Bomb attacks in Thai south 'challenge' to coup leaders

Sources in southern Muslim separatist movement tell Anadolu Agency that bomb attacks and gunfight show new junta what militants are still capable of

By Don Pathan
Anadolu Agency

PATTANI, Thailand

Bomb attacks and a sporadic gunfight between security forces and Malay Muslim separatists in Thailand's three southernmost provinces this weekend were a contemptuous gesture to a new Thai junta, which has this week seized power through a coup and placed the Muslim-majority region under an even tighter leash.

Sources in the separatist movement told The Anadolu Agency on Sunday that the simultaneous attacks, which claimed three lives and injured more than 60 people, were in the planning for some time.

Nevertheless, the sources underlined that the timing of the coup was an opportunity for them to show the junta what they are capable of in spite of strict measures imposed on a southern region that has already been living under controversial martial law and security acts for nearly a decade.

The sources -- who did not wish to be named out of matters of personal security -- are part of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), a long-standing armed separatist group that surfaced in the mid-1960s.

They told the AA that the attacks were a statement to the military forces that they will not let up on efforts to discredit their operations, and will make the area as ungovernable as possible.

More than 5,000 people have been killed in Thailand’s Muslim-majority southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and five Malay-speaking districts in Songkhla since the current wave of insurgency resurfaced in January 2004.

BRN said they are determined to reclaim their historical homeland in the three southernmost provinces.

In recent years the group has suggested that they are willing to enter into negotiation with the Thai government but has remained ambiguous on whether they are willing to settle for anything less than full independence.

Thailand announced in early 2013 that it had entered into peace talks with a faction of BRN, but a vast majority of the movement -- especially leaders with command-and-control over insurgents on the ground -- refused to go along with talks mediated by the Malaysian government.

Part of the reason, said the BRN sources and Thai officials speaking on condition of anonymity, was because the movement does not see Kuala Lumpur as an honest broker.

Moreover, the movement said it has yet to forgive Malaysian officials for secretly handing over to Thailand some of its leaders, some of whom are serving life in Thai prison on treason charges.

The Saturday evening explosions were mostly carried out in the city of Pattani, the historical capital of the Malay Muslim sultanates.

About a dozen power poles were brought down in the blasts, crippling power supplies and sending much of Pattani into darkness.

Many ATM's were also shut down due to the ensuing power shortage, and gas stations were forced to close for the day. Sporadic gunfights were heard in at least a couple of locations on the outskirts of Pattani.

Narong Sahamethapat, the permanent secretary for public health, was quoted by the Bangkok Post Sunday as saying that 51 of the injured had been released from hospitals and 22 were still being treated, including a two-year-old boy who was seriously wounded.

The Royal Thai Navy’s Adm Narong Pipattanasai reportedly ordered sailors and marines to go on high alert after a patrol boat anchored on Pattani River was hit by a grenade thrown by suspected insurgents.

"The explosion ripped a big hole in the side of the vessel and slightly injured three officers," Navy spokesman Rr Adm Kan Dee-ubon was quoted as saying by the Bangkok Post.

Colonel Banpote Poolpien, spokesman for the Fourth Army’s Internal Security Operation Command, the army-dominated multi-agencies that oversee the situation in Thailand’s deep South, told reporters that the military believes the Saturday night attacks were linked to the political turmoil in Bangkok.

Lt. General Walit Rojanaphakdi, commander of Army Region 4, however, ruled out blaming the attacks on the removal of Thawee Sodsong, the recently ousted secretary-general of the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SPBAC).

Thawee was the key figure behind the Malaysia-backed peace process that was formally launched in February 2012 by the recently ousted government of Yingluck Shinawatra.

His transfer put the already shaky Kuala Lumpur-backed peace process in jeopardy but sources in the Thai army said they are still interested in talking to the separatists, preferably without Malaysia’s participation. The army would like to keep the dialogue strictly between the combatants of both sides and without third party mediation or facilitation.

Sources in the BRN said they welcome the idea of a back channel communication to talk about various issues, such as rules of engagement, and to function as a sort of clearinghouse to verify which attacks are part of the conflict and which are criminal in nature.

Both sides said that taking the first step toward establishing such a channel will be very difficult because it requires taking a big leap of faith, but insisted that the Thai side is willing to do so.

BRN sources, on the other hand, said they are not in a hurry and wanted to make sure that the channel will not be a trap.

aa.com.tr/en

Map of violence could open a path to peace in deep South

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation 
May 24, 2014 

Both sides want to create a channel of communication to verify which attacks are insurgency-related and which are criminal

Mapping violence in Thailand's southernmost provinces, where a decade-old wave of insurgency has claimed more than 5,000 lives, is not easy, especially when there is no identifiable group claiming responsibility for the attacks and no neutral body to verify those claims. 

As a result, the two warring factions have been left to unilaterally observe unwritten ground rules: no direct attacks against civilians - though "unavoidable collateral damage" is "acceptable".

Meanwhile the security apparatus, and the pro-government death squads working for "rogue" units, are not supposed to target religious leaders and imams, no matter how close they are to local militant cells. Insurgents reciprocate by excluding Buddhist monks, temples and Chinese religious shrines, as well as public schools and teachers, from their hit list.

Not long after the current wave of insurgency went into full swing in January 2004, insurgents decapitated and castrated soldiers after gunning them down. The idea was to make a contemptuous gesture to the local commanders, nothing more.

Sources in the separatist movements said such acts were a far cry from the actions of South Asian or Middle Eastern jihadists, who often videotape the beheading-execution of their victims and post the clips on the Internet.

As for the insurgents in Thailand's Malay-speaking South, it took some time for the religious element within the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and other circles to convince the militants to end such practices. 

Ironic as it may seem, a nationalist conflict in Thailand's Malay-speaking South is citing Islamic rules of war to end the practice of decapitation and mutilation, while self-proclaimed holy warriors in South Asia and the Middle East have no qualms about beheading their enemies to make a political statement. 

The ground rules in Thailand's insurgency also extend to prohibiting arson attacks on public schools, the bastion of state-constructed narrative that local Malays dismissed as an assault on their historical and cultural identity. 

But because there is little unity among Thai security agencies, and the fact that the command-and-control on the BRN side is still somewhat fluid, while other longstanding separatist groups also have militants in the field, abiding by the ground rule is easier said than done.

