Shinawatra’s End

Thai PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra (Credit: Facebook posting)

Leaked Phone Call

Thailand’s Shinawatra political dynasty faces its gravest crisis yet as Prime Minister Paetongtarn finds herself trapped in a political firestorm that threatens to end her family’s decade-long dominance in Thai politics.

At 38, the inexperienced leader has become the centre of a scandal that exposes not only her political naivety but also the fragile foundations upon which her administration rests.

The crisis erupted when a private phone conversation between Paetongtarn and Cambodian strongman Hun Sen was leaked on social media platforms. In the recording, the Thai prime minister referred to her own military commanders as “opponents” and dismissed the Thai regional commander responsible for northeastern security as someone who “just wanted to look tough”.

She also addressed Hun Sen as “uncle”, a term of endearment that reflects the long-standing friendship between the Shinawatra and Hun families.

What Paetongtarn characterised as a “negotiation tactic” has been condemned by critics as a betrayal of national security and dignity. The leaked conversation has triggered mass protests demanding her resignation and thrown her government into chaos, threatening the fragile coalition that brought her Pheu Thai Party to power.

The phone call centred on resolving escalating tensions along the Thai-Cambodian border, specifically around the disputed Emerald Triangle where Thailand, Cambodia and Laos converge.

The standoff intensified after several provocative incidents: 1) a Thai-built friendship pavilion was burnt down in March 2025; 2) Cambodian forces dug trenches that Thai officials claimed extended 200 metres into the Thai territory and; 3) the shooting incident on 28 May 2025 that resulted in the death of a Cambodian soldier, with both sides claiming self-defence.

Despite an agreement reached on 8 June 2025 between border task force commanders to withdraw troops and fill the disputed trenches, implementation stalled. Thailand failed to restore normal operating hours at border checkpoints as promised, prompting Cambodia to reduce its own checkpoint hours in retaliation. The tit-for-tat escalation continued, creating the volatile atmosphere that led to the fateful phone conversation.

Outstanding Dispute

Thai-Cambodian border disputes have been a recurring feature of the bilateral relations since the colonial period, with boundaries drawn by French colonial powers through gunboat diplomacy. The two nations have long used these territorial disagreements as convenient sources of nationalist sentiment when domestic political legitimacy wanes.

The irony is particularly sharp given that both countries share cultural traditions – including martial arts known as Muay Thai in Thailand and Kun Khmer in Cambodia – practised throughout the Theravada Buddhist region.

As French orientalist Ernest Renan observed, nation-building requires people to forget certain things while remembering others. The problem for Thailand and Cambodia is their selective memory focuses on grievances rather than shared heritage.

The 1962 International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling awarding the Preah Vihear temple to Cambodia continues to rankle Thai nationalists, while discussions of joint maritime resource exploration in the Gulf of Thailand sparked fears about compromising Thai sovereignty over Koh Kood Island. Historical mistrust consistently undermines cooperation efforts between the two nations.

Power Struggle

The leaked call exposed deep rifts between Paetongtarn’s civilian government and the Royal Thai Army. Military leaders withheld information about the Cambodian trenches from the foreign affairs and defence ministries, releasing details to the media only after the 8 June 2025 shooting incident. This breach of the standard operating procedure, which typically requires diplomatic channels to be informed first, suggests a deliberate attempt by the military to achieve political gain.

The army appears to have emerged as the primary beneficiary of this crisis. They avoided scrutiny over their information handling, secured budget allocations from the parliament and positioned themselves as patriotic defenders of national sovereignty.

Even the opposition People’s Party, typically critical of military overreach, has remained notably silent, unwilling to risk being labelled unpatriotic.

The tit-for-tat continued with both refusing to discuss the overlapping dispute bilaterally and making a formal request to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to resolve the territorial disputes around the Emerald Triangle. On 23 May 2025, for example, Paetongtarn – speaking to the media following a meeting on transnational crime with all of the government’s security bigwigs – called on the international community to join Thailand in cracking down on Cambodia-based scam centres.

Cambodia’s suggestions that the border dispute with Thailand around the Emerald Triangle be brought to the ICJ irked Thailand badly, as it placed Cambodia on a legal and moral high ground. In reality, however, both sides undermined their own narrative of peace as they continuously beat the war drums and spin things unabashedly to round up domestic support.

Two Intertwined Families

For years, Thaksin and Hun Sen were courting each other. When Thaksin’s camp was in trouble, Hun Sen extended hospitality to Thaksin’s supporters fleeing arrest after the 2006 coup that ousted him from power.

Their children, Paetongtarn and Manet, also enjoyed cordial relations. Their governments went as far as reviving a two-decade-old MoU on overlapping maritime claims in the Gulf of Thailand and talked about profit sharing from the exploration of natural resources in the overlapping area.

Today, like Thaksin, Hun Sen is experiencing difficulties in making sure that Prime Minister Hun Manet governs the country without much obstacles and that his family continues to reign over Cambodia for the unforeseeable future. Hun Sen stepped down as the prime minister in August 2023 after four decades of rule, leaving Manet a big shoe to fill.

But unlike Thailand, where a critical press and a rowdy public constantly give Paetongtarn, or any government of the day, a big headache, Cambodia has no such outlets or adequate institutions for its people to express their grievances.

The Cambodian Parliament of 125 MPs has only five lawmakers in the “opposition” bench, and Hun Sen’s children run the country’s media outlets, including the online ones. Speaking out against the family has its consequences.

For Hun Sen, the decision to leak the conversation represents a calculated political maneuver designed to elevate his son, Manet, as a national hero. The ex-leader sought Thailand’s acceptance of Cambodia’s territorial claims over the Emerald Triangle, believing this diplomatic victory would strengthen his son’s position during a challenging transition period.

When it became clear that Thaksin and Paetongtarn would not sacrifice their political survival for Manet’s political ambitions, Hun Sen decided to burn bridges with his long-time allies. The leak served his domestic political needs while demonstrating his assessment that Thaksin’s political usefulness had expired.

Manet – a West Point graduate once described by an American military officer as possessing high integrity – now finds himself defending his father’s social media diplomacy tactics, claiming such methods are common in modern governance. However, few precedents exist for using leaked private conversations.

This crisis strikes at a particularly vulnerable moment for the Shinawatra family. Thaksin returned from exile in August 2023 believing his legal troubles were resolved, only to face continued challenges, including unresolved lese majeste charges and accusations of feigning illness to avoid jail. 

His sister Yingluck, still in exile following the 2014 coup, was ordered in May 2025 to pay THB10 bn in compensation for losses from her administration’s rice-pledging scheme. Her inability to return safely to Thailand represents the family’s unfinished business.

Why is She the Prime Minister?

The Pheu Thai Party’s decision to install Paetongtarn as prime minister – following Srettha Thavisin’s removal – was driven more by loyalty to Thaksin than confidence in her capabilities. Party members acknowledged privately that she lacked the experience for the role, but her appointment made the facilitation of continued deference to her father that much easier.

Moreover, it was not clear why Paetongtarn was not coached by those veteran politicians that she surrounded herself with. Perhaps they were so occupied with the big picture that they forgot that the devil is always in the details. Perhaps they took comfort in the belief that Hun Sen and Thaksin are old friends and assumed that friends do not stab each other in the back.

Of all the people, they should know that nothing lasts forever in Thailand and Cambodia’s cut-throat politics. Perhaps the cross-border aspect of it threw them off.

But the writing was always on the wall. Party members knew full well that Paetongtarn was not cut out for the job, but they insisted that her name be put forth to the parliament to replace Srettha Thavisin, who was removed by the Constitutional Court in August 2024.

The leaked conversation provided a convenient pretext for coalition partners already seeking an exit. Bhumjaithai Party, the coalition’s second-largest member, was about to be kicked out of the coalition due to disputes over cabinet seat allocation. The border controversy gave them a face-saving opportunity to withdraw while claiming to defend national honour.

This defection threatens the stability of Paetongtarn’s government and raises questions about the viability of the Faustian bargain that Thaksin and Pheu Thai struck with conservative political elites to form the current coalition and to exclude the reform-minded Move Forward Party from power.

That arrangement, built on expedience rather than shared vision, was always destined to be temporary.

The Dynasty in Crisis

The current crisis may indeed mark the beginning of the end for the Shinawatra dynasty in Thai politics. Paetongtarn’s inexperience, combined with her father’s diminished influence and mounting legal challenges, has left the family politically isolated and vulnerable.

