DON PATHAN - Thailand-based security analyst/development consultant (Photo: Anjaman Pass, Afghanistan, with two Northern Alliance fighters, October 2001)
The then Thailand's chief negotiator, Chatchai Bangchuad, Malaysian facilitator Gen Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, and Anas Abdulrahman, BRN chief negotiator, talked to the press after the February 6-7, 2024, high-level negotiation in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. (Credit: Peace Dialogue Panel)
In one of his first moves as newly appointed Prime Minister, Anutin Charnvirakul has named a new chief negotiator for the peace process in Thailand's far South, a region gripped by a conflict that has claimed over 7,700 lives since 2004.
The decision has been met with scepticism, however, as Anutin’s government is set to serve only four months before Parliament is dissolved. Since the negotiating team is mandated by the Cabinet, any new government will be free to appoint its own officials.
The immediate aim of Anutin's Bhumjaithai Party is widely seen as building political capital for the upcoming general election. By appointing retired Gen Somsak Rungsita, a former Secretary-General of the National Security Council (NSC), as chief negotiator, Anutin can claim an achievement that he will argue his predecessor, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, failed to secure during her year in office.
To be fair to the previous administration, a negotiating team was being assembled, but Paetongtarn was removed by the Constitutional Court just before a public announcement could be made. Her proposed list included top security figures from her party, a former head of the Parliament-funded Prajadhipok’s Institute, a village chief from Narathiwat, and a retired diplomat.
Under her administration, delays stemmed from a refusal to resume talks until the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN)—the primary longstanding separatist movement—ceased its violent operations. The BRN countered that any reduction of violence must be negotiated, questioning the baseline and monitoring mechanisms. The then-government was unwilling to entertain this. A nudge from Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, the designated facilitator for the off-and-on talks since 2013, finally prompted a response from Paetongtarn, just before the court removed her from power.
Political insiders say the choice of Gen Somsak is a safe bet for Anutin. The former NSC chief is a close associate of Defence Minister Gen Nattaphon Narkphanit and former PM Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, now a Privy Councillor. The Thai Army is also comfortable with him.
Gen Somsak's appointment marks the NSC's return to the peace process after being sidelined by the previous administration. Insiders from the Pheu Thai Party government had accused the NSC-led negotiators of exceeding their mandate and giving the BRN too much leeway by not making a reduction of violence a binding condition.
A senior BRN member on the negotiating team questioned Thailand's commitment to peace, stating that Gen Somsak’s appointment does not signal sincerity in seeking a peaceful outcome.
For Asmadee Bueheng, a Patani-based writer and long-time conflict observer, Gen Somsak's appointment—coupled with in the introduction of an outsider to lead the Fourth Army Area, which oversees security in the region—does not necessarily translate into meaningful concessions from the Thai state.
In fact, no political party in modern Thailand has ever spelled out terms for peaceful coexistence between the Malay people of Patani and the state. This refusal to make concessions has rendered the decade-old peace process a stagnant "talk shop" unable to move beyond confidence-building.
Even if the government decided to outline a real settlement, there is no guarantee that conservative elites in Thailand would permit it, as it would challenge Thailand's nation-state construct and narrative, Asmadee said.
Today, the controversial Martial Law and Emergency Law, which permits 30-day detention without legal representation, remain in effect. The Tak Bai massacre of October 2004, which resulted in 85 deaths, has yet to see closure, while harassment against local political activists continues.
For years, the Fourth Army and activists have been at loggerheads, fighting to control the narrative. At the Army's request, numerous activists have been charged with disturbing the peace and instigating separatism.
Moreover, the absence of a credible peace process gives BRN militants, who already operate with considerable autonomy, a freer hand to expand beyond their usual theatre of violence and breach unwritten rules of engagement that prohibit attacks on civilians.
Thai police inspect the scene of an attack by insurgents at Sunai Kolok District Office, March 2025. (Narathiwat Public Relations Office)
It remains to be seen if the new chief negotiator and the recently appointed commander of the Fourth Army Area, Maj Gen Norathip Phoinok, can reverse this trend and open political space for critical discussion, no matter how uncomfortable.
For decades, commanders of the Fourth Army have been drawn from its own ranks. Their counter-insurgency strategy has leaned heavily on militaristic approaches, with little focus on winning hearts and minds or addressing the root causes and historical grievances of this Malay-speaking region.
For over twenty years, Thailand's far South has been shaped by separatist insurgency, cross-border trade (both legal and illegal), an enormous military budget, and a culture of impunity among security officials. As one Thai military intelligence officer noted, the region has too many "dark sides." Bringing in an outsider to lead may not be a bad idea.
Although the violence is widely understood as political, Thai officials often view it through a narrow lens of security and legality. Few attempt to understand the insurgents' perspective, which sees government troops as a colonial force and local businesses as part of a system of exploitation. Government policies on transmigration and assimilation are viewed as integral to this same system.
Whether Maj Gen Norathip can bridge the trust gap between the state and the Malay-speaking region is an open question.
Political insiders say his appointment reflects the internal workings of the Royal Thai Army rather than any government initiative. With less than 70 seats in Parliament, Anutin cannot afford to create friction with the Army. His aim is to use these four months to prepare for the next election, which is why he is allowing the Army a free hand on border policy, be it with Cambodia or in the far South.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based consultant and security analyst.
The Myanmar military junta attempted to score a public relations victory during the recent ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur by demonstrating its willingness to crack down on scam centers operating in Karen State, adjacent to Thailand’s Mae Sot district in Tak province.
After attacking positions held by the Karen National Union’s (KNU) 6th Brigade, Myanmar troops entered portions of the notorious KK Park, a major scam hub linked to Chinese crime syndicates. They confiscated 30 Starlink devices that scammers had been using in recent years after Thailand, under pressure from both the United States and China, disrupted internet connections to these call centers by redirecting relay boxes on utility poles and ordering power lines running from Thailand to cease operations.
A turning point came in January 2025, when China intensified pressure on Thailand to take drastic action, including cutting off power supplies, fuel, and imposing stricter controls on internet connectivity. Chinese Assistant Minister of Public Security Liu Zhongy visited Mae Sot and Myawaddy twice in early 2025 to witness the crackdown firsthand.