Too often, emotion gets the better of combatants on both sides, generating a vicious cycle of tit-for-tat killings.

The attack in February this year on a family in Narathiwat's Bacho district that ended in the killing of three brothers by two Paramilitary Rangers is a case in point. Authorities insisted that the two Rangers had acted on their own, seeking revenge against a suspect who had entered into a plea bargain with the authorities in exchange for their dropping legal action against him. Authorities said the man whose three sons were killed was affiliated with a local insurgent cell and that he had ordered a hit on a Rangers' family member some time ago.

Neither Muslim residents nor the insurgents bought the explanation, refusing to believe that the two rangers had acted without permission from above. 

There were reports of a third assailant - a Buddhist member of the armed forces - but his identity was not revealed. According to government sources, the third attacker's identity had to be kept out of the public gaze because it would have raised unwanted questions and undermined the official line - that the killing of the boys was part of a blood feud between local Muslims and something the authorities had nothing to do with.

At about the same time, another series of tit-for-tat killings between Muslim residents and Muslim security officials was taking place in Yala's Bannang Sata. The killing spree escalated and the "collateral damage" spread as family members - parents, children and toddlers - from both sides were targeted. 

Insurgents hit back with a two-day bomb blitz in Yala, including a car bomb that started a fire that burned down an entire block of wooden shophouses in the heart of the city's busy business district.

They also extended the "warning" attacks to Hat Yai, an area that is supposed to be off-limits but is targeted as a pressure point whenever the insurgents deem that the Thai side has violated the ground rules. 

The last time insurgents hit Hat Yai was in March 30, 2012, two weeks after fugitive former premier Thaksin Shinawatra met with 16 separatist leaders in his attempt to kick-start a peace process. The same day also saw a triple car bomb in Yala's busy Ruammit Street that resulted in at least 13 deaths and more than 130 injuries. Both the Thai Army and the insurgents billed the attacks as a slap in the face for Thaksin. It was a way for the BRN and the insurgents affiliated with their movement to show their disapproval of his intervention. 

A similar spike in violence came later that year in November following the shooting death of a young and influential imam, Abdullateh Todir, in Yala's Yaha district, reportedly assassinated by a pro-government death squad. The "spike" - not so much in terms of the number of attacks but more their brutal nature and the fact that the targets were supposed to be off-limits - lasted for six weeks. Three Buddhist teachers were shot dead and three public schools torched during that period. A pro-government death squad hit back with a gangland-style shooting at a teashop full of Muslims on December 11, 2012 in Narathiwat's Rangae district, killing four, including an 11-month-old baby girl. 

One of the biggest concerns for security agencies is the possibility that the insurgency violence could be expanded to areas outside the Malay-speaking region. Hat Yai is technically off-limits, but an attack against the city signals a strategic violation of the ground rules by the insurgents. 

Phuket and Bangkok, on the other hand, are supposed to be totally off the radar screen. That psychological threshold was violated on December 22, 2013 when Phuket police discovered a massive bomb with a blast radius of 500 metres inside a stolen pickup truck parked inside the station's lot. The vehicle was stolen from Pattani's Sai Buri in May 2012, so how long it had been parked at the Phuket police station is anybody's guess.

Separatist sources said the bomb plot deliberately targeted Phuket. The idea, they said, was to send a stern warning to the authorities of what the movement is capable of. 

Bangkok's Ramkhamhaeng Soi 43/1 was hit in May 2013 by a Malay Muslim cell, but the official line is that the attack was part of a local dispute.

Meanwhile, Thai security forces are saying they want to set up a back channel of communication with the insurgents, especially those in direct contact with combatants, to function as a sort of clearing house to verify which attacks are part of the conflict and which are criminal in nature.

Sources in the BRN say they welcome the idea, as it could clear up misunderstandings over who is doing what. But if security forces are planning to use the channel to spread the same half-truths they dish out to the public, the BRN will not be interested in talking to them. 

Both warring sides say they are interested in seeing this back channel evolve into something bigger and better. But taking this first initial step won't be easy, as it requires each side to take a big leap of faith towards trust and confidence in the other. 

Don Pathan is a security and development consultant based in Yala. He is also a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).

Ten years on from Krue Se, but no closer to truth

Don Pathan

Special to The Nation

April 29, 2014
Yala, Thailand

Security officials investigate the site of an attack in Pattani

Thai security forces blamed 'drug-crazed Islamists' for the mosque stand-off that ended in slaughter; now they say family feuds are behind the latest wave of violence in the deep South

Ten years ago yesterday, more than 100 young men armed with little more than knives and machetes charged against 10 police outposts and one police station.

Believing they were protected by a mystical power that made them invincible, the men were charging towards almost-certain death.

These so-called insurgents were met with a hail of machinegun fire. Rules of engagement permitted state security officials to shoot to kill.

After attacking an outpost, one group of 32 retreated to the nearby historic Krue Se Mosque, where they took up a defensive position with the few weapons they had. They then commandeered the mosque's loudspeaker and called on Malay Muslims of the region to rise up against the invading Siamese forces and liberate their historic homeland.

In Songkhla's Saba Yoi district, 19 young men, part of the same network of "mystical-leaning" insurgents, were lined up and shot dead by the authorities at point-blank range, execution style. The 19 came from different schools but all played for a local football team.

Fearing that local residents would turn against the authorities, General Pallop Pinmanee, the highest-ranking officer at the Krue Se Mosque stand-off, called for an all-out bombardment before nightfall.

For security officials, the fact that well over 100 young men were willing to charge against machineguns was nothing less than disturbing. It was generally concluded that the incident was not a suicide mission but a suicidal one. After all, the insurgents had some form of weapons and they thought they were invincible.

The militants were dismissed by government officials as a bunch of drug-crazed youths who had embraced a defective strain of Islam and a distorted version of history. It was a line the Thai government continued to use for other insurgency-related incidents.

However, after the government declared in February last year that it was entering into peace talks with longstanding separatist groups, the official explanation for what's fuelling insurgency violence - drugs, militant Islam and false history - had to make way for a new one.

The new official line, which is just as unconvincing, blamed much of the killing on local family feuds - Muslims killing Muslims to settle old scores.

