Thailand’s Conflict: Guns, Bombs and Assassinations

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com 

Sungai Kolok district office was hit by a car bomb set off by BRN combatants on March 8, 2025.(Photo Credit: Narathiwat Public Relations Office)

Messages

For the past seven months or so, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), one of the long-standing separatist movements that control most insurgent activities in Thailand’s southern provinces, has been stepping up its pressure on locally hired Defence Volunteer (DV), security guards for the Ministry of Interior. The objective was to force the latter to quit working for the “Siamese State”.

It employs messages, often in the form of graffiti sprayed on the backroads and leaflets. These are in response to the Internal Security Operation Command – Region 4’s (ISOC4) effort to replace regular soldiers with DVs.

The idea is to have local Melayu DV officers to look after Melayu affairs in the region, explained one Thai army intelligence officer who spoke on condition of anonymity. But BRN did not see it that way and has shown they have no problem taking the fight to the DVs, regardless of their ethnicity.

DVs are locally hired security details who fall under the Ministry of Interior’s chain of command. Their functions involved manning checkpoints along the roads and at entrances of government installations.

For much of the past two decades – since the current wave of separatist insurgency resurfaced in this Malay historical homeland –DVs have been largely unchallenged by the insurgents as long as they do not engage in intelligence-gathering activities for the government or become part of military operations.

This changed 10 years ago, when ISOC4 was toying with the so-called Tung Yang Daeng model, named after a district in Pattani province where a fierce gunfight between BRN combatants and government troops jolted the nerves of the security apparatus and forced them to the drawing board.

The idea then was to assign the Ministry’s people — village chiefs, tambon staff and DVs — more onerous security duties, such as patrolling violence-prone areas alongside regular army soldiers and Paramilitary Rangers.

Naturally, it would place them in the line of fire of insurgents. It was a bigger plan to gradually pull out troops from other regional commands and replace them with Paramilitary Rangers.

The Thai army had reasons to be optimistic at the time. The number of violent incidents was declining, from just under 2,400 in 2007 to 850 in 2015, according to Deep South Watch’s statistics. Deep down, however, there was an understanding that as long as insurgency exists, Thailand can never declare victory.

The absence of violence – or, in this case, the reduction –  does not mean peace, not as long as the narrative that equates separatism to a moral obligation is still alive and well.

Trying to win hearts and minds. File photo; credit: CHAIWAT PUMPUANG 

Thailand went through a decade of relative calm in the 1990s, thinking that the conflict in the far south had ended. Combatants of the various movements may have put down their weapons, returned to their village and their leaders took up residency in foreign countries abroad. But the narrative of the Patani Malay – one that sees Patani as the Malays’ historical homeland worth liberating – never went away.

Like many other initiatives in Thailand that did not materialise, the Tung Yang Daeng model disappeared from the memories and the discussions of security planners.

Escalation

Worse, violence has increased steadily over the past five years in the far south. Gone are the guerrilla tactics that usually involve roadside bombings followed by a brief two-to-three minutes gunfight before they retreat to the woods.

These days, attacks are much more coordinated, with gunfights sometimes lasting up to half an hour. More importantly, these attacks must be heard, meaning they have to create a psychological impact in the minds of the security apparatus.

The 9 March 2025 attack on the Sungai Kolok district office by a 10-strong BRN unit – resulting in the death of two DVs and the injury of eight others – was an example of this. The assault ended with a car bomb that ripped through the compound moments after the combatants retreated.

The incident came just days after it was clear that the Thai government had rejected BRN’s counter-proposals for a ceasefire during Ramadhan this year.

Two weeks before the start of Ramadhan, the National Security Council (NSC) suggested that the two sides observe a unilateral ceasefire during the holy month. BRN agreed in principle but had demands of their own. These include reducing the number of days from 30 to 15, releasing an unspecified number of prisoners, permitting monitoring of the ceasefire by international and local observers, and requiring the government to appoint a negotiating team to restart peace talks.

When it became clear that Bangkok was not interested in any of these counterproposals, BRN combatants took over the course of direction on the ground, starting with the 9 March 2025 raid of the Sungai Kolok district office. That was the first spike of violence that unnerved the security agencies – especially the DVs throughout the region – as it became clear that they are now deemed to be legitimate targets by BRN.

The same evening also saw a double-tap operation in Pattani’s San Buri district in which a smaller bomb drew a group of ordinance officers to the scene just to be hit by a much bigger explosive. One officer died, and two were wounded.

The already tense situation became even deadlier after the shooting of Abdulroning Lateh, 60, on 18 April 2025. Abdulroning was a senior figure in the military wing of BRN who spent the past two decades as a mentor for the new generation of combatants. As expected, the Thai Army blamed BRN for his killing.

His death sparked a series of seemingly revenge attacks by combatants who ignored unwritten rules of engagement. They hit soft targets, including the shooting of a Buddhist novice on 22 April 2025 in the Saya Yoi district of Songkhla. A senior monk and another novice were wounded from the same attack.

Two days earlier in Narathiwat’s Khok Khan sub-district, an 80kg explosive exploded near a police flat as officers lined up in formation for their daily routine. A passenger vehicle full of Islamic religious students was approaching at the time the explosive detonated. Nine people, including seven children aged between 7 and 15, were wounded by the shrapnel.

On 28 April 2025, two separate attacks in Yala province resulted in the death of a DV whose vehicle was set on fire in the Banang Sata district and a border patrol police officer who was killed after a roadside bomb went off, flipping his armoured vehicle into an upside-down wreck and wounding two other colleagues inside.

Separately, on 30 April 2025, a sniper wounded a police officer as he was about to set up a checkpoint in the backroad of Yala’s Pron subdistrict.

