NIKKEI ASIAN REVIEW: Thai military and insurgents change tack in southern provinces

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August 15, 2016 12:30 am JST

Thai military and insurgents change tack in southern provinces

DON PATHAN, Contributing writer

A lightly armored pickup truck transporting five Defense Volunteers and two local officials was hit by a roadside bomb on Aug. 3 in Southern Thailand, after the group met with local villagers to encourage them to vote "yes" in the Aug. 7 referendum on the constitution. © Wartani News

SI SAKHON, NARATHIWAT, Thailand -- Even as fingers are pointed at southern separatists as among possible suspects behind a string of bombing and arson attacks on Aug. 11 and 12 in southern Thailand, the Thai military is shifting strategy on countering the 12-year old insurgency. By October, the Thai army will reduce its presence in the historically contested southernmost provinces, in favor of outsourcing security responsibilities to volunteers and officials at the village level.

Village chiefs, provincial governors, district chiefs and paramilitary Defense Volunteers, who normally take their orders from the Thai interior ministry, are being assigned more onerous security duties. These include patrolling violence-prone areas alongside regular army soldiers and paramilitary Rangers. The concept -- known as the Tung Yang Daeng model, after a district in Pattani province where it was introduced -- is to put the volunteers rather than regular soldiers in the line of fire of insurgents. In the past, the rebels have shown that they prefer to leave local people alone.

Thai army and police officials said that these village volunteers are often relatives of the insurgents in this restive region, where 90% of the 2 million population see themselves as ethnic Malay Muslims.

Up to now, village chiefs, their deputies and the Defense Volunteers have been largely unchallenged by the insurgents as long as they do not engage in intelligence-gathering activities for the government forces.

The Fourth Army Area command, which is responsible for security in the region, has also taken a more hands-off stance toward village officials, allowing them to carry out routine administrative tasks such as registering births and deaths. The officials are lightly armed and are not expected to do much more than defend themselves if required.

But all that could change with the shift of local volunteer forces to the frontline. Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha recently set a deadline for troops from Thailand's central, north, and northeast commands to withdraw from the region by October after being posted there since 2007. The withdrawal of non-local troops has been considered for some years, but a decision was finally reached in November 2014, six months after the coup that brought Prayuth to power.

At the time, Lt. General Prakarn Chonlayut, then commander of the Fourth Army Area, announced that local militia would replace the outgoing conscript troops. Citing the drop in insurgency incidents, Prakarn said the situation was improving and that it was time to scale back the central government's military presence. He explained that "locals are the ones who know the area best."

Some experts doubt that the region -- and the local volunteers -- are ready to shoulder the brunt of the counterinsurgency campaign. "The government's assertion that they can do this now because violence is down is a misnomer. If you look at the monthly rate of violence, the insurgents can ratchet it up at will," said Zachary Abuza, a professor at the National War College in Washington D.C., who has been monitoring the situation.

"There is a lot of concern about human rights violations by the Rangers. They are less disciplined and poorly trained; they think more about short-term tactical gains, than the long-term consequences of their actions," he added.

Bombings raise suspicion

Complicating the picture, the spate of 11 bombings and arson attacks in several Thai tourist resorts and southern towns on Aug. 11 and 12 has raised questions about whether the southern Thai insurgents are behind the attacks, for which no one has officially claimed responsibility.

The military-backed government has blamed the bombings on supporters of Thaksin Shinawatra, the populist former prime minister who was ousted by the army in 2006. The pro-Thaksin forces opposed the new constitution proposed by the government, which was approved in an Aug. 7 national referendum.

Thai security officials told the Nikkei Asian Review it was too early to rule out the Malay separatists. They explained that the pro-Thaksin camp has virtually no presence in southern Thailand, where most of the recent bombings occurred, and the bombs used in the attacks "looked too much like the ones used by the insurgents in the far south." On Aug. 13, a Buddhist man from Chiang Mai was arrested and questioned about a possible connection to the bombings, adding to suspicions of a possible connection to the pro-Thaksin "red shirt" movement. A Buddhist suspect would conveniently support the government's narrative, while if a Malay Muslim was implicated, it would highlight the military's failure in the southern provinces.

An officer from the Barisan Revolusi Nasional, the dominant separatist group in the south, told the NAR that the drop in insurgency activity was mostly due to a change in the movement's strategy. The BRN controls more than 90% of the rebel combatants, according to Thai military intelligence officers. The BRN officer denied that the expansion of the army's security network, using ranger units, was the prime reason for the change. The officer added that he had no knowledge whether his movement was involved in the Aug. 11 and 12 terrorist attacks.

The conflict in recent months has fallen into a pattern of strikes and retaliatory attacks between the insurgents and security forces. "There are costs to employing violence -- getting caught, limited manpower, limited resources, loss of local support. But [the BRN insurgents] have proven they can still strike at will. For example, the military stepped up security across the south in the week ahead of the [constitutional] referendum. Violence surged nonetheless," Abuza said.

For example, a powerful homemade bomb attached to a parked motorcycle ripped through a lightly armored pickup truck carrying five Defense Volunteers and two senior provincial officials on Aug. 3. All seven survived, although a bystander was injured by shrapnel.

The group had just left a Volunteer camp where the members had met local villagers in efforts to convince them to vote in favor of the new constitution. An overwhelming majority in the region voted against the proposed charter on Aug. 7.

Among other small bomb attacks in the lead up to the referendum, on the night before the vote, telephone poles in nearby districts were bombed, causing temporary power outages across Narathiwat province.