More than 7,000 operators, mostly Chinese nationals, were released from these centers and sent across the border into Thailand for processing and repatriation. Chinese charter planes stood ready to transport their nationals back home to either face charges or, if fortunate, be treated as human trafficking victims, depending on interrogation outcomes.
The scam centers adapted to Thailand’s obstruction by acquiring massive generators capable of powering the 30 or so compounds dotting the Myanmar side of the Moei River, which serves as the natural border with Thailand. Starlink satellite systems replaced Thai internet service providers, while fuel became significantly more expensive—though nothing is truly unobtainable in this rugged corner of Southeast Asia, where warlords, drug barons, ethnic rebel militias, resistance forces, and Myanmar government troops compete for control.
Until February 2025, two commercial flights filled with Chinese tourists would arrive daily in Mae Sot from Bangkok. This border town, known primarily as a major cross-border trading hub between Thailand and Myanmar, served as the gateway to an open secret: these “tourists” were actually headed to casinos, brothels, entertainment complexes, karaoke bars, and unregulated online gambling operations on the Myanmar side. “They just have to remember to return before their Thai visas expire,” said a Thai police officer in Mae Sot.
The two flights are a thing of the past as Thai officials, in line with measures imposed on foreign nationals after Liu visited the region.
The US Institute of Peace estimated that by the end of 2023, the annual value of funds stolen worldwide by Chinese syndicates operating from Myanmar and other locations in mainland Southeast Asia reached approximately $64 billion.
In response to Chinese and Thai pressure, the DKBA and KNA/BGF quickly abandoned their profitable landlord arrangements and began rounding up scam operators. This started in February 2025 and continued for several months.
The strict measures following Liu’s two visits may have disrupted operations temporarily, but in reality they created a balloon effect: squeeze one area and activity pops up elsewhere. Phayathonezu, an area controlled by the rebels near the Three Pagodas Pass opposite Thailand’s Kanchanaburi province, exemplifies how these illicit businesses are relocating from the Myawaddy area. Other syndicates maintained low profiles temporarily, planning to reemerge once attention subsided, while others moved deeper into the country.
The deportation of approximately 7,000 individuals since March 2025 damaged the illicit operations but didn’t eliminate them. While the two daily planeloads of Chinese nationals arriving in Mae Sot may have ended, these syndicates still operate cyber scam centers generating substantial income.
“Chinese businesses rent these complexes and convert them into entertainment and gambling outlets that operate in a gray area—not exactly illegal but certainly unregulated. However, portions of these complexes are designated specifically for online scamming operations,” explained a plainclothes Thai police officer in Mae Sot who has a front-row view of these illicit activities.
“The Karen militias controlling the area—whether they have ceasefire agreements with the Myanmar government, like the Karen National Army (KNA) and the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), or the Karen National Union (KNU), which is still fighting the government—none of them want scrutiny of what these Chinese businesses are actually doing,” said the officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
“They collect substantial rent money, and villagers in areas under their control gain employment. Thai people also benefit from their presence.” He pointed to the heightening of real estate prices around Mae Sot, saying being a merely stop-over has its benefits.
Last week’s attack on a portion of KK Park failed to convince observers, despite generating some international headlines when roughly 1,000 foreign nationals fled the park into Myawaddy and across to the Thai side of the border. Unfortunately for the Myanmar government, the incident generated little interest among ASEAN leaders, who were preoccupied with hosting US President Donald Trump, who had come to Malaysia to witness the signing of a peace deal between Thailand and Cambodia.
More significantly, according to a member of the DKBA militia group, the Myanmar military’s advance into KK Park disrupted the existing arrangements between Chinese crime syndicates and their respective landlords—namely the KNA, DKBA, and KNU.
“The offensive against KK Park created considerable anxiety among these Chinese syndicates, who never move around this part of Myanmar without security details,” said a DKBA officer who spoke on condition of anonymity.
“While the Karen groups receive rent and certain benefits from these Chinese syndicates in exchange for broad protection guarantees, it’s the armed bodyguards and security personnel who provide the immediate defensive line for these Chinese bosses and managers. Not all these guards are ethnically Chinese, but they are fluent in Chinese,” he added.
Myanmar was able to advance on KNU positions in recent months and weeks because the BGF/KNA assisted them, according to the Thai officer.
The KNA is a 7,000-strong force led by Col. Chit Thu, a Karen warlord with extensive business interests and connections throughout Myanmar and Thailand.
One observer of the situation along the Thailand-Myanmar border suggested that Chit Thu is no longer satisfied with merely collecting rent—he wants a direct share of profits from these scam centers, according to a source with direct dealings with ethnic armed organizations in Myanmar.
The DKBA, a much smaller outfit with just over 1,000 troops, might outlive its usefulness as a member of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement if the Myanmar government sees no reason to maintain the relationship. Fortunately for the DKBA, the recent attack on the KNU’s 6th Brigade and incursion into KK Park did little to change international perception of Myanmar’s military government.
“If the world viewed the Myanmar junta as the good guys, they wouldn’t have stopped at the KNU 6th Brigade—they would have targeted a low-hanging fruit like the DKBA,” said the Thai police officer in Mae Sot.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based development professional and security analyst.
Every time Anwar succeeded in getting the Thai government to accelerate progress, Thai politics invariably intervened, prolonging the peace process that has never been a high priority for any Thai administration.
Coming into power in November 2022, Anwar – a figure who has endured prison and a long political struggle – inspired excitement among Malay Muslims in Thailand’s southernmost provinces. They saw his rise as a victory against the ruling elite, a narrative that resonates deeply with the Malays of Patani and the rebels as well.
However, when Srettha Thavisin assumed premiership in August 2023, he largely ignored the far south, unwilling to antagonise the Thai Army and its uncompromising counterinsurgency stance. Furthermore, Srettha focused on maintaining a delicate political balance that had enabled Thaksin Shinawatra’s return from exile—a Faustian bargain with the conservative establishment that required careful nurturing. Upsetting the military was not part of that deal.
Yet, the Malaysian-facilitated peace process had been developing for over a decade, and Bangkok could only delay for so long. A nudge from Anwar three months into Srettha’s term led to the appointment of Chatchai Bangchuad, then deputy secretary-general of the National Security Council (NSC), as chief negotiator—the first civilian in the role in 12 years.