A new low came on 2 May 2025, when gunmen killed four – including a 9-year-old girl and a 76-year-old blind woman – in Narathiwat’s Tak Bai and Chanae districts. The elderly woman was riding a motorbike with her son, who suffered a bullet wound, while the young girl and two other residents were killed by a group of six gunmen on three motorbikes who fired multiple rounds into a house.

The next day, a bomb went off in Narathiwat’s Rueso district, not far from a public event where the Deputy Minister of Interior Sabeeda Thaised was about to open. Nobody was injured, but the explosion was close enough to rattle the nerves of the participants and the country’s security apparatus.

In a rare public statement, dated 5 May 2025, BRN condemned the violence against soft targets and reiterated its long-standing policy of not targeting civilians. The statement did not address the spike or the soft targets. It was understood that the statement was not just for public consumption but for the combatants who had gone off the rules of engagement.

Condemnation against the soft targets poured in relentlessly. There was a direct intervention from a local political actor who met with BRN representatives to call for the return of civility and reminded the BRN leaders of the commitment their organisation made with members of the international community about rules of engagement and respect for humanitarian norms. Since the visit and the statement, civilian targets have gone off the hit list. The only exception was the shooting of a Malay Muslim couple, 46 and 48, on 17 May 2025 in Raman district of Yala province. This time around, nobody is pointing their fingers at BRN.

Generally, BRN still sees itself as an underground movement, although public statements are issued to mark certain anniversaries and critical issues. Some observers said the group lacks a proper communication strategy, which is only possible if there is an identifiable political wing to speak publicly on their behalf.

Thailand’s and Malaysia’s refusal to officially acknowledge the presence of BRN’s political wing and allow it to operate independently is an obstacle to the movement’s move to engage the global community and its own constituency.

While condemnation against the killing of the novice poured in, sympathy for Abdulroning, on the other hand, was whispered as any public outcry would invite the wrath of Thai security officials, whose homemade narrative always put the blame on BRN. Mistrust of the state apparatus is still high, and no government has ever succeeded in convincing local Muslims that they are the good guys, much less winning the latter’s hearts and minds.

International engagement with BRN tends to be discreet and focus on political outcomes and not enough on capacity building. Overall, however, respect for humanitarian norms and principles has improved over the years; that is why the alleged attacks on the monk and novices irked a great deal of people, including local political activists like The Patani who advocate peaceful and political means to resolve the conflict.

But that is easier said than done. The Thai military is not open to discussion on sensitive issues, such as rights to self-determination for this historically contested region. Reference to the combatants as “shahid” – Arabic for martyr – could land one in jail.

Standstill

Meanwhile, the peace talks here have come to a complete standstill because the government refuses to appoint a negotiating team until BRN ends their campaign of violence, although Bangkok has softened its position by suggesting the talks can resume if BRN stops hitting soft targets.

Chulalongkorn University’s military expert, Prof Surachart Bamrungsuk, said BRN must guarantee that there be a cessation of violence and that civilians would be protected. BRN countered by stating that even a reduction of violence must be negotiated.

Incidentally, for much of the past two decades of on-and-off peace initiatives, Thailand has never wanted to engage in any formal arrangement or ink anything unless it is the final peace agreement, if and when there is ever one.

Speaking to the media, Defence Minister Phumtham Wechayachai tried hard to convince the public why the peace talks had to be halted. He said the past talks were failures because representatives from BRN at the negotiating table were not key decision-makers. He added that the spike in violence suggests that BRN representatives do not have influence in the movement and added that Malaysia will be working with Thailand to bring key BRN leaders to the negotiating table.

Thai security officials and BRN representatives rejected his claim, saying the movement has, time and again, publicly and secretly, demonstrated to the Thai officials that they have command and control over the combatants on the ground. The 45-day ceasefire during Ramadhan in 2022 was a case in point, not to mention the 24 months unilateral ceasefire during the COVID-19 outbreak. There were also secret dealings, a clearinghouse of sort, between the two sides to go over the incidents on the ground to prove to the Thai government that they were dealing with the right organisation.

Local activists said the gap between political representation and the armed forces is more of a Thai problem, pointing to the unwillingness of the hardliners to allow the peace process to move beyond a talk shop, which participants at the table referred to as confidence-building measures (CBM).

Up to now, however, the two sides have never discussed anything concrete. The Joint Comprehensive Plan Toward Peace (JCPP), the so-called roadmap for peace, put together by Thailand and BRN, with the help of foreign NGOs and the Malaysian government working in separate and often competing tracks, spent the past three years going back and forth on the negotiated text.

The best they could do was identify three items to be on the negotiating table: reduction of violence, public consultation and a political solution to the conflict. Specific details are to be negotiated in the next phase of the talk.

However, JCPP could be scrapped, as the current Thai government is likely to dismiss foreign participation, thus putting all the mediation and conflict resolution work on Malaysia. Surachart also suggested that JCPP should be ditched, saying the framework puts Thailand at a disadvantage.

If anything, Phumtham sounded like a broken record – playing up the “meager BRN negotiators” rhetoric when in fact there is no political will from Bangkok to come to the table and make any concessions to BRN or the people of Patani.

BRN insisted that the Thai side does not get to decide who or which individual leader they can talk to; Bangkok will have to talk to whoever the movement sends. But the Thai government has always wanted to deal with the BRN military leaders, believing in their ability to sweet-talk them out of the conflict, or at least reduce the violence.

Political activists like Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, said Thai governments’ interest in the peace process has always centred on public relations stunts, not the root causes or the wellbeing of the people of this region.

Besides not having anything to offer, Thailand’s disregard for negotiation protocol reflects poorly on the government’s leaders and security planners. Many in the BRN movement, on the other hand, think Thailand’s peace initiatives are aimed at getting them to surface so they can be eliminated at a later date when talks produce no concrete result.