BRN officials told the NAR that these attacks were a way of rejecting Thai sovereignty over the southern provinces. "Besides undermining Thailand's security apparatus, it was also an opportunity to demonstrate their capabilities," said one BRN operative. But the local population has indicated growing opposition to the violence and has pressed the armed groups to change their tactics.

In particular, many Muslims have spoken out against attacks on soft targets, including religious sites, schools, teachers and Buddhist monks.

Violence peaked in 2007 when there were 1,850 insurgency-related violent incidents, according to the researchers at Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani. That year also saw 164 schools targeted in arson attacks.

Since then, as an apparent result of public pressure, the number of incidents fell to 821 in 2008, with only 10 schools subjected to fire-bombings. The BRN officer admitted in an interview with the NAR that public pressure was one reason for the reduction in attacks, particularly against "soft" targets such as schools and markets. Even so, a string of bombings in May 2015 saw nearly 40 small bombs detonated in Yala, although no one was killed. The aim, according to another BRN member, was to demonstrate the group's capabilities and discredit the military.

Earlier in the long-running insurgency, the rebels resorted to beheading and castrating dead soldiers to "demoralize the local commanders and their units, especially those who had just been assigned to the region," said a BRN officer. But Muslim clerics have since ruled that this practice is out of line with Sharia law.

"Islam gives Muslims the right to fight their enemies but the juwae (fighter) has no right to mutilate their bodies after killing them," said one village imam, or religious leader.

Acknowledging the ability of local people to influence the insurgents, the government has attempted to find ways to use them to counter the separatists. In the first decade of the conflict, many local residents were employed as government clerks and assistants for the 60,000-strong security force in the region.

Outsourcing conflict

The big question behind the army's new thinking is whether the switch to outsource security responsibilities to villagers will work.

The army has encouraged local Muslims to join the Rangers, hoping they will serve as links between the security forces and the local community. The idea makes strategic sense for the Thai state but looks much less effective on the ground. Similar government thinking lies behind the creation of the Defense Volunteers Corps, which initially seemed to be a successful tactic, reducing the level of conflict.

But there are costs for social cohesion in local communities in this strategy. A Muslim Ranger manning an M60 machinegun in Si Sakhon district told the NAR that his decision to join the Rangers has turned him into a marked man who must take security precautions whenever he leaves the military camp. People from his village said he had "crossed the line" by joining the Rangers.

Indeed, the insurgents have shown their willingness to attack the local volunteer units if necessary, with 12 village headmen and 10 Defense Volunteers, most of them Muslims, killed in 2015, according to Abuza. So far this year, another seven headmen and seven Defense Volunteers have been killed. "So the cost of collaborating with the Thai government is not academic," he added.

Last July, the BRN attacked a Defense Volunteer camp for the first time. The assault, on a camp in Yala Province, was carried out by about 30 militants using machine guns and M79 grenades. BRN representatives told the NAR that no one was killed because the aim was to send a "stern warning" to local people who might take up arms against the insurgents. That warning was ignored by the Volunteers, a key factor no doubt in the Aug. 3 attack on their pickup truck.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based associate with Asia Conflict and Security Consulting.

http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Thai-military-and-insurgents-change-tack-in-southern-provinces

Decades-long identity crisis fuels insurgency in Thailand

Insurgents in Thailand’s far South launched 30 attacks that claimed 16 lives and wounded 24 people during the holy month of Ramadan, including a car-bomb this week that set off an enormous flame that took down an entire joint police-military outpost on the main southern highway. This is the latest in a 12-year wave of ongoing insurgency violence being launched by separatists determined to carve out a separate homeland for the ethnic Malay Muslims in this historically contested region. Here, DON PATHAN traces the peace initiatives to bring about a peaceful end to this ongoing conflict that so far claimed over 6,500 lives since January 2004.


After Ms Duangsuda Srangamphai’s father and grandfather were killed by insurgents in restive southern Thailand in 2004 and 2007, she channelled her rage and sorrow into providing moral support for families of other victims of the long-running violence. “By helping others, I help myself. It’s a healing process,” she said.

For the past decade, the Buddhist activist has crossed religious and ethnic lines by working with Muslim women to help others.

The group would visit victims and provide moral support and counselling, as well as assisting the family with ways to improve their livelihood. It is something, but it is not enough. Peace, she believes, is the only solution.

Yet peace continues to elude this region that is closer to Singapore than Bangkok. In the past 12 years, more than 6,500 people have been killed as the region fights for local autonomy from Buddhist-dominated Thailand.

Peace talks between the Bangkok government and Patani Malay separatist movements in the four southernmost border provinces of Thailand have started and fallen apart at least three times this past decade, with insurgents hobbled by infighting and Bangkok distracted by its own central power struggles and coups.

Armed insurrection surfaced in the early 1960s and subsided in the early 1990s after the armed wing ran out of steam. The current wave of insurgency resurfaced in late 2001, starting with sporadic attacks once every four months or so until January 2004. Since then, attacks have become somewhat of a daily occurrence in these provinces that are home to almost two million Thai Malay Muslims.

In April, peace talks stalled again after rebel groups refused to soften their demands over recognition, and Bangkok, in turn, refused to even officially recognise the rebels. Instead, the government is directly wooing villagers and sending in the army to curb the insurgents’ activities. That pushes any hope of peace even further into the future.

“The talk between the two sides is inevitable, but for the time being the government wants to focus their resources on strictly military operations. The aim here is to prevent the separatists from expanding their membership and support base,” said Prince of Songkla University’s Srisompob Jitspiromsri, director of Deep South Watch, a centre that monitors violence in the region.

The government also wants to use this period to deal directly with the villagers, the support base of the insurgents, to counter the insurgents’ separatist ideology and narrative, said Dr Srisompob.

