Thailand’s million-dollar gold heist reveals costly price of peace in insurgency-hit south

The robbery in Sungai Kolok, near the Thai-Malaysian border, bore the hallmarks of a rebel-led operation, the defence minister said

The suspects are caught on CCTV fleeing the scene after grabbing bags of gold on October 5. Photo: Thai police

Don Pathan

www.scmp.com 

A million-dollar gold heist in Thailand’s far south by armed robbers who blocked roads with spikes and set explosives to seal their escape across the Malaysian border has rattled the Thai security establishment, as efforts to reignite peace talks in an area roiled by insurgency continue to fall flat.

Around 20 men working in three teams carried out the October 5 theft from a gold shop in Sungai Kolok, bordering Malaysia’s Kelantan State.

The theft of hundreds of gold ornaments and jewellery valued at over 36.5 million baht (US$1.13 million) came as prices for the precious metal spiked to historic highs of over US$4,200 per 28 grams (one ounce) earlier this month.

Using two stolen getaway trucks, the robbers planted road spikes and explosives to obstruct police pursuit in a heist so well-oiled that Thai authorities immediately attributed it to the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN).

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New Thai appointments for the Deep South

The then Thailand's chief negotiator, Chatchai Bangchuad, Malaysian facilitator Gen Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, and Anas Abdulrahman, BRN chief negotiator, talked to the press after the February 6-7, 2024, high-level negotiation in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. (Credit: Peace Dialogue Panel)

Don Pathan
Prachatai 

In one of his first moves as newly appointed Prime Minister, Anutin Charnvirakul has named a new chief negotiator for the peace process in Thailand's far South, a region gripped by a conflict that has claimed over 7,700 lives since 2004.

The decision has been met with scepticism, however, as Anutin’s government is set to serve only four months before Parliament is dissolved. Since the negotiating team is mandated by the Cabinet, any new government will be free to appoint its own officials.

The immediate aim of Anutin's Bhumjaithai Party is widely seen as building political capital for the upcoming general election. By appointing retired Gen Somsak Rungsita, a former Secretary-General of the National Security Council (NSC), as chief negotiator, Anutin can claim an achievement that he will argue his predecessor, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, failed to secure during her year in office.

To be fair to the previous administration, a negotiating team was being assembled, but Paetongtarn was removed by the Constitutional Court just before a public announcement could be made. Her proposed list included top security figures from her party, a former head of the Parliament-funded Prajadhipok’s Institute, a village chief from Narathiwat, and a retired diplomat.

Under her administration, delays stemmed from a refusal to resume talks until the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN)—the primary longstanding separatist movement—ceased its violent operations. The BRN countered that any reduction of violence must be negotiated, questioning the baseline and monitoring mechanisms. The then-government was unwilling to entertain this. A nudge from Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, the designated facilitator for the off-and-on talks since 2013, finally prompted a response from Paetongtarn, just before the court removed her from power.

Political insiders say the choice of Gen Somsak is a safe bet for Anutin. The former NSC chief is a close associate of Defence Minister Gen Nattaphon Narkphanit and former PM Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, now a Privy Councillor. The Thai Army is also comfortable with him.

Gen Somsak's appointment marks the NSC's return to the peace process after being sidelined by the previous administration. Insiders from the Pheu Thai Party government had accused the NSC-led negotiators of exceeding their mandate and giving the BRN too much leeway by not making a reduction of violence a binding condition.

A senior BRN member on the negotiating team questioned Thailand's commitment to peace, stating that Gen Somsak’s appointment does not signal sincerity in seeking a peaceful outcome.

For Asmadee Bueheng, a Patani-based writer and long-time conflict observer, Gen Somsak's appointment—coupled with in the introduction of an outsider to lead the Fourth Army Area, which oversees security in the region—does not necessarily translate into meaningful concessions from the Thai state.

In fact, no political party in modern Thailand has ever spelled out terms for peaceful coexistence between the Malay people of Patani and the state. This refusal to make concessions has rendered the decade-old peace process a stagnant "talk shop" unable to move beyond confidence-building.

Even if the government decided to outline a real settlement, there is no guarantee that conservative elites in Thailand would permit it, as it would challenge Thailand's nation-state construct and narrative, Asmadee said.