A government source who works on the conflict sayid Phumtham is afraid that restarting the peace talks amid the spike in violence would make Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra look weak. She is already at the receiving end of many criticisms for just about every policy initiative.

Her father, Thaksin, on the other hand, appeared to want to start his own initiative, reaching out to Malaysian authorities to facilitate a meeting with BRN top leaders, preferably in Phuket. Legal charges against the former prime minister prohibit him from traveling abroad. A senior Malaysian officer said Thaksin just wanted “a photo op” for his public relations purposes.

BRN said they are willing to meet with Thaksin or official Thai representatives, but protocol must be respected. A peace process has many stakeholders and components, from the negotiators themselves to the policy-research-technical committees, as well as independent observers.

A BRN representative said their negotiators are mandated by their organisation; the negotiators are not just anybody, and no one individual can make a decision for the entire group. Thai officials at the negotiating table, on the other hand, said Artef, have difficulties convincing its own military to follow the political path set by the policymakers.

Author
Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.
This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require 1) credit authors and their institutions, and 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD  and include a link back to either our home page or the article URL.

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The targeted killing of Abdulroning Lateh and its consequences

Don Pathan
Prachatai English

For a brief moment, there was a real fear that the insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost border provinces would relive its bloody past where tit-for-tat violence by government forces and rebel combatants turned the conflict into a bloodbath marked by heavy-handed responses and vigilantism.

Insurgents attack Sungai Kolok District Office on Mar 9, 2025 (Narathiwat PR)

The second spike of violence came immediately after the shooting death of a very senior member of the National Revolutionary Front of Patani Malay/Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), Abdulroning Lateh, 60, on 18 April.

Abdulroning was known as a battle-hardened mentor who helped groom the current generation of combatants who resurfaced in January 2004 in Thailand’s Malay-speaking South after a decade of calm. More than 7,600 people have been killed since the insurgency resurfaced just over two decades ago and the end is nowhere in sight.

Combatants on the ground responded viciously to his killing, going beyond the unwritten rules of engagement, hitting civilian targets and security officials seemingly at will.

(Credit: ISOC4)

The low point came on 2 May in Narathiwat when gunmen killed four, including a 9-year-old girl in Tak Bai District and a 76-year-old blind woman in Chanae District. The elderly women was riding on a motorbike with her son, who suffered a bullet wound, while the young girl and two other residents were shot dead by a group of six gunmen who fired multiple rounds into their house as they were riding by on their motorbikes.

Two days later, a group of activists from the far South crossed the border into Malaysia to meet with BRN leaders to remind them of the commitment and obligations the movement had made to the local people and members of the international community about embracing international norms and humanitarian principles. In fact, the group even signed a deed of commitment with the INGO Geneva Call, in January 2020, vowing to respect children’s rights.

The BRN is one of the long-standing Patani Malay Muslim separatist movements and today controls virtually all of the combatants on the ground.

This latest spike in violence did not come out of the blue, however. In a way it was a reaction to the dismissive nature Bangkok had given the movement when the head of BRN technical team, Nikmatullah Bin Seri, issued a statement on video in December 2024, saying the group is ready to walk away from the peace process and ditch its commitment to negotiate under the Thai Constitution if the government is not interested in talking.

The BRN was led to believe that the talks would resume after the 2023 General Election. But national security issues took a back seat to economic programmes that the Pheu Thai Party-led government was hoping to use to win back the constituency they had lost following the post-election Faustian deal with the political parties they vowed to stay away from.

Abdulroning Lateh, 60 (Credit: ISOC4)

In January, Defence Minister Phumtham Wechayachai instructed all relevant ministries and agencies to draft an “actionable solution” for the government’s counter-insurgency strategy. He gave them 30 days. Days later, Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra made a trip to the far South, visiting Thamavitya Mulniti, a high school in Yala where a number of BRN political leaders had taught and where the late spiritual leader, Sapae-ing Basor, was the principal before fleeing abroad to escape arrest.

Phumtham’s order and the PM’s visit to the far South were wrongly understood as a gesture of goodwill. In fact, Phumtham was already committed to a position that there would be no talks until the BRN ceases its military operations on the ground. Observers said it was like putting the cart before the horse.

In mid-February, the Thai National Security Council sought help from the Malaysian government to facilitate talks with BRN negotiating team about a possible ceasefire for the upcoming Ramadan that runs from 1-30 March. The BRN counter-proposal included demands calling for the release of unspecific number of prisoners, international and local observers of the ceasefire, a reduction in the number of days for the cessation of hostilities be dropped from 30 to 15 days and that Thailand designated a negotiating team.

On 5 March, Phumtham rejected the BRN’s demands and reiterated his position that there would be no talks until the BRN abandoned their campaign of violence. He later added that the government will only talk to those who have command-and-control of forces on the ground. He argued that past talks had been a failure. If the BRN representatives at the negotiating table were legitimate, they would curb the violence on the ground, Phumtham argued.

For the BRN, coming to the table does not mean an end to military options. Reduction of violence has to be negotiated under an agreed baseline. Moreover, the peace talks is the beginning of a very long process, not an end in itself. Last but not least, Bangkok doesn’t get to decide for BRN who comes to the negotiating table.

When it was clear that the political dialogue had exhausted itself, the BRN military wing took over the course of direction and turned up the heat. On 9 March, a ten-strong BRN unit attacked Narathiwat’s Sungai Kolok district office, killing two Defence Volunteers (security details for Ministry of Interior staff) in the gunfight; eight others were wounded. A car bomb set off moments after the combatants retreated ripped through the compound of the district office, sending a brutal message to the Thai government in Bangkok that it doesn’t get to decide who represents the BRN at the negotiating table.