Sources in the Thai army suggest they could work with the opposition People’s Party, indicating that cooperation with the Thaksin camp has become untenable. However, how the so-called Orange Shirts (People’s Party supporters) and the military could coexist remains unclear, and many observers caution against counting Thaksin out entirely, given his history of political comebacks.

The tragedy of this crisis lies not only in its immediate political casualties but also in its demonstration of how quickly personal relationships and private conversations can escalate into matters of national security and international relations. For a political dynasty built on populist appeal, this episode exposes fundamental weaknesses that may prove insurmountable. As Thailand navigates this political turbulence, the broader question remains whether the country’s democratic institutions can emerge stronger from this crisis or whether it will deepen the cycle of instability that has plagued Thai politics for decades. The answer may well determine not just the fate of the Shinawatra family but the trajectory of Thai democracy itself.

Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

Thailand and the UWSA: A Complex Border Challenge

Don Pathan
Mizzima News

Happier times. UWSA chairman Bao Yu-xiang (left) and the then Third Army Area commander, Lt. General Picharnmate Muangmanee, with the then commander of Burma's Triangle Area, Brig. General Khin Zaw, celebrate the opening of a Thai-funded school and development project in a Wa-controlled area near the Thai border in 2003.

One of the first items on the agenda for then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra when he came to power in 2001 was to declare war on drugs. He singled out the United Wa State Army (UWSA), a 30,000-strong militia with its own sphere of influence along the China-Myanmar border and areas near the Thai frontier.

Wa leaders have been indicted by the US Federal Court as far back as 1993 on heroin trafficking charges. At least one commander, Wei Hsueh-kang, who leads all southern Wa units along the Thai border, has a $2 million bounty on his head. Methamphetamines from Wa-controlled laboratories reach far beyond Southeast Asian cities, extending to Amsterdam’s red-light district, where African dealers whisper to passing tourists, “Hey, mister! Thai pills!”

Wa and Thai soldiers on the border, Dec 2024 (Credit: Royal Thai Army) 

Origins and Expansion

Founded in 1989 after the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) disintegrated, the UWSA initially comprised ethnic Wa soldiers who mutinied against their CPB leaders. They established their organization and reached a verbal ceasefire with Myanmar, cementing their role as a strong Chinese ally. Over time, the UWSA expanded its influence and now supports various ethnic armed groups in Myanmar, including the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang Chinese), Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Kachin Independence Army, the Arakan Army, and the Shan State Army-North. 

The UWSA strengthened its foothold along the Thailand-Myanmar border after ousting its longtime rival, the Mong Tai Army (MTA) of late opium warlord Khun Sa, in the late 1990s. Ignoring instructions from the Myanmar government to return to the China-Myanmar border, the UWSA forcibly mobilized approximately 100,000 people from the north to newly built towns and cities near the Thai border, including areas once occupied by the MTA.

UWSA mass relocation to the Thai border.

The UWSA is no ordinary ethnic armed organization. From a marginalized group in mainland Southeast Asia known for headhunting, the ethnic Wa became the most significant component of the now-defunct CPB. When the organization collapsed along ethnic lines in 1989, the Wa retained enough weapons to last another decade.

The Confrontations

Known for their battlefield ferocity, the Wa faction in the CPB established the UWSA in 1989. A verbal ceasefire agreement was immediately established with the then-Myanmar’s security chief, Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt, allowing the UWSA to govern Special Region 2 and cultivate whatever crops they deemed appropriate. Opium became the natural choice in these rugged hills where warlords and freedom fighters operated.

Besides several strongholds deep inside Shan State along Thailand’s Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai, and Mae Hong Son borders, the UWSA established nine outposts directly on the still-undemarcated border.

Initially, there were even volleyball games between troops from both sides. However, everyone knew the good times wouldn’t last. The turning point came one morning in February 1999, when authorities discovered nine Thai villagers from Chiang Mai’s Fang district beaten to death with their hands tied behind their backs. A local official said the victims were on a hunting trip but encountered a drug caravan transporting methamphetamines and had to be eliminated. Burmese language learning software

All fingers pointed to the Wa militia. This incident prompted Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai’s government to close the border leading to Mong Yawn, a UWSA southern stronghold where Thai developers had been working to build towns and cities to accommodate Wa expansion into the southern command.

The low point came in May 2002, during what was officially billed as a field training exercise. Surasri 143, Thai soldiers, with mortar and artillery support, crossed into Myanmar territory and attacked UWSA positions, some jointly occupied by the Tatmadaw. Thaksin claimed the Army had “overreacted.”

The following year, in February 2003, Thaksin turned his counter-narcotic efforts inward and launched his ‘war on drugs,’ ostensibly aimed at suppressing drug traffickers. In the campaign’s first three months, approximately 2,800 extrajudicial killings occurred. A 2007 official investigation found that more than half of those killed had no connection to drugs whatsoever.

Thaksin’s Strategy and Miscalculations

When Thaksin assumed power in 2001, he wasted no time demonizing the UWSA, referred to as the “Red Wa” by the Thais, vowing to capture Wei Hsueh-kang “dead or alive.” For Thaksin, the UWSA seemed like a low-hanging fruit—or so he thought. However, he would learn that everything carries a political price. The UWSA had powerful allies: besides old comrades in China, the Wa maintained ties with the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military.

Wei Hsueh-kang (file photo)

Thaksin believed he could improve bilateral relations and stability with Myanmar by strengthening economic ties while ignoring ground realities. Ultimately, he was outsmarted by Khin Nyunt, as Myanmar generals historically do with their Thai counterparts. The Myanmar intelligence chief succeeded in getting Thaksin to co-sponsor the Yongkha Project, a massive development and crop substitution initiative in a UWSA-controlled area near the Thai border. Burmese language learning software

The Thai government invested 20 million baht in seed money, hoping others in the international community would follow. However, nobody wanted involvement in a project that seemed more focused on whitewashing the UWSA—dubbed the world’s largest armed drug trafficking army by the US State Department—than enhancing Myanmar villagers’ livelihoods.

The opening ceremony featured the bizarre sight of Third Army Area commander Lt-Gen Picharnmate Muangmanee walking hand-in-hand with UWSA Chairman Bao Yu-xiang, with Myanmar’s Triangle Commander Brig. General Khin Zaw between them. These were strange bedfellows indeed, considering that just a year earlier, Wa and Thai soldiers had engaged in regular gunfights along their common border.

Contemporary Challenges

The situation was never meant to be smooth sailing, but the return of coup-toppled, criminally convicted Thaksin—the de facto leader of Thailand’s ruling Pheu Thai Party— from self-imposed exile in August 2023. His role in Thai politics has drawn criticism from the media and conservative military-royalist circles who never trusted him to begin with.

The Faustian bargain he helped orchestrate between Pheu Thai and their former political foes—the junta behind the 2014 coup that ousted his sister Yingluck—was never meant to last. Critics now attack him and his daughter Paetongtarn, the current prime minister, over various issues, from the friendly deals with Cambodia over the overlapping territorial claims in the Gulf of Thailand to the three UWSA outposts that allegedly encroach about 200 meters into Thailand, according to Google Maps (since no official demarcation exists). He also tried to present himself as a peace broker between resistance forces and the junta in Myanmar. They all rejected him.

Thai soldiers in the northern command have held meetings with Wa leaders in the southern command area. Wa soldiers claim willingness to retreat, but orders must come from Panghsang, the UWSA headquarters on the Chinese border. According to informed sources, Panghsang has suggested that Thailand raise this issue with Myanmar’s central government as a sovereignty matter. Interestingly, Myanmar officials cannot enter UWSA territory unless disarmed and under escort.

Thailand raised this issue with Tatmadaw leader Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing as early as 2014, to no avail. According to Myanmar resistance forces, the UWSA will not make any moves without meaningful concessions in return.

Environmental and Political Pressures

Today, as Thaksin faces criticism from right-wing media and much of the public, including former supporters alienated by the Faustian deal that created the current shaky coalition, he has returned to demonizing the Wa. He has even suggested Thailand could take matters into its own hands if Myanmar’s government proves unable to act. The problem is that the Thai Army has no desire to return to the old days of border clashes. However, with Thaksin shaping current discourse on the issue, finding common ground with the UWSA becomes increasingly difficult.

Don Pathan in Panghsang, 2003. (Courtesy of UWSA)

Conclusion

The situation along the Thailand-Myanmar border has always been fraught with tension, and Thailand’s internal political dynamics further complicate matters as off-the-cuff statements from political leaders like Thaksin create additional challenges.