Today, the controversial Martial Law and Emergency Law, which permits 30-day detention without legal representation, remain in effect. The Tak Bai massacre of October 2004, which resulted in 85 deaths, has yet to see closure, while harassment against local political activists continues.

For years, the Fourth Army and activists have been at loggerheads, fighting to control the narrative. At the Army's request, numerous activists have been charged with disturbing the peace and instigating separatism.

Moreover, the absence of a credible peace process gives BRN militants, who already operate with considerable autonomy, a freer hand to expand beyond their usual theatre of violence and breach unwritten rules of engagement that prohibit attacks on civilians.

Thai police inspect the scene of an attack by insurgents at Sunai
Kolok District Office, March 2025. (Narathiwat Public Relations Office)

It remains to be seen if the new chief negotiator and the recently appointed commander of the Fourth Army Area, Maj Gen Norathip Phoinok, can reverse this trend and open political space for critical discussion, no matter how uncomfortable.

For decades, commanders of the Fourth Army have been drawn from its own ranks. Their counter-insurgency strategy has leaned heavily on militaristic approaches, with little focus on winning hearts and minds or addressing the root causes and historical grievances of this Malay-speaking region.

For over twenty years, Thailand's far South has been shaped by separatist insurgency, cross-border trade (both legal and illegal), an enormous military budget, and a culture of impunity among security officials. As one Thai military intelligence officer noted, the region has too many "dark sides." Bringing in an outsider to lead may not be a bad idea.

Although the violence is widely understood as political, Thai officials often view it through a narrow lens of security and legality. Few attempt to understand the insurgents' perspective, which sees government troops as a colonial force and local businesses as part of a system of exploitation. Government policies on transmigration and assimilation are viewed as integral to this same system.

Whether Maj Gen Norathip can bridge the trust gap between the state and the Malay-speaking region is an open question.

Political insiders say his appointment reflects the internal workings of the Royal Thai Army rather than any government initiative. With less than 70 seats in Parliament, Anutin cannot afford to create friction with the Army. His aim is to use these four months to prepare for the next election, which is why he is allowing the Army a free hand on border policy, be it with Cambodia or in the far South.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based consultant and security analyst. 

Behind the Myanmar junta’s raid on KK Park

KK Park, taken from the Thai side of the border that is separated by the Moei River, Feb. 28, 2025. (Credit: Don Pathan)

Don Pathan
Mizzima News

The Myanmar military junta attempted to score a public relations victory during the recent ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur by demonstrating its willingness to crack down on scam centers operating in Karen State, adjacent to Thailand’s Mae Sot district in Tak province.

After attacking positions held by the Karen National Union’s (KNU) 6th Brigade, Myanmar troops entered portions of the notorious KK Park, a major scam hub linked to Chinese crime syndicates. They confiscated 30 Starlink devices that scammers had been using in recent years after Thailand, under pressure from both the United States and China, disrupted internet connections to these call centers by redirecting relay boxes on utility poles and ordering power lines running from Thailand to cease operations.

A turning point came in January 2025, when China intensified pressure on Thailand to take drastic action, including cutting off power supplies, fuel, and imposing stricter controls on internet connectivity. Chinese Assistant Minister of Public Security Liu Zhongy visited Mae Sot and Myawaddy twice in early 2025 to witness the crackdown firsthand.

More than 7,000 operators, mostly Chinese nationals, were released from these centers and sent across the border into Thailand for processing and repatriation. Chinese charter planes stood ready to transport their nationals back home to either face charges or, if fortunate, be treated as human trafficking victims, depending on interrogation outcomes.

The scam centers adapted to Thailand’s obstruction by acquiring massive generators capable of powering the 30 or so compounds dotting the Myanmar side of the Moei River, which serves as the natural border with Thailand. Starlink satellite systems replaced Thai internet service providers, while fuel became significantly more expensive—though nothing is truly unobtainable in this rugged corner of Southeast Asia, where warlords, drug barons, ethnic rebel militias, resistance forces, and Myanmar government troops compete for control.

Until February 2025, two commercial flights filled with Chinese tourists would arrive daily in Mae Sot from Bangkok. This border town, known primarily as a major cross-border trading hub between Thailand and Myanmar, served as the gateway to an open secret: these “tourists” were actually headed to casinos, brothels, entertainment complexes, karaoke bars, and unregulated online gambling operations on the Myanmar side. “They just have to remember to return before their Thai visas expire,” said a Thai police officer in Mae Sot.

