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| Wa and Thai soldiers on the border, Dec 2024 (Credit: Royal Thai Army) |
Founded in 1989 after the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) disintegrated, the UWSA initially comprised ethnic Wa soldiers who mutinied against their CPB leaders. They established their organization and reached a verbal ceasefire with Myanmar, cementing their role as a strong Chinese ally. Over time, the UWSA expanded its influence and now supports various ethnic armed groups in Myanmar, including the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang Chinese), Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Kachin Independence Army, the Arakan Army, and the Shan State Army-North.
The UWSA strengthened its foothold along the Thailand-Myanmar border after ousting its longtime rival, the Mong Tai Army (MTA) of late opium warlord Khun Sa, in the late 1990s. Ignoring instructions from the Myanmar government to return to the China-Myanmar border, the UWSA forcibly mobilized approximately 100,000 people from the north to newly built towns and cities near the Thai border, including areas once occupied by the MTA.
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| UWSA mass relocation to the Thai border. |
The UWSA is no ordinary ethnic armed organization. From a marginalized group in mainland Southeast Asia known for headhunting, the ethnic Wa became the most significant component of the now-defunct CPB. When the organization collapsed along ethnic lines in 1989, the Wa retained enough weapons to last another decade.
The Confrontations
Known for their battlefield ferocity, the Wa faction in the CPB established the UWSA in 1989. A verbal ceasefire agreement was immediately established with the then-Myanmar’s security chief, Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt, allowing the UWSA to govern Special Region 2 and cultivate whatever crops they deemed appropriate. Opium became the natural choice in these rugged hills where warlords and freedom fighters operated.
Besides several strongholds deep inside Shan State along Thailand’s Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai, and Mae Hong Son borders, the UWSA established nine outposts directly on the still-undemarcated border.
Initially, there were even volleyball games between troops from both sides. However, everyone knew the good times wouldn’t last. The turning point came one morning in February 1999, when authorities discovered nine Thai villagers from Chiang Mai’s Fang district beaten to death with their hands tied behind their backs. A local official said the victims were on a hunting trip but encountered a drug caravan transporting methamphetamines and had to be eliminated. Burmese language learning software
All fingers pointed to the Wa militia. This incident prompted Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai’s government to close the border leading to Mong Yawn, a UWSA southern stronghold where Thai developers had been working to build towns and cities to accommodate Wa expansion into the southern command.
The low point came in May 2002, during what was officially billed as a field training exercise. Surasri 143, Thai soldiers, with mortar and artillery support, crossed into Myanmar territory and attacked UWSA positions, some jointly occupied by the Tatmadaw. Thaksin claimed the Army had “overreacted.”
The following year, in February 2003, Thaksin turned his counter-narcotic efforts inward and launched his ‘war on drugs,’ ostensibly aimed at suppressing drug traffickers. In the campaign’s first three months, approximately 2,800 extrajudicial killings occurred. A 2007 official investigation found that more than half of those killed had no connection to drugs whatsoever.
Thaksin’s Strategy and Miscalculations
When Thaksin assumed power in 2001, he wasted no time demonizing the UWSA, referred to as the “Red Wa” by the Thais, vowing to capture Wei Hsueh-kang “dead or alive.” For Thaksin, the UWSA seemed like a low-hanging fruit—or so he thought. However, he would learn that everything carries a political price. The UWSA had powerful allies: besides old comrades in China, the Wa maintained ties with the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military.
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| Wei Hsueh-kang (file photo) |
Thaksin believed he could improve bilateral relations and stability with Myanmar by strengthening economic ties while ignoring ground realities. Ultimately, he was outsmarted by Khin Nyunt, as Myanmar generals historically do with their Thai counterparts. The Myanmar intelligence chief succeeded in getting Thaksin to co-sponsor the Yongkha Project, a massive development and crop substitution initiative in a UWSA-controlled area near the Thai border. Burmese language learning software
The Thai government invested 20 million baht in seed money, hoping others in the international community would follow. However, nobody wanted involvement in a project that seemed more focused on whitewashing the UWSA—dubbed the world’s largest armed drug trafficking army by the US State Department—than enhancing Myanmar villagers’ livelihoods.
The opening ceremony featured the bizarre sight of Third Army Area commander Lt-Gen Picharnmate Muangmanee walking hand-in-hand with UWSA Chairman Bao Yu-xiang, with Myanmar’s Triangle Commander Brig. General Khin Zaw between them. These were strange bedfellows indeed, considering that just a year earlier, Wa and Thai soldiers had engaged in regular gunfights along their common border.
Contemporary Challenges
The situation was never meant to be smooth sailing, but the return of coup-toppled, criminally convicted Thaksin—the de facto leader of Thailand’s ruling Pheu Thai Party— from self-imposed exile in August 2023. His role in Thai politics has drawn criticism from the media and conservative military-royalist circles who never trusted him to begin with.
The Faustian bargain he helped orchestrate between Pheu Thai and their former political foes—the junta behind the 2014 coup that ousted his sister Yingluck—was never meant to last. Critics now attack him and his daughter Paetongtarn, the current prime minister, over various issues, from the friendly deals with Cambodia over the overlapping territorial claims in the Gulf of Thailand to the three UWSA outposts that allegedly encroach about 200 meters into Thailand, according to Google Maps (since no official demarcation exists). He also tried to present himself as a peace broker between resistance forces and the junta in Myanmar. They all rejected him.
Thai soldiers in the northern command have held meetings with Wa leaders in the southern command area. Wa soldiers claim willingness to retreat, but orders must come from Panghsang, the UWSA headquarters on the Chinese border. According to informed sources, Panghsang has suggested that Thailand raise this issue with Myanmar’s central government as a sovereignty matter. Interestingly, Myanmar officials cannot enter UWSA territory unless disarmed and under escort.
Thailand raised this issue with Tatmadaw leader Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing as early as 2014, to no avail. According to Myanmar resistance forces, the UWSA will not make any moves without meaningful concessions in return.
Environmental and Political Pressures
Today, as Thaksin faces criticism from right-wing media and much of the public, including former supporters alienated by the Faustian deal that created the current shaky coalition, he has returned to demonizing the Wa. He has even suggested Thailand could take matters into its own hands if Myanmar’s government proves unable to act. The problem is that the Thai Army has no desire to return to the old days of border clashes. However, with Thaksin shaping current discourse on the issue, finding common ground with the UWSA becomes increasingly difficult.
Don Pathan in Panghsang, 2003. (Courtesy of UWSA)
Conclusion
The situation along the Thailand-Myanmar border has always been fraught with tension, and Thailand’s internal political dynamics further complicate matters as off-the-cuff statements from political leaders like Thaksin create additional challenges.
The Thai government faces the complex task of managing relations with Myanmar’s UWSA, navigating domestic political opposition, and balancing its role in broader regional power struggles involving China, Myanmar, and various ethnic groups. How Thailand responds to these challenges in the coming months could significantly influence both its political landscape and its role in regional geopolitics. Burmese language learning software
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst. The views expressed here in this commentary do not necessarily reflect the views of Mizzima Media.
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