The same evening also saw a double-tap operation in Pattani’s Sai Buri District in which a smaller bomb drew a group of ordinance officers to the scene only to be hit by a much bigger explosive. One officer died and two were wounded.

The already tense situation became even deadlier after the shooting death of Abdulroning. As expected, the Thai Army blamed the BRN for his killing.

Two days later, on 20 April, an 80 kg explosive rigged inside a gas cylinder was hidden in a motorcycle sidecar parked next to the fence of police flats in Khok Khian Subdistrict, Mueang District, Narathiwat Province. It exploded as the officers lined up in formation, a daily routine. A passenger vehicle full of Islamic religious students was approaching. Nine people, including seven children aged between seven and 15, all of them students at a local Islamic school, were wounded by shrapnel.

Separately, on 22 April in Saba Yoi District of Songkhla Province, assailants fired on a pickup truck driven by a police officer who was transporting a group of Buddhist novices and monks. A 16-year-old novice, the son of the officer, succumbed to his injuries in hospital, while a 12-year-old novice, as well as the 70-year-old senior monk, suffered injuries.

On 28 April, two separate attacks in Yala Province resulted in the shooting death of a Defence Volunteer whose vehicle was set on fire in Banang Sata District. On the same day in nearby Tan Tho district, two Border Patrol Police were killed from a roadside bombing that flipped their armored vehicle into an upside down wreck; one other colleague inside the vehicle was wounded.

Another disturbing trend is the BRN’s expansion of its hit list to include the MOI’s Defence Volunteers following recommendations that they take over some of the security duties of regular army units in the region. For the past seven months, the BRN has stepped up its public campaign with roadside graffiti calling on DVs to leave their job.

Defence Volunteers are locally hired security details for provincial governors and district chiefs. They survived two decades of conflict and insurgency by not seeing anything or saying anything. Today, they are called on to provide intelligence to the government’s security apparatus.

All the while, pressures and criticism were pouring in, condemning the BRN for the attacks on civilians. In line with past practice, the BRN does not publicly confirm or deny specific operation or incident; the movement has no identifiable political wing to engage the public and the media. The group lacks a sound communication strategy, thus, leaving the Thai side to control the narrative about the conflict.

But on 5 May, the BRN issued a statement condemning the ongoing violence and reiterated its long standing policy of not targeting civilians. It did not make reference to any specific incident of the recent weeks.

The long road to peace

While Bangkok still insists on talking to BRN representatives who have command-and-control over insurgents on the ground, on 5 May, the same day that the BRN issued a statement about its long standing principles, Phumtham softened his position by saying peace talks can resume as long as the BRN stops attacking civilians.

A government source who works on the southern conflict said the reason for Thailand’s hard-line position on the talks was because Phumtham is afraid that restarting the formal peace talks amid the spike of violence would make Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra look weak. She is already the butt of many criticisms for just about every policy initiative, foreign and domestic.

Publicly, Phumtham questioned the BRN negotiators’ ability to influence the movement they represent when in fact, the problem stems from Bangkok’s lack of political will to negotiate and make concessions to the BRN and the Malays of Patani.

The BRN has time and again, publicly and secretly, demonstrated to the Thais that they have command-and-control over the combatants on the ground. The 45-day ceasefire during Ramadan 2022 was a case in point; a thorough cross-check between the two sides over the years removed all doubts that the Thai negotiators were dealing with the wrong people.

But Thailand has always wanted to deal with the BRN military leaders, believing in their ability to sweet talk them out of the conflict, or at least reduce the violence.

The BRN says Thailand doesn’t understand that to them, the peace talks are only the start of a very long journey. The talks are not an end in themselves. For years, the two sides have been stuck in the “talking shop” mode, unable to move the process beyond confidence-building exercises. Like past administrations, the Pheu Thai-led government doesn’t seem to have the political will to go further.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security consultant. 

https://prachataienglish.com/node/11397

Malaysia’s Enduring Significance for Peace in Southern Thailand

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com 

Funeral procession in the Patani, one of the few moments where Melayu can vent their anger towards the state. (File Photo: CHAROON THONGNUAL)

Introduction

In January 1998 – when the Malaysian government handed over four senior members of the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) to Thai law enforcement – few knew what to make of it.

Thailand’s Malay-speaking South was relatively peaceful at the time; armed insurgency had already subsided for some years. The blanket amnesty given to various separatist groups from the late 1980s to early 1990s appeared to have paid off—or so it seemed.

While combatants put down their arms and returned to their villages, many leaders remained abroad, obtaining residency status or citizenship in Northern European countries and Malaysia.

Thailand wrongly assumed that peace had been achieved in this Malay historical homeland known as Patani. So, when Malaysian authorities detained Abdul Rohman Bazo, Haji Daoh Thanam, Haji Mae Yala, and Haji Sama-ae Thanam and handed them over to Thai counterparts in January 1998, Patani residents and members of various Patani liberation groups were dumbstruck.

Four years later, when a new generation of Patani Malay fighters under the command of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) resurfaced – carrying out sporadic attacks against police and military outposts in the region – Malaysia realised they had shot themselves in the foot with the handover of the four PULO members.

Funeral procession for Thai soldiers in Pattani. (CHAIWAT PUPUANG)

Rocky Road

The official explanation as to why the Thais were after these PULO leaders was unconvincing. No one believed they were trying to start another standing army, as they were living openly in Malaysia, running legitimate businesses such as a restaurant.

One explanation that made the most sense came from a senior Thai diplomat who said the request for the arrest of the Thanam brothers and their associates was Thailand’s way of testing the waters with Malaysia—to gauge the level of commitment from then-prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohammed to his Thai counterpart, Chuan Leekpai.

