not all these guards are ethnically Chinese, but they are fluent in Chinese,” he added.

Myanmar was able to advance on KNU positions in recent months and weeks because the BGF/KNA assisted them, according to the Thai officer.

The KNA is a 7,000-strong force led by Col. Chit Thu, a Karen warlord with extensive business interests and connections throughout Myanmar and Thailand.

One observer of the situation along the Thailand-Myanmar border suggested that Chit Thu is no longer satisfied with merely collecting rent—he wants a direct share of profits from these scam centers, according to a source with direct dealings with ethnic armed organizations in Myanmar.

The DKBA, a much smaller outfit with just over 1,000 troops, might outlive its usefulness as a member of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement if the Myanmar government sees no reason to maintain the relationship. Fortunately for the DKBA, the recent attack on the KNU’s 6th Brigade and incursion into KK Park did little to change international perception of Myanmar’s military government.

“If the world viewed the Myanmar junta as the good guys, they wouldn’t have stopped at the KNU 6th Brigade—they would have targeted a low-hanging fruit like the DKBA,” said the Thai police officer in Mae Sot.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based development professional and security analyst.

Anwar’s Lack of Fortune in Thailand’s Far South

Credit: Google Gemini

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com

No Luck Anwar

Every time Anwar succeeded in getting the Thai government to accelerate progress, Thai politics invariably intervened, prolonging the peace process that has never been a high priority for any Thai administration.

Coming into power in November 2022, Anwar – a figure who has endured prison and a long political struggle – inspired excitement among Malay Muslims in Thailand’s southernmost provinces. They saw his rise as a victory against the ruling elite, a narrative that resonates deeply with the Malays of Patani and the rebels as well.

However, when Srettha Thavisin assumed premiership in August 2023, he largely ignored the far south, unwilling to antagonise the Thai Army and its uncompromising counterinsurgency stance. Furthermore, Srettha focused on maintaining a delicate political balance that had enabled Thaksin Shinawatra’s return from exile—a Faustian bargain with the conservative establishment that required careful nurturing. Upsetting the military was not part of that deal.

Yet, the Malaysian-facilitated peace process had been developing for over a decade, and Bangkok could only delay for so long. A nudge from Anwar three months into Srettha’s term led to the appointment of Chatchai Bangchuad, then deputy secretary-general of the National Security Council (NSC), as chief negotiator—the first civilian in the role in 12 years.

This move allowed the Peace Dialogue Panel and Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) – the group controlling combatants on the ground – to resume discussions on the Joint Comprehensive Plan toward Peace (JCPP). This roadmap includes proposed agreements on public consultations, violence reduction and political solutions.

Complications

But in the far south, nothing comes easily. When a draft of the JCPP was leaked, it drew harsh criticism from military and political insiders. Professor Surachart Bamrungsuk, a Pheu Thai insider, relentlessly attacked the NSC-led team, accusing them of exceeding their mandate and criticising European donors for not pressuring the BRN enough to curb the violence on the ground. The backlash left Thai negotiators isolated.

In reality, both Thai and BRN negotiators were participating in mediation training in Europe, and a Japanese organisation even offered to host high-level talks in Tokyo. Furthermore, Thailand participated in a back-channel discussion with BRN through foreign mediation without Malaysia’s participation. But the process never advanced beyond confidence-building measures. The political leadership above the negotiators showed no real intention of offering concessions to BRN or the Patani Malays.

Thai institutions have never been united on the south, even on basic issues like whether to classify BRN as a criminal organisation or as combatants. International NGOs face wrath for using the term “armed conflict”, and bodies like the Organization of Islamic Cooperation are criticised for engaging the BRN. Any hint of legitimacy for the insurgents provokes Thai ire—even as its negotiators are sent to meet with them.

Unlike the 1980s, when Patani Malay fighters received foreign support, today’s combatants are self-sufficient, drawing on local community backing to keep the conflict civil. Malaysia, meanwhile, practises quiet diplomacy, urging both sides to respect humanitarian norms.

But as an interlocutor, Malaysia faces a complex challenge: its proximity and refusal to support separatism require all Malaysian leaders to carefully balance between respecting Thailand’s territorial integrity and acknowledging the historical grievances of the Patani people.

Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, a local political action group, believes Malaysia must do more than just urge Thailand to come to the table. He argues that Thailand needs creative ideas, and Malaysia – with international help – can provide them.

