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| Credit: Google Gemini |
Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com
No Luck Anwar
Every time Anwar succeeded in getting the Thai government to accelerate progress, Thai politics invariably intervened, prolonging the peace process that has never been a high priority for any Thai administration.
Coming into power in November 2022, Anwar – a figure who has endured prison and a long political struggle – inspired excitement among Malay Muslims in Thailand’s southernmost provinces. They saw his rise as a victory against the ruling elite, a narrative that resonates deeply with the Malays of Patani and the rebels as well.
However, when Srettha Thavisin assumed premiership in August 2023, he largely ignored the far south, unwilling to antagonise the Thai Army and its uncompromising counterinsurgency stance. Furthermore, Srettha focused on maintaining a delicate political balance that had enabled Thaksin Shinawatra’s return from exile—a Faustian bargain with the conservative establishment that required careful nurturing. Upsetting the military was not part of that deal.
Yet, the Malaysian-facilitated peace process had been developing for over a decade, and Bangkok could only delay for so long. A nudge from Anwar three months into Srettha’s term led to the appointment of Chatchai Bangchuad, then deputy secretary-general of the National Security Council (NSC), as chief negotiator—the first civilian in the role in 12 years.
This move allowed the Peace Dialogue Panel and Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) – the group controlling combatants on the ground – to resume discussions on the Joint Comprehensive Plan toward Peace (JCPP). This roadmap includes proposed agreements on public consultations, violence reduction and political solutions.
Complications
But in the far south, nothing comes easily. When a draft of the JCPP was leaked, it drew harsh criticism from military and political insiders. Professor Surachart Bamrungsuk, a Pheu Thai insider, relentlessly attacked the NSC-led team, accusing them of exceeding their mandate and criticising European donors for not pressuring the BRN enough to curb the violence on the ground. The backlash left Thai negotiators isolated.
In reality, both Thai and BRN negotiators were participating in mediation training in Europe, and a Japanese organisation even offered to host high-level talks in Tokyo. Furthermore, Thailand participated in a back-channel discussion with BRN through foreign mediation without Malaysia’s participation. But the process never advanced beyond confidence-building measures. The political leadership above the negotiators showed no real intention of offering concessions to BRN or the Patani Malays.
Thai institutions have never been united on the south, even on basic issues like whether to classify BRN as a criminal organisation or as combatants. International NGOs face wrath for using the term “armed conflict”, and bodies like the Organization of Islamic Cooperation are criticised for engaging the BRN. Any hint of legitimacy for the insurgents provokes Thai ire—even as its negotiators are sent to meet with them.
Unlike the 1980s, when Patani Malay fighters received foreign support, today’s combatants are self-sufficient, drawing on local community backing to keep the conflict civil. Malaysia, meanwhile, practises quiet diplomacy, urging both sides to respect humanitarian norms.
But as an interlocutor, Malaysia faces a complex challenge: its proximity and refusal to support separatism require all Malaysian leaders to carefully balance between respecting Thailand’s territorial integrity and acknowledging the historical grievances of the Patani people.
Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, a local political action group, believes Malaysia must do more than just urge Thailand to come to the table. He argues that Thailand needs creative ideas, and Malaysia – with international help – can provide them.
“Negotiation is a give-and-take process,” Artef said, “but Thailand only wants to take.”
He points out to Thailand’s relentless push for a ceasefire, which does little to advance conflict resolution and more for public consumption, as Thai leaders are in a constant campaign to garner public endorsement.
In comparison, Malaysia was successful in mediating the peace process between the Moros and the Philippines government. That was because Malaysia was able to get a firm commitment from Manila for concession and compromise before it took up the mediation role. Malaysia did not make the same demand with Thailand before it committed itself as the mediator in February 2013.
While Malaysian officials discuss the southern Thai conflict with Thai NSC officials regularly, Dato Mohd Rabin Basir, the designated facilitator, has not had much luck reaching the army generals, the lynchpin behind conflict resolution in the far south.
Instability in Bangkok
But obstacles and roadblocks are nothing new in the quest for peace in this historically contested region known as Patani. Thailand’s political instability continues to take its toll.
In August 2024, the Constitutional Court removed Srettha on ethical grounds. He was replaced by Paetongtarn Shinawatra, Thaksin’s daughter, who was shielded by party elders. Her deputy, Phumtham Wechayachai, refused to resume talks unless BRN stopped its violence first. BRN replied that violence reduction was negotiable but demanded international monitoring of any ceasefire.
Thailand rejected these demands, despite BRN’s agreement to negotiate under the Thai Constitution—effectively taking independence off the table. Instead, Bangkok stuck to its old strategy: trying to identify and negotiate directly with the leaders of BRN’s military wing despite not knowing their identities and being unwilling to offer meaningful concessions. BRN insisted that protocol must be respected and insisted that the government do not get to pick and choose who in the movement they want to meet.
The Pheu Thai-led government feared that entering talks amid ongoing attacks would make them look weak. Ironically, it was not BRN that undermined Paetongtarn, but Cambodian leader Hun Sen, a long-time friend of the Shinawatra family. In June, he leaked a private phone call in which she appeared to kowtow to him while criticising her own border security general. The leak triggered a bilateral crisis, leading to border clashes four weeks later that killed 40 people and displaced 300,000.
Malaysia was called upon to mediate again, this time with the United States and China observing. Anwar also nudged Bangkok to restart the peace talks. A new, diverse negotiating team was planned, including retired generals, a former diplomat and a village chief from the far south, with an announcement set for September 2025.
But on 29 August, the Constitutional Court removed Paetongtarn from power over the Hun Sen incident. The Parliament then voted in Bhumjaithai’s Anutin Charnvirakul as prime minister under a four-month agreement with the opposition to pursue constitutional reform.
Anwar, as ASEAN chair, had earlier appointed Thaksin as an advisor on Myanmar and the far south—a move that yielded no results. Thaksin’s influence evaporated entirely on 9 September, when the Supreme Court ruled that his hospital detention was an attempt to avoid his reduced jail sentence. He is now back in jail.
Now, the peace process for the far south is once again in limbo, likely delayed until after the next general election. It makes little sense for a four-month government to appoint a negotiating team only to dissolve it shortly after. But for Anwar, the pursuit of peace in Thailand’s deep south remains a story of promise and perseverance, continuously unravelled by the political fortunes of its neighbour.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.