A LONG TIME COMING

In 1786, Siam defeated the Sultanate of Patani and turned this Malay-speaking region into a tributary state. The region was divided into seven chiefdoms ruled by a local sultan appointed by the Siamese in Ayutthaya. That changed at the turn of the century when King Rama V turned the seven chiefdoms into modern-day Thai provinces and replaced the sultans with governors sent from Bangkok.

An armed insurgency surfaced in the early 1960s in response to Thailand’s policy of assimilation.

That includes a ban on the use of minority languages in government offices, the requirement that everybody uses Thai names, and legislation that placed the pondoks (traditional Islamic religious schools) under the government’s education system. It also permits the government to dictate the curriculum of these pondoks.

The narrative and the identity that the state had constructed were flexible enough for all the people of this multicultural nation to call themselves “Thai”, as long as he or she does not question this notion.

But this was something the Malays of Patani had done, as they felt the Thai state policy was at the expense of their ethno-religious identity.

To be sure, Thailand’s nation-state construct also took its toll on the Chinese community. During World War II, Chinese language schools in Thailand were banned but spiked immediately after the war. However, it was not until 1992 that total restrictions were lifted on Chinese language schools as Thai policymakers were looking to attract Chinese-speaking investors from abroad.

The Thai Chinese, however, have the economic clout to negotiate their cultural space with the Thai state. The same could not be said about the Malays who took on a more symbolic gesture to resist assimilation. For example, while the Chinese and other minorities took up Thai names, the Malays of Patani refused to do so. Maintaining one’s distinctive cultural identity was their way of resisting the policy. In the early 1960s, such resistance translated into armed insurrection.

Where the local Chinese — descended from merchants — have found a comfort level with Malays, the Thai state failed miserably. Mistrust between the Malays and the Thai state has persisted throughout the decades, allowing a generation of insurgents to operate freely on the ground as they and the local Muslims share the same historical mistrust of the government.

Today, 90 per cent of the population in Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani and Songhkla are ethnic Malays. The region is Thailand’s least developed, but development is not the cause of the conflict.

Ethnic Chinese continue to control the local economy and the chamber of commerce. The mayors of the municipality of the three provincial seats — Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat — in the region are also ethnic Chinese. Both sides continue to respect each other’s turf and social practices. Property prices, meanwhile, continue to climb in spite of the violence.

In the past, the Thai military preferred a more understated approach to seeking a peace solution: Secret meetings away from the public spotlight.

But all that changed on February 28, 2013 when the government of Yingluck Shinawatra announced to the world that Thailand was entering a political negotiation with Patani Malay separatist movements.

A signing ceremony took place in Kuala Lumpur, as Malaysia was the designated facilitator for the talks. An exiled figure from the most powerful rebel group, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), Mr Hasan Taib was designated as the “liaison”. His job was to convince the BRN movement, namely the ruling council, to come to the negotiating table.

But within a year, it became clear that Mr Hasan was not able to convince BRN elders to give this peace initiative a chance. Mr Hasan quit.

Yet even as this high-profile failure played out, Yingluck’s government continued to hold secret meetings — its Plan B — with other members of the separatist movement. The idea was to eventually bring them onto the official track.

Before that transition could take place, Thailand went through another round of massive street protests, leading to the May 2014 coup which overthrew the Yingluck government. It was another seven months before the new junta government announced that talks would continue and Kuala Lumpur would continue to be the designated facilitator.

WHAT’S IN A NAME

In August 2015, the six organisations which were part of the Plan B came together and went public. They called themselves MARA Patani. They demanded that the Thai government recognise them officially, which would mean legal immunity for their negotiators.

They also demanded that the peace process be designated as a national agenda, which would require an endorsement from Parliament to ensure continuity with future governments of Thailand. MARA Patani deemed the parliamentary endorsement necessary because in the past every peace initiative ended with a change of government in Bangkok, and each new administration would start talks from scratch with a whole new team of negotiators who the government of the day trusted. MARA Patani also said if these demands were not met, there would be no negotiation.

What is not clear is their agenda. But the extent of their dialogue with the Thai officials suggested that the umbrella organisation is prepared to settle for something less than independence. BRN, after abandoning Mr Hasan and the Yingluck government’s initiative, continues to stay out of the public spotlight. In interviews, BRN operatives on the ground and in exile said the secretive ruling council has yet to agree on whether it would settle for something less than a complete break away from Thailand. But the organisation, which Thai security officials believe control over 90 per cent of the combatants on the ground, would be willing to receive technical training from foreign governments to strengthen its organisational capacity so that it can communicate more effectively with the international community and the Thai state. Like any other nationalist movement, it wants to be accepted as a legitimate organisation.

For MARA Patani, from August 2015, when it was officially launched, until April 2016, a series of meetings between the umbrella organisation and Thai negotiators were held to draft a Term of Reference (TOR) for the talks.

But when it came to signing the TOR, the Thai government balked.

Pressed for answers by local media, Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha said his government was not able to recognise MARA Patani in any capacity because they are associated with criminals — armed combatants on the ground. He described the peace initiative as a burden unfairly imposed by the previous government upon his.

Clearly, the conflict in Thailand’s far South was not Mr Prayuth’s priority.

“In the eyes of Bangkok, these groups (MARA Patani) are nothing more than rebels and criminals,” said Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) senior researcher of Thailand, Sunai Phasuk, one of the junta’s fiercest critics.

“Thailand’s ruling junta shows disregard of the root causes of ethnic Malay Muslim’s grievances that drive insurgency, including their call for decentralisation and self-determination.”