This move allowed the Peace Dialogue Panel and Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) – the group controlling combatants on the ground – to resume discussions on the Joint Comprehensive Plan toward Peace (JCPP). This roadmap includes proposed agreements on public consultations, violence reduction and political solutions.
Complications
But in the far south, nothing comes easily. When a draft of the JCPP was leaked, it drew harsh criticism from military and political insiders. Professor Surachart Bamrungsuk, a Pheu Thai insider, relentlessly attacked the NSC-led team, accusing them of exceeding their mandate and criticising European donors for not pressuring the BRN enough to curb the violence on the ground. The backlash left Thai negotiators isolated.
In reality, both Thai and BRN negotiators were participating in mediation training in Europe, and a Japanese organisation even offered to host high-level talks in Tokyo. Furthermore, Thailand participated in a back-channel discussion with BRN through foreign mediation without Malaysia’s participation. But the process never advanced beyond confidence-building measures. The political leadership above the negotiators showed no real intention of offering concessions to BRN or the Patani Malays.
Thai institutions have never been united on the south, even on basic issues like whether to classify BRN as a criminal organisation or as combatants. International NGOs face wrath for using the term “armed conflict”, and bodies like the Organization of Islamic Cooperation are criticised for engaging the BRN. Any hint of legitimacy for the insurgents provokes Thai ire—even as its negotiators are sent to meet with them.
Unlike the 1980s, when Patani Malay fighters received foreign support, today’s combatants are self-sufficient, drawing on local community backing to keep the conflict civil. Malaysia, meanwhile, practises quiet diplomacy, urging both sides to respect humanitarian norms.
But as an interlocutor, Malaysia faces a complex challenge: its proximity and refusal to support separatism require all Malaysian leaders to carefully balance between respecting Thailand’s territorial integrity and acknowledging the historical grievances of the Patani people.
Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, a local political action group, believes Malaysia must do more than just urge Thailand to come to the table. He argues that Thailand needs creative ideas, and Malaysia – with international help – can provide them.
“Negotiation is a give-and-take process,” Artef said, “but Thailand only wants to take.”
He points out to Thailand’s relentless push for a ceasefire, which does little to advance conflict resolution and more for public consumption, as Thai leaders are in a constant campaign to garner public endorsement.
In comparison, Malaysia was successful in mediating the peace process between the Moros and the Philippines government. That was because Malaysia was able to get a firm commitment from Manila for concession and compromise before it took up the mediation role. Malaysia did not make the same demand with Thailand before it committed itself as the mediator in February 2013.
While Malaysian officials discuss the southern Thai conflict with Thai NSC officials regularly, Dato Mohd Rabin Basir, the designated facilitator, has not had much luck reaching the army generals, the lynchpin behind conflict resolution in the far south.
Instability in Bangkok
But obstacles and roadblocks are nothing new in the quest for peace in this historically contested region known as Patani. Thailand’s political instability continues to take its toll.
In August 2024, the Constitutional Court removed Srettha on ethical grounds. He was replaced by Paetongtarn Shinawatra, Thaksin’s daughter, who was shielded by party elders. Her deputy, Phumtham Wechayachai, refused to resume talks unless BRN stopped its violence first. BRN replied that violence reduction was negotiable but demanded international monitoring of any ceasefire.
Thailand rejected these demands, despite BRN’s agreement to negotiate under the Thai Constitution—effectively taking independence off the table. Instead, Bangkok stuck to its old strategy: trying to identify and negotiate directly with the leaders of BRN’s military wing despite not knowing their identities and being unwilling to offer meaningful concessions. BRN insisted that protocol must be respected and insisted that the government do not get to pick and choose who in the movement they want to meet.
The Pheu Thai-led government feared that entering talks amid ongoing attacks would make them look weak. Ironically, it was not BRN that undermined Paetongtarn, but Cambodian leader Hun Sen, a long-time friend of the Shinawatra family. In June, he leaked a private phone call in which she appeared to kowtow to him while criticising her own border security general. The leak triggered a bilateral crisis, leading to border clashes four weeks later that killed 40 people and displaced 300,000.
Malaysia was called upon to mediate again, this time with the United States and China observing. Anwar also nudged Bangkok to restart the peace talks. A new, diverse negotiating team was planned, including retired generals, a former diplomat and a village chief from the far south, with an announcement set for September 2025.
But on 29 August, the Constitutional Court removed Paetongtarn from power over the Hun Sen incident. The Parliament then voted in Bhumjaithai’s Anutin Charnvirakul as prime minister under a four-month agreement with the opposition to pursue constitutional reform.
Anwar, as ASEAN chair, had earlier appointed Thaksin as an advisor on Myanmar and the far south—a move that yielded no results. Thaksin’s influence evaporated entirely on 9 September, when the Supreme Court ruled that his hospital detention was an attempt to avoid his reduced jail sentence. He is now back in jail.
Now, the peace process for the far south is once again in limbo, likely delayed until after the next general election. It makes little sense for a four-month government to appoint a negotiating team only to dissolve it shortly after. But for Anwar, the pursuit of peace in Thailand’s deep south remains a story of promise and perseverance, continuously unravelled by the political fortunes of its neighbour.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.
A ranking member of the Thai Senate, Ms. Angkhana Neelaphaijit, has called for United Nations intervention regarding the pollution of the Kok and Sai rivers, contaminated by Chinese gold and rare earth extraction operations in territories controlled by the Wa militia, located mere kilometers from Thailand’s border with Myanmar.
Angkhana Neelaphaijit
Angkhana referenced the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to justify such intervention.
The 2019 Ramon Magsaysay Award winner, who joined the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances in 2022, argued that China bears moral and legal responsibility to address this issue. She suggested Thailand should petition the UN to raise concerns with China, given Myanmar’s inability to control the United Wa State Army (UWSA), a 30,000-member ethnic armed group maintaining a ceasefire agreement with Myanmar’s government since 1989.
According to the Shan Human Rights Foundation, while recent media coverage has concentrated on gold extraction along the Kok and Sai rivers near UWSA territory approximately 25 kilometers from Thailand’s border, satellite imagery reveals rare earth mining operations at two sites in Mong Yawn, southern Mong Hsat, roughly 25 kilometers from northern Thailand’s border, facing Mae Ai district in Chiang Mai province.
