Lights, camera, action!

The recent spike in violence in the South is spearheaded by a new crop of insurgents who often choose to attack in front of security cameras, striving for a bigger psychological impact.

Don Pathan
The Nation on Sunday

Pattani

It was like synchronised swimming. The two pickup trucks came from behind and neatly positioned themselves adjacent to each of the two motorbikes. Within a split second of coming neck-and-neck with the two motorbikes, the gunmen on the back of the pickups commenced fire, riddling four soldiers with bullets from close range.

Another pickup truck flanked the third motorbike and kept the two remaining soldiers at bay with sporadic gunfire. Outgunned and outnumbered, the soldiers stayed put and then retreated.

The timing and coordination of the Ma-Yor attack was dead on. But this was not Olympic sport. In fact, such incidents take place almost on a daily basis in the three southernmost border provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat where more than 5,000 have died in the violence.

It didn't take long for the footage to make its way to local television, YouTube and other media. The vividness of the Ma-Yor attack sent a big chill throughout the country and shook up security officials and policy-makers, who are now forced to explain the spike in violence despite claims of progress on the ground.

"The insurgents appeared to be more daring and bold, often choosing to attack in front of security cameras. They are looking to create a greater psychological impact with little regard to civilian casualties, said Human Rights Watch's Sunai Phasuk.

Leaders in the exiled community confirmed the analysis, saying the current crop of militants, locally referred to as juwae, or fighters in Patani Malay dialect, have stepped up their attacks in recent months as part of their ongoing strategy to make the area as ungovernable as possible.

As a sign of desperation, the government quickly appointed Deputy PM Chalerm Yoobamrung, a veteran but erratic politician, to take care of security matters in the deep South.

Angkhana Neelaphaijit, chairperson of the Justice for Peace Foundation, called the move a "knee-jerk" reaction. "I believe Prime Minister Yingluck needs to take direct charge of the situation in the South, instead of passing the buck to a politician who has a reputation of disrespecting other people's viewpoints."

Two days after the announcement, the insurgents launched an attack on CS Pattani Hotel, a place popular among foreigners and local VIPs visiting the deep South. And last Wednesday, a public school came under arson attack. The incident was a chilling reminder of 2007, when more than 100 public schools were burned down by insurgents.

Assistant Prof Srisompob Jitpiromsri, the director of Prince of Songkhla University-based Deep South Watch, believes the insurgents are drifting towards a higher level of information warfare. "It was as if they were performing for the camera, as if they wanted the authorities to see what they are capable of doing," said Srisompob, in reference to the Ma-Yor and other attacks.

"Insurgency and terrorism are essentially communicative actions. In the Ma-Yor operation, the insurgency scored big and managed to use the government's communication equipment to get their point across," Srisompob said.

If the insurgents in the deep South are looking to create greater psychological impact by their activities, then making the area ungovernable may no longer be enough for them.

For the time being, said Sunai, all agencies are hard-pressed to come up with a better explanation and analysis than the usual simplistic line that described the militants as drug-crazy youth who have embraced false Islamic teachings and are being taught a distorted version of Thailand's history. The spike in violence over the past eight months coincides with the government's effort to carry out secret talks with leaders of long-standing separatist groups in exile. They are hoping the old guard could talk sense to the new generation of militants. The talks led up to a secret meeting last March between fugitive Thaksin Shinawatra, the de facto leader of the current government, and about 16 Patani Malay separatist leaders.

Thaksin thought his presence would make a difference. But as it turned out, the meeting was boycotted by the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), the one group that has the best working relations with the new generation of militants currently operating on the ground.

Two weeks after the meeting, militants on the ground carried out triple bomb attacks on a short stretch of a busy street in downtown Yala, killing 10 and injuring more than 100 people. The same day also saw a car bomb going off at a basement parking lot in a downtown hotel in Hat Yai that killed three and injured more than 400.

Sunai called the March 31 attack a slap in the face for Thaksin and the so-called peace initiative of the government. With the secret peace move floundering and violence rising, all eyes are on Yingluck to see what steps she will take.

The fight over the peace process prolongs conflict

Don Pathan
The Nation

The recent transfer of National Security Council (NSC) Deputy Secretary-General Somkiat Boonchoo to an inactive post in the Prime Minister's Office has raised a lot of eyebrows among those who closely observe the ongoing insurgency in Thailand's deep South.