The Thai government faces the complex task of managing relations with Myanmar’s UWSA, navigating domestic political opposition, and balancing its role in broader regional power struggles involving China, Myanmar, and various ethnic groups. How Thailand responds to these challenges in the coming months could significantly influence both its political landscape and its role in regional geopolitics. Burmese language learning software

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst. The views expressed here in this commentary do not necessarily reflect the views of Mizzima Media.

Thailand’s Conflict: Guns, Bombs and Assassinations

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com 

Sungai Kolok district office was hit by a car bomb set off by BRN combatants on March 8, 2025.(Photo Credit: Narathiwat Public Relations Office)

Messages

For the past seven months or so, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), one of the long-standing separatist movements that control most insurgent activities in Thailand’s southern provinces, has been stepping up its pressure on locally hired Defence Volunteer (DV), security guards for the Ministry of Interior. The objective was to force the latter to quit working for the “Siamese State”.

It employs messages, often in the form of graffiti sprayed on the backroads and leaflets. These are in response to the Internal Security Operation Command – Region 4’s (ISOC4) effort to replace regular soldiers with DVs.

The idea is to have local Melayu DV officers to look after Melayu affairs in the region, explained one Thai army intelligence officer who spoke on condition of anonymity. But BRN did not see it that way and has shown they have no problem taking the fight to the DVs, regardless of their ethnicity.

DVs are locally hired security details who fall under the Ministry of Interior’s chain of command. Their functions involved manning checkpoints along the roads and at entrances of government installations.

For much of the past two decades – since the current wave of separatist insurgency resurfaced in this Malay historical homeland –DVs have been largely unchallenged by the insurgents as long as they do not engage in intelligence-gathering activities for the government or become part of military operations.

This changed 10 years ago, when ISOC4 was toying with the so-called Tung Yang Daeng model, named after a district in Pattani province where a fierce gunfight between BRN combatants and government troops jolted the nerves of the security apparatus and forced them to the drawing board.

The idea then was to assign the Ministry’s people — village chiefs, tambon staff and DVs — more onerous security duties, such as patrolling violence-prone areas alongside regular army soldiers and Paramilitary Rangers.

Naturally, it would place them in the line of fire of insurgents. It was a bigger plan to gradually pull out troops from other regional commands and replace them with Paramilitary Rangers.

The Thai army had reasons to be optimistic at the time. The number of violent incidents was declining, from just under 2,400 in 2007 to 850 in 2015, according to Deep South Watch’s statistics. Deep down, however, there was an understanding that as long as insurgency exists, Thailand can never declare victory.

The absence of violence – or, in this case, the reduction –  does not mean peace, not as long as the narrative that equates separatism to a moral obligation is still alive and well.

Trying to win hearts and minds. File photo; credit: CHAIWAT PUMPUANG 

Thailand went through a decade of relative calm in the 1990s, thinking that the conflict in the far south had ended. Combatants of the various movements may have put down their weapons, returned to their village and their leaders took up residency in foreign countries abroad. But the narrative of the Patani Malay – one that sees Patani as the Malays’ historical homeland worth liberating – never went away.

Like many other initiatives in Thailand that did not materialise, the Tung Yang Daeng model disappeared from the memories and the discussions of security planners.

Escalation

Worse, violence has increased steadily over the past five years in the far south. Gone are the guerrilla tactics that usually involve roadside bombings followed by a brief two-to-three minutes gunfight before they retreat to the woods.

These days, attacks are much more coordinated, with gunfights sometimes lasting up to half an hour. More importantly, these attacks must be heard, meaning they have to create a psychological impact in the minds of the security apparatus.

The 9 March 2025 attack on the Sungai Kolok district office by a 10-strong BRN unit – resulting in the death of two DVs and the injury of eight others – was an example of this. The assault ended with a car bomb that ripped through the compound moments after the combatants retreated.

The incident came just days after it was clear that the Thai government had rejected BRN’s counter-proposals for a ceasefire during Ramadhan this year.

Two weeks before the start of Ramadhan, the National Security Council (NSC) suggested that the two sides observe a unilateral ceasefire during the holy month. BRN agreed in principle but had demands of their own. These include reducing the number of days from 30 to 15, releasing an unspecified number of prisoners, permitting monitoring of the ceasefire by international and local observers, and requiring the government to appoint a negotiating team to restart peace talks.

When it became clear that Bangkok was not interested in any of these counterproposals, BRN combatants took over the course of direction on the ground, starting with the 9 March 2025 raid of the Sungai Kolok district office. That was the first spike of violence that unnerved the security agencies – especially the DVs throughout the region – as it became clear that they are now deemed to be legitimate targets by BRN.

The same evening also saw a double-tap operation in Pattani’s San Buri district in which a smaller bomb drew a group of ordinance officers to the scene just to be hit by a much bigger explosive. One officer died, and two were wounded.

The already tense situation became even deadlier after the shooting of Abdulroning Lateh, 60, on 18 April 2025. Abdulroning was a senior figure in the military wing of BRN who spent the past two decades as a mentor for the new generation of combatants. As expected, the Thai Army blamed BRN for his killing.

His death sparked a series of seemingly revenge attacks by combatants who ignored unwritten rules of engagement. They hit soft targets, including the shooting of a Buddhist novice on 22 April 2025 in the Saya Yoi district of Songkhla. A senior monk and another novice were wounded from the same attack.

Two days earlier in Narathiwat’s Khok Khan sub-district, an 80kg explosive exploded near a police flat as officers lined up in formation for their daily routine. A passenger vehicle full of Islamic religious students was approaching at the time the explosive detonated. Nine people, including seven children aged between 7 and 15, were wounded by the shrapnel.

On 28 April 2025, two separate attacks in Yala province resulted in the death of a DV whose vehicle was set on fire in the Banang Sata district and a border patrol police officer who was killed after a roadside bomb went off, flipping his armoured vehicle into an upside-down wreck and wounding two other colleagues inside.

Separately, on 30 April 2025, a sniper wounded a police officer as he was about to set up a checkpoint in the backroad of Yala’s Pron subdistrict.

A new low came on 2 May 2025, when gunmen killed four – including a 9-year-old girl and a 76-year-old blind woman – in Narathiwat’s Tak Bai and Chanae districts. The elderly woman was riding a motorbike with her son, who suffered a bullet wound, while the young girl and two other residents were killed by a group of six gunmen on three motorbikes who fired multiple rounds into a house.

The next day, a bomb went off in Narathiwat’s Rueso district, not far from a public event where the Deputy Minister of Interior Sabeeda Thaised was about to open. Nobody was injured, but the explosion was close enough to rattle the nerves of the participants and the country’s security apparatus.

In a rare public statement, dated 5 May 2025, BRN condemned the violence against soft targets and reiterated its long-standing policy of not targeting civilians. The statement did not address the spike or the soft targets. It was understood that the statement was not just for public consumption but for the combatants who had gone off the rules of engagement.

Condemnation against the soft targets poured in relentlessly. There was a direct intervention from a local political actor who met with BRN representatives to call for the return of civility and reminded the BRN leaders of the commitment their organisation made with members of the international community about rules of engagement and respect for humanitarian norms. Since the visit and the statement, civilian targets have gone off the hit list. The only exception was the shooting of a Malay Muslim couple, 46 and 48, on 17 May 2025 in Raman district of Yala province. This time around, nobody is pointing their fingers at BRN.

Generally, BRN still sees itself as an underground movement, although public statements are issued to mark certain anniversaries and critical issues. Some observers said the group lacks a proper communication strategy, which is only possible if there is an identifiable political wing to speak publicly on their behalf.

Thailand’s and Malaysia’s refusal to officially acknowledge the presence of BRN’s political wing and allow it to operate independently is an obstacle to the movement’s move to engage the global community and its own constituency.

While condemnation against the killing of the novice poured in, sympathy for Abdulroning, on the other hand, was whispered as any public outcry would invite the wrath of Thai security officials, whose homemade narrative always put the blame on BRN. Mistrust of the state apparatus is still high, and no government has ever succeeded in convincing local Muslims that they are the good guys, much less winning the latter’s hearts and minds.

International engagement with BRN tends to be discreet and focus on political outcomes and not enough on capacity building. Overall, however, respect for humanitarian norms and principles has improved over the years; that is why the alleged attacks on the monk and novices irked a great deal of people, including local political activists like The Patani who advocate peaceful and political means to resolve the conflict.

But that is easier said than done. The Thai military is not open to discussion on sensitive issues, such as rights to self-determination for this historically contested region. Reference to the combatants as “shahid” – Arabic for martyr – could land one in jail.