Recent months have witnessed a series of public protests in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces, demanding government action to address the issue with both Myanmar and the UWSA. In early 2025, Thai conservative media sources even advocated military intervention against the Wa, claiming three UWSA outposts had violated Thai territory by 200 meters.
The powerful UWSA controls an autonomous territory along the China-Myanmar frontier. During the late 1990s, the UWSA expanded southward toward the Thai border after collaborating with Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw, to eliminate their longtime adversary, Shan opium warlord Khun Sa and his Mong Tai Army (MTA).
Access to UWSA territories remains strictly controlled. Myanmar military personnel and government representatives must surrender weapons and accept escort.
Responding to mounting public pressure regarding river contamination, Thailand and Myanmar took a modest bilateral initiative last week, agreeing during Naypyidaw discussions to establish a joint committee addressing the Kok and Sai river pollution.
Both nations are committed to enhancing river water quality, sharing water management information, and creating a joint technical working group for concrete cooperation on contamination solutions. However, the agreement made no reference to the UWSA or China.
A senior Thai military official from the Third Army Area command said there have been internal discussions about approaching China directly, since negotiations with the UWSA and seeking the Myanmar government's assistance have proven ineffective.
Thailand’s communications with the UWSA have consistently involved the group’s southern command, which invariably defers major decisions to Panghsang, their organization’s headquarters on the Sino-Myanmar border. This includes Thailand’s request for UWSA to move back from at least nine outposts that are situated right on the Thai border; three of these outposts are allegedly positioned 200 meters inside Thai territory. Wa forces maintain that orders must originate from Panghsang and suggest Thailand address border demarcation issues with Myanmar’s government, as they concern state sovereignty.
Other ethnic armed organizations said the UWSA will take no action without receiving concessions from Thailand. Like similar groups, legitimacy and recognition are something that are often desired. However, Thailand refuses to offer concessions to the UWSA, particularly given its drug trafficking history.
Several UWSA leaders face US Federal Court indictments for heroin trafficking and related crime, while their southern commander, Wei Hsueh-kang, carries a US$2 million bounty from American authorities for his conviction as far back as 1993.
Wei and his brothers, originally from Yunnan, arrived in the Burmese Golden Triangle during the 1970s, initially as Kuomintang operatives before entering the profitable heroin trade. When the UWSA formed in 1989 following the Communist Party of Burma’s dissolution, Wei provided financial backing, transforming the organization into Myanmar’s most formidable ethnic armed group. The UWSA granted him access to opium supplies needed for producing premium grade 4 heroin, known as “China White.”
The Tatmadaw quickly established a ceasefire arrangement with the UWSA, and within a decade, the Wa had effectively moved southward, displacing longtime rival Khun Sa’s now-defunct Mong Tai Army (MTA) and occupying territories along the Thailand-Myanmar frontier. Currently, UWSA installations, camps, and strongholds populate newly constructed settlements along Myanmar’s border adjacent to Thailand’s Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai, and portions of Mae Hong Son provinces.
Thailand’s requests for Tatmadaw mediation with the UWSA are not unprecedented. In 2014, the Thai Army discussed UWSA border positions with Myanmar leader Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing during his Thailand visit. As of today, the Tatmadaw possesses limited influence over the UWSA.
But the same cannot be said about China. Last week, the UWSA declared it would terminate all assistance to allied groups battling Myanmar’s military, citing a request from China.
“Beginning immediately, Wa State will not provide weapons, military transit, or economic assistance to other organizations under any circumstances, at any time or location,” announced Zhao Guoan, Wa Vice Chairman and Foreign Relations Minister, informing representatives from the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) during an August 20, 2025 high-level meeting in Panghsang.
The Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN) reported that Zhao attributed this reluctant decision to intense Beijing pressure. Chinese authorities had frozen billions in Wa State institutional, corporate, and individual assets, implemented comprehensive border restrictions, and threatened severe measures unless the Wa ceased supporting armed groups in active conflict, according to SHAN, citing Wa News Land, the UWSA’s media outlet, as saying.
Since the Brotherhood Alliance’s late 2023 offensive began, China has served as a peace broker between Myanmar and ethnic armed organizations. Beijing's position gradually shifted toward supporting the Burmese junta, demanding that certain groups, particularly the TNLA and MNDAA, return territories captured from Myanmar’s military. Analysts believe China views Myanmar’s military government as the sole entity capable of maintaining national unity, with current support aimed at ensuring the upcoming December 2025 and January 2026 General Elections proceed smoothly enough to legitimize the new administration. Ultimately, this concerns risk mitigation for Chinese investments, trade routes, and strategic interests rather than power-sharing arrangements between the Myanmar military government and the ethnic armed organizations.
UWSA: An Uncomfortable Neighbor
Surprisingly, there were periods when Thai soldiers and United Wa State Army (UWSA) troops engaged in friendly volleyball matches along the northern border.
These games represented friendly overtures from new neighbors whose presence deeply concerned the Thai Army for multiple reasons. The UWSA’s notorious drug trafficking reputation and their regional commander, Wei Hsueh-kang, certainly didn’t help matters.
Furthermore, Thailand and the UWSA never developed the necessary comfort level for peaceful coexistence. Typically, ethnic armed organizations maintaining ceasefires with the Tatmadaw are perceived as threats to Thailand, while those fighting Myanmar for self-governance or independence are considered allies and sometimes serve as buffers or proxies for Thai military forces.
After securing their southern command along the Thai border, the UWSA forcibly relocated over 100,000 Wa villagers from their China-Myanmar border stronghold to the southern command area.
However, the UWSA failed to convince Thai military leadership they posed no national threat. The massive population movement from the north, Wa drug operations and illicit regional investments, and the general perception that ceasefire-holding ethnic armed organizations threaten Thailand’s security—all contributed to maintaining this suspicious outlook.
Undoubtedly, historical distrust between Thailand and Burma shaped this threat perception, which traditionally views Myanmar’s friends and allies as dangers to Thailand.
Nevertheless, Thailand-Myanmar bilateral relations have not always been straightforward. Despite mistrust, various Thai governments since decolonization have served as Myanmar’s bridge to the international community, seeking to isolate the regime for its severe human rights abuses. Thailand was the first to enter Burma following the 1988 bloody crackdown against the pro-democracy uprising. Thaksin Shinawatra, shortly after assuming power in 2001, made extraordinary efforts to strengthen bilateral economic relations with the country. His assistance to Myanmar included whitewashing the UWSA through the Yongka Project development initiative, which never materialized due to a lack of international funding.