The two flights are a thing of the past as Thai officials, in line with measures imposed on foreign nationals after Liu visited the region.

The US Institute of Peace estimated that by the end of 2023, the annual value of funds stolen worldwide by Chinese syndicates operating from Myanmar and other locations in mainland Southeast Asia reached approximately $64 billion.

In response to Chinese and Thai pressure, the DKBA and KNA/BGF quickly abandoned their profitable landlord arrangements and began rounding up scam operators. This started in February 2025 and continued for several months.

The strict measures following Liu’s two visits may have disrupted operations temporarily, but in reality they created a balloon effect: squeeze one area and activity pops up elsewhere. Phayathonezu, an area controlled by the rebels near the Three Pagodas Pass opposite Thailand’s Kanchanaburi province, exemplifies how these illicit businesses are relocating from the Myawaddy area. Other syndicates maintained low profiles temporarily, planning to reemerge once attention subsided, while others moved deeper into the country.

The deportation of approximately 7,000 individuals since March 2025 damaged the illicit operations but didn’t eliminate them. While the two daily planeloads of Chinese nationals arriving in Mae Sot may have ended, these syndicates still operate cyber scam centers generating substantial income.

“Chinese businesses rent these complexes and convert them into entertainment and gambling outlets that operate in a gray area—not exactly illegal but certainly unregulated. However, portions of these complexes are designated specifically for online scamming operations,” explained a plainclothes Thai police officer in Mae Sot who has a front-row view of these illicit activities.

“The Karen militias controlling the area—whether they have ceasefire agreements with the Myanmar government, like the Karen National Army (KNA) and the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), or the Karen National Union (KNU), which is still fighting the government—none of them want scrutiny of what these Chinese businesses are actually doing,” said the officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

“They collect substantial rent money, and villagers in areas under their control gain employment. Thai people also benefit from their presence.” He pointed to the heightening of real estate prices around Mae Sot, saying being a merely stop-over has its benefits.

Last week’s attack on a portion of KK Park failed to convince observers, despite generating some international headlines when roughly 1,000 foreign nationals fled the park into Myawaddy and across to the Thai side of the border. Unfortunately for the Myanmar government, the incident generated little interest among ASEAN leaders, who were preoccupied with hosting US President Donald Trump, who had come to Malaysia to witness the signing of a peace deal between Thailand and Cambodia.

More significantly, according to a member of the DKBA militia group, the Myanmar military’s advance into KK Park disrupted the existing arrangements between Chinese crime syndicates and their respective landlords—namely the KNA, DKBA, and KNU.

“The offensive against KK Park created considerable anxiety among these Chinese syndicates, who never move around this part of Myanmar without security details,” said a DKBA officer who spoke on condition of anonymity.

“While the Karen groups receive rent and certain benefits from these Chinese syndicates in exchange for broad protection guarantees, it’s the armed bodyguards and security personnel who provide the immediate defensive line for these Chinese bosses and managers. Not all these guards are ethnically Chinese, but they are fluent in Chinese,” he added.

Myanmar was able to advance on KNU positions in recent months and weeks because the BGF/KNA assisted them, according to the Thai officer.

The KNA is a 7,000-strong force led by Col. Chit Thu, a Karen warlord with extensive business interests and connections throughout Myanmar and Thailand.

One observer of the situation along the Thailand-Myanmar border suggested that Chit Thu is no longer satisfied with merely collecting rent—he wants a direct share of profits from these scam centers, according to a source with direct dealings with ethnic armed organizations in Myanmar.

The DKBA, a much smaller outfit with just over 1,000 troops, might outlive its usefulness as a member of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement if the Myanmar government sees no reason to maintain the relationship. Fortunately for the DKBA, the recent attack on the KNU’s 6th Brigade and incursion into KK Park did little to change international perception of Myanmar’s military government.

“If the world viewed the Myanmar junta as the good guys, they wouldn’t have stopped at the KNU 6th Brigade—they would have targeted a low-hanging fruit like the DKBA,” said the Thai police officer in Mae Sot.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based development professional and security analyst.