Standstill

Meanwhile, the peace talks here have come to a complete standstill because the government refuses to appoint a negotiating team until BRN ends their campaign of violence, although Bangkok has softened its position by suggesting the talks can resume if BRN stops hitting soft targets.

Chulalongkorn University’s military expert, Prof Surachart Bamrungsuk, said BRN must guarantee that there be a cessation of violence and that civilians would be protected. BRN countered by stating that even a reduction of violence must be negotiated.

Incidentally, for much of the past two decades of on-and-off peace initiatives, Thailand has never wanted to engage in any formal arrangement or ink anything unless it is the final peace agreement, if and when there is ever one.

Speaking to the media, Defence Minister Phumtham Wechayachai tried hard to convince the public why the peace talks had to be halted. He said the past talks were failures because representatives from BRN at the negotiating table were not key decision-makers. He added that the spike in violence suggests that BRN representatives do not have influence in the movement and added that Malaysia will be working with Thailand to bring key BRN leaders to the negotiating table.

Thai security officials and BRN representatives rejected his claim, saying the movement has, time and again, publicly and secretly, demonstrated to the Thai officials that they have command and control over the combatants on the ground. The 45-day ceasefire during Ramadhan in 2022 was a case in point, not to mention the 24 months unilateral ceasefire during the COVID-19 outbreak. There were also secret dealings, a clearinghouse of sort, between the two sides to go over the incidents on the ground to prove to the Thai government that they were dealing with the right organisation.

Local activists said the gap between political representation and the armed forces is more of a Thai problem, pointing to the unwillingness of the hardliners to allow the peace process to move beyond a talk shop, which participants at the table referred to as confidence-building measures (CBM).

Up to now, however, the two sides have never discussed anything concrete. The Joint Comprehensive Plan Toward Peace (JCPP), the so-called roadmap for peace, put together by Thailand and BRN, with the help of foreign NGOs and the Malaysian government working in separate and often competing tracks, spent the past three years going back and forth on the negotiated text.

The best they could do was identify three items to be on the negotiating table: reduction of violence, public consultation and a political solution to the conflict. Specific details are to be negotiated in the next phase of the talk.

However, JCPP could be scrapped, as the current Thai government is likely to dismiss foreign participation, thus putting all the mediation and conflict resolution work on Malaysia. Surachart also suggested that JCPP should be ditched, saying the framework puts Thailand at a disadvantage.

If anything, Phumtham sounded like a broken record – playing up the “meager BRN negotiators” rhetoric when in fact there is no political will from Bangkok to come to the table and make any concessions to BRN or the people of Patani.

BRN insisted that the Thai side does not get to decide who or which individual leader they can talk to; Bangkok will have to talk to whoever the movement sends. But the Thai government has always wanted to deal with the BRN military leaders, believing in their ability to sweet-talk them out of the conflict, or at least reduce the violence.

Political activists like Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, said Thai governments’ interest in the peace process has always centred on public relations stunts, not the root causes or the wellbeing of the people of this region.

Besides not having anything to offer, Thailand’s disregard for negotiation protocol reflects poorly on the government’s leaders and security planners. Many in the BRN movement, on the other hand, think Thailand’s peace initiatives are aimed at getting them to surface so they can be eliminated at a later date when talks produce no concrete result.

A government source who works on the conflict sayid Phumtham is afraid that restarting the peace talks amid the spike in violence would make Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra look weak. She is already at the receiving end of many criticisms for just about every policy initiative.

Her father, Thaksin, on the other hand, appeared to want to start his own initiative, reaching out to Malaysian authorities to facilitate a meeting with BRN top leaders, preferably in Phuket. Legal charges against the former prime minister prohibit him from traveling abroad. A senior Malaysian officer said Thaksin just wanted “a photo op” for his public relations purposes.

BRN said they are willing to meet with Thaksin or official Thai representatives, but protocol must be respected. A peace process has many stakeholders and components, from the negotiators themselves to the policy-research-technical committees, as well as independent observers.

A BRN representative said their negotiators are mandated by their organisation; the negotiators are not just anybody, and no one individual can make a decision for the entire group. Thai officials at the negotiating table, on the other hand, said Artef, have difficulties convincing its own military to follow the political path set by the policymakers.

Author
Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.
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The targeted killing of Abdulroning Lateh and its consequences

Don Pathan
Prachatai English

For a brief moment, there was a real fear that the insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost border provinces would relive its bloody past where tit-for-tat violence by government forces and rebel combatants turned the conflict into a bloodbath marked by heavy-handed responses and vigilantism.

Insurgents attack Sungai Kolok District Office on Mar 9, 2025 (Narathiwat PR)

The second spike of violence came immediately after the shooting death of a very senior member of the National Revolutionary Front of Patani Malay/Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), Abdulroning Lateh, 60, on 18 April.

Abdulroning was known as a battle-hardened mentor who helped groom the current generation of combatants who resurfaced in January 2004 in Thailand’s Malay-speaking South after a decade of calm. More than 7,600 people have been killed since the insurgency resurfaced just over two decades ago and the end is nowhere in sight.

Combatants on the ground responded viciously to his killing, going beyond the unwritten rules of engagement, hitting civilian targets and security officials seemingly at will.

(Credit: ISOC4)

The low point came on 2 May in Narathiwat when gunmen killed four, including a 9-year-old girl in Tak Bai District and a 76-year-old blind woman in Chanae District. The elderly women was riding on a motorbike with her son, who suffered a bullet wound, while the young girl and two other residents were shot dead by a group of six gunmen who fired multiple rounds into their house as they were riding by on their motorbikes.

Two days later, a group of activists from the far South crossed the border into Malaysia to meet with BRN leaders to remind them of the commitment and obligations the movement had made to the local people and members of the international community about embracing international norms and humanitarian principles. In fact, the group even signed a deed of commitment with the INGO Geneva Call, in January 2020, vowing to respect children’s rights.

The BRN is one of the long-standing Patani Malay Muslim separatist movements and today controls virtually all of the combatants on the ground.

This latest spike in violence did not come out of the blue, however. In a way it was a reaction to the dismissive nature Bangkok had given the movement when the head of BRN technical team, Nikmatullah Bin Seri, issued a statement on video in December 2024, saying the group is ready to walk away from the peace process and ditch its commitment to negotiate under the Thai Constitution if the government is not interested in talking.

The BRN was led to believe that the talks would resume after the 2023 General Election. But national security issues took a back seat to economic programmes that the Pheu Thai Party-led government was hoping to use to win back the constituency they had lost following the post-election Faustian deal with the political parties they vowed to stay away from.

Abdulroning Lateh, 60 (Credit: ISOC4)

In January, Defence Minister Phumtham Wechayachai instructed all relevant ministries and agencies to draft an “actionable solution” for the government’s counter-insurgency strategy. He gave them 30 days. Days later, Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra made a trip to the far South, visiting Thamavitya Mulniti, a high school in Yala where a number of BRN political leaders had taught and where the late spiritual leader, Sapae-ing Basor, was the principal before fleeing abroad to escape arrest.

Phumtham’s order and the PM’s visit to the far South were wrongly understood as a gesture of goodwill. In fact, Phumtham was already committed to a position that there would be no talks until the BRN ceases its military operations on the ground. Observers said it was like putting the cart before the horse.

In mid-February, the Thai National Security Council sought help from the Malaysian government to facilitate talks with BRN negotiating team about a possible ceasefire for the upcoming Ramadan that runs from 1-30 March. The BRN counter-proposal included demands calling for the release of unspecific number of prisoners, international and local observers of the ceasefire, a reduction in the number of days for the cessation of hostilities be dropped from 30 to 15 days and that Thailand designated a negotiating team.

On 5 March, Phumtham rejected the BRN’s demands and reiterated his position that there would be no talks until the BRN abandoned their campaign of violence. He later added that the government will only talk to those who have command-and-control of forces on the ground. He argued that past talks had been a failure. If the BRN representatives at the negotiating table were legitimate, they would curb the violence on the ground, Phumtham argued.

For the BRN, coming to the table does not mean an end to military options. Reduction of violence has to be negotiated under an agreed baseline. Moreover, the peace talks is the beginning of a very long process, not an end in itself. Last but not least, Bangkok doesn’t get to decide for BRN who comes to the negotiating table.