Over time, Wa-Thai military clashes gradually ceased, but tensions persisted. Thai security officials report the UWSA has not forgotten the “Surisri 143” incident—allegedly a Thai Army training exercise in May 2002 that saw Thai forces cross the border in tracked vehicles, supported by mortars and artillery, conducting a 24-hour operation eliminating several Wa positions. Some outposts were jointly occupied by the Tatmadaw. Thaksin later claimed the Army had “overreacted.”
While the UWSA sought to avoid war with Thailand and desired peace, they were unlikely to easily forget the May 2002 violence. Although both sides no longer engage in border gunfights, that two-decade-old hostility continues influencing Wa attitudes toward Thailand.
Unlike the early 2000s when Wa troops regularly exchanged gunfire with Thai soldiers, UWSA leaders would grant interviews and permit foreign media access to their China-Burma border territory. Today, statements are released through media platforms. Most posts showcase military strength through parades, troop movements, and daily training activities.
The toxic nationalism of the Thai-Cambodia border crisis
Bangkok's rush to punish neighbor may hurt industries, stoke political dysfunction
Don Pathan
August 26, 2025 17:05 JST
Thai military and Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) personnel stand guard near the Thai-Cambodian border at Chong Chub Ta Mok area in Surin Province, Thailand, on Aug. 20, 2025.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.
Following the border clashes that erupted on July 24 and lasted five days until a ceasefire was reached, Thai people from all walks of life are united in their anger against Cambodia and have come together to punish their eastern neighbor in any way they can -- despite knowing that their toxic nationalism comes with a heavy price.
More than 40 people were killed and about 300,000 were displaced by cross-border attacks on both countries. Not only are bilateral ties at a new low, the social and economic fabric of these two nations whose people share similar cultural traits -- residents along both sides of the border are predominantly Khmer-speakers -- has been ripped apart.
The toxic nationalism of the Thai-Cambodia border crisis
Bangkok's rush to punish neighbor may hurt industries, stoke political dysfunction
Don Pathan
August 26, 2025 17:05 JST
20250825 Thai Cambo 1
Thai military and Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) personnel stand guard near the Thai-Cambodian border at Chong Chub Ta Mok area in Surin Province, Thailand, on Aug. 20, 2025.
Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.
Following the border clashes that erupted on July 24 and lasted five days until a ceasefire was reached, Thai people from all walks of life are united in their anger against Cambodia and have come together to punish their eastern neighbor in any way they can -- despite knowing that their toxic nationalism comes with a heavy price.
More than 40 people were killed and about 300,000 were displaced by cross-border attacks on both countries. Not only are bilateral ties at a new low, the social and economic fabric of these two nations whose people share similar cultural traits -- residents along both sides of the border are predominantly Khmer-speakers -- has been ripped apart.
Just this past week, a group of Thai senators called on the government to end scholarships for Cambodian students, accusing them of being "ungrateful." The move followed an earlier decision by acting Defense Minister Gen. Nattapol Nakpanit, who ordered all Cambodians at the National Defence College to pack up and leave the country.
Similarly, Ramkhamhaeng University in Bangkok revoked the honorary doctorate degree it had granted to Hun Sen, the president of the Cambodian Senate. The Cambodian strongman said this measure was unnecessary because he had already flushed the degree down the toilet.
Little consideration is given to the fact that the Thai economy -- particularly industries and factories in the northeastern provinces -- depends heavily on cheap Cambodian labor. More than 1 million Cambodian nationals work in Thailand under a bilateral arrangement.
And while the Thai armed forces are enjoying an outpouring of support, civil-military relations have deteriorated as nobody is talking about reforms for fear of sounding unpatriotic.
The absence of strong political leadership in Thailand has created a free-for-all situation in which just about everybody is pushing their own agenda. Nationalists are talking about collecting donations to purchase drones for military units along the border, while others are suggesting migrant workers from Myanmar should replace the Cambodians -- an off-the-cuff idea that overlooks the fact migrant workers tend to be regular fixtures in border communities.
Such arrangements were achieved through years of negotiations between government agencies and the private sector, who realize that fairness is the best policy when dealing with migrant workers from neighboring countries.
Still, many Thais believe they possess the moral high ground because Thailand provides these foreign workers the means for their livelihood. They ignore the fact that these back-breaking jobs are shunned by Thai nationals who have other options, such as going abroad for higher pay and better working conditions.
To escape constant harassment, many Cambodians have opted to return home. Needless to say, Thailand's private sector is feeling the heat.
If recent history teaches us anything, it is that bilateral ties between Thailand and Cambodia are usually quickly patched up after border clashes. This is because deep down, Thailand and Cambodia know that for the sake of their people, it is better to cooperate than fight. But the lure of the border disputes never fails to attract political leaders looking to enhance their national standing. The two countries don't want war, they want what war can bring: national unity and the opportunity to solidify their credentials.
But nothing comes easy in this bilateral relationship, which comes with annoying pretexts. This time around, Bangkok cited suppression of scam centers in Cambodia as an excuse for extended border restrictions. Hun Sen was furious.
The situation deteriorated quickly when Hun Sen on June 18 leaked a private phone conversation he had with suspended Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, during which she appeared to be kowtowing to the Cambodian leader while criticizing her regional commander's handling of the border dispute.
Disagreements over the border demarcation between the two countries have been an issue since the colonial period and are often exploited by political leaders. The dispute over the world-famous Preah Vihear Temple reached the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, on two separate occasions. The ICJ ruled in Cambodia's favor both times: first in 1962 concerning the temple's ownership, and again in 2013 regarding the surrounding area. Cambodia has also sought the ICJ's judgment on the current dispute over the Ta Muen Thom temple. However, Thailand insists on using a bilateral mechanism, likely fearing a repeat of history.
And while the Thai government is picking up the pieces shattered by the embarrassing phone conversation, the Thai military is currently enjoying enormous public support because of the border standoff. A survey in early August by the National Institute Development Administration of 1,310 people nationwide revealed that most Thais trust and are satisfied with the military's role in addressing the Thai-Cambodian conflict. They expressed strong dissatisfaction with the government and the foreign ministry.