At first, as sporadic attacks occurred in mid-2001, the then-government – led by Thaksin Shinawatra – was dismissive, calling the insurgents “sparrow bandits”. Following the 4 January 2004 arms heist, in which BRN combatants made off with more than 350 military weapons from an army battalion in Narathiwat, Bangkok could no longer deny the political underpinnings of these attacks.

Suddenly, there was acknowledgment that a new generation of Patani Malay Muslim separatist combatants had resurfaced.

The first few years were not smooth sailing for the two countries as public accusations and microphone diplomacy took their toll on bilateral relations, with each side accusing the other of not doing enough to quell the insurgency.

Fleeing Villagers

One low point came in August 2005 when 131 Malay Muslim villagers from Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district crossed the border and took refuge in Kelantan’s mosques following alleged harassment by Thai security forces.

Deporting these villagers back to Thailand would have been difficult as Malaysia sought to maintain its place in the Muslim world. Moreover, the 131 displaced villagers were not just Muslims; they were fellow Malays who shared the same cultural and linguistic traits as Malays in Malaysia.

At the time of the exodus, death squads were on a killing spree, targeting ethnic Malays at village teashops; the imam from Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district and a female teacher at an Islamic preschool in the village were shot dead by unknown gunmen.

The atmosphere was tense and a climate of fear enveloped the entire region.

Malaysia did not push the 131 back to the Thai side but refused to recognise or treat them as asylum seekers. There were concerns that more would come. Eventually, the Malaysian government asked the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) to assist these fleeing Patani Malay villagers, thus internationalising the issue.

Thaksin was furious because he never wanted the problem in the far South to be more than a bilateral issue. Putting Patani on an international stage forced Thailand to confront this disturbing aspect of its state-minority relations. This is not to mention its failed assimilation policy that Patani Malays violently rejected because it threatened their ethno-religious identity and historical-cultural narrative.

Eventually, over the years, the issue faded from officials’ memories. Some of the displaced villagers quietly returned to their homes in Narathiwat, while others remained in northern Malaysia as undocumented migrants.

Yet, someone must pay the price. Thaksin was ousted in a coup in October 2006 by an army general who cited his handling of the separatist insurgency as one of the reasons.

Strings of Prime Ministers

The relationship between Malaysia and Thailand during the reign of prime minister Surayud Chulanont was described as cordial and respectful. The former army chief placed great emphasis on the root causes of the conflict. In late 2007, Surayud made a public apology to the people of Patani for the deaths of 87 unarmed protesters in Tak Bai in late 2004.

He reached out to the international community for help to establish a foundation for peace negotiations with the rebels, but his time in office lasted just 16 months. The foundation he laid was largely ignored by the subsequent government of prime minister Samak Sundaravej of the Thaksin-linked People Power Party (PPP).

In March 2012, Thaksin held a quiet meeting in Kelantan with leaders from various Patani Malay separatist organisations, during which he blamed his heavy-handedness on distorted information given to him by the Army. Thaksin thought his direct participation would help improve the situation. He urged all participants to let bygones be bygones and start over.

Two weeks after the meeting, a triple car bomb exploded in the heart of Yala, one of Thailand’s three southernmost border provinces, killing 13 and wounding about 140 civilians. Conflict observers and Thai security officials said the attack was a stern message to Thaksin that nothing in the far south comes easy.

The following year, on 28 February 2013, prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister, caught everyone by surprise, including the Royal Thai Army, by launching a peace process with a group of exiled old guards claiming to be BRN members. Malaysia was officially designated as the facilitator.

It has been repeatedly pointed out that, due to geographical proximity, Malaysia cannot be seen as an honest broker. Some conspiracy-minded officials in Thailand even suggest that Patani wants to join Malaysia.

However, among security officials, it was generally understood that mainland Southeast Asian borders have a life of their own. At one time or another, buffers and proxies along borders were common among countries in the region while diplomatic relations took their course.

To some BRN members, Malaysia’s opposition to an independent Patani already disqualified them as an honest broker. But this is Southeast Asia, where peace and conflict resolution theories do not align well.

Malaysia took up the mediation role, thinking that Thailand was politically stable. Nevertheless, just over a year after peace negotiations launched, Yingluck was ousted in a coup.

The coup leader, General Prayut Chan-ocha, appointed himself the country’s prime minister and deliberated continuing Yingluck’s peace initiative. After all, the Army had not been consulted and learned about it just days before the official launch in Malaysia. In the end, Prayut relented and allowed the talks to continue.

From the start, Yingluck’s peace initiative wavered between a hoax and a leap of faith. The representatives at the table lacked command and control over the combatants on the ground. But when BRN finally came to the table in January 2020, these old guards from the 2013 talks were immediately sidelined.

Having the real BRN at the table did not mean violence on the ground would end. The new chief negotiator, General Udomchai Thamsarorat, was appointed in October 2018 and immediately sought help from local civil society organisations, hoping they could amplify messages to BRN about the need to talk and reconcile differences.

However, it remained unclear what the Thai side had to offer or what concessions the government was willing to make to the people of Patani. Besides engaging local CSOs, Udomchai also asked Malaysia to bypass BRN negotiators and arrange a meeting for him with top leaders from the BRN military wing. BRN refused.

Decline

Another low point between Thailand and Malaysia came in late 2019 when Bangkok created a back channel with BRN through foreign mediation without informing Malaysia.

There are several reasons as to why Malaysia was uninformed. Firstly, Thailand blamed Malaysia for its failure in bringing BRN’s military leaders to the table. Secondly, Thailand was still not satisfied with talking to the BRN negotiators, even through a proper channel.

Thailand assumed that if it can talk to the military wing, it can (somehow) convince the movement to lay down their arms. Thus, Thailand approached a foreign NGO to establish a back channel with BRN, with the assumption that this could be done without giving any concession to BRN or the Malays of Patani.