When it was clear that the political dialogue had exhausted itself, the BRN military wing took over the course of direction and turned up the heat. On 9 March, a ten-strong BRN unit attacked Narathiwat’s Sungai Kolok district office, killing two Defence Volunteers (security details for Ministry of Interior staff) in the gunfight; eight others were wounded. A car bomb set off moments after the combatants retreated ripped through the compound of the district office, sending a brutal message to the Thai government in Bangkok that it doesn’t get to decide who represents the BRN at the negotiating table.

The same evening also saw a double-tap operation in Pattani’s Sai Buri District in which a smaller bomb drew a group of ordinance officers to the scene only to be hit by a much bigger explosive. One officer died and two were wounded.

The already tense situation became even deadlier after the shooting death of Abdulroning. As expected, the Thai Army blamed the BRN for his killing.

Two days later, on 20 April, an 80 kg explosive rigged inside a gas cylinder was hidden in a motorcycle sidecar parked next to the fence of police flats in Khok Khian Subdistrict, Mueang District, Narathiwat Province. It exploded as the officers lined up in formation, a daily routine. A passenger vehicle full of Islamic religious students was approaching. Nine people, including seven children aged between seven and 15, all of them students at a local Islamic school, were wounded by shrapnel.

Separately, on 22 April in Saba Yoi District of Songkhla Province, assailants fired on a pickup truck driven by a police officer who was transporting a group of Buddhist novices and monks. A 16-year-old novice, the son of the officer, succumbed to his injuries in hospital, while a 12-year-old novice, as well as the 70-year-old senior monk, suffered injuries.

On 28 April, two separate attacks in Yala Province resulted in the shooting death of a Defence Volunteer whose vehicle was set on fire in Banang Sata District. On the same day in nearby Tan Tho district, two Border Patrol Police were killed from a roadside bombing that flipped their armored vehicle into an upside down wreck; one other colleague inside the vehicle was wounded.

Another disturbing trend is the BRN’s expansion of its hit list to include the MOI’s Defence Volunteers following recommendations that they take over some of the security duties of regular army units in the region. For the past seven months, the BRN has stepped up its public campaign with roadside graffiti calling on DVs to leave their job.

Defence Volunteers are locally hired security details for provincial governors and district chiefs. They survived two decades of conflict and insurgency by not seeing anything or saying anything. Today, they are called on to provide intelligence to the government’s security apparatus.

All the while, pressures and criticism were pouring in, condemning the BRN for the attacks on civilians. In line with past practice, the BRN does not publicly confirm or deny specific operation or incident; the movement has no identifiable political wing to engage the public and the media. The group lacks a sound communication strategy, thus, leaving the Thai side to control the narrative about the conflict.

But on 5 May, the BRN issued a statement condemning the ongoing violence and reiterated its long standing policy of not targeting civilians. It did not make reference to any specific incident of the recent weeks.

The long road to peace

While Bangkok still insists on talking to BRN representatives who have command-and-control over insurgents on the ground, on 5 May, the same day that the BRN issued a statement about its long standing principles, Phumtham softened his position by saying peace talks can resume as long as the BRN stops attacking civilians.

A government source who works on the southern conflict said the reason for Thailand’s hard-line position on the talks was because Phumtham is afraid that restarting the formal peace talks amid the spike of violence would make Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra look weak. She is already the butt of many criticisms for just about every policy initiative, foreign and domestic.

Publicly, Phumtham questioned the BRN negotiators’ ability to influence the movement they represent when in fact, the problem stems from Bangkok’s lack of political will to negotiate and make concessions to the BRN and the Malays of Patani.

The BRN has time and again, publicly and secretly, demonstrated to the Thais that they have command-and-control over the combatants on the ground. The 45-day ceasefire during Ramadan 2022 was a case in point; a thorough cross-check between the two sides over the years removed all doubts that the Thai negotiators were dealing with the wrong people.

But Thailand has always wanted to deal with the BRN military leaders, believing in their ability to sweet talk them out of the conflict, or at least reduce the violence.

The BRN says Thailand doesn’t understand that to them, the peace talks are only the start of a very long journey. The talks are not an end in themselves. For years, the two sides have been stuck in the “talking shop” mode, unable to move the process beyond confidence-building exercises. Like past administrations, the Pheu Thai-led government doesn’t seem to have the political will to go further.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security consultant. 

https://prachataienglish.com/node/11397

Malaysia’s Enduring Significance for Peace in Southern Thailand

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com 

Funeral procession in the Patani, one of the few moments where Melayu can vent their anger towards the state. (File Photo: CHAROON THONGNUAL)

Introduction

In January 1998 – when the Malaysian government handed over four senior members of the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) to Thai law enforcement – few knew what to make of it.

Thailand’s Malay-speaking South was relatively peaceful at the time; armed insurgency had already subsided for some years. The blanket amnesty given to various separatist groups from the late 1980s to early 1990s appeared to have paid off—or so it seemed.

While combatants put down their arms and returned to their villages, many leaders remained abroad, obtaining residency status or citizenship in Northern European countries and Malaysia.

Thailand wrongly assumed that peace had been achieved in this Malay historical homeland known as Patani. So, when Malaysian authorities detained Abdul Rohman Bazo, Haji Daoh Thanam, Haji Mae Yala, and Haji Sama-ae Thanam and handed them over to Thai counterparts in January 1998, Patani residents and members of various Patani liberation groups were dumbstruck.

Four years later, when a new generation of Patani Malay fighters under the command of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) resurfaced – carrying out sporadic attacks against police and military outposts in the region – Malaysia realised they had shot themselves in the foot with the handover of the four PULO members.

Funeral procession for Thai soldiers in Pattani. (CHAIWAT PUPUANG)

Rocky Road

The official explanation as to why the Thais were after these PULO leaders was unconvincing. No one believed they were trying to start another standing army, as they were living openly in Malaysia, running legitimate businesses such as a restaurant.

One explanation that made the most sense came from a senior Thai diplomat who said the request for the arrest of the Thanam brothers and their associates was Thailand’s way of testing the waters with Malaysia—to gauge the level of commitment from then-prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohammed to his Thai counterpart, Chuan Leekpai.

At first, as sporadic attacks occurred in mid-2001, the then-government – led by Thaksin Shinawatra – was dismissive, calling the insurgents “sparrow bandits”. Following the 4 January 2004 arms heist, in which BRN combatants made off with more than 350 military weapons from an army battalion in Narathiwat, Bangkok could no longer deny the political underpinnings of these attacks.

Suddenly, there was acknowledgment that a new generation of Patani Malay Muslim separatist combatants had resurfaced.

The first few years were not smooth sailing for the two countries as public accusations and microphone diplomacy took their toll on bilateral relations, with each side accusing the other of not doing enough to quell the insurgency.

Fleeing Villagers

One low point came in August 2005 when 131 Malay Muslim villagers from Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district crossed the border and took refuge in Kelantan’s mosques following alleged harassment by Thai security forces.

Deporting these villagers back to Thailand would have been difficult as Malaysia sought to maintain its place in the Muslim world. Moreover, the 131 displaced villagers were not just Muslims; they were fellow Malays who shared the same cultural and linguistic traits as Malays in Malaysia.

At the time of the exodus, death squads were on a killing spree, targeting ethnic Malays at village teashops; the imam from Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district and a female teacher at an Islamic preschool in the village were shot dead by unknown gunmen.

The atmosphere was tense and a climate of fear enveloped the entire region.

Malaysia did not push the 131 back to the Thai side but refused to recognise or treat them as asylum seekers. There were concerns that more would come. Eventually, the Malaysian government asked the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) to assist these fleeing Patani Malay villagers, thus internationalising the issue.

Thaksin was furious because he never wanted the problem in the far South to be more than a bilateral issue. Putting Patani on an international stage forced Thailand to confront this disturbing aspect of its state-minority relations. This is not to mention its failed assimilation policy that Patani Malays violently rejected because it threatened their ethno-religious identity and historical-cultural narrative.

Eventually, over the years, the issue faded from officials’ memories. Some of the displaced villagers quietly returned to their homes in Narathiwat, while others remained in northern Malaysia as undocumented migrants.

Yet, someone must pay the price. Thaksin was ousted in a coup in October 2006 by an army general who cited his handling of the separatist insurgency as one of the reasons.

Strings of Prime Ministers

The relationship between Malaysia and Thailand during the reign of prime minister Surayud Chulanont was described as cordial and respectful. The former army chief placed great emphasis on the root causes of the conflict. In late 2007, Surayud made a public apology to the people of Patani for the deaths of 87 unarmed protesters in Tak Bai in late 2004.