From the minute the conflict started, both countries began reached out to members of the international community to press their case, trying to convince the world that they weren't the ones who fired the first shot. Yet overseas onlookers were more interested in understanding the nature of the problem and how to resolve it.
While Cambodia constantly pushed for outside mediation and involvement in conflict resolution, Thailand insisted on resolving the conflict bilaterally. Cambodia succeeded in getting the United Nations Security Council to convene an emergency meeting in New York, but failed to get the council to forward the case to the ICJ.
According to one government official from an ASEAN member state, the Cambodian diplomats were met by a much better prepared and better staffed delegation from Thailand. "The Thais were sophisticated and technical in their messaging, citing the Geneva Conventions and breaches of anti-mine and anti-cluster munitions obligations," the person said. "By contrast, Cambodia's position was undermined -- fairly or unfairly -- by the incident involving the Thai hospital [and attacks on other civilian targets, such as schools and convenience stores]. ... Regardless of the facts, that episode loomed large in the minds of many in New York."
In situations like these, the truth becomes almost irrelevant because there was no credible third party to verify what actually happened on the ground. In New York, it ultimately comes down to who presented their case more convincingly.
During the five-day standoff, Thailand's superior and more sophisticated firepower allowed its armed forces to focus their attacks on military targets and come across as respectful of the rules of engagement. But the generals need to understand that the world doesn't see the government and its armed forces as two separate entities.
While the "we are the good guy" narrative might go down well for domestic consumption, it does nothing in winning support from the international community, much less addressing the root causes of the border problem with Cambodia.
Thai and Cambodian army officers shake hands at Chong Bok. Credit: Royal Thai Army www.stratsea.com
Introduction
The morning of 24 July 2025 started off with a brief but fierce gunfight between Thai and Cambodian troops dispatched to a poorly demarcated area around a disputed ancient Hindu temple, Prasat Ta Muen Thom, which is accessible by the people of both sides.
As expected, Thailand and Cambodia accused each other of starting the fight. The risk for deadly confrontation was obvious given recent developments and the military buildup in the area. But neither side had the political courage to rethink their strategy for fear of looking weak in the eyes of their constituency.
Lack of unity between the political leaders in Bangkok and the Thai army made policy coordination that much more difficult. Cambodia, on the other hand, was getting on Thai troops’ last good nerve with the digging of trenches around the disputed area earlier this year.
To recap, armed clashes erupted on 28 May 2025, resulting in the death of one Cambodian soldier. Ten days later, on 8 June 2025, regional commanders from both sides met and agreed to fill up the trenches and withdraw their soldiers from the disputed location. They shook hands and posed for a photo and then retreated to their previous positions before the confrontation in late May.
But the absence of clashes does not spell peace. Cambodia was determined to take this case, along with other disputed territories on the border, to the International Court of Justice (ICJ); the Thai government rejected the idea, saying it is committed to bilateral negotiations through the Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) and will not accept the ICJ’s jurisdiction.
Things went downhill quickly on 18 June 2025 after Cambodia’s President of the Senate Hun Sen leaked a private phone conversation he had with the then Thai prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra three days earlier.
Besides the appearance of kowtowing to Cambodia, Paetongtarn made a critical remark about one of her senior military commanders, referring to him as an “opponent” who just “wanted to look tough.”
Street protests erupted in Bangkok as demonstrators called for her resignation.
Colonial Legacy Complicates Resolution
Asking Thailand and Cambodia leaders to think constructively about border affairs may be unrealistic given that the disputes are rooted in the colonial past—a legacy from which Thailand has struggled to move forward.
Thailand’s refusal to accept its colonial legacy goes beyond simply lamenting past losses. Consider Siam’s “lost” territories to British Malaya: the surrender of what are now northern Malaysian states – Kedah and Kelantan – continues to shape the Thai national psyche. “It was ours, and we gave it to the British for peace’s sake,” goes the common refrain.
The Thai state does not make a big issue of these “losses”, partly because Malaysia does not politicise the issue or rub it in Thailand’s face. Demarcation along the Thai-Malaysian political border is conducted by technical officials from both sides without incident, although separatist insurgency in Thailand’s Malay-speaking South serves as a reminder that post-colonial nation-state construction is never without challenges.
Nonetheless, Thailand is not alone in dealing with historical hangups. In 2003, deep-rooted resentment in Cambodia resulted in an anti-Thai riot that ended in an arson attack against the Thai embassy in Phnom Penh after a Thai actress was reported to have said Angkor Wat, one of the world’s most important archaeological sites, belongs to Thailand.
Instead of making the hard choice between explaining to their respective citizens about the injustice of the colonial past and the need to come to terms with it, Thai and Cambodian political leaders took the easy way out by exploiting this resentment for quick political gains.
International Arena Becomes Battlefield
The competition extends beyond the battlefield as military actions coincided with intense diplomatic outreach, with both Thailand and Cambodia attempting to control the narrative. Both countries have turned to ASEAN, the United Nations and members of the international community to present their respective cases.
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet succeeded in getting the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to an urgent meeting “to stop Thailand’s aggression” but fail to get the Council to issue a resolution to call for an immediate ceasefire.
Thailand, in turn, has accused Cambodia of committing war crimes for targeting civilians and of violating a major international convention, the Ottawa Treaty, for planting fresh mines around Prasat Ta Muen Thom. Cambodia denied the allegations and added that the blast site was well within Cambodian territory.
Thailand fell short of calling on the treaty’s secretariat to send a fact-finding mission to investigate the incident. The blast site is part of a larger minefield, known as the K5 Belt, where the Thailand/China-backed Khmer Rouge fought the Vietnam-supported People’s Republic of Kampuchea throughout the 1980s. Both sides had flooded the area with landmines that, 50 years later, have yet to be fully removed. Neither Thailand nor Cambodia is a party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
Thailand is unable to convince members of the international community of its justification to reject Cambodia’s proposal to allow ICJ to rule on the overlapping claims of the Ta Muen Thom Temple. The country has not been able to move on from the 1962 ICJ ruling that, based on the French map, gave the Preah Vihear temple to Cambodia. Thailand reluctantly accepted the ruling but continued to dispute the area surrounding the temple.
