KNU, DKBA and the Scam Center Economy on Myanmar’s Border

KNU-controlled Shunda Park Scam, an online money laundering operation in Minletpan area south of Myawaddy, is seen distributing food to foreign money laundering workers and arranging for their repatriation.

Don Pathan
Mizzima News

Three decades ago, a Karen National Union (KNU) splinter group decided to go their own way, citing discrimination on religious grounds.

The core leaders of the KNU were mainly Christians, while the Buddhist faction felt neglected and overlooked.

The splinter group called themselves the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). The name highlighted the theological differences, but the breakup had more to do with the absence of a political power-sharing system where positions are proportionally allocated along religious lines.

As expected, the split was exploited by the Myanmar military government, known at the time as the State Law and Order Restoration Council, or SLORC. A ceasefire agreement with the government came with military assistance that translated into military victory. KNU headquarters at Manerplaw was overrun in early 1995, fundamentally altering the dynamics of the ongoing civil war. For the next 15 years, the two sides were constantly at each other’s throats.

A major turning point occurred in 2009 when the Myanmar government ordered all ethnic armed groups, including the DKBA, to transform into Border Guard Forces (BGF) under the command of the country’s military, the Tatmadaw. Most DKBA fighters followed their commanders, Col. Saw Chit Thu and Brigadier General Saw Mo Shay, who formalized their units into Karen BGF battalions.

A faction of the DKBA – known as DKBA Brigade 5 or Kalo Htoo Baw – refused to go along and opted for an uneasy alliance with the KNU, their former adversaries. The following year, in 2011, the KNU and DKBA’s Brigade 5 forged closer cooperation, enough to form a united position in peace negotiations with the government, but not enough to unite into one single command.

To downplay the religious differences that led to their breakup nearly two decades earlier, the DKBA replaced the “Buddhist” label with “Benevolent” in 2012, becoming the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army.

The same year also saw the KNU and DKBA taking a leap of faith by signing the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the government. This half-baked arrangement was filled with flaws. The NCA insisted that ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) sign a comprehensive ceasefire agreement before substantive political issues were discussed.

In 2021, the Tatmadaw ousted the government of Aung San Suu Kyi from power through a coup, forcing her National League for Democracy (NLD) members to flee to the jungle and abroad.

The KNU saw no point in clinging to the NCA, while the DKBA held on to the alliance despite uncertainties and nervousness. It would be an uneasy alliance because, unlike Chit Thu’s BGF or the KNU, the DKBA didn’t have the kind of military muscle to command respect from the Tatmadaw.

In August 2022, KNU and DKBA leaders held historic meetings to discuss reunification. There were high hopes on the ground as soldiers began wearing badges of the new Kawthoolei Armed Forces as a first step toward full integration in the Land of Flowers – the historical name of the Karen lands. But factions within the DKBA were still holding out, clinging to the NCA.

It was never clear what the military regime, known as the State Administrative Council (SAC) – the name the junta gave itself after the 2021 coup – had promised them.

The relationship between the KNU and DKBA following Myanmar’s 2021 military coup has been marked by uneasy cooperation and, at times, confrontation. This relatively small outfit finds itself stuck between two giants – the Tatmadaw and the KNU. There were times when the Tatmadaw would try to pit the DKBA against the KNU. There were also times when DKBA fighters would don KNU uniforms to go into battle against the Tatmadaw.

“At the policy level, DKBA is officially aligned with the Myanmar military government. But at the operational level, where people know each other, there were times when DKBA troops would lend a helping hand to the KNU on the battlefield,” said one DKBA officer who spoke on condition of anonymity.

“Do Myanmar troops know about this? Yes, but there isn’t much they can do about it,” the officer said.

When asked why the DKBA didn’t just merge with the KNU, the officer said: “The desire to remain a standalone organization is still there. Money from the Chinese is also an important reason.”

“We want to get in on some of the action,” said the officer, referring to the Chinese investors and crime syndicates behind the scores of entertainment complexes, brothels, casinos, and scam centers that dot the Thailand-Myanmar border.

Like the much larger Karen BGF, who earlier this year renamed themselves the Karen National Army (KNA), thinking they could lead the world to believe they had left the clutches of the Tatmadaw, the DKBA tells people they are not aware of the illicit activities of the Chinese investors, whose site managers come with security details.

But the group tries to be as helpful as it can. According to an aid worker from the border: “DKBA doesn’t have the troop strength to generate a meaningful impression, so they try to be as friendly as possible.”