He reached out to the international community for help to establish a foundation for peace negotiations with the rebels, but his time in office lasted just 16 months. The foundation he laid was largely ignored by the subsequent government of prime minister Samak Sundaravej of the Thaksin-linked People Power Party (PPP).

In March 2012, Thaksin held a quiet meeting in Kelantan with leaders from various Patani Malay separatist organisations, during which he blamed his heavy-handedness on distorted information given to him by the Army. Thaksin thought his direct participation would help improve the situation. He urged all participants to let bygones be bygones and start over.

Two weeks after the meeting, a triple car bomb exploded in the heart of Yala, one of Thailand’s three southernmost border provinces, killing 13 and wounding about 140 civilians. Conflict observers and Thai security officials said the attack was a stern message to Thaksin that nothing in the far south comes easy.

The following year, on 28 February 2013, prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister, caught everyone by surprise, including the Royal Thai Army, by launching a peace process with a group of exiled old guards claiming to be BRN members. Malaysia was officially designated as the facilitator.

It has been repeatedly pointed out that, due to geographical proximity, Malaysia cannot be seen as an honest broker. Some conspiracy-minded officials in Thailand even suggest that Patani wants to join Malaysia.

However, among security officials, it was generally understood that mainland Southeast Asian borders have a life of their own. At one time or another, buffers and proxies along borders were common among countries in the region while diplomatic relations took their course.

To some BRN members, Malaysia’s opposition to an independent Patani already disqualified them as an honest broker. But this is Southeast Asia, where peace and conflict resolution theories do not align well.

Malaysia took up the mediation role, thinking that Thailand was politically stable. Nevertheless, just over a year after peace negotiations launched, Yingluck was ousted in a coup.

The coup leader, General Prayut Chan-ocha, appointed himself the country’s prime minister and deliberated continuing Yingluck’s peace initiative. After all, the Army had not been consulted and learned about it just days before the official launch in Malaysia. In the end, Prayut relented and allowed the talks to continue.

From the start, Yingluck’s peace initiative wavered between a hoax and a leap of faith. The representatives at the table lacked command and control over the combatants on the ground. But when BRN finally came to the table in January 2020, these old guards from the 2013 talks were immediately sidelined.

Having the real BRN at the table did not mean violence on the ground would end. The new chief negotiator, General Udomchai Thamsarorat, was appointed in October 2018 and immediately sought help from local civil society organisations, hoping they could amplify messages to BRN about the need to talk and reconcile differences.

However, it remained unclear what the Thai side had to offer or what concessions the government was willing to make to the people of Patani. Besides engaging local CSOs, Udomchai also asked Malaysia to bypass BRN negotiators and arrange a meeting for him with top leaders from the BRN military wing. BRN refused.

Decline

Another low point between Thailand and Malaysia came in late 2019 when Bangkok created a back channel with BRN through foreign mediation without informing Malaysia.

There are several reasons as to why Malaysia was uninformed. Firstly, Thailand blamed Malaysia for its failure in bringing BRN’s military leaders to the table. Secondly, Thailand was still not satisfied with talking to the BRN negotiators, even through a proper channel.

Thailand assumed that if it can talk to the military wing, it can (somehow) convince the movement to lay down their arms. Thus, Thailand approached a foreign NGO to establish a back channel with BRN, with the assumption that this could be done without giving any concession to BRN or the Malays of Patani.

In theory, a back channel is supposed to support the main (official) channel. However, in this case, the two tracks continue to compete against one another (the official track with Malaysia as the lead and the back channel with a foreign NGO trying to convince everybody that Malaysia needs to be dumped because it is not an honest broker).

Tensions arising from this competition took their toll on BRN unity. Thus, in early 2022, the BRN central committee decided to end all forms of back channels unless Malaysia is kept in the loop.

Udomchai was replaced by retired National Security Council (NSC) chief General Wallop Raksanoh, who spent the next three years developing a blueprint to serve as the roadmap for the peace process. A commitment from BRN that future negotiations would align with the Thai Constitution was a significant victory for Wallop, but more work remained for the Malaysian mediator to get both sides to agree on the roadmap’s content.

Meanwhile, Thailand held a general election in May 2023 that created a coalition government, with Thaksin’s Pheu Thai Party coming in second but successfully forming a coalition with like-minded partners, including parties from the junta leaders who ousted Yingluck in 2014.

Later, real estate tycoon Srettha Tavisin became prime minister. During his tenure, Malaysia was left pondering when Thailand would appoint a chief negotiator. This was because national security was not an immediate concern of the Srettha administration.

This was demonstrated with Srettha making no reference to the far south (or to Burma) during his speech to the Parliament. His priorities were clear. Firstly, to prioritise the economy as a means to winning back the constituency whom his party had lost after the Faustian deal with the pro-junta/military camp to get Thaksin back to Thailand. Secondly, to deny the Move Forward Party the lead in setting up a government. Thirdly, to make the Pheu Thai Party the overall lead in this coalition of political parties that compromised their stated democratic principles in exchange for a political truce that may not last very long.

Eventually, then-NSC deputy chief Chartchai Bangchuad was appointed as chief negotiator. His stint lasted only a few months, as the Constitutional Court removed Srettha from office in August 2024 following ethical violation charges.

The government of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, much like the one preceding it, showed little concern for the conflict in the far south. Last December, BRN threatened to walk away from talks and withdrew its earlier commitment to operate under the Thai Constitution if Thailand continued to drag its feet on the peace process.

Bangkok refused to yield and insisted that a new negotiating team would be appointed only after BRN curbed violence on the ground. BRN maintained that even the reduction of violence had to be negotiated.

Just before Ramadhan in 2025, the new Malaysian facilitator, Datuk Mohd Rabin Basir, tried to help Thailand secure a ceasefire during the holy month. However, Bangkok found BRN’s demand for international observers to monitor the ceasefire too much to accept. Thailand has always resisted outside intervention, leading to the rejection.

Interestingly, BRN sources had shared with the author that Datuk Mohd Rabin’s appointment to replace Tan Sri Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, the retired chief of the armed forces and a professor at the National Defence University of Malaysia, was perceived as a setback to the peace process. This was because Tan Sri Zulkifli had worked hard to gain BRN’s trust and respect during his appointment as Malaysia’s facilitator.

The recent spike in violence has become the new normal. Targets include Defense Volunteers (DV), locally hired security personnel assigned to the Ministry of Interior’s provincial governors and district chiefs. These DVs have been asked to serve as government informants. BRN has demonstrated that they have no qualms about targeting DVs who spy on them.

In March 2025, Thaksin offered to carry out a direct talk with BRN leaders from the military wing. He suggested Phuket as the venue and offered legal immunity. BRN leaders turned down the offer, as no one was certain about what kind of mandate Thaksin had to be making such an offer.

Observers said Thaksin just wanted photo ops with BRN military leaders. For BRN, the peace process is the start of a very long journey, one that should not be taken lightly, much less used as a photo op for an ageing, former fugitive prime minister who does not seem to know his place.

Conclusion

Despite the challenges, Malaysia plays an important role in attempting to resolve the long-running insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces. The relationship with Thailand has become much calmer compared to the early days of microphone diplomacy.

Both Thailand and BRN see Malaysia’s geographical proximity as beneficial to their logistical and operational needs. Furthermore, ethnic Malays in Malaysia may share similar cultural-religious characteristics with the Malays of Patani, indicating that a great sympathy for the plight of the latter might exist among the former.

But it stops there. Both government and non-government entities in Malaysia know that nurturing this bilateral tie is extremely challenging, as one wrong move could bring down the whole house.

Balancing its relationship with Thailand while maintaining credibility with insurgent groups has not been an easy act to follow for Malaysia. Some in Malaysia say the Malaysian government should do nothing more than facilitate discussion, while others said the proximity makes the country a stakeholder and intervention is extremely necessary. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that BRN needs all the help it can get from members of the international community and that Malaysia should facilitate the discussion. Getting Thailand to go along with the idea, on the other hand, is like moving a mountain.

Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require 1) credit authors and their institutions, and 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD  and include a link back to either our home page or the article URL.

Malaysia’s Enduring Significance for Peace in Southern Thailand

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com 

Not everybody agrees that Malaysia can play an honest broker to facilitate peace in southern Thailand. Credit: Mahendra Putra/Unpslash

Introduction

In January 1998 – when the Malaysian government handed over four senior members of the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) to Thai law enforcement – few knew what to make of it.

Thailand’s Malay-speaking South was relatively peaceful at the time; armed insurgency had already subsided for some years. The blanket amnesty given to various separatist groups from the late 1980s to early 1990s appeared to have paid off—or so it seemed.