In theory, a back channel is supposed to support the main (official) channel. However, in this case, the two tracks continue to compete against one another (the official track with Malaysia as the lead and the back channel with a foreign NGO trying to convince everybody that Malaysia needs to be dumped because it is not an honest broker).

Tensions arising from this competition took their toll on BRN unity. Thus, in early 2022, the BRN central committee decided to end all forms of back channels unless Malaysia is kept in the loop.

Udomchai was replaced by retired National Security Council (NSC) chief General Wallop Raksanoh, who spent the next three years developing a blueprint to serve as the roadmap for the peace process. A commitment from BRN that future negotiations would align with the Thai Constitution was a significant victory for Wallop, but more work remained for the Malaysian mediator to get both sides to agree on the roadmap’s content.

Meanwhile, Thailand held a general election in May 2023 that created a coalition government, with Thaksin’s Pheu Thai Party coming in second but successfully forming a coalition with like-minded partners, including parties from the junta leaders who ousted Yingluck in 2014.

Later, real estate tycoon Srettha Tavisin became prime minister. During his tenure, Malaysia was left pondering when Thailand would appoint a chief negotiator. This was because national security was not an immediate concern of the Srettha administration.

This was demonstrated with Srettha making no reference to the far south (or to Burma) during his speech to the Parliament. His priorities were clear. Firstly, to prioritise the economy as a means to winning back the constituency whom his party had lost after the Faustian deal with the pro-junta/military camp to get Thaksin back to Thailand. Secondly, to deny the Move Forward Party the lead in setting up a government. Thirdly, to make the Pheu Thai Party the overall lead in this coalition of political parties that compromised their stated democratic principles in exchange for a political truce that may not last very long.

Eventually, then-NSC deputy chief Chartchai Bangchuad was appointed as chief negotiator. His stint lasted only a few months, as the Constitutional Court removed Srettha from office in August 2024 following ethical violation charges.

The government of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, much like the one preceding it, showed little concern for the conflict in the far south. Last December, BRN threatened to walk away from talks and withdrew its earlier commitment to operate under the Thai Constitution if Thailand continued to drag its feet on the peace process.

Bangkok refused to yield and insisted that a new negotiating team would be appointed only after BRN curbed violence on the ground. BRN maintained that even the reduction of violence had to be negotiated.

Just before Ramadhan in 2025, the new Malaysian facilitator, Datuk Mohd Rabin Basir, tried to help Thailand secure a ceasefire during the holy month. However, Bangkok found BRN’s demand for international observers to monitor the ceasefire too much to accept. Thailand has always resisted outside intervention, leading to the rejection.

Interestingly, BRN sources had shared with the author that Datuk Mohd Rabin’s appointment to replace Tan Sri Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, the retired chief of the armed forces and a professor at the National Defence University of Malaysia, was perceived as a setback to the peace process. This was because Tan Sri Zulkifli had worked hard to gain BRN’s trust and respect during his appointment as Malaysia’s facilitator.

The recent spike in violence has become the new normal. Targets include Defense Volunteers (DV), locally hired security personnel assigned to the Ministry of Interior’s provincial governors and district chiefs. These DVs have been asked to serve as government informants. BRN has demonstrated that they have no qualms about targeting DVs who spy on them.

In March 2025, Thaksin offered to carry out a direct talk with BRN leaders from the military wing. He suggested Phuket as the venue and offered legal immunity. BRN leaders turned down the offer, as no one was certain about what kind of mandate Thaksin had to be making such an offer.

Observers said Thaksin just wanted photo ops with BRN military leaders. For BRN, the peace process is the start of a very long journey, one that should not be taken lightly, much less used as a photo op for an ageing, former fugitive prime minister who does not seem to know his place.

Conclusion

Despite the challenges, Malaysia plays an important role in attempting to resolve the long-running insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces. The relationship with Thailand has become much calmer compared to the early days of microphone diplomacy.

Both Thailand and BRN see Malaysia’s geographical proximity as beneficial to their logistical and operational needs. Furthermore, ethnic Malays in Malaysia may share similar cultural-religious characteristics with the Malays of Patani, indicating that a great sympathy for the plight of the latter might exist among the former.

But it stops there. Both government and non-government entities in Malaysia know that nurturing this bilateral tie is extremely challenging, as one wrong move could bring down the whole house.

Balancing its relationship with Thailand while maintaining credibility with insurgent groups has not been an easy act to follow for Malaysia. Some in Malaysia say the Malaysian government should do nothing more than facilitate discussion, while others said the proximity makes the country a stakeholder and intervention is extremely necessary. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that BRN needs all the help it can get from members of the international community and that Malaysia should facilitate the discussion. Getting Thailand to go along with the idea, on the other hand, is like moving a mountain.

Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require 1) credit authors and their institutions, and 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD  and include a link back to either our home page or the article URL.

Malaysia’s Enduring Significance for Peace in Southern Thailand

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com 

Not everybody agrees that Malaysia can play an honest broker to facilitate peace in southern Thailand. Credit: Mahendra Putra/Unpslash

Introduction

In January 1998 – when the Malaysian government handed over four senior members of the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) to Thai law enforcement – few knew what to make of it.

Thailand’s Malay-speaking South was relatively peaceful at the time; armed insurgency had already subsided for some years. The blanket amnesty given to various separatist groups from the late 1980s to early 1990s appeared to have paid off—or so it seemed.

While combatants put down their arms and returned to their villages, many leaders remained abroad, obtaining residency status or citizenship in Northern European countries and Malaysia.

Thailand wrongly assumed that peace had been achieved in this Malay historical homeland known as Patani. So, when Malaysian authorities detained Abdul Rohman Bazo, Haji Daoh Thanam, Haji Mae Yala, and Haji Sama-ae Thanam and handed them over to Thai counterparts in January 1998, Patani residents and members of various Patani liberation groups were dumbstruck.