One recent case that comes to mind was the killing of three brothers, aged three, five and nine, in Narathiwat's Bacho district on February 3 this year by at least two Muslim men, both Paramilitary Rangers, who authorities said had acted on their own. The boys' parents were wounded but survived the incident.

According to various sources, there was a third assailant, a Buddhist security official, but his identity was kept secret as it would have contradicted the official line that the killings were part of a feud between local Muslims.

But authorities knew that their official version of events would carry little weight with the insurgents, who would be looking for retaliation over the death of the boys. Suspects had to be produced to contain the situation. But it took the authorities four weeks to present the suspects. For the insurgents, it was too little and too late.

Unsurprisingly, the killing of the three brothers sparked a spate of violence in the following days. Three Buddhist women were shot dead, their bodies set alight. A Buddhist monk and four lay people were also gunned down by suspected insurgents.

A hand-written left at the site of one attack read: "To the Commander of the Thai Army. This is not the last victim. [This killing is] for the three brothers."

And then came the shooting death of an elderly couple on February 23 in Yala's Bannang Sata district. The 15 or so assailants, some of whom were local Defence Volunteers, set fire to the couple's home, a pick-up truck, a car and a motorcycle.

Again, authorities trotted out the same line: That the incident was personal in nature and that the superiors of the Defence Volunteers involved had nothing to do with the attack.

Sources on the insurgents' side said there was some truth to the family-feud claim, but they dismissed outright the notion that all the attackers' superiors were clueless about events on February 23 in Bannang Sata, especially when the tit-for-tat killings had been going on for months.

Leaflets supposedly passed out by an insurgent cell identified Defence Volunteer Abdulhakim Darasae as the lead suspect for the February 23 attack.

On March 5, a Buddhist gardener was murdered in the district, presumably as part of insurgents' effort to discredit the security apparatus.

Things were pretty quiet for a few days, until on March 27 when gunmen snuck into the house of Marosidi Kachaladi, 42, in Bannang Sata, and shot him dead while he was sleeping. One local resident suspected that Marosidi was targeted because he was closely associated with the local security forces.

Then on April 2, a village chief and two female deputies were killed in an ambush. One of the deputies was beheaded.

Insurgents struck again on April 6 and 7 and this time they took the fight to the heart of Yala, unleashing four simultaneous explosions, including a car bomb that started a fire that gutted nearly an entire block of shophouses. One man, a Muslim, was killed in the explosion. The following morning, a warehouse just a few metres away from the main army camp was razed to the ground by an arson attack.

Ten days later, on April 17, the plague of violence in Bannang Sata continued when suspected insurgent Mukta Ali-mama was gunned down along with his six-year-old son. Grisly photos of the son's body were spread via the social media, prompting condemnation from local civil-society organisations from both ends of the political spectrum.

Two days later, on April 19, the parents of Abdulhakim, the Defence Volunteer allegedly behind the February 23 attack on the elderly couple, were gunned down along with their two-year-old niece.

Army Chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha ordered the recently appointed commander of the Fourth Army Area, Lt-General Walit Rojanapakdi, to visit Bannang Sata district, which he did on April 21. The visit was little more than a public relations exercise given the fact that the Army, or any Thai state agency, is not seen as an honest broker by many in the deep South. After all, local Malay Muslims and separatist militants don't believe that the "rogue" members of the Army's Paramilitary Rangers and the Ministry of Interior's Defence Volunteers acted without consent from higher-ups.

There has been talk of bringing the feuding clans in Bannang Sata to the table to negotiate a peaceful settlement. Some suspect that the suggestion could be an attempt to whitewash the authorities, as they are likely to pin everything on Abdulhakim in the same manner that the two Paramilitary Rangers "confessed" to the killings of the three boys in Bacho.

Face-to-face talks between the feuding clans may bring a much-needed pause in the ongoing tit-for-tat killings. But insurgent sources say it won't change the nature of the conflict between them and the state.

Don Pathan is a freelance consultant based in Yala. He is also a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).

Turkish officials trying to identify group found in Thailand

Source tells the Anadolu Agency that he suspects an unidentified group is Uighur Muslims from Xinjiang province in China.

Turkish officials are trying to identify a group found in Thailand.

Don Pathan
Anadolu Agency

HAT YAI, Thailand--Diplomats from the Turkish Embassy in Bangkok arrived at an immigration detention center in southern Thailand on Friday to identify 220 people who claim to be Turkish refugees and have expressed a desire to be relocated to the country.

 "I have been instructed to establish their identity. My findings will be passed to my headquarters. They don't have documentation, as far as I know,” Ahmet Akay, the deputy chief of mission from the Turkish Embassy in Bangkok, told the Anadolu Agency.  

Speaking to reporters immediately after a brief meeting with the refugees' leaders, Akay said they appeared to be speaking a dialect of a Turkic language and that they had expressed a desire to be relocated to Turkey.    

 When asked if the refugees were Turkish citizens, Akay said, “Ethnicity and citizenship are two different things. This is a humanitarian situation.”    

He said it was not up to the embassy in Bangkok to decide whether they would be permitted to relocate to Turkey or whether they would be classified as asylum seekers. 

The two diplomats will remain at the scene until Sunday to work with Thai officials to determine the identity of the 220 refugees -- 78 of whom are men, 60 are women, and 82 are children, mostly toddlers.    

 The group was discovered on Wednesday night, residing in a remote camp surrounded by a rubber plantation, and was immediately relocated to the detention center. 

Authorities initially tried to separate the women and children from the men to place them at a government-run Child Protection Centre, but the men refused to allow them to do so. 

The group then spent two nights in tents at the Immigration Detention Centre compound, which is situated less than two kilometers from the entrance to Hat Yai International Airport.  

During this time, authorities were unable to garner little information from them.

Police Major General Thatchai Pitaneelaboot, the chief of Thailand’s immigration bureau in the south, said the refugees would not provide any personal information, such as their country of origin, their nationality, or how they arrived in southern Thailand.    

 Only one person, a presumed leader of the group, would talk, and all he would say was that his people are “Turkish” and added that he would only talk to Turkish officials, Pitaneelaboot said.    

A group of local Thai Muslim females arrived at the detention Friday afternoon with halal food and to act as a go-between for the authorities by speaking Arabic, yet the refugees refused to provide any more information. 

A turning point came with the arrival of the Turkish diplomats and a self-proclaimed teacher, Erkin Ezizi, who flew from Ankara and arrived in southern Thailand on the same flight as the Turkish diplomats. 