“Negotiation is a give-and-take process,” Artef said, “but Thailand only wants to take.”

He points out to Thailand’s relentless push for a ceasefire, which does little to advance conflict resolution and more for public consumption, as Thai leaders are in a constant campaign to garner public endorsement.

In comparison, Malaysia was successful in mediating the peace process between the Moros and the Philippines government. That was because Malaysia was able to get a firm commitment from Manila for concession and compromise before it took up the mediation role. Malaysia did not make the same demand with Thailand before it committed itself as the mediator in February 2013.

While Malaysian officials discuss the southern Thai conflict with Thai NSC officials regularly, Dato Mohd Rabin Basir, the designated facilitator, has not had much luck reaching the army generals, the lynchpin behind conflict resolution in the far south.

Instability in Bangkok

But obstacles and roadblocks are nothing new in the quest for peace in this historically contested region known as Patani. Thailand’s political instability continues to take its toll.

In August 2024, the Constitutional Court removed Srettha on ethical grounds. He was replaced by Paetongtarn Shinawatra, Thaksin’s daughter, who was shielded by party elders. Her deputy, Phumtham Wechayachai, refused to resume talks unless BRN stopped its violence first. BRN replied that violence reduction was negotiable but demanded international monitoring of any ceasefire.

Thailand rejected these demands, despite BRN’s agreement to negotiate under the Thai Constitution—effectively taking independence off the table. Instead, Bangkok stuck to its old strategy: trying to identify and negotiate directly with the leaders of BRN’s military wing despite not knowing their identities and being unwilling to offer meaningful concessions. BRN insisted that protocol must be respected and insisted that the government do not get to pick and choose who in the movement they want to meet.

The Pheu Thai-led government feared that entering talks amid ongoing attacks would make them look weak. Ironically, it was not BRN that undermined Paetongtarn, but Cambodian leader Hun Sen, a long-time friend of the Shinawatra family. In June, he leaked a private phone call in which she appeared to kowtow to him while criticising her own border security general. The leak triggered a bilateral crisis, leading to border clashes four weeks later that killed 40 people and displaced 300,000.

Malaysia was called upon to mediate again, this time with the United States and China observing. Anwar also nudged Bangkok to restart the peace talks. A new, diverse negotiating team was planned, including retired generals, a former diplomat and a village chief from the far south, with an announcement set for September 2025.

But on 29 August, the Constitutional Court removed Paetongtarn from power over the Hun Sen incident. The Parliament then voted in Bhumjaithai’s Anutin Charnvirakul as prime minister under a four-month agreement with the opposition to pursue constitutional reform.

Anwar, as ASEAN chair, had earlier appointed Thaksin as an advisor on Myanmar and the far south—a move that yielded no results. Thaksin’s influence evaporated entirely on 9 September, when the Supreme Court ruled that his hospital detention was an attempt to avoid his reduced jail sentence. He is now back in jail.

Now, the peace process for the far south is once again in limbo, likely delayed until after the next general election. It makes little sense for a four-month government to appoint a negotiating team only to dissolve it shortly after. But for Anwar, the pursuit of peace in Thailand’s deep south remains a story of promise and perseverance, continuously unravelled by the political fortunes of its neighbour.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

Don Pathan

Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

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Thailand, Myanmar and the Pollution of Thai Waterways

Thai and United Wa State Army soldiers meeting on the border near Mae Hong Son in early 2025. (Credit: Royal Thai Army)

Don Pathan
www.mizzima.com

A ranking member of the Thai Senate, Ms. Angkhana Neelaphaijit, has called for United Nations intervention regarding the pollution of the Kok and Sai rivers, contaminated by Chinese gold and rare earth extraction operations in territories controlled by the Wa militia, located mere kilometers from Thailand’s border with Myanmar.

Angkhana Neelaphaijit

Angkhana referenced the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to justify such intervention.

The 2019 Ramon Magsaysay Award winner, who joined the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances in 2022, argued that China bears moral and legal responsibility to address this issue. She suggested Thailand should petition the UN to raise concerns with China, given Myanmar’s inability to control the United Wa State Army (UWSA), a 30,000-member ethnic armed group maintaining a ceasefire agreement with Myanmar’s government since 1989.