While combatants put down their arms and returned to their villages, many leaders remained abroad, obtaining residency status or citizenship in Northern European countries and Malaysia.

Thailand wrongly assumed that peace had been achieved in this Malay historical homeland known as Patani. So, when Malaysian authorities detained Abdul Rohman Bazo, Haji Daoh Thanam, Haji Mae Yala, and Haji Sama-ae Thanam and handed them over to Thai counterparts in January 1998, Patani residents and members of various Patani liberation groups were dumbstruck.

Four years later, when a new generation of Patani Malay fighters under the command of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) resurfaced – carrying out sporadic attacks against police and military outposts in the region – Malaysia realised they had shot themselves in the foot with the handover of the four PULO members.

Rocky Road

The official explanation as to why the Thais were after these PULO leaders was unconvincing. No one believed they were trying to start another standing army, as they were living openly in Malaysia, running legitimate businesses such as a restaurant.

One explanation that made the most sense came from a senior Thai diplomat who said the request for the arrest of the Thanam brothers and their associates was Thailand’s way of testing the waters with Malaysia—to gauge the level of commitment from then-prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohammed to his Thai counterpart, Chuan Leekpai.

At first, as sporadic attacks occurred in mid-2001, the then-government – led by Thaksin Shinawatra – was dismissive, calling the insurgents “sparrow bandits”. Following the 4 January 2004 arms heist, in which BRN combatants made off with more than 350 military weapons from an army battalion in Narathiwat, Bangkok could no longer deny the political underpinnings of these attacks.

Suddenly, there was acknowledgment that a new generation of Patani Malay Muslim separatist combatants had resurfaced.

The first few years were not smooth sailing for the two countries as public accusations and microphone diplomacy took their toll on bilateral relations, with each side accusing the other of not doing enough to quell the insurgency.

Fleeing Villagers

One low point came in August 2005 when 131 Malay Muslim villagers from Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district crossed the border and took refuge in Kelantan’s mosques following alleged harassment by Thai security forces.

Deporting these villagers back to Thailand would have been difficult as Malaysia sought to maintain its place in the Muslim world. Moreover, the 131 displaced villagers were not just Muslims; they were fellow Malays who shared the same cultural and linguistic traits as Malays in Malaysia.

At the time of the exodus, death squads were on a killing spree, targeting ethnic Malays at village teashops; the imam from Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi district and a female teacher at an Islamic preschool in the village were shot dead by unknown gunmen.

The atmosphere was tense and a climate of fear enveloped the entire region.

Malaysia did not push the 131 back to the Thai side but refused to recognise or treat them as asylum seekers. There were concerns that more would come. Eventually, the Malaysian government asked the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) to assist these fleeing Patani Malay villagers, thus internationalising the issue.

Thaksin was furious because he never wanted the problem in the far South to be more than a bilateral issue. Putting Patani on an international stage forced Thailand to confront this disturbing aspect of its state-minority relations. This is not to mention its failed assimilation policy that Patani Malays violently rejected because it threatened their ethno-religious identity and historical-cultural narrative.

Eventually, over the years, the issue faded from officials’ memories. Some of the displaced villagers quietly returned to their homes in Narathiwat, while others remained in northern Malaysia as undocumented migrants.

Yet, someone must pay the price. Thaksin was ousted in a coup in October 2006 by an army general who cited his handling of the separatist insurgency as one of the reasons.

Strings of Prime Ministers

The relationship between Malaysia and Thailand during the reign of prime minister Surayud Chulanont was described as cordial and respectful. The former army chief placed great emphasis on the root causes of the conflict. In late 2007, Surayud made a public apology to the people of Patani for the deaths of 87 unarmed protesters in Tak Bai in late 2004.

He reached out to the international community for help to establish a foundation for peace negotiations with the rebels, but his time in office lasted just 16 months. The foundation he laid was largely ignored by the subsequent government of prime minister Samak Sundaravej of the Thaksin-linked People Power Party (PPP).

In March 2012, Thaksin held a quiet meeting in Kelantan with leaders from various Patani Malay separatist organisations, during which he blamed his heavy-handedness on distorted information given to him by the Army. Thaksin thought his direct participation would help improve the situation. He urged all participants to let bygones be bygones and start over.

Two weeks after the meeting, a triple car bomb exploded in the heart of Yala, one of Thailand’s three southernmost border provinces, killing 13 and wounding about 140 civilians. Conflict observers and Thai security officials said the attack was a stern message to Thaksin that nothing in the far south comes easy.

The following year, on 28 February 2013, prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister, caught everyone by surprise, including the Royal Thai Army, by launching a peace process with a group of exiled old guards claiming to be BRN members. Malaysia was officially designated as the facilitator.

It has been repeatedly pointed out that, due to geographical proximity, Malaysia cannot be seen as an honest broker. Some conspiracy-minded officials in Thailand even suggest that Patani wants to join Malaysia.

However, among security officials, it was generally understood that mainland Southeast Asian borders have a life of their own. At one time or another, buffers and proxies along borders were common among countries in the region while diplomatic relations took their course.

To some BRN members, Malaysia’s opposition to an independent Patani already disqualified them as an honest broker. But this is Southeast Asia, where peace and conflict resolution theories do not align well.

Malaysia took up the mediation role, thinking that Thailand was politically stable. Nevertheless, just over a year after peace negotiations launched, Yingluck was ousted in a coup.

The coup leader, General Prayut Chan-ocha, appointed himself the country’s prime minister and deliberated continuing Yingluck’s peace initiative. After all, the Army had not been consulted and learned about it just days before the official launch in Malaysia. In the end, Prayut relented and allowed the talks to continue.

From the start, Yingluck’s peace initiative wavered between a hoax and a leap of faith. The representatives at the table lacked command and control over the combatants on the ground. But when BRN finally came to the table in January 2020, these old guards from the 2013 talks were immediately sidelined.

Having the real BRN at the table did not mean violence on the ground would end. The new chief negotiator, General Udomchai Thamsarorat, was appointed in October 2018 and immediately sought help from local civil society organisations, hoping they could amplify messages to BRN about the need to talk and reconcile differences.

However, it remained unclear what the Thai side had to offer or what concessions the government was willing to make to the people of Patani. Besides engaging local CSOs, Udomchai also asked Malaysia to bypass BRN negotiators and arrange a meeting for him with top leaders from the BRN military wing. BRN refused.

Decline

Another low point between Thailand and Malaysia came in late 2019 when Bangkok created a back channel with BRN through foreign mediation without informing Malaysia.

There are several reasons as to why Malaysia was uninformed. Firstly, Thailand blamed Malaysia for its failure in bringing BRN’s military leaders to the table. Secondly, Thailand was still not satisfied with talking to the BRN negotiators, even through a proper channel.

Thailand assumed that if it can talk to the military wing, it can (somehow) convince the movement to lay down their arms. Thus, Thailand approached a foreign NGO to establish a back channel with BRN, with the assumption that this could be done without giving any concession to BRN or the Malays of Patani.

In theory, a back channel is supposed to support the main (official) channel. However, in this case, the two tracks continue to compete against one another (the official track with Malaysia as the lead and the back channel with a foreign NGO trying to convince everybody that Malaysia needs to be dumped because it is not an honest broker).

Tensions arising from this competition took their toll on BRN unity. Thus, in early 2022, the BRN central committee decided to end all forms of back channels unless Malaysia is kept in the loop.

Udomchai was replaced by retired National Security Council (NSC) chief General Wallop Raksanoh, who spent the next three years developing a blueprint to serve as the roadmap for the peace process. A commitment from BRN that future negotiations would align with the Thai Constitution was a significant victory for Wallop, but more work remained for the Malaysian mediator to get both sides to agree on the roadmap’s content.

Meanwhile, Thailand held a general election in May 2023 that created a coalition government, with Thaksin’s Pheu Thai Party coming in second but successfully forming a coalition with like-minded partners, including parties from the junta leaders who ousted Yingluck in 2014.

Later, real estate tycoon Srettha Tavisin became prime minister. During his tenure, Malaysia was left pondering when Thailand would appoint a chief negotiator. This was because national security was not an immediate concern of the Srettha administration.

This was demonstrated with Srettha making no reference to the far south (or to Burma) during his speech to the Parliament. His priorities were clear. Firstly, to prioritise the economy as a means to winning back the constituency whom his party had lost after the Faustian deal with the pro-junta/military camp to get Thaksin back to Thailand. Secondly, to deny the Move Forward Party the lead in setting up a government. Thirdly, to make the Pheu Thai Party the overall lead in this coalition of political parties that compromised their stated democratic principles in exchange for a political truce that may not last very long.