After all, here was a man who had followed the conflict in the region with a high degree of consistency. Somkiat has been replaced by Lieutenant-General Paradon Pattanathaboot, who returns to a post he once held until he was removed by the previous government.

Technically, it is a swap. But in the Thai political context, if one's name card says you're an "advisor to the Prime Minister's Office", it can mean you were transferred to the post because you are considered deadwood. Or it could be that you are someone with high integrity, thus making you incompatible with the government of the day - especially an administration as insecure as this one. No one doubts Somkiat's integrity, however.

Somkiat has contributed to the recently announced NSC plan that includes recommendations for the government to consider establishing a "safe zone" where dialogue between the authorities and militant separatists could take place.

Besides pushing the idea of dialogue with the separatists into the public sphere, Somkiat's direct participation marked a significant shift that paved the way for more civilian agencies and non-Army personnel, as well as civil society representatives, to get involved in the secret "peace process".

From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, this job was exclusively reserved for Army personnel. That changed in late 2005 when the then NSC chief General Winai Pathiyakul, along with the then NSC's director Lieutenant-General Vaipot Srinual, took part in the now-defunct Langkawi Process, a peace initiative launched by former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohammed.

This was during the time when Thaksin Shinwatra was the country's prime minister, although he didn't pay much attention to the recommendations from the process.

After the 2006 coup that ousted Thaksin, the NSC was given greater responsibility by the Surayud Chulanont government. In fact, Surayud had opened the door for other agencies and ministries to take part in the process, which included reaching out to neighbouring countries, professional mediators and the international community for help in this daunting task.

The secret peace process drifted off the radar screen during the two pro-Thaksin administrations of Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat. It came back on the screen again during Abhisit Vejjajiva's tenure as prime minister.

But the NSC was not the only agency talking to the leaders of the long-standing separatist movement. Other agencies got in on the act as well. Everybody, it seemed, wanted to become a peace broker, but nobody wanted to work with anyone else.

When Yingluck Shinawatra came into power and appointed favourite bureaucrat, Police Colonel Thawee Sodsong as the new secretary-general of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), the task of talking to the enemy was given to him.

Somkiat saw the writing on the wall and understood full well what this meant for the NSC's secret initiative. But those who know him didn't think the Thaksin camp would go as far as removing him from his post at the NSC.

It is not clear what Paradon's job will be in the NSC, but political insiders believe his main duty is to ensure that the NSC strategy and future plan will be in line with the peace initiative of the Thaksin camp, spearheaded by Thawee.

In fact, Thawee was already acting as the head of Thailand's "peace delegation" almost immediately after this government came to power, and he moved to the SBPAC office about a year ago.

In the months leading up to March, Thawee was sending representatives abroad to meet with leaders of the long-standing separatist groups - the old guard - in the hope that they would convince the new generation of militants on the ground to end their campaign of violence.

These leaders claimed to have dialogue and working relations with the militants, locally referred to as juwae, but few observers and officials were convinced that the link was strong enough to constitute a shared command, or command-and-control in military language.

Moreover, Thawee thought that by bringing Thaksin into the picture, the separatist leaders would be convinced that the Thai side was sincere about its commitment. And so a secret meeting between Thaksin and a group of 17 separatist leaders was held in mid-March. Nothing major came out of it, as expected, as the encounter was more symbolic than anything else.

The interesting part was not so much which separatist groups showed up but which one didn't. Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), the group with the best working relationship with the juwae, boycotted the meeting because it couldn't forgive Thaksin for his heavy-handed and abusive tactics when he was in power.

For the BRN-C to surface and come to the table at this point in time, there would have to be great demands and expectations - the kind of expectations and demands that neither side will be able to deliver.

According to BRN-C and other separatist sources, although the BRN-C may have the best working relationship with the juwae, this link does not constitute a shared command.

To add insult to the boycott, the juwae on March 31 carried out massive car-bomb attacks in Hat Yai and Yala. With more than a dozen killed and over 100 injured in the two incidents, the insurgent violence in Thailand's deep South reached a new threshold. It was a slap in the face for Thaksin and his cronies.

The Army and the opposition Democrat Party didn't waste time in ridiculing the government about Thaksin's participation in the secret talks, despite the fact that all parties have at one time or another talked to the representatives of the separatists.