Mr Suhaimee Dulasa, director of international relations at The Patani Institute, a local political think tank, said he was perplexed with Mr Prayuth’s statement because it was the prime minister himself who agreed to set up the government negotiation team for talks with MARA Patani.

“I believe the problem was also in the name — Patani — because, connotatively, it’s in reference to the Malays’ historical homeland,” said Mr Suhaimee.

“The Thai state has never wanted to give the Malays of Patani any sense of ownership of their region.”

BRN sources said the junta is only concerned with bringing down the number of incidents to show the public that the government is moving in the right direction. They said the junta never talked about the root cause of the conflict.

Other political insiders said the junta pulled the plug on this initiative because they are convinced that it is BRN, not MARA Patani, that controls the vast majority of insurgents on the ground.

Once, when the Thai Army called MARA Patani’s bluff and demanded that they declare Chao Airong, one of the districts in Narathiwat province, a “safety zone”. In other words, the government needed a verification that they are talking to the people who can order the insurgents to carry out a unilateral ceasefire — or “safety zone”, as Thai officials would call it — in the designated district. MARA Patani could not.

A CHANGING WORLD

For the Patani Malay separatists, part of the problem is that the world outside Thailand has changed. Most if not all of their old network of international supporters — Libya, Syria, and other rich Arab gulf countries — no longer have the resources or inclination to fund or train anybody.

In the 1980s, about 3,000 Patani Malays had trained in Libya alongside other so-called revolutionaries from other countries. During the 1990s, the lull before the storm, the government of Chuan Leekpai convinced the Arab countries to stop supporting the Patani Malays separatists.

Moreover, in 1998, with the help of Muslim countries in Asean, Thailand was granted a Permanent Observer Status in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. It was a seal of approval from the Islamic world, a signal of satisfaction with how Thailand treats its Muslim minority.

But while Bangkok was busy with its diplomatic assault to deny foreign support to the insurgents, a new generation of militants was being groomed. Local Malay Muslim villagers who share the same sentiment and mistrust of the Thai state agencies began supplying combatants with money and logistical support. Thai officials monitoring the conflict said money from the Middle East continues to find its way to the Patani Malay separatist movements but not in the same open manner as the 1980s.

One thing that the Army had going for them, at least until February this year, was the fact that the past two years saw an overall decline of insurgency incidents in the region.

Statistics compiled by the Prince of Songkhla University’s Deep South Watch showed that since July 2014, the number of overall incidents has dropped considerably, averaging below 60 incidents a month — down from the peak of 300-400 a month.

Part of the reason is improved intelligence by the Thai authorities, as well as an expansion of security grid with setting up more military outposts in remote areas and villages. Insurgents, too, have shifted tactics, putting their energies to bigger attacks on public facilities and security patrols, rather than smaller disturbances.

Then in February, the violence escalated again, along with more daring attacks in the form of roadside ambush and one massive car-bomb that wounded seven police officers and two civilians.

On March 13, about 35 insurgents took over a hospital in Narathiwat’s Cho Airong district and used it to stage an attack on a Paramilitary Ranger camp next to it. The district was about to be declared a “safety zone” but the BRN and the insurgents on the ground were not about to let the MARA Patani or the Thai government have something to show for allow the half-baked peace process.

The violence continues with no end in sight. The number of violent incidents jumped to 66 in February and 74 in March 2016. Bangkok is still seeking ways to bring down the number. BRN sources said they are aware that Thai government wants to talk directly with them but maintained that they are not in a hurry to come to the table.

“The so-called peace strategy ends up being led by military operations and political pressure aiming to get ethnic Malay Muslims to surrender — including by offering ceasefire — not to build trust and confidence for genuine dialogue for long term and sustainable peace,” said HRW’s Mr Sunai.

For Ms Duangsuda, praying for peace, it means her work is not yet done.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Don Pathan is an associate with the Asia Conflict and Security Consulting Ltd. (http://www.acasconsulting.com) and a founding member of Patani Forum (http://www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organisation dedicated to promoting critical discussion on the nature of the conflict in Thailand’s far South.

http://www.todayonline.com/world/decades-long-identity-crisis-fuels-insurgency-thailand

Two more hammer blows to a HALF-COCKED peace process

BANGKOK’S RELUCTANCE TO GRANT LEGITIMACY TO ITS DIALOGUE PARTNERS IN THE FAR SOUTH HAS CLOSED OFF THE POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS IN TALKS

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

Confused signals from Bangkok have brought two setbacks for the deep South peace process that would never have happened if policymakers had taken a more progressive attitude towards the Malay-speaking region from the start.

The first setback was the dismissal of Lt-General Nakrob Boonbuakarn, the secretary-general of the so-called Dialogue Panel of Thai negotiators in ongoing talks with MARA Patani, an umbrella group of Patani Malay separatist organisations.

Nakrob was accused by his Bangkok overseers of stepping beyond his mandate, which was never clearly defined in the first place. Junta leaders are said to be concerned about their legacy in the far South, and don’t want to be seen as the ones who “gave away” the historically contested region.
The second setback was the government’s pressuring of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to refrain from mentioning MARA Patani in resolutions adopted at its recent summit in Turkey. Thailand succeeded in this quest, though some of the 57 OIC membernations insisted on referring to the ongoing peace dialogue.

In its summit communiqué the OIC urged Bangkok to “grant the group of representatives of the Muslim community in the South the required recognition and called upon the government to provide guarantee of safety in travelling to and from Thailand to members of the dialogue team and protection from detention and prosecution during their engagement in the peace process”.
Bangkok has always been concerned at MARA Patani receiving international recognition beyond that granted by appointing the Dialogue Panel to talk with the separatists.