Pursuing the road towards ICJ may put Cambodia in a positive light in the eyes of the international community, but – as one Bangkok-based diplomat noted – this path was undermined when Cambodian rockets landed on Thai public schools, hospitals and a convenience store.
Taking the Moral High Ground
With a high number of displaced people and damaged properties, both sides appeared to have exercised some degree of restraint and confined the fighting to the border provinces. No major infrastructure or commercial assets in the border region have come under attack.
Footage of Thai villagers and school children running for cover prompted Thai citizens, particularly the conservative nationalists, to inflict more punishment on Cambodia. Their past public campaign forced previous Thai governments to go against Cambodia’s effort to obtain the United Nations World Heritage Site status for the Preah Vihear temple, which was granted in 2008.
Thailand’s deployment of F-16 fighter jets demonstrated the country’s superior military power. By limiting air and artillery attacks to military targets, Thailand appeared to be seeking international respect for embracing international norms.
Thailand’s race to the moral high ground may not be an easy climb, however. The Cambodian government was quick to point out that Thai airstrikes and artillery fire had damaged the Preah Vihear temple, not to mention the use of internationally prohibited cluster munitions.
In a statement dated 25 July 2025, the Thai army said cluster munitions were used for military targets only. The problem with cluster bombs is that a significant percentage of submunitions fail to detonate upon impact, leaving behind unexploded ordnance, turning the area into de facto landmines.
In the past, the aftermath of border gunfights followed a similar pattern: Thai and Cambodian troops would sit together the next day, eating lunch with their bare hands in a traditional style, showing the world that both countries have patched things up and moved on. This time, however, the fallout will be more costly in many ways. Lives have been lost, and raw emotions have poured out on social media, creating narratives beyond the control of any state agency’s public relations machines. Anyone with a mobile phone can now report on developments as they see fit.
Mediation in Kuala Lumpur
With Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim mediating the negotiation, Thailand and Cambodia came face-to-face in Malaysia as representatives from the United States and China observed the talks. Cambodia got the ceasefire that they wanted, starting on the midnight of 28 July 2025. The two sides vowed to meet regularly with Malaysia, while fellow ASEAN Member States (AMS) will serve as observers.
The mediation process in Kuala Lumpur. Credit: Reuters Photo
In the coming days, Thailand is expected to tell the world that its military might had forced the Cambodians to stand down. Domestically, the Thai army will use this opportunity to strengthen its institution and remain politically assertive amid a growing call for reform, which, in Thailand’s context, means armed forces should stay out of politics.
For Cambodia, the narrative is likely to centre on how a small nation stood up to a neighbour, one that failed to diminish Cambodia’s fighting spirit despite its superior firepower. Cambodia will use this crisis to solidify Prime Minister Hun Manet’s nationalist credentials. But given Cambodians’ restlessness due to economic downturn, this will not be easy.
The transition of power from strongman Hun Sen to his son, Manet, has been difficult, as the young leader has yet to convince his countrymen that he can lead them to a better future.
After leading Cambodia for four decades, his father left him with big shoes to fill. The world watched Hun Sen as he went through wars and genocide, emerging politically powerful and financially wealthy. The same cannot be said for Cambodia’s people, who are currently struggling to make ends meet.
Ordinary Cambodians are frustrated with the current conditions, but they are without outlets to voice their complaints. Indeed, the Hun family members control all media platforms, both online and offline. The National Assembly has 125 seats with Hun Sen as the president of the ruling Cambodia People’s Party; five seats are occupied by friendly oppositions.
Cambodia is turning to Vietnam and China while shutting down economic ties with Thailand. Whether this will offset the loss of income from one million Cambodian migrant workers who depend on Thailand for employment, on the other hand, remains to be seen.
The Pheu Thai-led government had initially clashed with the army over how to handle border affairs with Cambodia—specifically whether to close checkpoints as punishment or keep them open while pursuing diplomatic solutions. However, the Pheu Thai Party-led administration has been effectively sidelined after Hun Sen leaked the phone conversation, forcing the government to run for cover.
Following a petition from a group of senators, the Constitutional Court on 1 July 2025 suspended Paetongtarn from her post pending an ethics investigation. Since then, the Thai government has been on the defensive as the public calls for either a fresh election or the prime minister’s resignation.
Few expect the government to survive beyond the first quarter of next year. The army, since then, has been pretty much calling the shots on the border affairs.
It is not clear why Hun Sen chose to turn on the Shinawatra, a long-time family friend. Many theories have been floated, but the one that made the most sense was Thaksin’s refusal to push through the offshore gas deal in the Gulf of Thailand.
The 27,000-square-km of gas-rich area is claimed by both countries. Talk of a win-win arrangement between the two governments kicked off a storm of criticism in Thailand against the Shinawatra family, whom the public accused of standing to gain from the deal. According to one estimate, the disputed area is believed to hold at least US$300bn worth of reserves.
The clashes that erupted last Thursday claimed the lives of more than 38 people on both sides and displaced more than 300,000. In Kuala Lumpur, the two leaders agreed to meet regularly, starting with their regional military commanders. They also agreed on direct communications between the leaders and their defence ministers.
But there is nothing really new about this, as the two countries have gone through this before. The solution to the border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia may not necessarily lie in the bilateral mechanism but in the internal politics of Thailand and Cambodia. Considering the internal crisis that the two countries are going through, mustering the needed political courage to make peace with one another may not be high on the agenda of either country.
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Explosive Ordnance Disposal officers neutralising bombs in Phuket.
IEDs in Tourist Destinations
Actions speak louder than words. In Thailand’s southernmost border provinces, where a two-decade separatist insurgency has claimed over 7,700 lives, the dominant rebel group, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), keeps its intentions shrouded in mystery.
Such tactics have irritated the Thai security apparatus ever since this wave of insurgency returned to the Malay-speaking South over two decades ago. It will continue to be that way as long as the Thai state and other stakeholders, such as Malaysia, do not support BRN in setting up a recognisable and functional political wing that can engage and explain its stance to the world.
The unearthing of 11 improvised explosive devices (IED) in Krabi and Phuket – two of Thailand’s top destinations on the Andaman coast – sent a shockwave in all directions. This is despite efforts by policymakers in Bangkok to minimise the incident by not linking it to the insurgency in the far south.