Thaksin, of course, denied meeting the separatists. So much for the so-called commitment. As the government retreats to the drawing board, it has decided to ditch Somkiat, the one man who knows a great deal about the conflict in the region.

But Somkiat's absence doesn't mean Thawee's job will be easier. Somkiat would have been a good resource person for Thawee but the manner in which he was sidelined suggests that the Thaksin camp wants to have complete control of the process even though their effort so far has not produced any meaningful result.

Moreover, the Army's ridiculing the government for "talking to the enemy" should not be equated to an uncompromising stance because the Army, too, talks to the separatists. Essentially the spitting contest among these power cliques is all about having full control of the peace process.

One way out of this quagmire, according to several observers and insiders, is to have the government designate an agency that has full control over peace processes, similar to the one in the Philippines. With a full political mandate, the military and other agencies would have no choice but to get in line or miss the boat.

Wishful thinking perhaps. For the time being, the government's hopes are still pinned on Thawee, hoping that he can come up with something bold and creative. But where he goes from here is anybody's guess.

Thailand has no clue how to end the insurgency in the South

Don Pathan
The Nation

Justice and equality for the Malay-Muslims in the three southernmost provinces is high on the agenda of the high-level representatives of the 56-member Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), as Foreign Minister Surapong Tovichakchaikul confirmed that the delegates have asked about the use of the controversial Emergency Degree to quell the ongoing insurgency.

The delegation is headed by Ambassador Sayed Kassem El-Masry, an Egyptian envoy who visited the country last in 2005. In spite of the long absence between the previous and this visit, the OIC has consistently to look for ways to engage in resolution of the conflict in the restive region, meeting with the Patani Malay diaspora and people who keep a close watch on developments in Thailand's deep South.

But Bangkok, under successive governments, has never been comfortable with the idea of permitting the OIC, or any outsiders for that matter, to get involved in mediation or peace talks with the rebels, for fear that the issue would be internationalised. But denying them the political capital has not changed the course of the violence either.

Thailand’s was granted the status of Permanent Observer in the OIC in the late 1990s during the Chuan Leekpa administration. It was Thailand’s way of blocking the separatists from the setting any official recognition from the Islamic grouping.

To Bangkok's disappointment, in late 2010, the OIC met for two days with leaders of the long-standing separatist groups in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and in Kuala Lumpur. The meetings were carried out simultaneously from the end of September to the start of October. The OIC secretary-general, Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, chaired the meeting in Jeddah, while Talal A Daous, the organisation's director for the Muslim Minorities and Communities Department, chaired the gathering in Kuala Lumpur.

According to diplomatic and exiled sources, the OIC urged the long-standing separatist groups to combine efforts and form a United Patani People's Council (UPPC). As for the question of the mandate, the Patani People's Congress (PCC) would be the forum that draws its legitimacy from the people in the Malay historical homeland that is now part of Thailand's three southernmost provinces. How the PCC would operate, violating Thailand's sovereignty, remained a big question.

But the then foreign minister, Kasit Piromya, decided to pour cold water on the idea of permitting the OIC to mediate in the conflict, and the organisation was forced to retreat to the drawing baard.

Today, just weeks after massive car bomb attacks in Hat Yai and Yala that resulted in the deaths of more than ten people and injuries to more than 100 others, the OIC is back in the spotlight. Thailand is hard pressed to come up with answers to the insurgency because the business-as-usual approach can no longer contain the violence. The devastating nature of the Yala and Hat Yai attacks suggest that a new threshold has been crossed and the worst is yet to come. And the fact that Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra repeated the same old mantra during her recent visit to the region is not very encouraging.

The OIC's visit could very well be part of Thailand's effort to put on a brave, positive, active face, to create the impression that the state is doing something about the conflict.

The OIC mediating in the conflict might not be part of the official agenda but one can be certain that many stakeholders, especially the separatist leaders, wouldn't mind seeing the OIC involved in some kind of peace process.

One thing Thailand is concerned about is that the OIC could be too sympathetic to the separatist movement. But one prominent exiled leader, who has had dealings with the the OIC over the past three decades, said the organisation respects Thailand's territorial integrity and has never really entertained the idea of seeing the Muslim-majority deep South divided from the Kingdom.