The refugee men wept openly on seeing him. Some walked over and hugged Ezizi tightly as he appeared to comfort them with encouraging words. 

Ezizi was traveling on a Turkish passport, but a Thai translator said, judging from his dialect, he may have been an ethnic Uighur living in Turkey. 

Ezizi and the diplomats urged the refugees to cooperate with Thai immigration officials, who have expressed frustration over their inability to communicate with the refugees and the refugees' unwillingness to provide basic information about their country of origin, their immediate plans in southern Thailand, or how they arrived in the Southeast Asian country. 

Thai immigration officials also held a closed-door meeting with a Chinese official from the consulate in Songkhla province on Friday morning, but the diplomat did not meet with the refugees or speak to the press. 

“The Chinese diplomat just wanted our briefings and informed us that they stand by to provide any assistance should we request it,” Police Major General Thatchai said. 

Thatchai said he suspected that the refugees are part of a human trafficking network that works with local “agents.” 

“Rohingya refugees (from Burma) have come through this region, and lately, more Bangladeshi have been arriving on our shores. This is the first of such a group, of this scale, who appeared to have originated from Central Asia,” Thatchai said.

He added that Thailand has a porous border with many entry points, especially along the coastal areas, making it easy for people to enter.   

In what appeared to be a related incident, Malaysian border officials have detained 62 self-proclaimed “Turks” suspected of entering Malaysia illegally on its northern border with Thailand. They were spotted on the Thai-Malaysian border fence at about 5:30am on Thursday.  

Authorities have yet to establish if the 220 “Turks” in southern Thailand were from the same human trafficking network. 

Senior Thai government officials told the Anadolu Agency on Friday that they are aware that the entire world is watching and that they have to be careful about how they handle this issue. 

A source working in an environment connected to the livelihood of refugees told the Anadolu Agency on Thursday that he suspected that the unidentified group of Muslims is Uyghur from Xinjiang province in western China. 

“If it is established that they are Uighur from Xinjiang, it could be a diplomatic headache if the Chinese government decides to pressure Thailand and ask for their deportation,” the man, who did not wish to be named for reasons of confidentiality, said.

Malaysia came under strong criticism from human rights organizations in December 2013 when officials deported six Uyghur.    

Similarly, in December 2009, Cambodia, despite objections from the United States and the United Nations, deported 20 ethnic Uyghur minority back to China. 

The deportation came at the height of communal violence between ethnic Han Chinese and the local Uyghur in the Chinese province of Xinjiang. Nearly 200 people, mostly Han Chinese, were killed during the riot. 

The Uyghur people are a Turkic-speaking ethnic minority group who have accused the Chinese of government of human rights violations and discrimination against them. 

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Deep South talks: a fresh attempt to revive the corpse

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

February 27, 2014 

Government negotiators are about to claim "progress"; in reality this is a sham process that refuses to include the real powers behind the insurgency

Last year on February 28, the Thai government announced it was entering peace talks with the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C) to seek a political solution to the conflict in the southernmost provinces.

Representing the BRN-C was Hasan Taib, the designated "liaison". Malaysia's former intelligence chief, Dato Ahmad Zamzamin Hashim, was appointed as facilitator by the Malaysian government.

The public face for the Thais was National Security Council (NSC) chief Lt Gen Paradon Pattanatabut, and by his side was the head of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre, Pol Colonel Thawee Sodsong. Both men are extremely close to the Pheu Thai Party and its de facto leader, Thaksin Shinawatra.

Among Thai officials and some casual observers there is a longstanding belief that Malaysia has been backing separatist movements in the deep South.

They believed that with Kuala Lumpur on board the dialogue process, peace and political settlement was inevitable.

But the people who embrace this notion never bothered to ask whether the exiled separatist leaders and the Kuala Lumpur government had patched up differences that date back as far as 1997, when Malaysian officials handed over number of senior separatist leaders to their Thai counterparts. At the time, Malaysia wanted to show Thailand it was a friend, but the damage stemming from the handover has haunted Malaysia ever since.

The insurgents, or "juwae", operating in the South, wasted no time in displaying their disapproval of the Kuala Lumpur-backed initiative. Within 24 hours of the official launch of talks on February 28, 2013, juwae unleashed a bomb attack in the heart of Patani just metres away from the city's iconic clock tower. Since than, hardly a day has gone by without an insurgency-related attack in the contested region.

This is hardly surprising, given that the February 28 initiative did not have the blessing of the BRN-C's inner circle. Thawee and Paradon like to claim that Hasan is a part of that circle, but sources and operatives in the movement insist otherwise.

Instead, the movement "used" Hasan to make demands, knowing that the Thais would never agree. The idea was to test the water. And Team Thailand danced to their tune.

Tired of being kicked around like a football between the BRN, Malaysian authorities and the Thai negotiating team, Hasan threw in the towel and has been incommunicado since December last year.

Talking to Malay-Muslim separatist leaders is nothing new for Thai officials, of course. Back in the 1980s, the task went to mid-ranking army officers, who treated the dialogue as more of a news-gathering exercise for the top brass.

In 2006 the Thai NSC was brought into the picture, and then-prime minister Surayud Chulanont gave the green light for a Geneva-based NGO to facilitate talks.

The so-called Geneva Process brought together the Thai NSC and one of the three Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) factions, under the leadership of Kasturi Mahkota. NSC deputy secretary-general Somkiet Boonchoo was named Thailand's point-man in the negotiations.

Then, shortly after Yingluck came into power, the Geneva Process was scrapped and Malaysia was brought in to mediate the process.

Somkiet and his NSC chief at the time, Thawil Pliensri, were moved to inactive posts. Thawil kicked up a fuss about the transfer but Yingluck couldn't care less. She and her brother Thaksin were more concerned with loyalty, and they put their trust in Thawee and Paradon.

Not only did Thaksin conjure up the idea of bringing Malaysia to the peace process, he thought that if he played a more direct role he would add legitimacy to the process. Thaksin met with a group of 16 exiled separatist leaders in March, 2012, in Kuala Lumpur, asking them to close the book on this conflict.

Those who took Thaksin's bait were dismissed as 'opportunists", while the core insurgents, namely the BRN inner circle and the operatives, were labelled as "hardliners".