According to the Shan Human Rights Foundation, while recent media coverage has concentrated on gold extraction along the Kok and Sai rivers near UWSA territory approximately 25 kilometers from Thailand’s border, satellite imagery reveals rare earth mining operations at two sites in Mong Yawn, southern Mong Hsat, roughly 25 kilometers from northern Thailand’s border, facing Mae Ai district in Chiang Mai province.

Recent months have witnessed a series of public protests in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces, demanding government action to address the issue with both Myanmar and the UWSA. In early 2025, Thai conservative media sources even advocated military intervention against the Wa, claiming three UWSA outposts had violated Thai territory by 200 meters.

The powerful UWSA controls an autonomous territory along the China-Myanmar frontier. During the late 1990s, the UWSA expanded southward toward the Thai border after collaborating with Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw, to eliminate their longtime adversary, Shan opium warlord Khun Sa and his Mong Tai Army (MTA).

Access to UWSA territories remains strictly controlled. Myanmar military personnel and government representatives must surrender weapons and accept escort.

Responding to mounting public pressure regarding river contamination, Thailand and Myanmar took a modest bilateral initiative last week, agreeing during Naypyidaw discussions to establish a joint committee addressing the Kok and Sai river pollution.

Both nations are committed to enhancing river water quality, sharing water management information, and creating a joint technical working group for concrete cooperation on contamination solutions. However, the agreement made no reference to the UWSA or China.

A senior Thai military official from the Third Army Area command said there have been internal discussions about approaching China directly, since negotiations with the UWSA and seeking the Myanmar government's assistance have proven ineffective.

Thailand’s communications with the UWSA have consistently involved the group’s southern command, which invariably defers major decisions to Panghsang, their organization’s headquarters on the Sino-Myanmar border. This includes Thailand’s request for UWSA to move back from at least nine outposts that are situated right on the Thai border; three of these outposts are allegedly positioned 200 meters inside Thai territory. Wa forces maintain that orders must originate from Panghsang and suggest Thailand address border demarcation issues with Myanmar’s government, as they concern state sovereignty.

Other ethnic armed organizations said the UWSA will take no action without receiving concessions from Thailand. Like similar groups, legitimacy and recognition are something that are often desired. However, Thailand refuses to offer concessions to the UWSA, particularly given its drug trafficking history.

Several UWSA leaders face US Federal Court indictments for heroin trafficking and related crime, while their southern commander, Wei Hsueh-kang, carries a US$2 million bounty from American authorities for his conviction as far back as 1993.

Wei and his brothers, originally from Yunnan, arrived in the Burmese Golden Triangle during the 1970s, initially as Kuomintang operatives before entering the profitable heroin trade. When the UWSA formed in 1989 following the Communist Party of Burma’s dissolution, Wei provided financial backing, transforming the organization into Myanmar’s most formidable ethnic armed group. The UWSA granted him access to opium supplies needed for producing premium grade 4 heroin, known as “China White.”

The Tatmadaw quickly established a ceasefire arrangement with the UWSA, and within a decade, the Wa had effectively moved southward, displacing longtime rival Khun Sa’s now-defunct Mong Tai Army (MTA) and occupying territories along the Thailand-Myanmar frontier. Currently, UWSA installations, camps, and strongholds populate newly constructed settlements along Myanmar’s border adjacent to Thailand’s Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai, and portions of Mae Hong Son provinces.

Thailand’s requests for Tatmadaw mediation with the UWSA are not unprecedented. In 2014, the Thai Army discussed UWSA border positions with Myanmar leader Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing during his Thailand visit. As of today, the Tatmadaw possesses limited influence over the UWSA.

But the same cannot be said about China. Last week, the UWSA declared it would terminate all assistance to allied groups battling Myanmar’s military, citing a request from China.

“Beginning immediately, Wa State will not provide weapons, military transit, or economic assistance to other organizations under any circumstances, at any time or location,” announced Zhao Guoan, Wa Vice Chairman and Foreign Relations Minister, informing representatives from the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) during an August 20, 2025 high-level meeting in Panghsang.

The Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN) reported that Zhao attributed this reluctant decision to intense Beijing pressure. Chinese authorities had frozen billions in Wa State institutional, corporate, and individual assets, implemented comprehensive border restrictions, and threatened severe measures unless the Wa ceased supporting armed groups in active conflict, according to SHAN, citing Wa News Land, the UWSA’s media outlet, as saying.