"The OIC is essentially a state actor. It would be in Thailand's interest to have the OIC involved in mediation, but successive Thai governments are just too afraid to take the chance," said the exiled leader, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Although the Foreign Ministry has been the public face for Thailand in answering nagging questions about the ongoing conflict in the Malay-speaking region, it is the military and policy-makers at Government House that are the ones who set the policy and directions on how the country deals with the separatists.

During the administration of Abhisit Vejjajiva, the National Security Council (NSC) was given the task of formulating peace talks with the separatist movement. The Army wasn't too thrilled with the idea but nevertheless, sent a senior officer to observe the NSC-led process. One explanation for the willingness to appear to be cooperative may have to with the fact that the Army and the Democrat-led government were on good terms.

But when the Pheu Thai Party came to power, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra handed responsibility for the situation to the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC), which is headed by Thawee Sodsong, one of the party's favourite bureaucrats.

But instead of addressing the root cause of the conflict, Thawee has treated the job as if he is preparing for a sort of summit with de facto leader, Thaksin Shinawatra; that being the goal in itself. Thaksin met with a group of about 16 exiled leaders in mid-March but nothing meaningful came out of it. Moreover, it was heavily politicised by the opposition and the military when the event became public information. Thawee and Pheu Thai are back to the drawing board.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the meeting with Thaksin was not so much who was there but who wasn't. The Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), the group with the best working relations with the militants on the ground, boycotted the meeting, saying it could never forgive Thaksin for "what he has done to the Malays of Patani". They were referring to his heavy-handed tactics during his rule, which he blamed on bureaucrats for providing him with inaccurate information.

But the BRN-Coordinate says it is not completely ruling out the idea of talking to the Thais, as long as it is not Thaksin's camp. Moreover, senior members in the movement say they have yet to establish an adequate command-and-control relationship with the militants on the ground.

It remains to be seen if Bangkok will ask the OIC to get the BRN-Coordinate to let bygones be bygones and take up any olive branch from the Pheu Thai camp. But if the recent devastating car bombs in Yala and Hat Yai tell us anything, it is that the insurgents are not in the mood to talk.

Hearts and minds not won in Thailand's deep South

By Don Pathan
The Nation

Ban Sa-eh, Thailand

The foul smell from five pools of blood was still apparent on a hillside at the remote village of Ban Sa-eh in Krong Pinang subdistrict of Yala, just 20 hours after a gunfight between scores of security officers and about a dozen Malay-Muslim insurgents ended.
Five militants, known locally as juwae, were shot dead, while six fled over the hill after holding their ground for about half an hour.

Media and police reports, as expected, painted the security forces as heroic and hard-working, but local residents appear to be more concerned with possible extrajudicial killings, not to mention the culture of impunity of security officers.
Traces of the bullets suggest that weapons were being fired from three different directions. This confirms the story of a local military officer of two teams of security officials creeping up on a group of about 11 insurgents lying low in a cabin on a hill outside this remote village in the early afternoon. A pot full of instant noodles inside the cabin suggested that they were about to have lunch.

One village elder, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that at least 11 young men had been coming in and out of the cabin for the past month.

“I didn’t ask what they were doing and didn’t really want to know. But I told them that a group of people who were hunting wild boars came across their hideout and suggested that they should relocate,” said the villager. “But they didn’t take my warning seriously.”
The government’s strategy is to win the hearts and minds of local Malay-Muslims in order to deny the insurgents possible tactical support. But turning a blind eye could also mean trouble as state officials expect one to display loyalty by tipping them off with information about the insurgents’ activities.

Sitting on the front porch of Bae Riff, a local influential figure who the Army is trying to win over, a Special Force’s colonel admitted that without the support of local residents, “We won’t be able to win this war.” His stated strategy is to reach out to local community leaders and win their trust and friendship.

But people in the three southernmost provinces say arm-twisting is often employed as a tactic, coupled with rewards that come with being well connected to the authorities.
As part of his way of blending in and putting locals at ease, the colonel is dressed in civilian clothing. He lifted up his shirt to show that he was not armed. But just 30 metres from where we sat, a guard armed was armed with a semi-automatic rifle and a handgun tucked in a holster tied to his right thigh. His eyes scanned the road through this remote village where few soldiers or police dare to drive.
The colonel said the key to winning this war is to link up with a person like Bae Riff, once a member of the separatist Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C). Bae Riff is considered to be a good resource in the context of southern Thailand; he has “jungle credentials”.