BRN leaders refuse to recognise Kuala Lumpur as an honest broker and have yet to forgive the Malaysians for the secret handovers.

Insurgent operatives also showed their disapproval of Thaksin's initiative by launching a triple car bomb attack on March 30, 2012, in the heart of Yala two weeks after he met with the 16 exiled leaders. A major hotel in downtown Hat Yai was also hit. In all, the attacks killed at least 13 people and injured more than 100.

But Thaksin, his political cronies and Malaysia decided to overlooked the warning and went ahead with the Kuala Lumpur-backed initiative in February last year.

Local politicians under the Pheu Thai Party's wing did the leg work to pave the way for a process that BRN leaders said had more to do with whitewashing Thaksin for his questionable handling of the conflict than getting to the bottom of the historical grievances between the Malays of Patani and the Thai state.

Kasturi's faction was kept out of the process while a rival Pulo faction, under the leadership of Noor Abdulrahman (also known as Abae Kamae), was given a seat at the table.

The snub for Kasturi's faction was understandable given that the Geneva Process wouldn't permit Kuala Lumpur to join their initiative. A deal was cut in October last year to give Kasturi's Pulo faction a seat at the table. Details about the trade-off were not disclosed but government sources said it centred on rules of engagement.

The Army, needless to say, never liked the idea of having civilians running a peace process. And so late last year, the Army sponsored three trips for Wan Kadir Che Man, former leader of the now defunct Bersatu, an umbrella group for the longstanding separatist movements, to speak in Thailand.

Wan Kadir, a well-known exiled separatist leader, has long been critical of using Malaysia as facilitator or mediator for talks. He didn't mince words in lashing out at the current peace process. He wasn't too keen on the Geneva Process either, and suggested that the Thai government and the separatist leaders should meet face to face. And if there was need for a mediator, Wan Kadir suggested that Western governments with a long record of humanitarian actions should be in the frame, not NGOs.

While the Yingluck government has paid lip-service to a political solution for the conflict, the Thai team working on the current initiative is an ad hoc group that hardly inspires confidence. There is no secretariat and team members have regular day jobs to attend to, only coming together a day before any meeting with Hasan.

From the beginning, their immediate goal has been to get Hasan to convince the core BRN leadership and the juwae to reduce the number of attacks in the South. They needed something tangible to show their political bosses and the public that they are moving in the right direction.

But when it became clear that the BRN-C and juwae were not going to play along, Hasan decided to thrown in the towel and go into hiding last December.

Ironically, the political crises and street protests in Bangkok have given everyone in the deep South talks breathing space. Team Thaksin and Zamzamin went back to the drawing board. This week Zamzamin is expected to announce the "progress" on the process, like securing the participation of the third Pulo faction, led by Samsudine Khan, as well as that of the Barisan Islam Pembangunan Pattani (BIPP). There is also talk of permitting other separatist groups and local NGOs into the process.

BRN sources are reportedly unimpressed with this numbers game. They say they look at Bangkok and see a big mess, and as a result there is no way they are going to believe anything that comes out of Thawee's or Paradon's mouth.

Moreover, regardless of how many NGOs or separatist groups take part in the next round of talks, without the blessing of the core BRN leaders and the juwae, any attempt to salvage this sinking boat of a peace process will be met with the insurgents' wrath.

Revenge killings torpedo chances for peace in South

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation February 19, 2014

Rescue team members work next to bodies of villagers shot dead by suspected militants in Pattani province on February 13. Five people, including a nine-year-old boy and a Buddhist monk, died in the attack.

Insurgents say pro-government death squads signal lack of unified position among Thai security agencies and policymakers

A two-man paramilitary Ranger team escorting an elderly Buddhist monk travelling in a beat-up saloon car was no match for six assailants on three motorbikes with automatic weapons.

Exiled rebel sources maintained that the insurgents were going after "legitimate" targets, thus the decision to spare the 70-year-old monk who was sitting in the front of the bullet-ridden vehicle. The incident took place Pattani's Sai Buri district in the morning of January 24.

Ten days later in Narathiwat's Bacho district, gunmen killed three brothers aged three, five and nine, in an attempt to liquidate an entire family who had just returned from evening prayers at the village mosque. The father took a bullet to his leg but kept running, and the mother, who was four-months pregnant, was also hit. The parents survived.

At first, Thai authorities moved quickly to dismiss any suggestion that the assailants were officials or a pro-government death squad. Two weeks after the deadly shooting of the three boys, officials are still repeating the same mantra - that insurgents killed the three boys as part of an escalating campaign of violence now targeting innocent civilians, like the policeman's wife, 28, who was shot dead then set on fire in front of a terrified crowd at an open market in Pattani's Tambon Ratapanyang on February 9.

A similar incident took place on a Pattani-Narathiwat highway on February 12 when gunmen riding pillion shot dead a female bank employee, 29, and set her body on fire.

A hand-written note to the army chief read: "To the Commander of the Thai Army. This is not the last victim. [This killing is] for the three brothers."

The following day, February 13, in Pattani's Mae Lan district, suspected insurgents dressed in military fatigues opened fire on residents giving alms to monks, killing four, including a monk and a boy. Six people received gunshot wounds. The attackers also came with gasoline, but the attempt to set the victims on fire was thwarted by the monk's security detail.

Police believe at least one of the assailants was hit by return fire, and authorities are seeking tip-offs from locals about where the wounded man might be receiving treatment.

While the monk who survived the January 24 attack on two rangers was "collateral damage", the victims of the February 13 killings were intentional, said an exiled separatist cadre and member of a longstanding separatist group, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), who was ordered to look into the series of events since the murder of the three boys.

The BRN-C cadre was tight-lipped about the accusation that the boy's father was a member of a Bacho cell, but pointed out that he had fought the allegation in court and been acquitted.

Over this past weekend, preliminary findings by the Southern Border Provinces Administration and Development Advisory Council said the killing of the three boys may be linked to a paramilitary ranger wanting to settle a score with the Bacho cell after losing a family member. The ranger had acted alone, believing the boys' father was an insurgent member, the council said.

The suggestion that the ranger had acted alone without instruction from higher-ups drew criticism from the Muslim Attorney Centre, who accused the council members of reaching a premature decision.