“When requests from foreign embassies in Bangkok ask them to help track down certain individuals from their country caught up somewhere in one of these Myawaddy complexes, DKBA tries to be as helpful as they can,” said the aid worker on condition of anonymity.

But being a nice guy in a permissive environment where extensive criminal enterprises thrive is never enough to save your own skin, especially when the tenants are criminals who have been scamming citizens of the world’s superpowers, like the U.S. and China.

And so in May 2025, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned the KNA as a transnational criminal organization, along with the group’s leader, Chit Thu, and his two sons, Htoo Eh Moo and Chit Chit, “for their role in facilitating cyber scams that harm U.S. citizens, human trafficking, and cross-border smuggling.”

The DKBA, along with the top four leaders of the organization, joined this notorious list in November 2025. On the day DKBA made the list, the U.S. also announced the establishment of the Scam Center Strike Force.

No one was really surprised by the moves from the U.S. and China, however. The writing had been on the wall for some time. The Strike Force was America’s way of displaying its seriousness. China, at the beginning of 2025, wanted to let Thailand and Myanmar know that enough is enough.

Chinese Assistant Minister of Public Security Liu Zhongyi made two back-to-back visits to Mae Sot and Myawaddy to pressure both Thailand and Myanmar to take action. Power supply, internet access, and fuel leading to these scam centers were cut off. But they were quickly replaced by powerful generators, Starlink terminals, and fuel smuggled from the Myanmar side. These measures ended up hurting local villagers more than the intended targets.

Before Liu’s trips to the border, two flights a day – planeloads of Chinese tourists – would come to Mae Sot, cross illegally to the Myanmar side to visit these entertainment complexes, casinos, brothels, and so on. They would return to Mae Sot before their Thai visas ran out or their coffers ran dry, which never seemed to be the case, said one Thai security officer who spoke on condition of anonymity.

By February, when the Thai pressure began to go into action, the flights dropped to one a day, and the seats were mostly empty. So-called tourists were screened upon arrival. Unless they had real business in Mae Sot, they were put on the return flight to Bangkok.

But the writing had been on the wall for some time. Two years before Liu’s arrival, Chinese crime syndicates were looking for safer places. A number of these illicit operations began relocating from Myawaddy to Phayathonezu, an area near the Three Pagodas Pass that sits on the border of Thailand’s Kanchanaburi province.

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), online scamming generates more than $40 billion a year in the Mekong subregion through crime syndicates working from various pockets in Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos.

KNU-controlled Shunda Park Scam, an online money laundering operation in the Minletpan area south of Myawaddy, is seen distributing food to foreign money laundering workers and arranging for their repatriation.

Ongoing Assault on Scam Centers on the Thailand-Myanmar Border

On the surface, it looks like international pressure from China and the U.S. is paying off. Combined forces of Tatmadaw and KNA troops attacked two notorious scam compounds – KK Park and Shwe Kokko – in October and November 2025, respectively.

Myanmar state-run media released photos and footage of buildings being raided and torn down as thousands of panicked foreign nationals fled on foot in all directions. Many appeared to be Chinese nationals, and not all are scam operators, said an aid worker on the border.

Taking down scam centers in KK Park, Nov 12, 2025. (Myanmar Intl. TV)

But this doesn’t seem to be enough to improve Myanmar’s international image, much less that of the KNA/Karen BGF, the so-called landlords who claim to know nothing about illicit activities in the areas under their control. General elections are less than a month away, and Myanmar wants to put on its best face for the world to see that it means business. But nobody is giving them credit for any of it.

Despite the crackdowns, experts noted the inconsistencies. The Tatmadaw and allied militias have historically profited from these illicit operations. One Thai security officer on the border said that in the days leading to the attack on KK Park in early November, the KNA was taking site managers and Chinese bosses to a new location opposite Tak’s Mae Ramat district, about 55 kilometers north of Mae Sot. He said the initial migration involved about 200 people.

Meanwhile, clashes between the Tatmadaw and the KNU continue unabated. The November 21 clashes between the two sides, 16 kilometers south of Myawaddy around the Min Let Pan village, “inadvertently” brought the DKBA into the gunfight. It started with a stray bullet hitting DKBA positions, according to a DKBA liaison officer in Mae Sot.