The two suspects caught at a police checkpoint in Phang-nga are from Pattani. Their confessions led police to more hidden bombs: one in an abandoned motorcycle near Phuket International Airport, two buried at Patong Beach and one at Promthep Cape.
The Australian and Canadian governments, on 1 July and 4 July 2025, respectively, issued separate updated terrorism warnings to their citizens travelling to Thailand in response to the arrests of two suspects.
One of the two IEDs found in Krabi was planted on a seawall at Ao Nang Beach near the commercial area; the second was discovered beneath a banyan tree at Noppharat Thara Beach.
All IEDs were deactivated by explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) officers using high-power water cannons.
The then Defence Minister Phutham Wechayachai was reluctant to link the IEDs to the conflict in the far south and urged reporters to exercise caution in their coverage to avoid possible chaos. Security officials at the operational level, however, said the bomb circuits and design suggested BRN involvement.
Policymakers and security officials agreed that the bomb size – which, according to one military intelligence officer, had an explosive radius of about 10 metres – was designed to create psychological impact and discredit the state security apparatus rather than take lives or inflict major physical damage.
The two suspects, while providing information leading to the locations of other IEDs, claimed they were merely hired to drive the vehicle, according to media reports quoting unnamed official sources.
True to form, BRN neither confirms nor denies its involvement, though during military operations its negotiators occasionally issue statements or videos reiterating demands. Insights into the group’s mindset emerged when chief negotiator Anas Abdulrahman spoke to the media briefly after high-level talks with Thai negotiators.
Faltering Peace Process
BRN made no public statement about the IEDs but indicated that in the absence of a formal peace process, increased violence intensity and attacks outside historically contested areas are inevitable. The attack against the Sungai Kolok district office exemplified this, occurring after secret negotiations over a Ramadhan ceasefire were exhausted, setting the stage for combatant intervention.
The last such press conference followed a February 2024 meeting, where both sides agreed in principle to work on the roadmap for the talks—the Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace (JCPP). Since then, BRN has largely stayed out of the public eye, with sporadic video statements offering only fragmented glimpses into the movement and its demands.
The peace process began unravelling soon after the February meeting when Prof Surachart Bamrungsuk, a key advisor to the ruling Pheu Thai Party, publicly criticised the JCPP.
He slammed the Peace Dialogue Panel for failing to curb BRN violence and accused international mediators and donors of neglecting Thailand’s national security. The Panel was badly isolated, and it may not recover, as hardliners pushed through uncompromising recommendations, like classifying BRN as a “terrorist” organisation as a way to pressure Malaysia – the designated mediator/facilitator – to deport the movement’s leaders.
In the second half of 2024, the Thai government was in disarray after the Constitutional Court ousted Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin for ethics violations in a cabinet appointment. The cabinet’s dissolution left the Peace Dialogue Panel obsolete—a status that persists today, as no new team has been appointed.
Incoming Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra inherited the southern Thai crisis. Unwilling to burden the political novice, senior officials in the security sector pushed the agenda way down in the list.
Bangkok now insists it will only resume talks if the BRN halts violence—a demand the rebels reject, arguing that de-escalation or ceasefire must be negotiated and that international observers must be allowed to monitor any ceasefire on the ground.
Thailand’s refusal to compromise frustrated Malaysia, the designated mediator for the so-called peace process, Dato Mohd Rabin Basir, the facilitator who has been trying to reached out to the army for serious discussion on how to move the peace process forward. But he would come to learn that the lack of political will applies to everybody in the Thai government, not just the army.
Escalating Violence
Paetongtarn’s political inexperience was exposed last month when Cambodian strongman Hun Sen leaked a recording of her criticising Thailand’s military over the border standoff with Cambodia. The scandal damaged both her credibility and the Shinawatra family’s political standing.
Some observers say this could be the beginning of the end of the family that has been dominating Thai politics for more than two decades.
Meanwhile, violence in the Deep South has escalated over the past six years, with a sharp uptick in March 2025 after Thailand rejected BRN’s counter-proposal for Ramadhan ceasefire. Talks collapsed, and the rebels launched a bold assault on Sungai Kolok’s district office in Narathiwat on 8 March 2025, killing two security personnel and wounding 10 before detonating a car bomb.
These locally hired security officials, known as Defence Volunteers, have been told to quit their jobs and to refrain from acting as spies for the Thai security apparatus, or else they would be considered legitimate targets.
The shooting death of a senior member in the BRN military wing, Abdulroning Lateh, on 18 April 2025, triggered further retaliation, including attacks on monks and civilians—a breach of the group’s usual rules of engagement.
The incident prompted a wide range of condemnation from civil society organisations and direct intervention from The Patani, a political action group who called on the BRN leadership to respect the commitment they made with members of the international community and to respect humanitarian principles, international norms, and civility.
BRN later reaffirmed its policy of avoiding civilian targets in a press statement but made no reference to any particular incident. The message, aimed at reining in fighters, eventually restored attacks to “legitimate” military and government targets.
Conflict and Political Crisis
Combatants stepping out of line and violating their own rules of engagement is uncommon but does occur, as seen in the targeting of soft targets to avenge Abdulroning’s assassination.
Operations outside the Malay-speaking South have also occurred periodically, usually as a retaliation against Thai security forces for alleged violation of the unwritten ground rule. In August 2019, for example, Bangkok was hit by six small bombs as the city hosted meetings of Southeast Asian foreign ministers and their counterparts from the United States, China, Japan, the European Union, and other world powers.
In August 2016, 13 bombing incidents struck Hua Hin and four upper Southern provinces – Phuket, Surat Thani, Trang, and Phang-nga – in a 48-hour span in what then-prime minister Prayut Chan-ocha called “an attempt to create chaos and confusion.”
Today, Thailand has once again found itself in a political crisis, with the Constitutional Court on 1 July 2025 suspending Prime Minister Paetongtarn pending an investigation into her conduct over the phone conversation with Hun Sen. The Pheu Thai party is also under pressure from the opposition and the public to call fresh elections or face a vote of no confidence.
Peace talks are expected to resume if and when the People’s Party (PP) takes control of the government. The party has shown willingness to accommodate the demands of BRN and the Malay-speaking region. How far PP is willing to go, on the other hand, remains to be seen.
But if the current coalition survives the ongoing political storm, violence in the far south will continue to rise, as neither side is willing to reconsider their current course of action.
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