Thailand’s policy is somewhat contradictory here, mixing a willingness to acknowledge and sit down for talks with MARA Patani with irritation every time the group seeks dialogue with others.
However, it is only natural that a nonstate actor such as MARA Patani would seek ways to enhance its legitimacy internationally and with the people of Patani, the historically contested region encompassing the southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and the four Malay-speaking districts of Songhla.

In December last year, OIC secretarygeneral Iyad Ameen Madani met with members of MARA Patani in Malaysia prior to coming to Thailand.

Bangkok expressed its disapproval of the meeting and blamed Kuala Lumpur for arranging it. But MARA Patani members were quick to point out it was their own initiative.

Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha stopped the OIC chief in his tracks during their meeting in Bangkok, informing him that his concern was welcome but not his intervention.
The conflict in the far South has drifted on and off OIC’s radar screen for decades. In 2010, then OIC secretarygeneral Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu secretly met with leaders of longstanding Patani separatist organisations in Saudi Arabia.

He urged them to forge a political front – the United Patani People Council (UPPC) – while the OIC vowed to help facilitate a dialogue process with the Thai government.

Once the front was formed, a regional assembly called the Patani People Congress (PCC) was to be next in the pipeline. The purpose of the PCC was to provide the needed legitimacy for the UPPC.
But the government of Abhisit Vejjajiva refused to go along with the plan, halting the OIC initiative.
Patani was mentioned again in the 2012 OIC foreign ministers meeting, where the 57-member organisation expressed concern at “meagre progress” made on the 2007 joint statement between the two sides. The OIC also expressed dismay at the “continued application of the emergency law in most southern areas and the limited progress in introducing [the local Malayu] language … as a language of instruction in the schools of the South”.

The OIC also criticised the “continued extensive military presence of armed forces throughout the southern border provinces and its negative impacts on the population’s normal life”, as well as “the mounting reliance on undisciplined paramilitary militias accused of committing illegal acts, [with their] consequences of increasing ethnic and religious polarisation”.

The 2007 joint statement, inked with the government of Surayud Chulanont, has become the OIC’s reference point for measuring Thailand’s commitment to peace in the far South. The statement was somewhat bold, making references to the disappearance of Somchai Neelaphaijit, the Krue Se standoff and the Tak Bai massacre, plus more general issues of human rights violations and the culture of impunity among Thai security forces.

But Bangkok’s bold bid for peace didn’t last beyond the tenure of Surayud’s military administration. No government since then has had the courage to make peace with the Malays of Patani, not even that of Yingluck Shinawatra, whose clumsily put-together dialogue constituted something between a hoax and a huge leap of faith.

For fear of being perceived as antipeace, the current ruling junta decided to resurrect that so-called peace process. That decision helps explain their footdragging now and their unwillingness to make concessions necessary to progress.

Lt-General Nakrob, who was part of the Yingluck initiative and stayed aboard after the May 2014 coup, was forced to operate in a confusing environment.
Nakrob was caught between MARA Patani separatists desperate to shore up their own legitimacy and international standing, and a junta in Bangkok whose unwillingness to make concessions extends to refusing to call their dialogue partners by name.

Nakrob was set an impossibly broad task – as secretary- general for the Dialogue Panel, spokesman for the initiative, and head of the technical team mapping out the terms of reference for the talks.
He backed the involvement of the separatist umbrella group even before it became MARA Patani. Back then the separatists were engaged as “Plan B” for the original Yingluck peace process that had Hasan Taib at the negotiating table.

And when Hasan threw in the towel, Plan B became Party B.

Nakrob was working in an environment where progress was held hostage by stakeholders unwilling to make concessions.

Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the longstanding separatist group that controls the vast majority of separatist combatants, says it will not come to the table until properly prepared and ready.
BRN also says Bangkok is only interested cutting the number of violent incidents for domestic consumption, not in addressing the root cause of the conflict.
The government refuses to address the roots of historical grievances in the South since that would mean having to make concessions.

For independent observers of the conflict, signals coming from the junta seem confusing: Nakrob and the Dialogue Panel are mandated to meet MARA Patani but are not permitted to utter the name “MARA Patani” because the generals don’t want to lend the separatists legitimacy.

Meanwhile government sources report that the top brass in Bangkok has yet to be convinced that MARA Patani has command and control over the militants in the deep South.

BRN says it is not prepared to come to the table and adds that the OIC is just one more international organisation out there looking to gain entry to the peace process in their historical homeland.
The question is, whether Bangkok is willing to entertain the idea of allowing foreign entities to get involved with peace initiatives in the southernmost provinces.

DON PATHAN is an independent security consultant based in Thailand. He is also the founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).

The moment a peace process was exposed as futile?

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

Separatists at the table have just denied involvement in violence - further evidence they have no control over the combatants

MARA Patani is stuck between the devil and the deep blue sea.

The umbrella organisation of six longstanding Patani Malay separatist movements is facing its moment of truth.

Are they or are they not involved in the recent spike in separatist violence in the far South, particularly the operation in which a Narathiwat hospital was used as a staging post for an attack on the Paramilitary Ranger unit next door?

Answering yes could have legal ramifications that complicate ongoing peace negotiations with the Thai government. It would also suggest a violation of international humanitarian norms amid efforts by the umbrella organisation to gain legitimacy from the international community.

The Malaysian government is facilitating the latest peace talks and has posted its former spy chief to oversee a poorly thought-out initiative that's being driven by its Special Branch.

If, on the other hand, MARA Patani were to deny involvement in the violence, their status as partners in the talks would automatically be rendered irrelevant. Why, after all, should Bangkok be speaking to people who are not involved with the insurgency's combatants?