“DKBA retaliated with warning shots, and the situation quickly evolved into a gunfight between them and the KNU. Outnumbered and outgunned, 230 DKBA militia surrendered and handed their weapons to the KNU,” said the liaison officer.

But in the KNU press statement dated November 25, the KNU described DKBA action as a “coordinated attack.” A ground assessment was conducted the following day, on November 22, during which the KNU came across scam operations and about 2,000 foreign nationals, mostly Chinese, working at this particular compound. Thai and international agencies have been notified, and help was sought from them on how investigations into these illicit activities should be conducted.

In its December 2 statement, the KNU said it can no longer guarantee the safety of more than 900 foreign nationals who are refusing to leave the scam compound, known as Shunda Park, as junta forces intensify their offensive to retake the area.

Padoh Saw Taw Nee, spokesman for the KNU, called on China to apply pressure on the Tatmadaw to stop using heavy weapons and aerial bombardment against the compound in Min Let Pan, saying the lives of 2,000 people – most of them Chinese nationals – in the area are at risk.

Many are stranded on the Moei River, wanting to cross into Thailand for safety. But the Thai Army insisted that they must go through Thailand-Myanmar Friendship Bridge 2, which links Myawaddy to Mae Sot.

“I don’t understand why Thai officials are being nitpicky about where they can cross. People are fleeing fighting. We stand to look really bad if Myanmar airstrikes kill these foreign nationals in and around Min Let Pan,” said a Thai security official on the border.

But eventually, by December 5, nearly all of the 2,400 were handed over to the Thai authorities. They may be out of the Tatmadaw’s harm's way, but they can expect a thorough interrogation once they reach their home country.

Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand’s far south.

New Government, New Team

The National Security Council (NSC) of Thailand organized a seminar in Bangkok on 29 October 2025, bringing together the chief negotiators for the southern peace process to share their experiences. Credit: Don Pathan

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com

Resumed Talks

After nearly two years of stagnation, peace negotiations between the Thai government and the rebel Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) are getting back on track. Leaders from both sides met recently to acquaint themselves and prepare for a high-level official meeting next month, facilitated by Malaysia.

Thailand’s newly appointed chief negotiator for the conflict, Gen (rtd) Somsak Rungsita, along with National Security Council (NSC) Secretary-General Chatchai Bangchuad, met with BRN chief negotiator Anas Abdulrohman in Kuala Lumpur on 11 November 2025.

According to a press statement from the Office of the Malaysian Government Facilitator, the meeting was “cordial and constructive”, with both parties committing to resume official and technical dialogues in December 2025. The meeting was facilitated by retired Malaysian NSC chief Mohd Rabin Bashir.

A BRN officer from the negotiation team said the organisation acknowledges the short time the current government of Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has in office but pledged the movement would do its utmost to ensure continuity.

The last high-level talks with the BRN – the longstanding separatist group that controls combatants in Thailand’s far south – were held in Kuala Lumpur on 6-7 February 2024.

Past Setbacks

As for the meeting next month, the two sides will pick up where they left off—discussing the Joint Comprehensive Plan toward Peace (JCPP). This framework identifies three key items: reduction of violence, public consultation and a political solution to end the conflict, which has claimed over 7,700 lives since the current wave of insurgency resurfaced in January 2004. The region is the historical Malay homeland known as Patani.

Initially, they had planned to delve deeper into these three items. However, fierce criticism from insiders of the then-ruling Pheu Thai Party, particularly Prof Surachart Bamrungsuk, sidelined the negotiators and effectively put formal talks on hold for nearly two years.

Surachart was upset that the Thai team had not made the reduction of violence a binding commitment and lashed out at international donors for not pressuring the BRN to end its violent tactics; he said their role in the peace process has helped to legitimise BRN.

Still, quiet discussions between BRN and Thai representatives continued outside the formal track. During a meeting at the beginning of this year, the Thai side requested a temporary ceasefire during the holy month of Ramadhan, which ran from 1 to 30 March 2025.

BRN agreed on the condition that international observers be permitted on the ground and an unspecified number of detainees be released. The then-defence minister Phumtham Wechayachai rejected the proposal, insisting the government would only negotiate if BRN ended its campaign of violence and that they would only talk with those who have command-and-control over militants on the ground.

When political discussions hit a brick wall, BRN’s military wing took charge to map out the next move. On 9 March, a 10-strong BRN unit attacked the Sungai Kolok district office in Narathiwat, killing two Defence Volunteers (security details for the Ministry of Interior officials) and wounding eight others.