Eventually, then-NSC deputy chief Chartchai Bangchuad was appointed as chief negotiator. His stint lasted only a few months, as the Constitutional Court removed Srettha from office in August 2024 following ethical violation charges.

The government of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, much like the one preceding it, showed little concern for the conflict in the far south. Last December, BRN threatened to walk away from talks and withdrew its earlier commitment to operate under the Thai Constitution if Thailand continued to drag its feet on the peace process.

Bangkok refused to yield and insisted that a new negotiating team would be appointed only after BRN curbed violence on the ground. BRN maintained that even the reduction of violence had to be negotiated.

Just before Ramadhan in 2025, the new Malaysian facilitator, Datuk Mohd Rabin Basir, tried to help Thailand secure a ceasefire during the holy month. However, Bangkok found BRN’s demand for international observers to monitor the ceasefire too much to accept. Thailand has always resisted outside intervention, leading to the rejection.

Interestingly, BRN sources had shared with the author that Datuk Mohd Rabin’s appointment to replace Tan Sri Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, the retired chief of the armed forces and a professor at the National Defence University of Malaysia, was perceived as a setback to the peace process. This was because Tan Sri Zulkifli had worked hard to gain BRN’s trust and respect during his appointment as Malaysia’s facilitator.

The recent spike in violence has become the new normal. Targets include Defense Volunteers (DV), locally hired security personnel assigned to the Ministry of Interior’s provincial governors and district chiefs. These DVs have been asked to serve as government informants. BRN has demonstrated that they have no qualms about targeting DVs who spy on them.

In March 2025, Thaksin offered to carry out a direct talk with BRN leaders from the military wing. He suggested Phuket as the venue and offered legal immunity. BRN leaders turned down the offer, as no one was certain about what kind of mandate Thaksin had to be making such an offer.

Observers said Thaksin just wanted photo ops with BRN military leaders. For BRN, the peace process is the start of a very long journey, one that should not be taken lightly, much less used as a photo op for an ageing, former fugitive prime minister who does not seem to know his place.

Conclusion

Despite the challenges, Malaysia plays an important role in attempting to resolve the long-running insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces. The relationship with Thailand has become much calmer compared to the early days of microphone diplomacy.

Both Thailand and BRN see Malaysia’s geographical proximity as beneficial to their logistical and operational needs. Furthermore, ethnic Malays in Malaysia may share similar cultural-religious characteristics with the Malays of Patani, indicating that a great sympathy for the plight of the latter might exist among the former.

But it stops there. Both government and non-government entities in Malaysia know that nurturing this bilateral tie is extremely challenging, as one wrong move could bring down the whole house.

Balancing its relationship with Thailand while maintaining credibility with insurgent groups has not been an easy act to follow for Malaysia. Some in Malaysia say the Malaysian government should do nothing more than facilitate discussion, while others said the proximity makes the country a stakeholder and intervention is extremely necessary. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that BRN needs all the help it can get from members of the international community and that Malaysia should facilitate the discussion. Getting Thailand to go along with the idea, on the other hand, is like moving a mountain.

Author
Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require 1) credit authors and their institutions, and 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD  and include a link back to either our home page or the article URL.

Myanmar junta chief to meet ASEAN chair after years of being kept at a distance

Don Pathan
Mizzima News

Tomorrow’s meeting between Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and Chairman of the State Administration Council (SAC), Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, in Bangkok will mark the first time that the chair of the ASEAN Standing Committee meets with the Myanmar junta chief after years of keeping him at a distance.

“The meeting comes at a time of uncertainty, and at the same time provides opportunities for Myanmar stakeholders to work and converge on the common objective of humanitarian support for the quake victims. Thailand and Malaysia will work closer on this and both would like to see progress on the ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus,” said Kavi Chongkitavorn, a veteran journalist and an expert on ASEAN affairs.

Anwar insists that he is not abandoning ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus as the basis for the regional grouping’s engagement with Myanmar, but maintains that the meeting is being held purely on humanitarian grounds. He will be looking to advance the ceasefire between rebel forces and SAC troops.

“With just one phone call, he (Min Aung Hlaing) agreed to meet in Bangkok, despite April 17 being a major religious holiday in Myanmar. This reflects both respect for Malaysia and their willingness to engage in dialogue,” Anwar said.

Instead of thanking Min Aung Hlaing, it makes more sense that the Myanmar junta chief thanks Anwar for the invitation. After all, this is something that the junta chief has been looking for and something that the resistance movements have been dead against — legitimizing the status of this junta chief who pay lip service to humanitarian issues but continue to bomb civilians, not necessary as part of a military strategy but to terrorize them into submission.

SAC’s decision to renege on the promise to halt offensives to facilitate humanitarian aid to the areas affected by the earthquake reflects the fragility of Anwar’s peace initiative.

If nothing concrete comes out of the meeting, Min Aung Hlaing can always say that he did not hesitate to engage with regional leaders to address Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis.

Indeed, one cannot overlook the political underpinnings of tomorrow’s meeting in Bangkok. It is not clear if Thaksin Shinawatra and his daughter, Prime Minister Paetongtarn, will join the meeting. Thaksin was appointed advisor to Anwar.

Malaysia may be the chairman of ASEAN. But it doesn’t mean its policy and strategy are confined to humanitarian initiatives. Thousands have lost their lives because of the earthquake and the ongoing conflicts. Access to medical support is extremely limited.

But with the current humanitarian drive following the massive earthquake, ASEAN members and Myanmar’s neighbouring countries may have just found a new way to work toward resolving the crisis inside the country. Min Aung Hlaing is using it to heighten his standing internationally. There is no reason why Thailand and other ASEAN member states cannot do the same thing — using the crisis to reach out to Myanmar’s resistance forces and EAOs to push for a more robust ceasefire and conflict resolution.

Thailand employed the same humanitarian argument when it pushed through the humanitarian coordination effort to bring aid across the border to villagers in Karen State. Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) warned against it, saying the effort did more to help legitimize the SAC. They said the design was flawed as it reached only a handful of people. Such concerns still exist today.

Anwar said the ceasefire was crucial as it allows humanitarian aid to reach victims of the recent earthquake in Myanmar. Yes, that may be true. But one has to keep in mind that much of the areas along the Myanmar border are controlled by EAOs and resistance forces. The question is whether Malaysia, Thailand, and ASEAN will have the political courage to engage these forces or will they stick to the status quo for fear of offending the SAC, the fancy name that the Myanmar junta has given itself.

Anwar said assistance would only be offered if military operations were suspended. “The people are suffering… so I asked for a ceasefire. Two days later, Myanmar announced a truce in place until April 22. Although not solely due to our efforts, Malaysia has at least taken a clear stand on behalf of ASEAN. Insha-Allah, during my meeting with him on April 17, I will push for the ceasefire to be extended,” he added.

The Red Cross Society of Thailand, an outfit that coordinates its humanitarian efforts with state agencies, has consistently provided aid and medical supplies to Burmese internally displaced persons (IDPs) through civil authorities closely aligned with EAOs such as the Karen National Union (KNU) and Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA). Perhaps the government could learn from their examples.

Indeed, the fragmentation in Myanmar has forced bordering countries to adjust their stance and policy. But balancing engagement with Naypyidaw and the opponents of the regime has not been easy. There have been suggestions in Thai government circles that Thailand should become a place where discussions and debates about Myanmar can be conducted safely. But such ideas have not gained serious traction at the policy level. Again, for fear of offending the SAC, Thailand does not seem to want to be too open about their interactions with opposition forces and prefers to keep them as local, unofficial arrangements.

Meanwhile, Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG) and other opposition groups have issued a statement expressing their concern about the planned meeting between the Myanmar junta chief and the ASEAN chair. The statement warned about the dangers of the meeting being held under the guise of trying to help with humanitarian aid. The junta has not adhered to the Five-Point Consensus and continues to attack civilians, despite the desperate need to help quake victims.

The statement points out that players other than the military junta need to be engaged during the humanitarian aid drive. They point out the dangers of unilateral engagement with a player who is considered a “terrorist”. Such an approach undermines the core humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence and fails to ensure aid is delivered according to need.

“Rather than supporting the people of Myanmar, these actions risk legitimizing the illegal military coup and reinforcing the regime responsible for their suffering. Therefore, we firmly reject any such decisions,” the statement says.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst

https://eng.mizzima.com/2025/04/16/21353