After a barrage of criticism from local and international human rights organisations and the Bangkok government over the invasion of the hospital, MARA Patani decided to play it safe and deny any involvement.That prompted Thai security officers to ponder out loud the merits of dealing with an organisation that appeared to have no command and control over the militants.

Bangkok's longstanding practice in dealing with the Patani Malay separatists has always been to use either the envelope (bribe money) or the bullet.

But unlike the previous wave of insurgency that surfaced in the mid-1960s and subsided in the late 1980s, this time around the men with command-and-control are not interested in talking, leaving the negotiations to figures whose influence waned decades ago.

The half-baked peace initiative was launched under Yingluck Shinawatra's government in February 2013. A so-called Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) leader, Hasan Taib, was hastily placed at the centre of the negotiations without anyone questioning what role or influence, if any, he had in the militant separatist leadership.

The Thai and Malaysian security officials involved knew that Yingluck's initiative was doomed from the start because they didn't have the right people.

As a backup, the so-called Track 1.5 quietly came into being as the official Track 1 with Hasan Taib at the helm died a natural death.

That death was hastened by the concerted efforts of a Thai military that was not part of the inception or planning of the peace initiative cooked up by Yingluck and her fugitive brother Thaksin.

But then came the May 2014 coup and with it the question of what to do with this hot potato. Junta chief General Prayut Chan-o-cha had seven months to think about it - the time between the coup and his December 2014 visit to Kuala Lumpur.

During the visit, Prayut announced that Malaysia would continue to facilitate the peace dialogue though conditions would be added. The separatists would have to develop a common platform and then demonstrate they had command-and-control over the militants.

One thing the junta had going for them was that the overall number of insurgent attacks had dropped dramatically.

For those invested in the peace dialogue, the drop in violence was proof of the talks' traction. But separatist sources and other close observers insisted that the lull meant nothing, pointing out that as long as the insurgents still existed, the state hadn't won.

Now, with the return of almost daily violence to this historically contested region, notions of a link between the peace talks and the insurgency have been shattered.

Separatist sources said a car bomb planted just two days before a Pattani seminar on the peace talks was a stern warning to participants that the conflict is far from over. Foreign participants were forced to cancel their trip to the event.

And then came the operation in Cho Ai Rong, Narathiwat, which signalled a moment of truth for many stakeholders. The hospital raid was a slap in the face for the peace initiative's much-vaunted "safety zone", where Bangkok was relying on MARA Patani to enforce a ceasefire. Cho Ai Rong was supposed to be among the five districts designated for the zone.

Separatist sources say last Friday's gun and grenade attack on a teashop full of Malay Muslim residents in Yala's Raman district was carried out either by a rogue unit or a pro-government death squad in retaliation for the spike. One villager was killed and four others suffered bullet wounds.

Meanwhile, the unprecedented nature of the Cho Ai Rong operation has shaken the Thai military to its foundations, demonstrating a capability and daring to undermine the entire security apparatus at will.

In the final analysis, however, Cho Ai Rong was not a military operation. It was a public relations exercise performed in front of hospital CCTV cameras and aimed at sapping Thai military will and morale. Needless to say, it succeeded in doing that - and much more besides.

Don Pathan is a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a Thailand-based security consultant.

Outrage over hospital raid reveals military hypocrisy

Insurgents are accused of violating humanitarian principles; meanwhile Thai security forces continue to place monks and children in line of fire

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

Sunday's raid by militant separatists on a Joh I Rong hospital in Narathiwat couldn't have come at a better time for the Thai side.

The incident has provided a much-needed pretext for the military to attack armed insurgents who continue to discredit the government's peace effort with MARA Patani, the umbrella organisation of six longstanding separatist organisations that the militants say does not represent them.

Bangkok is struggling to justify talks with MARA Patani whose lack of traction is being underscored by a spike in violence in the far South. The Thai side is also facing ill-feeling among the local community over a Bangkok court's decision to seize the 14-rai grounds of an Islamic boarding school, Jihad Withya pondok, in Pattani's Tambon Tha Dan, Yaring district, which was used as an insurgent training facility a decade ago.

The land belongs to the family of Abduloh Waemanor, a local cleric and suspected Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) member who fled the region back in 2005.

Thai military officers have quietly requested that the Waemanor family appeal the court's decision, but they refuse to do so, saying they are unable to come to terms with the state's action.

Some in the separatist movement are suggesting the decision not to appeal was a deliberate move to drive a bigger wedge between local Malay Muslims and the state. Judging from the reaction of local residents - an outpouring of support and sympathy - the alleged strategy appears to have worked.

The seizing of the Jihad Withya pondok - part of a venerable institution that forged the cradle of Islamic civilisation in Southeast Asia - reinforces a notion that the Thai state has never dealt fairly with the Malays of Patani.

The court decision sent shock waves through the region, serving as a warning of what the future could hold. Thai authorities see the pondoks as a hotbed for recruitment and indoctrination of the current generation of insurgents.

Local residents take a different view, pointing out that the Patani historical and cultural narrative is ingrained in their society, making it unfair to single out any institution.

The Thai side has made it clear that the raid on the Narathiwat hospital was a gross violation of humanitarian and international norms for which the militants should be condemned in the strongest terms.

This is not the first time that insurgents have targeted a medical facility, however. In May 2014, three people were seriously wounded when militant separatists detonated a bomb in the parking lot of Pattani's Khok Pho hospital, damaging at least 50 vehicles.

Yet the militants consider the Thai military's ongoing efforts to demonise them via references to humanitarian principles a case of the pot calling the kettle black. The security forces' underhand tactics in managing a decade or so of conflict in the Malay-speaking South are well documented, as is the culture of impunity among its personnel.