The combatants left behind a car packed with explosives that detonated during their retreat. The car bomb ripped through the district office compound, sending a stern message to Bangkok that it does not get to decide who represents BRN at the negotiating table.

Differing Definitions of “Peace”

Today, with Pheu Thai and Surachart out, NSC has returned to the fold. A public event was organised by NSC on 29 October where all former chief negotiators were invited to share their experiences. They largely echoed the same points: that there is continuity despite political instability, a commitment to peace and that Thailand’s territorial integrity remains paramount.

But academic and peace expert Mark Tamthai, who led the negotiation team under former premier Abhisit Vejjajiva, said Thailand has yet to understand the nature of the conflict in the far south and therefore has not developed the necessary tools to extinguish it.

“At first, there is the simplistic view that people take up arms because they are upset with the state. But the reality is more complicated than that,” said Mark, a retired professor of peace studies at Chiang Mai’s Payap University.

Mark believes there must be a better way to involve the public because their participation could help strengthen the peace process and generate traction.

“My other question is why the peace process doesn’t seem to be going anywhere. We take a step forward and then take a step back. Why is that?” he asked.

One reason the process seems circular is that both sides define peace differently.

“For the government, peace is the absence of violence, as well as the people of Patani living within the framework set by the government. They are not allowed to make too many demands, such as self-determination rights, and there can also be no seminar on a public referendum,” Mark said. “If these demands continue to surface, in the state’s view, then the fire in the south has yet to be put out.”

Mark said BRN and local civil society agree with the state on the first point—that regional violence must end. But the second point involves opening a political space where no issue is off-limits. This is where the two sides differ greatly, as demonstrated by the ongoing court case against political activists in the far south.

“I’m glad that the new chief negotiator (Gen [rtd] Somsak) wants to hear what the local people are saying. But you must be serious about wanting to listen; you can’t let them speak and then turn around and charge them with whatever law is at hand.”

Mark also pointed to JCPP as an example of progress that can only go so far. “But when the issue of public consultation comes up, some people retreat. Why? Because public consultation doesn’t fit their definition of what is politically permissible,” he said.

Hurdles

The upcoming high-level meeting will not be a walk in the park. It comes at a time when flimsy charges are being levied against five civic actors, scheduled to appear in the Pattani Criminal Court on 20 November 2025, to face charges of advocating separatism during a 2023 seminar that they had participated in.

From left to right: Artef Sohko – President of The Patani; Hussen Bue-nae – Former President, Student Organization of Yala Rajabhat University (YRUSO); Irfan Umar – Member of The Patani; Sareef Salaeman – Patani–Malay cultural youth activist, Student at PSU Pattani, Member of The Patani; and Hakim Pongtigor – Deputy Secretary-General, Fair Party at the time of the seminar, currently senior member of The Patani. Photo taken in front of the Office of the Attorney  General in Pattani. (Photo Credit: The Patani)

What got on the nerves of the region’s military command was the mock referendum, which asked participants a hypothetical question on whether they would support the idea of a referendum on rights to self-determination if Thai law permitted it. They did not advocate independence or encourage political mobilisation to call for separatism. But a hypothetical question was enough for the military to push for legal action against the activists.

Moreover, old issues like public consultation under the framework of JCPP remain far from resolved. BRN has informed Thailand that its representatives should be permitted to enter the far south to conduct in-person public consultations.

This request was rejected by the Thai army, whose leaders feared a public relations nightmare. One military intelligence officer, speaking on condition of anonymity, asked to imagine an outpouring of public support for BRN delegates; such a scene would not only embarrass the Thai side but also shatter its long-standing claim that the Malays of Patani side with them.

Making the Most of Limited Time

After nearly two years of a halted formal process, BRN considered the setting up of a negotiating team as somewhat pretentious, considering the government has only less than four months in office before a general election is called. Yet, it could set a precedent for the incoming administration, especially if the ruling Bhumjaithai Party is part of the coalition and tasked with conflict resolution in the far south.

“We are looking to make the most of it given the limited time in office of this government,” one BRN operative said.

BRN has already stated it is willing to settle for something less than full independence. The ball now seems to be in Thailand’s court to reciprocate.

For Artef Sohko, president of The Patani – a political action group that often acts as an interlocutor between BRN and Thai government agencies – the clock is ticking. The next wave of BRN leaders might not be as accommodating as the current ones.