“It’s not really harassment,” said the former BRN-C cadre. “The idea is to use people like me to relay messages to the new generation of militants in the ongoing insurgency.” His job is not to spy on the militants but to serve as a link between the two sides.

The former BRN-C cadre admitted that the local militants are not totally happy with him but allow him to continue as long as he doesn’t provide security officials with intelligence information about their movements and activities.

What motivates Bae Riff to do what he does is the desire to see local Malay-Muslims treated fairly. But if insurgents are executed – as he initially believed after the events of April 19 at Ban Se’a – then the responsible authorities must be brought to justice. There is a long-standing culture of impunity in the security forces but there are enough good and honest officials out there who can make a difference, he said.

It is clear that Bae Riff sympathises with the predicament of ordinary villagers. The previous round in this insurgency, two decades ago, was fought in the jungle between Thai security forces and Patani Malay nationalists from various separatist groups. Today, the theatre of violence has switched into towns and villages. Caught in the middle are innocent civilians.

“It has been very hard for them to position themselves,” Bae Riff said.

But the official government line is that locals who turn a blind eye to the insurgents’ activities are afraid of repercussion from the juwae.

It is clear that if the insurgents suspected that someone has crossed the line by becoming an informant for the state, that person is considered a fair target. But it was also clear that the villager elder who urged the insurgents to relocate from Ban Se’a did so out of concern for their safety.
Since this insurgency re-erupted in early 2004, few Thai officials have been willing to admit that local Malay-Muslims sympathise with the insurgents or share the same sentiments and historical mistrust of the state.

Using villagers to broker talks or negotiations between insurgents and local security units may not be part of government policy. But in this region where more than 5,000 people have been killed since 2004, local security units can’t afford to go strictly by the policy book.
Like the colonel, Army commanders at the company level say they have come to terms with the fact that locally hired village security staff, as well as ordinary villagers, will not make more effort than is expected of them. It is understood that all residents have to turn a blind eye to the presence of insurgents. Then there are those who actively support the separatist ideology embraced by the militants.

Coupled with historical mistrust, the use of vigilantes to kill suspects or to settle scores have hampered Thailand’s effort to close the trust gap between the state and the Malays of the deep South.
Locals here say they have yet to see justice for their neighbours in nearby Ban Kasod when in May 2011 a former paramilitary Ranger and three of his buddies went on a shooting spree from the back of his pickup truck, killing four Muslims and injuring 16 others in three-kilometre stretch. The act was to avenge his brother who was previously killed by suspected insurgents during a hunting trip.
Two years before that, on June 8, 2009, six gunmen walked up to a village mosque in Ai Bayae in Narathiwat’s Joh Ai Rong district and opened fire, killing ten and wounding 12 while they were at evening prayer.

From these two incidents, two paramilitary Rangers were arrested but later released on the ground that there wasn’t enough evidence against them. Legally speaking, that may be so. But for the Malay Muslims, the system is seen as being stacked against them. And as long as this perception prevails, one can be certain that villagers will continue to look the other way when a group of armed militants set up camp in their community.

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/opinion/aec/30180615

Did Thaksin meet insurgents?

Don Pathan
The Nation

Alleged sightings of fugitive former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra meeting quietly with Muslim insurgent chieftains just before the bloody bombings in Songkhla and Yala have kicked up a major political storm.

The ruling Pheu Thai Party and the man himself have vehemently denied any such rendezvous. Several sources, including some from the insurgency side, have contradicted that, however.

The Nation has learned some details of the "meeting", in which Thaksin supposedly stopped short of apologising but expressed regret for some of the violent incidents carried out by authorities during his administration.

The sources said he told the group of 15 exiled leaders from long-standing Malay Muslim separatist groups that his harsh tactics in the deep South were partly the result of his being "misinformed" by authorities.

Thaksin urged all sides to let bygones be bygones and work together to bring peace back to the restless region.

He gave each exiled leader a hug before leaving, according to the sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Thaksin was not accompanied by any Thai government official to the meeting in the middle of last month, about two weeks before the bomb attacks in Yala and Hat Yai, that was facilitated by a Malaysian government agency.

"I thought he [Thaksin] was sincere with his gesture," said one exiled separatist who was at the meeting. "But this conflict is beyond the control of one man."

