Thailand has no clue how to end the insurgency in the South

Don Pathan
The Nation

Justice and equality for the Malay-Muslims in the three southernmost provinces is high on the agenda of the high-level representatives of the 56-member Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), as Foreign Minister Surapong Tovichakchaikul confirmed that the delegates have asked about the use of the controversial Emergency Degree to quell the ongoing insurgency.

The delegation is headed by Ambassador Sayed Kassem El-Masry, an Egyptian envoy who visited the country last in 2005. In spite of the long absence between the previous and this visit, the OIC has consistently to look for ways to engage in resolution of the conflict in the restive region, meeting with the Patani Malay diaspora and people who keep a close watch on developments in Thailand's deep South.

But Bangkok, under successive governments, has never been comfortable with the idea of permitting the OIC, or any outsiders for that matter, to get involved in mediation or peace talks with the rebels, for fear that the issue would be internationalised. But denying them the political capital has not changed the course of the violence either.

Thailand’s was granted the status of Permanent Observer in the OIC in the late 1990s during the Chuan Leekpa administration. It was Thailand’s way of blocking the separatists from the setting any official recognition from the Islamic grouping.

To Bangkok's disappointment, in late 2010, the OIC met for two days with leaders of the long-standing separatist groups in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and in Kuala Lumpur. The meetings were carried out simultaneously from the end of September to the start of October. The OIC secretary-general, Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, chaired the meeting in Jeddah, while Talal A Daous, the organisation's director for the Muslim Minorities and Communities Department, chaired the gathering in Kuala Lumpur.

According to diplomatic and exiled sources, the OIC urged the long-standing separatist groups to combine efforts and form a United Patani People's Council (UPPC). As for the question of the mandate, the Patani People's Congress (PCC) would be the forum that draws its legitimacy from the people in the Malay historical homeland that is now part of Thailand's three southernmost provinces. How the PCC would operate, violating Thailand's sovereignty, remained a big question.

But the then foreign minister, Kasit Piromya, decided to pour cold water on the idea of permitting the OIC to mediate in the conflict, and the organisation was forced to retreat to the drawing baard.

Today, just weeks after massive car bomb attacks in Hat Yai and Yala that resulted in the deaths of more than ten people and injuries to more than 100 others, the OIC is back in the spotlight. Thailand is hard pressed to come up with answers to the insurgency because the business-as-usual approach can no longer contain the violence. The devastating nature of the Yala and Hat Yai attacks suggest that a new threshold has been crossed and the worst is yet to come. And the fact that Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra repeated the same old mantra during her recent visit to the region is not very encouraging.

The OIC's visit could very well be part of Thailand's effort to put on a brave, positive, active face, to create the impression that the state is doing something about the conflict.

The OIC mediating in the conflict might not be part of the official agenda but one can be certain that many stakeholders, especially the separatist leaders, wouldn't mind seeing the OIC involved in some kind of peace process.

One thing Thailand is concerned about is that the OIC could be too sympathetic to the separatist movement. But one prominent exiled leader, who has had dealings with the the OIC over the past three decades, said the organisation respects Thailand's territorial integrity and has never really entertained the idea of seeing the Muslim-majority deep South divided from the Kingdom.

"The OIC is essentially a state actor. It would be in Thailand's interest to have the OIC involved in mediation, but successive Thai governments are just too afraid to take the chance," said the exiled leader, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Although the Foreign Ministry has been the public face for Thailand in answering nagging questions about the ongoing conflict in the Malay-speaking region, it is the military and policy-makers at Government House that are the ones who set the policy and directions on how the country deals with the separatists.

During the administration of Abhisit Vejjajiva, the National Security Council (NSC) was given the task of formulating peace talks with the separatist movement. The Army wasn't too thrilled with the idea but nevertheless, sent a senior officer to observe the NSC-led process. One explanation for the willingness to appear to be cooperative may have to with the fact that the Army and the Democrat-led government were on good terms.

But when the Pheu Thai Party came to power, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra handed responsibility for the situation to the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC), which is headed by Thawee Sodsong, one of the party's favourite bureaucrats.

But instead of addressing the root cause of the conflict, Thawee has treated the job as if he is preparing for a sort of summit with de facto leader, Thaksin Shinawatra; that being the goal in itself. Thaksin met with a group of about 16 exiled leaders in mid-March but nothing meaningful came out of it. Moreover, it was heavily politicised by the opposition and the military when the event became public information. Thawee and Pheu Thai are back to the drawing board.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the meeting with Thaksin was not so much who was there but who wasn't. The Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), the group with the best working relations with the militants on the ground, boycotted the meeting, saying it could never forgive Thaksin for "what he has done to the Malays of Patani". They were referring to his heavy-handed tactics during his rule, which he blamed on bureaucrats for providing him with inaccurate information.

But the BRN-Coordinate says it is not completely ruling out the idea of talking to the Thais, as long as it is not Thaksin's camp. Moreover, senior members in the movement say they have yet to establish an adequate command-and-control relationship with the militants on the ground.

It remains to be seen if Bangkok will ask the OIC to get the BRN-Coordinate to let bygones be bygones and take up any olive branch from the Pheu Thai camp. But if the recent devastating car bombs in Yala and Hat Yai tell us anything, it is that the insurgents are not in the mood to talk.