The fight over the peace process prolongs conflict

Don Pathan
The Nation

The recent transfer of National Security Council (NSC) Deputy Secretary-General Somkiat Boonchoo to an inactive post in the Prime Minister's Office has raised a lot of eyebrows among those who closely observe the ongoing insurgency in Thailand's deep South.

After all, here was a man who had followed the conflict in the region with a high degree of consistency. Somkiat has been replaced by Lieutenant-General Paradon Pattanathaboot, who returns to a post he once held until he was removed by the previous government.

Technically, it is a swap. But in the Thai political context, if one's name card says you're an "advisor to the Prime Minister's Office", it can mean you were transferred to the post because you are considered deadwood. Or it could be that you are someone with high integrity, thus making you incompatible with the government of the day - especially an administration as insecure as this one. No one doubts Somkiat's integrity, however.

Somkiat has contributed to the recently announced NSC plan that includes recommendations for the government to consider establishing a "safe zone" where dialogue between the authorities and militant separatists could take place.

Besides pushing the idea of dialogue with the separatists into the public sphere, Somkiat's direct participation marked a significant shift that paved the way for more civilian agencies and non-Army personnel, as well as civil society representatives, to get involved in the secret "peace process".

From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, this job was exclusively reserved for Army personnel. That changed in late 2005 when the then NSC chief General Winai Pathiyakul, along with the then NSC's director Lieutenant-General Vaipot Srinual, took part in the now-defunct Langkawi Process, a peace initiative launched by former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohammed.

This was during the time when Thaksin Shinwatra was the country's prime minister, although he didn't pay much attention to the recommendations from the process.

After the 2006 coup that ousted Thaksin, the NSC was given greater responsibility by the Surayud Chulanont government. In fact, Surayud had opened the door for other agencies and ministries to take part in the process, which included reaching out to neighbouring countries, professional mediators and the international community for help in this daunting task.

The secret peace process drifted off the radar screen during the two pro-Thaksin administrations of Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat. It came back on the screen again during Abhisit Vejjajiva's tenure as prime minister.

But the NSC was not the only agency talking to the leaders of the long-standing separatist movement. Other agencies got in on the act as well. Everybody, it seemed, wanted to become a peace broker, but nobody wanted to work with anyone else.

When Yingluck Shinawatra came into power and appointed favourite bureaucrat, Police Colonel Thawee Sodsong as the new secretary-general of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), the task of talking to the enemy was given to him.

Somkiat saw the writing on the wall and understood full well what this meant for the NSC's secret initiative. But those who know him didn't think the Thaksin camp would go as far as removing him from his post at the NSC.

It is not clear what Paradon's job will be in the NSC, but political insiders believe his main duty is to ensure that the NSC strategy and future plan will be in line with the peace initiative of the Thaksin camp, spearheaded by Thawee.

In fact, Thawee was already acting as the head of Thailand's "peace delegation" almost immediately after this government came to power, and he moved to the SBPAC office about a year ago.

In the months leading up to March, Thawee was sending representatives abroad to meet with leaders of the long-standing separatist groups - the old guard - in the hope that they would convince the new generation of militants on the ground to end their campaign of violence.

These leaders claimed to have dialogue and working relations with the militants, locally referred to as juwae, but few observers and officials were convinced that the link was strong enough to constitute a shared command, or command-and-control in military language.

Moreover, Thawee thought that by bringing Thaksin into the picture, the separatist leaders would be convinced that the Thai side was sincere about its commitment. And so a secret meeting between Thaksin and a group of 17 separatist leaders was held in mid-March. Nothing major came out of it, as expected, as the encounter was more symbolic than anything else.

The interesting part was not so much which separatist groups showed up but which one didn't. Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), the group with the best working relationship with the juwae, boycotted the meeting because it couldn't forgive Thaksin for his heavy-handed and abusive tactics when he was in power.

For the BRN-C to surface and come to the table at this point in time, there would have to be great demands and expectations - the kind of expectations and demands that neither side will be able to deliver.

According to BRN-C and other separatist sources, although the BRN-C may have the best working relationship with the juwae, this link does not constitute a shared command.

To add insult to the boycott, the juwae on March 31 carried out massive car-bomb attacks in Hat Yai and Yala. With more than a dozen killed and over 100 injured in the two incidents, the insurgent violence in Thailand's deep South reached a new threshold. It was a slap in the face for Thaksin and his cronies.

The Army and the opposition Democrat Party didn't waste time in ridiculing the government about Thaksin's participation in the secret talks, despite the fact that all parties have at one time or another talked to the representatives of the separatists.

Thaksin, of course, denied meeting the separatists. So much for the so-called commitment. As the government retreats to the drawing board, it has decided to ditch Somkiat, the one man who knows a great deal about the conflict in the region.

But Somkiat's absence doesn't mean Thawee's job will be easier. Somkiat would have been a good resource person for Thawee but the manner in which he was sidelined suggests that the Thaksin camp wants to have complete control of the process even though their effort so far has not produced any meaningful result.

Moreover, the Army's ridiculing the government for "talking to the enemy" should not be equated to an uncompromising stance because the Army, too, talks to the separatists. Essentially the spitting contest among these power cliques is all about having full control of the peace process.

One way out of this quagmire, according to several observers and insiders, is to have the government designate an agency that has full control over peace processes, similar to the one in the Philippines. With a full political mandate, the military and other agencies would have no choice but to get in line or miss the boat.

Wishful thinking perhaps. For the time being, the government's hopes are still pinned on Thawee, hoping that he can come up with something bold and creative. But where he goes from here is anybody's guess.