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Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com
Resumed Talks
After nearly two years of stagnation, peace negotiations between the Thai government and the rebel Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) are getting back on track. Leaders from both sides met recently to acquaint themselves and prepare for a high-level official meeting next month, facilitated by Malaysia.
Thailand’s newly appointed chief negotiator for the conflict, Gen (rtd) Somsak Rungsita, along with National Security Council (NSC) Secretary-General Chatchai Bangchuad, met with BRN chief negotiator Anas Abdulrohman in Kuala Lumpur on 11 November 2025.
According to a press statement from the Office of the Malaysian Government Facilitator, the meeting was “cordial and constructive”, with both parties committing to resume official and technical dialogues in December 2025. The meeting was facilitated by retired Malaysian NSC chief Mohd Rabin Bashir.
A BRN officer from the negotiation team said the organisation acknowledges the short time the current government of Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has in office but pledged the movement would do its utmost to ensure continuity.
The last high-level talks with the BRN – the longstanding separatist group that controls combatants in Thailand’s far south – were held in Kuala Lumpur on 6-7 February 2024.
Past Setbacks
As for the meeting next month, the two sides will pick up where they left off—discussing the Joint Comprehensive Plan toward Peace (JCPP). This framework identifies three key items: reduction of violence, public consultation and a political solution to end the conflict, which has claimed over 7,700 lives since the current wave of insurgency resurfaced in January 2004. The region is the historical Malay homeland known as Patani.
Initially, they had planned to delve deeper into these three items. However, fierce criticism from insiders of the then-ruling Pheu Thai Party, particularly Prof Surachart Bamrungsuk, sidelined the negotiators and effectively put formal talks on hold for nearly two years.
Surachart was upset that the Thai team had not made the reduction of violence a binding commitment and lashed out at international donors for not pressuring the BRN to end its violent tactics; he said their role in the peace process has helped to legitimise BRN.
Still, quiet discussions between BRN and Thai representatives continued outside the formal track. During a meeting at the beginning of this year, the Thai side requested a temporary ceasefire during the holy month of Ramadhan, which ran from 1 to 30 March 2025.
BRN agreed on the condition that international observers be permitted on the ground and an unspecified number of detainees be released. The then-defence minister Phumtham Wechayachai rejected the proposal, insisting the government would only negotiate if BRN ended its campaign of violence and that they would only talk with those who have command-and-control over militants on the ground.
When political discussions hit a brick wall, BRN’s military wing took charge to map out the next move. On 9 March, a 10-strong BRN unit attacked the Sungai Kolok district office in Narathiwat, killing two Defence Volunteers (security details for the Ministry of Interior officials) and wounding eight others.
The combatants left behind a car packed with explosives that detonated during their retreat. The car bomb ripped through the district office compound, sending a stern message to Bangkok that it does not get to decide who represents BRN at the negotiating table.
Differing Definitions of “Peace”
Today, with Pheu Thai and Surachart out, NSC has returned to the fold. A public event was organised by NSC on 29 October where all former chief negotiators were invited to share their experiences. They largely echoed the same points: that there is continuity despite political instability, a commitment to peace and that Thailand’s territorial integrity remains paramount.
But academic and peace expert Mark Tamthai, who led the negotiation team under former premier Abhisit Vejjajiva, said Thailand has yet to understand the nature of the conflict in the far south and therefore has not developed the necessary tools to extinguish it.
“At first, there is the simplistic view that people take up arms because they are upset with the state. But the reality is more complicated than that,” said Mark, a retired professor of peace studies at Chiang Mai’s Payap University.
Mark believes there must be a better way to involve the public because their participation could help strengthen the peace process and generate traction.
“My other question is why the peace process doesn’t seem to be going anywhere. We take a step forward and then take a step back. Why is that?” he asked.
One reason the process seems circular is that both sides define peace differently.
“For the government, peace is the absence of violence, as well as the people of Patani living within the framework set by the government. They are not allowed to make too many demands, such as self-determination rights, and there can also be no seminar on a public referendum,” Mark said. “If these demands continue to surface, in the state’s view, then the fire in the south has yet to be put out.”