Four years later, when a new generation of Patani Malay fighters under the command of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) resurfaced – carrying out sporadic attacks against police and military outposts in the region – Malaysia realised they had shot themselves in the foot with the handover of the four PULO members.

Rocky Road

The official explanation as to why the Thais were after these PULO leaders was unconvincing. No one believed they were trying to start another standing army, as they were living openly in Malaysia, running legitimate businesses such as a restaurant.

One explanation that made the most sense came from a senior Thai diplomat who said the request for the arrest of the Thanam brothers and their associates was Thailand’s way of testing the waters with Malaysia—to gauge the level of commitment from then-prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohammed to his Thai counterpart, Chuan Leekpai.

At first, as sporadic attacks occurred in mid-2001, the then-government – led by Thaksin Shinawatra – was dismissive, calling the insurgents “sparrow bandits”. Following the 4 January 2004 arms heist, in which BRN combatants made off with more than 350 military weapons from an army battalion in Narathiwat, Bangkok could no longer deny the political underpinnings of these attacks.

Suddenly, there was acknowledgment that a new generation of Patani Malay Muslim separatist combatants had resurfaced.

The first few years were not smooth sailing for the two countries as public accusations and microphone diplomacy took their toll on bilateral relations, with each side accusing the other of not doing enough to quell the insurgency.

Fleeing Villagers

One low point came in August 2005 when 131 Malay Muslim villagers from Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district crossed the border and took refuge in Kelantan’s mosques following alleged harassment by Thai security forces.

Deporting these villagers back to Thailand would have been difficult as Malaysia sought to maintain its place in the Muslim world. Moreover, the 131 displaced villagers were not just Muslims; they were fellow Malays who shared the same cultural and linguistic traits as Malays in Malaysia.

At the time of the exodus, death squads were on a killing spree, targeting ethnic Malays at village teashops; the imam from Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district and a female teacher at an Islamic preschool in the village were shot dead by unknown gunmen.

The atmosphere was tense and a climate of fear enveloped the entire region.

Malaysia did not push the 131 back to the Thai side but refused to recognise or treat them as asylum seekers. There were concerns that more would come. Eventually, the Malaysian government asked the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) to assist these fleeing Patani Malay villagers, thus internationalising the issue.

Thaksin was furious because he never wanted the problem in the far South to be more than a bilateral issue. Putting Patani on an international stage forced Thailand to confront this disturbing aspect of its state-minority relations. This is not to mention its failed assimilation policy that Patani Malays violently rejected because it threatened their ethno-religious identity and historical-cultural narrative.

Eventually, over the years, the issue faded from officials’ memories. Some of the displaced villagers quietly returned to their homes in Narathiwat, while others remained in northern Malaysia as undocumented migrants.

Yet, someone must pay the price. Thaksin was ousted in a coup in October 2006 by an army general who cited his handling of the separatist insurgency as one of the reasons.

Strings of Prime Ministers

The relationship between Malaysia and Thailand during the reign of prime minister Surayud Chulanont was described as cordial and respectful. The former army chief placed great emphasis on the root causes of the conflict. In late 2007, Surayud made a public apology to the people of Patani for the deaths of 87 unarmed protesters in Tak Bai in late 2004.

He reached out to the international community for help to establish a foundation for peace negotiations with the rebels, but his time in office lasted just 16 months. The foundation he laid was largely ignored by the subsequent government of prime minister Samak Sundaravej of the Thaksin-linked People Power Party (PPP).

In March 2012, Thaksin held a quiet meeting in Kelantan with leaders from various Patani Malay separatist organisations, during which he blamed his heavy-handedness on distorted information given to him by the Army. Thaksin thought his direct participation would help improve the situation. He urged all participants to let bygones be bygones and start over.

Two weeks after the meeting, a triple car bomb exploded in the heart of Yala, one of Thailand’s three southernmost border provinces, killing 13 and wounding about 140 civilians. Conflict observers and Thai security officials said the attack was a stern message to Thaksin that nothing in the far south comes easy.

The following year, on 28 February 2013, prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister, caught everyone by surprise, including the Royal Thai Army, by launching a peace process with a group of exiled old guards claiming to be BRN members. Malaysia was officially designated as the facilitator.

It has been repeatedly pointed out that, due to geographical proximity, Malaysia cannot be seen as an honest broker. Some conspiracy-minded officials in Thailand even suggest that Patani wants to join Malaysia.

However, among security officials, it was generally understood that mainland Southeast Asian borders have a life of their own. At one time or another, buffers and proxies along borders were common among countries in the region while diplomatic relations took their course.

To some BRN members, Malaysia’s opposition to an independent Patani already disqualified them as an honest broker. But this is Southeast Asia, where peace and conflict resolution theories do not align well.

Malaysia took up the mediation role, thinking that Thailand was politically stable. Nevertheless, just over a year after peace negotiations launched, Yingluck was ousted in a coup.

The coup leader, General Prayut Chan-ocha, appointed himself the country’s prime minister and deliberated continuing Yingluck’s peace initiative. After all, the Army had not been consulted and learned about it just days before the official launch in Malaysia. In the end, Prayut relented and allowed the talks to continue.

From the start, Yingluck’s peace initiative wavered between a hoax and a leap of faith. The representatives at the table lacked command and control over the combatants on the ground. But when BRN finally came to the table in January 2020, these old guards from the 2013 talks were immediately sidelined.

Having the real BRN at the table did not mean violence on the ground would end. The new chief negotiator, General Udomchai Thamsarorat, was appointed in October 2018 and immediately sought help from local civil society organisations, hoping they could amplify messages to BRN about the need to talk and reconcile differences.