The Thai military has been criticised for positioning outposts in the grounds of temples and schools, thereby placing monks and students in line of fire. Such decisions not only violate international humanitarian norms, they are also made without consulting local residents.

Insurgent attacks against schools and temples were a regular occurrence a decade ago but now take place less frequently, and only as retaliation for instances in which the Thais are deemed to have "crossed the line" and/or violated unwritten rules of engagement.

Separatist sources say the scores of militants behind the recent attacks were aware that using the hospital as a staging point for an attack on Paramilitary Rangers was a violation of international norms. Accordingly, they made a concerted effort not to harm the people inside the hospital.

But they didn't foresee that the Thai side would "milk" the situation to such a degree, even rounding up local imams to carry out a "prayer for peace" at the hospital. Observers outside the region likely saw the prayer event as a slap in the face for the insurgents. But locals know that the clerics would have been under pressure to go with the flow or else risk being accused by the military of being uncooperative.

Claims by the authorities that a nurse was tied up were discredited by the nurse in question, who told reporters that while she was tied to her chair to prevent her from moving she quickly realised the insurgents weren't out to harm people in the hospital.

The vast majority of separatist militants operate under the BRN, whose leadership continues to keep a distance from the Kuala Lumpur-facilitated peace initiative between the Thai government and MARA Patani.

Although MARA Patani claims to have BRN members on board, militants and sources in the movement dismiss any suggestion that the movement's ruling council endorses the peace initiative.

The raid on the Paramilitary Ranger unit, which is situated next to the hospital, was part of an ongoing spike in violence after more than a year of relative quiet.

Don Pathan is a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a Thailand-based freelance security and development consultant.

Outrage over hospital raid reveals military hypocrisy

Insurgents are accused of violating humanitarian principles; meanwhile Thai security forces continue to place monks and children in line of fire

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

Sunday's raid by militant separatists on a Joh I Rong hospital in Narathiwat couldn't have come at a better time for the Thai side.

The incident has provided a much-needed pretext for the military to attack armed insurgents who continue to discredit the government's peace effort with MARA Patani, the umbrella organisation of six longstanding separatist organisations that the militants say does not represent them.

Bangkok is struggling to justify talks with MARA Patani whose lack of traction is being underscored by a spike in violence in the far South. The Thai side is also facing ill-feeling among the local community over a Bangkok court's decision to seize the 14-rai grounds of an Islamic boarding school, Jihad Withya pondok, in Pattani's Tambon Tha Dan, Yaring district, which was used as an insurgent training facility a decade ago.

The land belongs to the family of Abduloh Waemanor, a local cleric and suspected Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) member who fled the region back in 2005.

Thai military officers have quietly requested that the Waemanor family appeal the court's decision, but they refuse to do so, saying they are unable to come to terms with the state's action.

Some in the separatist movement are suggesting the decision not to appeal was a deliberate move to drive a bigger wedge between local Malay Muslims and the state. Judging from the reaction of local residents - an outpouring of support and sympathy - the alleged strategy appears to have worked.

The seizing of the Jihad Withya pondok - part of a venerable institution that forged the cradle of Islamic civilisation in Southeast Asia - reinforces a notion that the Thai state has never dealt fairly with the Malays of Patani.

The court decision sent shock waves through the region, serving as a warning of what the future could hold. Thai authorities see the pondoks as a hotbed for recruitment and indoctrination of the current generation of insurgents.

Local residents take a different view, pointing out that the Patani historical and cultural narrative is ingrained in their society, making it unfair to single out any institution.

The Thai side has made it clear that the raid on the Narathiwat hospital was a gross violation of humanitarian and international norms for which the militants should be condemned in the strongest terms.

This is not the first time that insurgents have targeted a medical facility, however. In May 2014, three people were seriously wounded when militant separatists detonated a bomb in the parking lot of Pattani's Khok Pho hospital, damaging at least 50 vehicles.

Yet the militants consider the Thai military's ongoing efforts to demonise them via references to humanitarian principles a case of the pot calling the kettle black. The security forces' underhand tactics in managing a decade or so of conflict in the Malay-speaking South are well documented, as is the culture of impunity among its personnel.

The Thai military has been criticised for positioning outposts in the grounds of temples and schools, thereby placing monks and students in line of fire. Such decisions not only violate international humanitarian norms, they are also made without consulting local residents.

Insurgent attacks against schools and temples were a regular occurrence a decade ago but now take place less frequently, and only as retaliation for instances in which the Thais are deemed to have "crossed the line" and/or violated unwritten rules of engagement.

Separatist sources say the scores of militants behind the recent attacks were aware that using the hospital as a staging point for an attack on Paramilitary Rangers was a violation of international norms. Accordingly, they made a concerted effort not to harm the people inside the hospital.

But they didn't foresee that the Thai side would "milk" the situation to such a degree, even rounding up local imams to carry out a "prayer for peace" at the hospital. Observers outside the region likely saw the prayer event as a slap in the face for the insurgents. But locals know that the clerics would have been under pressure to go with the flow or else risk being accused by the military of being uncooperative.

Claims by the authorities that a nurse was tied up were discredited by the nurse in question, who told reporters that while she was tied to her chair to prevent her from moving she quickly realised the insurgents weren't out to harm people in the hospital.

The vast majority of separatist militants operate under the BRN, whose leadership continues to keep a distance from the Kuala Lumpur-facilitated peace initiative between the Thai government and MARA Patani.

Although MARA Patani claims to have BRN members on board, militants and sources in the movement dismiss any suggestion that the movement's ruling council endorses the peace initiative.