If the Thai government continues to kick the can down the road, the next generation of BRN leaders could retreat from their commitment to work within the Thai Constitution. Artef is one of the five civic actors being charged with advocating separatism for participating in a mock referendum.

The challenge for the current and incoming government is enormous. It is unclear if Bhumjaithai has the appetite or the mindset for a challenge that demands creative policy and serious thought about what aspects of Thailand’s nation-state construct must be revised for the sake of peace and peaceful coexistence with the Malays of Patani.

Moreover, violence in this historically contested region has been on the rise, with combatants (who are operating quite freely) straying outside the normal theatre of conflict. Last month’s gold heist in Narathiwat, where over 36.5 million baht worth of gold was stolen, as well as a botched bombing operation in major tourist spots on the Andaman coast in June 2025, are examples of how the absence of a political platform has allowed violence to morph and spread. BRN made no public statement about the 11 bombs unearthed in Krabi and Phuket provinces, but it did say that without a formal peace process, increased violence and attacks outside historically contested areas are inevitable.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence. Republications minimally require 1) credit authors and their institutions, and 2) credit to STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD  and include a link back to either our home page or the article URL.

Author

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  Don Pathan

  Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

Thailand’s million-dollar gold heist reveals costly price of peace in insurgency-hit south

The robbery in Sungai Kolok, near the Thai-Malaysian border, bore the hallmarks of a rebel-led operation, the defence minister said

The suspects are caught on CCTV fleeing the scene after grabbing bags of gold on October 5. Photo: Thai police

Don Pathan

www.scmp.com 

A million-dollar gold heist in Thailand’s far south by armed robbers who blocked roads with spikes and set explosives to seal their escape across the Malaysian border has rattled the Thai security establishment, as efforts to reignite peace talks in an area roiled by insurgency continue to fall flat.

Around 20 men working in three teams carried out the October 5 theft from a gold shop in Sungai Kolok, bordering Malaysia’s Kelantan State.

The theft of hundreds of gold ornaments and jewellery valued at over 36.5 million baht (US$1.13 million) came as prices for the precious metal spiked to historic highs of over US$4,200 per 28 grams (one ounce) earlier this month.

Using two stolen getaway trucks, the robbers planted road spikes and explosives to obstruct police pursuit in a heist so well-oiled that Thai authorities immediately attributed it to the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN).

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New Thai appointments for the Deep South

The then Thailand's chief negotiator, Chatchai Bangchuad, Malaysian facilitator Gen Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, and Anas Abdulrahman, BRN chief negotiator, talked to the press after the February 6-7, 2024, high-level negotiation in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. (Credit: Peace Dialogue Panel)

Don Pathan
Prachatai 

In one of his first moves as newly appointed Prime Minister, Anutin Charnvirakul has named a new chief negotiator for the peace process in Thailand's far South, a region gripped by a conflict that has claimed over 7,700 lives since 2004.

The decision has been met with scepticism, however, as Anutin’s government is set to serve only four months before Parliament is dissolved. Since the negotiating team is mandated by the Cabinet, any new government will be free to appoint its own officials.

The immediate aim of Anutin's Bhumjaithai Party is widely seen as building political capital for the upcoming general election. By appointing retired Gen Somsak Rungsita, a former Secretary-General of the National Security Council (NSC), as chief negotiator, Anutin can claim an achievement that he will argue his predecessor, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, failed to secure during her year in office.

To be fair to the previous administration, a negotiating team was being assembled, but Paetongtarn was removed by the Constitutional Court just before a public announcement could be made. Her proposed list included top security figures from her party, a former head of the Parliament-funded Prajadhipok’s Institute, a village chief from Narathiwat, and a retired diplomat.

Under her administration, delays stemmed from a refusal to resume talks until the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN)—the primary longstanding separatist movement—ceased its violent operations. The BRN countered that any reduction of violence must be negotiated, questioning the baseline and monitoring mechanisms. The then-government was unwilling to entertain this. A nudge from Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, the designated facilitator for the off-and-on talks since 2013, finally prompted a response from Paetongtarn, just before the court removed her from power.

Political insiders say the choice of Gen Somsak is a safe bet for Anutin. The former NSC chief is a close associate of Defence Minister Gen Nattaphon Narkphanit and former PM Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, now a Privy Councillor. The Thai Army is also comfortable with him.

Gen Somsak's appointment marks the NSC's return to the peace process after being sidelined by the previous administration. Insiders from the Pheu Thai Party government had accused the NSC-led negotiators of exceeding their mandate and giving the BRN too much leeway by not making a reduction of violence a binding condition.