However, it remained unclear what the Thai side had to offer or what concessions the government was willing to make to the people of Patani. Besides engaging local CSOs, Udomchai also asked Malaysia to bypass BRN negotiators and arrange a meeting for him with top leaders from the BRN military wing. BRN refused.

Decline

Another low point between Thailand and Malaysia came in late 2019 when Bangkok created a back channel with BRN through foreign mediation without informing Malaysia.

There are several reasons as to why Malaysia was uninformed. Firstly, Thailand blamed Malaysia for its failure in bringing BRN’s military leaders to the table. Secondly, Thailand was still not satisfied with talking to the BRN negotiators, even through a proper channel.

Thailand assumed that if it can talk to the military wing, it can (somehow) convince the movement to lay down their arms. Thus, Thailand approached a foreign NGO to establish a back channel with BRN, with the assumption that this could be done without giving any concession to BRN or the Malays of Patani.

In theory, a back channel is supposed to support the main (official) channel. However, in this case, the two tracks continue to compete against one another (the official track with Malaysia as the lead and the back channel with a foreign NGO trying to convince everybody that Malaysia needs to be dumped because it is not an honest broker).

Tensions arising from this competition took their toll on BRN unity. Thus, in early 2022, the BRN central committee decided to end all forms of back channels unless Malaysia is kept in the loop.

Udomchai was replaced by retired National Security Council (NSC) chief General Wallop Raksanoh, who spent the next three years developing a blueprint to serve as the roadmap for the peace process. A commitment from BRN that future negotiations would align with the Thai Constitution was a significant victory for Wallop, but more work remained for the Malaysian mediator to get both sides to agree on the roadmap’s content.

Meanwhile, Thailand held a general election in May 2023 that created a coalition government, with Thaksin’s Pheu Thai Party coming in second but successfully forming a coalition with like-minded partners, including parties from the junta leaders who ousted Yingluck in 2014.

Later, real estate tycoon Srettha Tavisin became prime minister. During his tenure, Malaysia was left pondering when Thailand would appoint a chief negotiator. This was because national security was not an immediate concern of the Srettha administration.

This was demonstrated with Srettha making no reference to the far south (or to Burma) during his speech to the Parliament. His priorities were clear. Firstly, to prioritise the economy as a means to winning back the constituency whom his party had lost after the Faustian deal with the pro-junta/military camp to get Thaksin back to Thailand. Secondly, to deny the Move Forward Party the lead in setting up a government. Thirdly, to make the Pheu Thai Party the overall lead in this coalition of political parties that compromised their stated democratic principles in exchange for a political truce that may not last very long.

Eventually, then-NSC deputy chief Chartchai Bangchuad was appointed as chief negotiator. His stint lasted only a few months, as the Constitutional Court removed Srettha from office in August 2024 following ethical violation charges.

The government of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, much like the one preceding it, showed little concern for the conflict in the far south. Last December, BRN threatened to walk away from talks and withdrew its earlier commitment to operate under the Thai Constitution if Thailand continued to drag its feet on the peace process.

Bangkok refused to yield and insisted that a new negotiating team would be appointed only after BRN curbed violence on the ground. BRN maintained that even the reduction of violence had to be negotiated.

Just before Ramadhan in 2025, the new Malaysian facilitator, Datuk Mohd Rabin Basir, tried to help Thailand secure a ceasefire during the holy month. However, Bangkok found BRN’s demand for international observers to monitor the ceasefire too much to accept. Thailand has always resisted outside intervention, leading to the rejection.

Interestingly, BRN sources had shared with the author that Datuk Mohd Rabin’s appointment to replace Tan Sri Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, the retired chief of the armed forces and a professor at the National Defence University of Malaysia, was perceived as a setback to the peace process. This was because Tan Sri Zulkifli had worked hard to gain BRN’s trust and respect during his appointment as Malaysia’s facilitator.

The recent spike in violence has become the new normal. Targets include Defense Volunteers (DV), locally hired security personnel assigned to the Ministry of Interior’s provincial governors and district chiefs. These DVs have been asked to serve as government informants. BRN has demonstrated that they have no qualms about targeting DVs who spy on them.

In March 2025, Thaksin offered to carry out a direct talk with BRN leaders from the military wing. He suggested Phuket as the venue and offered legal immunity. BRN leaders turned down the offer, as no one was certain about what kind of mandate Thaksin had to be making such an offer.

Observers said Thaksin just wanted photo ops with BRN military leaders. For BRN, the peace process is the start of a very long journey, one that should not be taken lightly, much less used as a photo op for an ageing, former fugitive prime minister who does not seem to know his place.

Conclusion

Despite the challenges, Malaysia plays an important role in attempting to resolve the long-running insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces. The relationship with Thailand has become much calmer compared to the early days of microphone diplomacy.

Both Thailand and BRN see Malaysia’s geographical proximity as beneficial to their logistical and operational needs. Furthermore, ethnic Malays in Malaysia may share similar cultural-religious characteristics with the Malays of Patani, indicating that a great sympathy for the plight of the latter might exist among the former.

But it stops there. Both government and non-government entities in Malaysia know that nurturing this bilateral tie is extremely challenging, as one wrong move could bring down the whole house.

Balancing its relationship with Thailand while maintaining credibility with insurgent groups has not been an easy act to follow for Malaysia. Some in Malaysia say the Malaysian government should do nothing more than facilitate discussion, while others said the proximity makes the country a stakeholder and intervention is extremely necessary. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that BRN needs all the help it can get from members of the international community and that Malaysia should facilitate the discussion. Getting Thailand to go along with the idea, on the other hand, is like moving a mountain.

Author
Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require 1) credit authors and their institutions, and 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD  and include a link back to either our home page or the article URL.