Refusing to take part in the secret meeting were the elders of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), whose cadre told The Nation that they "could never forgive Thaksin for what he has done to the Malays of Patani" when he was premier.

They pointed to the Tak Bai massacre and other incidents in which he refused to punish abusive authorities.

This source said it didn't matter whether Thaksin's overtures were sincere or not because the so-called exiled leaders whom Thaksin met had no real influence on the militants in the field.

The BRN-Coordinate's refusal to deal with the Thaksin camp does not mean that the group has ruled out the idea of talking or negotiating with the Thai state.

There are other entities in the Kingdom that they are willing to talk to but only if the "situation" is right, the source said.

The BRN-C member said his outfit has the best working relationship with the Juwae, or armed militants currently operating on the ground, but the relationship is too fluid to establish a shared command.

Juwae are organised into semi-independent cells that span the three southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat and the four Malay-speaking districts in Songkhla.

Juwae and the BRN-Coordinate are working towards establishing a shared command.

Unless the BRN-C and the Juwae can consolidate into one entity, with the BRN leaders forming the political wing and juwae the military wing of the movement, it would be difficult to move forward with any negotiations or peace talks with the Thai side, the source said.

According to exiled leaders, there isn't much unity among the so-called Patani Malay separatist groups, many of whom surfaced in the late 1960s to take up arms against the Thai state.

The Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo), for example, has three persons claiming to be the president of the group.

Similarly, the identities of the members of the BRN-Coordinate remain heavily guarded. Like Pulo, the BRN-Coordinate has many self-professed leaders.

In the view of one BRN-Coordinate cadre from the faction that boycotted the Thaksin meeting, the recent attack in Yala that killed at least 11 people and wounded more than 100 was the juwae's way of turning down Thaksin's offer of an olive branch.

Hat Yai was hit on the same day as Yala but Hat Yai was not on the separatist movement's agenda, the source said.

The car bombing of the Lee Gardens Plaza Hotel in Hat Yai was probably part of a turf war between influential figures with an axe to grind with authorities, the source said.

Juwae selling their skills to crime syndicates is not uncommon, he said.

The Lee Gardens Plaza hotel and shopping complex was also targeted in September 2006 when one of the six motorcycle bombs that rocked the city exploded right in front of it.

No easy way to start a peace process in the deep South

With the backing of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and the premier's older brother Thaksin, the secretary-general of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), Thawee Sodsong, thinks he is on a roll.

Don Pathan
The Nation

Over the past few months, Thawee has been working hard to kick-start a peace process in the three southernmost provinces, where the ongoing insurgency has claimed more than 5,000 lives since January 2004.

Thawee has been sending representatives to neighbouring countries to ask for their assistance in facilitating secret talks with leaders of long-standing separatist movements in southern Thailand.
One of the things Thawee will be offering is that the future SBPAC chief be locally elected. The ruling Pheu Thai Party is also exploring, again, the idea of granting the Muslim-majority South special administrative status.

On the surface, Thawee’s idea of permitting the future SBPAC chief to be locally elected may sound like a good idea, as the Malay Muslims – who constitute over 80 per cent of the residents in the deep South – would be given an opportunity to elect one of their own people to a top post. But some exiled separatist leaders, as well as members of the Barisan Revolusi National-Coordinate (BRN-C), think Thawee and the Thaksin camp are trying to wash their hands of the deep South. Autonomy and decentralisation could mean political and administrative power in the deep South falling into the hands of the few Malay elites, who could very well be Bangkok’s lackeys, they say.

And while a locally elected SBPAC chief would take the heat for things that go wrong, the locally hired paramilitary Rangers would inevitably become the target for insurgents’ bullets and bombs, as the regular Army command pulled soldiers back to their respective regions.

Many observers warn that without a meaningful decentralisation process in place, or structural reform in such a way that would give the SBPAC real power over administrative and security matters, a locally appointed secretary-general would amount to a paper tiger.

Nevertheless, Thawee is going ahead with his plan and is preparing to take this message of peace and reconciliation to the leaders of the long-standing separatist movements living in exile.
However, a number of Thai officials who have observed the conflict for years, as well as the exiled separatist leaders, think Thawee’s textbook-like approach will not work because there are too many factors that he has yet to overcome.

“Thawee thinks he can bring exiled separatist leaders to the table and cut a deal to end this conflict once and for all. It won’t work because the grievances are deep-rooted in the hearts and minds of just about every single Malay Muslim of Patani,” said a BRN Coordinate cadre.