The raid on the Paramilitary Ranger unit, which is situated next to the hospital, was part of an ongoing spike in violence after more than a year of relative quiet.

Don Pathan is a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com) and a Thailand-based freelance security and development consultant.

Bombs, bullets fly as ‘peace’ message fails to reach South

Upsurge in deadly violence suggests neither insurgents nor security officials are willing to put down their guns just yet

Don Pathan
Special to The Nation

Insurgent attacks this past weekend have prompted speculation galore on why violence in the far South has spiked after months of relative calm.

Some officials believe insurgents carried out the region-wide attacks in retaliation for a February 10 assault by security forces on a small base camp hidden in the mangroves of Pattani's Nong Chik district.

It remains unclear why the operation was deemed a "success" when five militants deployed at the camp succeeded in escaping after a brief gunfight with the security officials.

Gas cylinders and bomb making materials were seized, though, and one local resident detained for questioning.

Improvised explosive devices are locally made and the material to make them is legally available in the region. But the fact that authorities were able to identify the location of this small camp suggests that intelligence on the ground has improved over the year. Tracking down the militants, however, is another matter. They are proving to be as elusive and slippery as ever, thanks in part to the strong support they enjoy among local residents.

Some officials also suggested that the spike in violence was a means for insurgents to commemorate fallen comrades, namely the 16 militants who walked into a hail of gunfire at a marine base camp in Narathiwat's Bacho district on February 13 three years ago.

That operation was led by well-known militant Mahroso Jantarawadee, who according to separatist sources ignored warnings from his superiors about the danger of attacking a base where reinforcements were close by.

Last Friday night, four blasts shook Narathiwat's Bacho district, while a petrol station in Pattani's Nong Chik district was set on fire. The same evening saw a group of assailants in Pattani's Muang district spray bullets at a police-military checkpoint in Tambon Lulor.

Earlier that day, two soldiers were killed and five injured when a roadside bomb exploded in Yala's Krong Pinang district. It was aimed at a seven-strong foot patrol passing through the hilly Ban Sa-ae village. A 100-metre-long detonating wire was found bundled up under a nearby tree.

More deadly violence followed on the same morning when a resident of Tambon Tam Masu in Pattani's Yaring district was found shot in the head on a well-travelled road. Locals said he had a good working relationship with security officials in the area.

Elsewhere, an arson attack was carried out at the Ban Khai School in Pattani's Nong Chik district at about 4am on Friday morning. It was the first incident of what was to become a very long day for local authorities.

Perhaps the most disturbing attack over the weekend was the point-blank shooting death of a cargo truck driver, whose two colleagues were spared. Initial reports said the victim was singled out because he was not able to speak Malay.

A Barisan Revolusi National source insisted that the movement had no policy of singling out innocent people but admitted that "collateral damage" was still a problem. The murder of the truck driver in Narathiwat's Rangae was perhaps a one-off incident in which emotion got the better of the assailant.

Cargo trucks are part of the economic lifeline on which the local residents, regardless of race and religion, depend for their livelihood. Hence, said the BRN source, it is a policy that this lifeline goes untouched.

The same policy applies to businesses such as rubber factories and auto showrooms, though these have been caught in the crossfire as part of retaliatory actions against Thai security officials accused by the militants of grossly abusing their power.

Separatist sources say militants have been told to scale back their campaign of violence over the last 12 months unless the situation calls for retaliation - which the militants are encouraged to do on a massive scale.

Militant attacks should be carried out on "legitimate targets" (security officials) with consideration given to "collateral damage" (to civilians). The aim should be to demoralise government troops, as well as discredit the security apparatus and associated measures such as the Thung Yang Daeng Model - an attempt to outsource security to local village officials.

The raid at the mangrove camp on Wednesday last week was in line with these unofficial rules of engagement and did not merit retaliation. Neither did the third anniversary of Mahroso's death, the BRN sources said.

What set off the spate of violence at the weekend was the February 6 shooting death of a community leader in Tambon Yupo in Yala's Muang district. One local resident said authorities had accused the victim of turning a blind eye to insurgent activity in his area, particularly the December 13 killing of a Paramilitary Ranger who was described by government and separatist sources as a "high value" target because of his local intelligence work.

The Ranger was on leave visiting the grave of his recently deceased mother when he was killed by a bomb buried at the site. His father was injured by the blast.

BRN sources suspected that the community leader from Tambon Yupo accused of turning a blind eye to the attackers had been killed by a pro-government death squad.

Despite the upsurge of violence, the Thai government is determined to show that it is making progress on its "Track I" peace negotiations with a group of six longstanding separatist organisations who call themselves MARA Patani.

Bangkok is set to push for the implementation of a "safety zone" - a fancy term for "ceasefire".

The designated Malaysian facilitator of the peace talks, Dato Ahmad Zamzamin Hashim, and MARA Patani representative Awang Jabat, have been invited to speak at a conference in Pattani later this month. Sources in the Thai government said the idea is to assure members of MARA Patani that they have immunity from prosecution or other government action.

But such display of half-baked openness may not be enough, as men like Awang Jabat have no legal charges pending against them.

The umbrella organisation is likely to make immunity one of its demands before the dialogue process becomes official negotiation between the two sides.

The real challenge at this informal stage of negotiations is to demonstrate that MARA Patani has influence over the insurgents who are actually doing the fighting.

The BRN, the group that controls the vast majority of militants, has repeatedly declined to take part in the current peace initiative.

The spike in violence over this past week is a reminder that nothing comes easy for this historically contested region, where militants, security officials and other stakeholders play for keeps.

Don Pathan is an independent consultant based in southern Thailand. He is also a founding member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).