A senior BRN member on the negotiating team questioned Thailand's commitment to peace, stating that Gen Somsak’s appointment does not signal sincerity in seeking a peaceful outcome.

For Asmadee Bueheng, a Patani-based writer and long-time conflict observer, Gen Somsak's appointment—coupled with in the introduction of an outsider to lead the Fourth Army Area, which oversees security in the region—does not necessarily translate into meaningful concessions from the Thai state.

In fact, no political party in modern Thailand has ever spelled out terms for peaceful coexistence between the Malay people of Patani and the state. This refusal to make concessions has rendered the decade-old peace process a stagnant "talk shop" unable to move beyond confidence-building.

Even if the government decided to outline a real settlement, there is no guarantee that conservative elites in Thailand would permit it, as it would challenge Thailand's nation-state construct and narrative, Asmadee said.

Today, the controversial Martial Law and Emergency Law, which permits 30-day detention without legal representation, remain in effect. The Tak Bai massacre of October 2004, which resulted in 85 deaths, has yet to see closure, while harassment against local political activists continues.

For years, the Fourth Army and activists have been at loggerheads, fighting to control the narrative. At the Army's request, numerous activists have been charged with disturbing the peace and instigating separatism.

Moreover, the absence of a credible peace process gives BRN militants, who already operate with considerable autonomy, a freer hand to expand beyond their usual theatre of violence and breach unwritten rules of engagement that prohibit attacks on civilians.

Thai police inspect the scene of an attack by insurgents at Sunai
Kolok District Office, March 2025. (Narathiwat Public Relations Office)

It remains to be seen if the new chief negotiator and the recently appointed commander of the Fourth Army Area, Maj Gen Norathip Phoinok, can reverse this trend and open political space for critical discussion, no matter how uncomfortable.

For decades, commanders of the Fourth Army have been drawn from its own ranks. Their counter-insurgency strategy has leaned heavily on militaristic approaches, with little focus on winning hearts and minds or addressing the root causes and historical grievances of this Malay-speaking region.

For over twenty years, Thailand's far South has been shaped by separatist insurgency, cross-border trade (both legal and illegal), an enormous military budget, and a culture of impunity among security officials. As one Thai military intelligence officer noted, the region has too many "dark sides." Bringing in an outsider to lead may not be a bad idea.

Although the violence is widely understood as political, Thai officials often view it through a narrow lens of security and legality. Few attempt to understand the insurgents' perspective, which sees government troops as a colonial force and local businesses as part of a system of exploitation. Government policies on transmigration and assimilation are viewed as integral to this same system.

Whether Maj Gen Norathip can bridge the trust gap between the state and the Malay-speaking region is an open question.

Political insiders say his appointment reflects the internal workings of the Royal Thai Army rather than any government initiative. With less than 70 seats in Parliament, Anutin cannot afford to create friction with the Army. His aim is to use these four months to prepare for the next election, which is why he is allowing the Army a free hand on border policy, be it with Cambodia or in the far South.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based consultant and security analyst. 

Behind the Myanmar junta’s raid on KK Park

KK Park, taken from the Thai side of the border that is separated by the Moei River, Feb. 28, 2025. (Credit: Don Pathan)

Don Pathan
Mizzima News

The Myanmar military junta attempted to score a public relations victory during the recent ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur by demonstrating its willingness to crack down on scam centers operating in Karen State, adjacent to Thailand’s Mae Sot district in Tak province.

After attacking positions held by the Karen National Union’s (KNU) 6th Brigade, Myanmar troops entered portions of the notorious KK Park, a major scam hub linked to Chinese crime syndicates. They confiscated 30 Starlink devices that scammers had been using in recent years after Thailand, under pressure from both the United States and China, disrupted internet connections to these call centers by redirecting relay boxes on utility poles and ordering power lines running from Thailand to cease operations.

A turning point came in January 2025, when China intensified pressure on Thailand to take drastic action, including cutting off power supplies, fuel, and imposing stricter controls on internet connectivity. Chinese Assistant Minister of Public Security Liu Zhongy visited Mae Sot and Myawaddy twice in early 2025 to witness the crackdown firsthand.

More than 7,000 operators, mostly Chinese nationals, were released from these centers and sent across the border into Thailand for processing and repatriation. Chinese charter planes stood ready to transport their nationals back home to either face charges or, if fortunate, be treated as human trafficking victims, depending on interrogation outcomes.