Since the Brotherhood Alliance’s late 2023 offensive began, China has served as a peace broker between Myanmar and ethnic armed organizations. Beijing's position gradually shifted toward supporting the Burmese junta, demanding that certain groups, particularly the TNLA and MNDAA, return territories captured from Myanmar’s military. Analysts believe China views Myanmar’s military government as the sole entity capable of maintaining national unity, with current support aimed at ensuring the upcoming December 2025 and January 2026 General Elections proceed smoothly enough to legitimize the new administration. Ultimately, this concerns risk mitigation for Chinese investments, trade routes, and strategic interests rather than power-sharing arrangements between the Myanmar military government and the ethnic armed organizations.

UWSA: An Uncomfortable Neighbor

Surprisingly, there were periods when Thai soldiers and United Wa State Army (UWSA) troops engaged in friendly volleyball matches along the northern border.

These games represented friendly overtures from new neighbors whose presence deeply concerned the Thai Army for multiple reasons. The UWSA’s notorious drug trafficking reputation and their regional commander, Wei Hsueh-kang, certainly didn’t help matters.

Furthermore, Thailand and the UWSA never developed the necessary comfort level for peaceful coexistence. Typically, ethnic armed organizations maintaining ceasefires with the Tatmadaw are perceived as threats to Thailand, while those fighting Myanmar for self-governance or independence are considered allies and sometimes serve as buffers or proxies for Thai military forces.

After securing their southern command along the Thai border, the UWSA forcibly relocated over 100,000 Wa villagers from their China-Myanmar border stronghold to the southern command area.

However, the UWSA failed to convince Thai military leadership they posed no national threat. The massive population movement from the north, Wa drug operations and illicit regional investments, and the general perception that ceasefire-holding ethnic armed organizations threaten Thailand’s security—all contributed to maintaining this suspicious outlook.

Undoubtedly, historical distrust between Thailand and Burma shaped this threat perception, which traditionally views Myanmar’s friends and allies as dangers to Thailand.

Nevertheless, Thailand-Myanmar bilateral relations have not always been straightforward. Despite mistrust, various Thai governments since decolonization have served as Myanmar’s bridge to the international community, seeking to isolate the regime for its severe human rights abuses. Thailand was the first to enter Burma following the 1988 bloody crackdown against the pro-democracy uprising. Thaksin Shinawatra, shortly after assuming power in 2001, made extraordinary efforts to strengthen bilateral economic relations with the country. His assistance to Myanmar included whitewashing the UWSA through the Yongka Project development initiative, which never materialized due to a lack of international funding.

Over time, Wa-Thai military clashes gradually ceased, but tensions persisted. Thai security officials report the UWSA has not forgotten the “Surisri 143” incident—allegedly a Thai Army training exercise in May 2002 that saw Thai forces cross the border in tracked vehicles, supported by mortars and artillery, conducting a 24-hour operation eliminating several Wa positions. Some outposts were jointly occupied by the Tatmadaw. Thaksin later claimed the Army had “overreacted.”

While the UWSA sought to avoid war with Thailand and desired peace, they were unlikely to easily forget the May 2002 violence. Although both sides no longer engage in border gunfights, that two-decade-old hostility continues influencing Wa attitudes toward Thailand.

Unlike the early 2000s when Wa troops regularly exchanged gunfire with Thai soldiers, UWSA leaders would grant interviews and permit foreign media access to their China-Burma border territory. Today, statements are released through media platforms. Most posts showcase military strength through parades, troop movements, and daily training activities.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

THAILAND-CAMBODIA BORDER CRISIS

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The toxic nationalism of the Thai-Cambodia border crisis

Bangkok's rush to punish neighbor may hurt industries, stoke political dysfunction

 

Don Pathan

August 26, 2025 17:05 JST

 

Thai military and Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) personnel stand guard near the Thai-Cambodian border at Chong Chub Ta Mok area in Surin Province, Thailand, on Aug. 20, 2025.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

Following the border clashes that erupted on July 24 and lasted five days until a ceasefire was reached, Thai people from all walks of life are united in their anger against Cambodia and have come together to punish their eastern neighbor in any way they can -- despite knowing that their toxic nationalism comes with a heavy price.

More than 40 people were killed and about 300,000 were displaced by cross-border attacks on both countries. Not only are bilateral ties at a new low, the social and economic fabric of these two nations whose people share similar cultural traits -- residents along both sides of the border are predominantly Khmer-speakers -- has been ripped apart.

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