Even if Thawee succeeded in getting the current crop of separatists to come on board, a new generation of militants will eventually surface to continue the armed struggle, as this past eight years have shown.

Another problem for Thawee, said another exiled leader, is that there is no unity among leaders of these separatist groups he plans to meet. Personal rivalries aside, the views of these leaders vary from wanting complete independence to willingness to settle for some form of autonomy.
Perhaps the most important factor that would hamper Thawee’s peace process is the fact that none of these groups seem to have adequate control over the new generation of insurgents, locally known as juwae, operating on the ground.

Members of the BRN Coordinate, who are said to have the best working relationship with the juwae, admit that the chain of command is too fluid, and more time will be needed to consolidate command-and-control with the juwae. And without the ability to effectively influence the juwae or curb the ongoing violence, Thawee negotiating with the old guard could prove meaningless.

One of the biggest concerns for the BRN, said one of its cadre, is that some of the juwae, or young men who call themselves juwae, have been selling their services to crime syndicates and smugglers. This has made consolidation much more difficult.

For the time being, there is a truce between the Army and the Thaksin camp. No one is certain how long this truce will last, but Thawee’s quest for a quick peace deal has rubbed many of the country’s top brass up the wrong way. The Army chief is against autonomy, and the top brass does not like the idea of talking to the enemy unless they are the ones doing the talking.

And in spite of the fact that the Army sent one of its generals to observe the nearly defunct National Security Council’s secret peace talks two years ago, the idea of backing another government agency’s peace initiative is not something the top brass is willing to entertain in any meaningful way.
But with support from Thaksin and Yingluck, Thawee thinks there is nothing that is going to stop him. Separatist leaders, on the other hand, see things differently. There are just too many unresolved issues that Thawee will have to overcome, they say.

Besides the fact that Thawee is surrounded by people they don’t really trust, exiled Patani Malay leaders say he is still haunted by his past deeds. Indeed, many locals still recall how, back in 2004, Thawee hunted down suspected insurgents and Islamic teachers, including a Malay-Muslim spiritual leader, Sapae-ing Basor. Thaksin had accused Sapaeing of wanting to be president of a liberated Patani.

Today, many Thai government officials are quietly saying what the local Malays have believed all along – that the charges against Sapae-ing were fabricated. Incidentally, many of the peace-brokers are looking for the man, hoping that he could help bridge the trust gap between the state and the Malays of Patani.

The talk of autonomy or permitting a locally elected SBPAC chief may appeal to some local Malay elites but certainly not the vast majority of the voters, who, at the last general election, did not grant even one parliamentary seat to the Pheu Thai Party, which was promising special status for the region. Locals say policy-makers should concern themselves with issues like justice, equality and social mobility for the Malays, not structural reforms aimed at changing an agency’s head but not much else.

Assuming that Thawee and Thaksin’s camp can cut a deal with the separatist movements, there is no guarantee that the Patani Malay’s historical narrative will just disappear. The emergence of a new generation of insurgents after a relatively quiet decade in the deep South is a testimony to this very point.

Police insiders say Thawee has asked Malaysia to facilitate talks with the separatist leaders. It is not the first time that top Thai officials have tried to arrange talks with the separatist leaders in a collective manner. In 2005, former Malaysian PM Dr Mahathir Mohammed facilitated a series of talks between top Thai security officials, and the outcome did not have any real impact on the conflict or Thai policy in the deep South. Separatist leaders who took part in the Langkawi peace talks say they didn’t like the fact that they were being dictated to, and warn that future dealings with Thawee could very well be repetition of the so-called Langawi initiative – a peace process that didn’t get anywhere.

“You can’t just impose peace. Thailand has to work for it in a meaningful way,” said one exiled leader.

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/opinion/aec/30177950

Thailand Grapples With Deadly Tensions Between Muslims, Buddhists (PBS NewsHour)

PBS NewsHour 

At least 5,000 people have been killed since 2004 in Thailand's three southern provinces amid ongoing mistrust between minority Muslims and majority Buddhists. Kira Kaye reports on efforts to resolve tensions as part of the new Fault Lines of Faith series, produced in partnership with the Bureau for International Reporting.

Click for more: http://to.pbs.org/xcqHfZ