Mark said BRN and local civil society agree with the state on the first point—that regional violence must end. But the second point involves opening a political space where no issue is off-limits. This is where the two sides differ greatly, as demonstrated by the ongoing court case against political activists in the far south.
“I’m glad that the new chief negotiator (Gen [rtd] Somsak) wants to hear what the local people are saying. But you must be serious about wanting to listen; you can’t let them speak and then turn around and charge them with whatever law is at hand.”
Mark also pointed to JCPP as an example of progress that can only go so far. “But when the issue of public consultation comes up, some people retreat. Why? Because public consultation doesn’t fit their definition of what is politically permissible,” he said.
Hurdles
The upcoming high-level meeting will not be a walk in the park. It comes at a time when flimsy charges are being levied against five civic actors, scheduled to appear in the Pattani Criminal Court on 20 November 2025, to face charges of advocating separatism during a 2023 seminar that they had participated in.
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| From left to right: Artef Sohko – President of The Patani; Hussen Bue-nae – Former President, Student Organization of Yala Rajabhat University (YRUSO); Irfan Umar – Member of The Patani; Sareef Salaeman – Patani–Malay cultural youth activist, Student at PSU Pattani, Member of The Patani; and Hakim Pongtigor – Deputy Secretary-General, Fair Party at the time of the seminar, currently senior member of The Patani. Photo taken in front of the Office of the Attorney General in Pattani. (Photo Credit: The Patani) |
What got on the nerves of the region’s military command was the mock referendum, which asked participants a hypothetical question on whether they would support the idea of a referendum on rights to self-determination if Thai law permitted it. They did not advocate independence or encourage political mobilisation to call for separatism. But a hypothetical question was enough for the military to push for legal action against the activists.
Moreover, old issues like public consultation under the framework of JCPP remain far from resolved. BRN has informed Thailand that its representatives should be permitted to enter the far south to conduct in-person public consultations.
This request was rejected by the Thai army, whose leaders feared a public relations nightmare. One military intelligence officer, speaking on condition of anonymity, asked to imagine an outpouring of public support for BRN delegates; such a scene would not only embarrass the Thai side but also shatter its long-standing claim that the Malays of Patani side with them.
Making the Most of Limited Time
After nearly two years of a halted formal process, BRN considered the setting up of a negotiating team as somewhat pretentious, considering the government has only less than four months in office before a general election is called. Yet, it could set a precedent for the incoming administration, especially if the ruling Bhumjaithai Party is part of the coalition and tasked with conflict resolution in the far south.
“We are looking to make the most of it given the limited time in office of this government,” one BRN operative said.
BRN has already stated it is willing to settle for something less than full independence. The ball now seems to be in Thailand’s court to reciprocate.
For Artef Sohko, president of The Patani – a political action group that often acts as an interlocutor between BRN and Thai government agencies – the clock is ticking. The next wave of BRN leaders might not be as accommodating as the current ones.
If the Thai government continues to kick the can down the road, the next generation of BRN leaders could retreat from their commitment to work within the Thai Constitution. Artef is one of the five civic actors being charged with advocating separatism for participating in a mock referendum.
The challenge for the current and incoming government is enormous. It is unclear if Bhumjaithai has the appetite or the mindset for a challenge that demands creative policy and serious thought about what aspects of Thailand’s nation-state construct must be revised for the sake of peace and peaceful coexistence with the Malays of Patani.
Moreover, violence in this historically contested region has been on the rise, with combatants (who are operating quite freely) straying outside the normal theatre of conflict. Last month’s gold heist in Narathiwat, where over 36.5 million baht worth of gold was stolen, as well as a botched bombing operation in major tourist spots on the Andaman coast in June 2025, are examples of how the absence of a political platform has allowed violence to morph and spread. BRN made no public statement about the 11 bombs unearthed in Krabi and Phuket provinces, but it did say that without a formal peace process, increased violence and attacks outside historically contested areas are inevitable.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.
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