The use of death squads against civilian targets to settle scores is not uncommon in the deep South. For the authorities, the challenge has always been how to handle the aftermath of such incidents. No Muslims in this historically contested region believe the separatists could ever shoot at a mosque or a teashop full of people of their own kind.

But it is not in the nature of Thai officials to blame their own people. In the aftermath of the Ai Bayae massacre in June 2009, for example, in which gunmen mowed down a mosque full of Muslims, killing 10 and injured another 12, then-prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva was clever enough not to draw premature conclusions, like blaming the separatist militants. As with other cases, a committee was set up to look into the massacre and over time people forgot about it.

Extrajudicial and target killings, needless to say, have always been a major obstacle to any peace initiative between the government and the separatist movements.

Since February 28 last year, when the Thai government entered into peace talks with the BRN, at least 10 ex-detainees, all of whom are accused of committing treason and are fighting the charges in court, have been shot and killed, presumably by pro-government death squads.

Observers of the southern conflict are reminded of the spike of violence from mid-November 2012 to the New Year, when soft targets that had apparently dropped off the radar screen returned to insurgents' hit lists. Three Buddhist teachers were killed and three public schools came under arson attack, joining other "legitimate" targets, like police and soldiers. During this period, on December 11, a teashop full of Muslims in Narathiwat's Rangae district also came under attack, leaving four dead, including an 11-month-old baby girl, and another four injured.

The six-week spike was set off by the target killing of a Yala imam, Abdullateh Todir, 49, on November 14, 2012. Abdullateh was also a member of the Yala Islamic Committee. Abdullateh was one of the clerics who the military and Thai officials at the Malaysia-backed peace talks were competing among themselves to garner support from to act as a go-between with active separatist militants and the exiled leaders. But some rogue unit didn't see it that way and decided to take him out, according to a military source. About one year before his death, a gunman fired at him but instead hit his daughter. Army Special Forces immediately provide Abdullateh with a security detail.

A cleric like Abdullateh was an ideal person to act as a go-between as he was respected by both warring sides. Both the BRN and senior Thai officials working on the peace process said he was a man of integrity and would have served the peace talks well.

But when a pro-government death squad took him out in November 14, 2012, other clerics immediately dropped the idea of playing interlocutor for any government agencies. Thailand's lack of unity was costly, as the six weeks of intense violence showed.

No one knows if and when the current spike in violence will end. Buddhist civic groups have called for calm and condemned the killings.

But local Muslims residents and observers generally dismiss the authorities' claims that the insurgents are using the death of the three boys as an excuse to hit civilian targets. Europe-based Kasturi Mahkota, the president of the Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo), also issued a statement condemning the massacre of the three boys and blamed a Thai security outfit for the killings.

Groups like Human Rights Watch have pointed to the use of target killings by pro-government death squads as an obstacle to peace initiatives in the South.

For the time being, the Malaysia-backed peace talks that were launched on February 28 last year have hit a big snag as the designated BRN-C "liaison", Hasan Taib, has thrown in the towel and gone incommunicado.

BRN elders say they are in no mood to talk, especially given the current political deadlock in Bangkok, not to mention the absence of a unified position among Thai security agencies and policymakers.

The peace initiative has managed to secure the participation of the three Pulo factions, but few expect it to change the course of the conflict in this contested region.

Don Pathan is a freelance consultant and member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).

ASIA PEACEBUILDING INITIATIVES

http://peacebuilding.asia/hostage-to-national-politics-thailands-southern-peace-initiatives/

Hostage to National Politics: Thailand’s Southern Peace Initiatives

The latest wave of street protests, which began in Bangkok in November 2013, were in some ways a blessing in disguise for peace talks between the Thai government and self-proclaimed members of Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C). This is because the talks, which were officially launched on 28 February 2013, had run into a brick wall. Hasan Taib, the designated “liaison” officer for BRN, issued a video statement through YouTube, saying he was no longer part of the process. Shortly after, he went incommunicado. Sources in the movement said he threw in the towel and is currently laying low. Kuala Lumpur, the designated “facilitator”, is looking for a new liaison to take his place. And this time around, they are looking at men with whom the insurgents on the ground can identify. A break from the talks could give stakeholders time to go back to the drawing board. But there is no guarantee that the participants would return to the table with anything fundamentally new or sound. If history is any lesson, peace initiatives for Thailand’s Deep South have always been at the mercy of Thai national politics.

The 28 February initiative, which is still a far cry from qualifying as a formal negotiation, has limped along from the minute it was launched. At first the government was dismissive of the unabated violence that continued even after the formal announcement. But in the end it became too difficult to deny the political underpinning of the attacks. More than 5,000 people have been killed since January 2004 from this wave of insurgency violence and there is no end in sight. Thai delegates to the talks wanted the BRN to instruct the militants to curb the number of attacks so that their political bosses could tell the public that the initiative was worthwhile. The BRN delegates, on the other hand, issued all sorts of demands knowing that the Thai government could not deliver. Along the way, it became clear that Hasan Taib and his delegates were unable to influence the situation on the ground, although the Thai team insisted they were talking to the right people. Adding to the grave disconnect between Hasan’s team and the insurgent network was disunity between Thai policymakers and the security community.

Photo: Veerayut Saengnoree. www.wewatch.info

Seeing that the Thais lacked a united front on this extremely sensitive and important issue, the BRN ruling council, also known as the Dewan Penilian Party (DPP), decided to use the initiative to test how the Thai side would react to certain sensitive requests. Some of these requests, which were issued through Hasan, called on the Thai government to pull out troops who were dispatched to the Deep South from other regions. They also called for the release of all prisoners and detainees convicted and arrested on charges relating to the ongoing insurgency, as well as the dropping of charges pending against all suspects. They also called for the talks or negotiation to have the backing of the state, which meant that Parliament would have to endorse the negotiation.

But the demand that Malaysia’s status in the process be upgraded from “facilitator” to “mediator”, as well as permitting international non-governmental organisations (INGO) and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to participate in the talk, was meant to mislead the public. Sources in the BRN movement say these demands were strategic: the DPP wanted to know how Bangkok would react to these issues. Moreover, they had to be polite, or at least appeared to be, to Kuala Lumpur for fear that the Malaysian authorities would come down hard on the exiled leaders from various long-standing separatist movements living in the country, not to mention the tens of thousands of Thai Malay Muslim unskilled migrant workers from the southernmost provinces.

Honest brokers are thin on the ground

BRN leaders and other exiled leaders said Malaysia was not an honest broker, adding that the separatist movement had unresolved disputes with Kuala Lumpur dating back to the 1990s when Malaysian authorities sent Patani Malay suspects back to Thailand. As for the OIC, exiled Patani Malay leaders said they had lost faith in the Islamic body in 1998, after it granted Thailand a permanent observer status. Mediation is a thing of the future and the BRN and other groups suggested they would like to see the position taken by Western governments, countries with track record on conflict resolution and strong humanitarian law.

The Thai delegation is headed by two of the ruling Phue Thai Party’s most trusted bureaucrats: Lt.-General Paradon Pattanatabut, the head of the National Security Council (NSC); and Police Colonel Thawee Sodsong, the chief of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC). While Thawee and Paradon have a police and military background and are deemed to have very close links to Thaksin Shinawatra, the fugitive ex-prime minister and Pheu Thai de facto leader, it does not mean they can influence the security agencies at the national level or have the ability or the will to clamp down on targeted killings of suspected insurgent leaders. Needless to say, such practices have chipped away the credibility of the peace process. Thailand does not have a policy on targeted killing; it is believed that such activities are carried out by rogue officers with a grudge against suspected insurgents, especially ex-detainees who have been acquitted by the Thai courts. Such practices also erode trust in the Thai legal system. After all, these suspects have decided to fight the charges instead of going underground to take up arms. In fact, the use of extra judicial killings against ex-detainees became a convenient excuse used by Hasan Taib to shoot down a proposed ceasefire deal in 2013 during the Islamic fasting month of Ramadan.

Although there was no reason to doubt that Hasan and his delegates were part of the BRN movement two or three decades ago, a well-placed Malaysian source dealing with the peace initiative confirmed that leaders with a meaningful connection, or command-and-control, with the insurgents on the ground would not be taking part in the talks because the current Yingluck government would not grant them immunity. But BRN sources, on the other hand, said the issue is more than simply immunity for their negotiators. They said Malaysia is not an honest broker, and that the separatist movements still recall how Malaysian security officials have in the past secretly handed over members and leaders of separatist movements to Thailand. Some have been convicted and are serving life sentence in Thai prisons. Echoing the sentiment of BRN and other exiled leaders, Associate Professor Wan Kadir Che Man, the former leader of the now defunct Bersatu, an umbrella group for all the long-standing separatist movement, said a coherent process would produce viable representatives.

Sources in the Malaysian and Thai governments admitted that the two governments had taken a big leap of faith in thinking the process begun in February 2013 could gain traction. Some admitted they knew beforehand that Hasan and his delegates did not have any meaningful influence on the BRN’s DPP, much less the insurgents on the ground. There are several reasons why the DPP refused to endorse the 28 February initiative. First, the group didn’t think Thailand would commit itself to a formal process because there was no unity among the policymakers, much less the various government agencies tasked with bringing an end to the conflict. Moreover, the BRN would like to see its political wing be formally recognised by the Thai side, as well as the international community, before they permit them to take part in any peace talk. That status, of course, would bring immunity from the Thai government.

While it was clear that neither side was prepared for the 28 February initiative, this begged the question: Why did Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur decide to go ahead anyway?

One explanation for why Yingluck Shinawatra’s government rushed through with the initiative has to do with Thaksin’s desire to clear his name. His handling of the unrest in the southernmost provinces was one of the reasons cited by the military after they dislodged him in 2006. But with a peace initiative in place, regardless of its coherency, Yingluck would be able to tell the local and international community that her government had extended an olive branch to the separatists but the movement chose not to cooperate.  Malaysia took the same leap of faith as Bangkok, thinking the process would attract the participation of other long-standing groups. Historically, Kuala Lumpur viewed southern Thailand as their back yard, and believed any initiatives to resolve the conflict there must have their inputs. And while historical mistrust between the two countries persists, there is understanding among policymakers in Bangkok that any conflict resolution for the Deep South must have Malaysia’s involvement. The sticky question was how much involvement Bangkok was willing to allow.

Wan Kadir blamed successive Thai governments for going to the same mediators, facilitators and go-betweens, and for refusing to take a new approach to negotiation. Speaking at the Prince of Songkhla University-Pattani Campus on 24 December 2012, Wan Kadir, who was recently allowed to return to the country after 53 years of exile, didn’t mince words when he called Thai officials “stupid” and “insincere” in their past handling of peace initiatives. He said many of the Thai officials who had participated in three decades of talks appeared more concerned with enhancing their own careers rather than achieving peace, and added that the mediators, facilitators and go-betweens were opportunists who exploited the talks for personal and political gain. He said the February 2013 peace initiative in Kuala Lumpur was also an example of Thailand’s lack of sincerity.

But instead of pausing to reconsider, the Thai government decided to stubbornly keep the February initiative alive for fear of losing face. But with violence continuing, Bangkok was hard-pressed to show any deliverables. The plan was to bring on board other long-standing separatist groups, namely groups that were kept out of the process from the start. An invitation was extended to Kasturi Mahkota, the Sweden-based leader of a faction of the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO) that had been working with Thailand’s NSC through a Geneva-based mediator from 2005-2011. The so-called Geneva Process was scrapped by the Yingluck government who gave the mandate to Kuala Lumpur to facilitate. Another PULO faction, under the leadership of Samsudine Khan, also agreed to take part in the talks. Khan, who is also based in Sweden, had initially given the February initiative the cold shoulder but later changed his mind. The two would join the third self-proclaimed PULO president, Noor Abdulrahman, at the negotiating table. Bangkok was also planning to extend an invitation to the Barisan Islam Pembangunan Pattani (BIPP) but the founder, Wan Kadir, was dismissive of the report. Sources in the movement said BIPP’s leadership was split.

Photo: Surapan Boonthanom. www.wewatch.info

Another Thai strategy has been to try to lure well-known figures like Sapae-ing Basor, a respected spiritual leader and former principle of Thamvithya Multini School in Yala, to the table for ‘photo opportunities’ to give credibility to the February initiative. Sapae-ing has been accused by the Thai authorities of being a top BRN leader. A warrant for his arrest was issued in 2005, signed by the SBPAC’s Thawee Sodsong who was at the time a police colonel. Sapae-ing has so far refused to take part in the process because he is extremely angered by the Thai authorities for demonising him, according to his close associates. At one time, the police even offered 20 million baht for information leading to his capture. Thai officials who read the charges against him said the allegations were too weak and that he would beat the case should his case go to court. The BRN has been tight-lipped about Sapae-ing’s status and his whereabouts, but stated that he has long been an important spiritual leader for the Patani Malay Muslims.

The Thai team, namely the SBPAC and the NSC, had also turned to Muslim religious leaders in the Deep South to act as go-betweens after they realized that local Malay Muslim politicians had a credibility problem with both the movements and local people. Clerics were toying with the idea of acting as go-betweens, but then a death squad killed one of their own, imam Abdullateh Todir, on 14 November 2012. The religious leaders backed away as insurgents on the ground, from mid-November to the new year, went back to targeting government schools, killing three Buddhist teachers. Attacks during this period spiked unprecedentedly.

But before anybody could come to the table, there was a massive anti-government street protest in Bangkok against the passing of an amnesty bill aimed at absolving Thaksin of his conviction for corruption and abuse of power. The Yingluck government decided to dissolve Parliament and called for a fresh election. But the anti-government demonstrators, led by former Democrat Party deputy leader Suthep Thaugsuban, vowed to obstruct the upcoming election. They demanded that the country first undergo serious reform to rid the country of Thaksin’s influence. Amid uncertainty whether the February 2014 general election will ever take place, any peace resolution for the Muslim-majority South has been put on hold.

Failure warnings were ignored

The February peace initiative had ample warning of an imminent failure but they were ignored by the stakeholders mainly because Thai officials task and the go-betweens tasked with laying the ground work for the peace talk was more concern with rescuing Thaksin rather then saving southern Thailand. The first warning came on 30 March 2012, two weeks after a meeting between Thaksin and a group of 16 separatist leaders in Kuala Lumpur. The meeting was set up by the Malaysian government, the would-be “facilitator” for the peace initiative that would be announce a year later. Wan Kadir, during his first public appearance in nearly a decade, told Thai reporters in Bangkok in November 2013 that the triple car-bombs in Yala, and one in the basement parking lot of a Hat Yai hotel on 30 March 2012, were meant as a message to the Thaksin-backed initiative. More than 13 people were killed and 110 people injured from the attacks. The Thai army’s top brass also made the same point, saying the civilian initiative was doomed to fail and that such a task should be carried out by military personnel. Thai soldiers have yet to come to terms with the notion of civilian supremacy.

While the BRN’s DPP and core leaders did not endorse the February initiative, it does not mean the BRN does not want to talk peace with the Thai state. Ever since its birth in the late 1960s, BRN has always stood for independence for the historical Malay homeland of Thailand’s three southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and the Malay-speaking districts in Songkhla province. So the fact that they would be willing to talk peace with the Thais is a big change for the movement. The BRN said they wanted the initiative to be kept out of the public spotlight and to generate enough confidence before going public and/or engage in a formal negotiation process with the government. They accused Thailand of being reckless by pushing through the February initiative, knowing that the issue of immunity was not resolved and also knowing that they (BRN) still have yet to bridge the trust gap between them and the Malaysian government about the deportation issue. By presenting the 28 February launch as more than what it was, it set the stage for microphone diplomacy that became a political circus, where announcements, demands and statements were issued through the media and YouTube.

Photo: Nakharin Chinnawornkomal. wewatch.info

As stated earlier, what the BRN desire at this juncture is to establish a legitimate and recognisable political wing that can surface publicly and engage with the international community. BRN said they would be willing to work with international organisations that can help them with capacity-building and give members a better understanding of a wide range of issues, such as international norms, the Geneva Convention and humanitarian law. The problem with Bangkok is that the government thought it could achieve results in one push by bringing in Thaksin and Malaysia into the picture. Soldiers and other bureaucrats said it was difficult for them to manoeuvre because of Thaksin’s direct participation. An opportunity to criticise civilians on this point emerged when it was realized that Wan Kadir was luke-warm about the on-going process. And so the Thai Army organised two trips—in November and December 2013—for him to Bangkok and Pattani, respectively, knowing that he would be critical of the initiative.

In fact, as of December 2013, militants have expanded their operation to include Sadao, the fifth Malay-speaking district of Songkhla province. Two motorbike bombs hit police targets and a car bomb was placed in a hotel parking lot in a small street filled with prostitutes and karaoke bars. The same day also saw a botched car bomb attempt on a police station in Phuket. A pickup truck for the Phuket hit was stolen from Pattani’s Sai Buri District in May 2013 and was used to carry two canisters filled with explosive materials powerful with a blast radius of about 500 metres. Indeed, with the attacks in Sadao and Phuket, a new threshold has been crossed. But it does not mean the desire to talk is not there. Violence on the ground, including the expansion of the battlefield, is part of that negotiation.

BRN said the next phase of the peace initiative could very well be without Kuala Lumpur, citing hard feelings that date back to the handing over of suspected separatist leaders in 1998. These differences would have to be overcome before Kuala Lumpur could have a seat at the table, they said. But officials in Bangkok are not sure how to break this impasse with the Malaysian government. Bangkok had asked for Kuala Lumpur’s participation, and embarrassment could now be inevitable. Wan Kadir said using mediating organisations has not worked and suggested that Western governments like the United States, Sweden or Germany should be invited to take part in the process since this would give the initiative more legitimacy.

No one in the BRN can clearly explain why its top leaders are now willing to talk to the Thais. One explanation, according to a mid-ranking BRN cadre, has to do with the generation gap between the exiled leaders and the current crop of militants, the so-called post-Tak Bai generation, who could become increasingly uncompromising and/or unwilling to accept the guidance of elders living in exile. Tak Bai is a Narathiwat district where a demonstration in late 2004 ended in the death of 78 young men, who all died from suffocation after they were stacked into the back of military trucks. Seven others were shot dead at the demonstration site. For the time being, the BRN elders believe they have enough clout to influence the combatants and change the course of the conflict, but such a task will be increasingly difficult as time passes and the generation gap gets wider and wider.

Don Pathan

Don Pathan is a freelance consultant based in Yala, one of the three southernmost provinces of Thailand hit by this wave of insurgency violence. He is also a founding member of the Patani Forum, a local non-governmental organisation dedicate to promoting critical dialogue on the conflict in the region.