The scam centers adapted to Thailand’s obstruction by acquiring massive generators capable of powering the 30 or so compounds dotting the Myanmar side of the Moei River, which serves as the natural border with Thailand. Starlink satellite systems replaced Thai internet service providers, while fuel became significantly more expensive—though nothing is truly unobtainable in this rugged corner of Southeast Asia, where warlords, drug barons, ethnic rebel militias, resistance forces, and Myanmar government troops compete for control.

Until February 2025, two commercial flights filled with Chinese tourists would arrive daily in Mae Sot from Bangkok. This border town, known primarily as a major cross-border trading hub between Thailand and Myanmar, served as the gateway to an open secret: these “tourists” were actually headed to casinos, brothels, entertainment complexes, karaoke bars, and unregulated online gambling operations on the Myanmar side. “They just have to remember to return before their Thai visas expire,” said a Thai police officer in Mae Sot.

The two flights are a thing of the past as Thai officials, in line with measures imposed on foreign nationals after Liu visited the region.

The US Institute of Peace estimated that by the end of 2023, the annual value of funds stolen worldwide by Chinese syndicates operating from Myanmar and other locations in mainland Southeast Asia reached approximately $64 billion.

In response to Chinese and Thai pressure, the DKBA and KNA/BGF quickly abandoned their profitable landlord arrangements and began rounding up scam operators. This started in February 2025 and continued for several months.

The strict measures following Liu’s two visits may have disrupted operations temporarily, but in reality they created a balloon effect: squeeze one area and activity pops up elsewhere. Phayathonezu, an area controlled by the rebels near the Three Pagodas Pass opposite Thailand’s Kanchanaburi province, exemplifies how these illicit businesses are relocating from the Myawaddy area. Other syndicates maintained low profiles temporarily, planning to reemerge once attention subsided, while others moved deeper into the country.

The deportation of approximately 7,000 individuals since March 2025 damaged the illicit operations but didn’t eliminate them. While the two daily planeloads of Chinese nationals arriving in Mae Sot may have ended, these syndicates still operate cyber scam centers generating substantial income.

“Chinese businesses rent these complexes and convert them into entertainment and gambling outlets that operate in a gray area—not exactly illegal but certainly unregulated. However, portions of these complexes are designated specifically for online scamming operations,” explained a plainclothes Thai police officer in Mae Sot who has a front-row view of these illicit activities.

“The Karen militias controlling the area—whether they have ceasefire agreements with the Myanmar government, like the Karen National Army (KNA) and the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), or the Karen National Union (KNU), which is still fighting the government—none of them want scrutiny of what these Chinese businesses are actually doing,” said the officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

“They collect substantial rent money, and villagers in areas under their control gain employment. Thai people also benefit from their presence.” He pointed to the heightening of real estate prices around Mae Sot, saying being a merely stop-over has its benefits.

Last week’s attack on a portion of KK Park failed to convince observers, despite generating some international headlines when roughly 1,000 foreign nationals fled the park into Myawaddy and across to the Thai side of the border. Unfortunately for the Myanmar government, the incident generated little interest among ASEAN leaders, who were preoccupied with hosting US President Donald Trump, who had come to Malaysia to witness the signing of a peace deal between Thailand and Cambodia.

More significantly, according to a member of the DKBA militia group, the Myanmar military’s advance into KK Park disrupted the existing arrangements between Chinese crime syndicates and their respective landlords—namely the KNA, DKBA, and KNU.

“The offensive against KK Park created considerable anxiety among these Chinese syndicates, who never move around this part of Myanmar without security details,” said a DKBA officer who spoke on condition of anonymity.

“While the Karen groups receive rent and certain benefits from these Chinese syndicates in exchange for broad protection guarantees, it’s the armed bodyguards and security personnel who provide the immediate defensive line for these Chinese bosses and managers. Not all these guards are ethnically Chinese, but they are fluent in Chinese,” he added.

Myanmar was able to advance on KNU positions in recent months and weeks because the BGF/KNA assisted them, according to the Thai officer.

The KNA is a 7,000-strong force led by Col. Chit Thu, a Karen warlord with extensive business interests and connections throughout Myanmar and Thailand.

One observer of the situation along the Thailand-Myanmar border suggested that Chit Thu is no longer satisfied with merely collecting rent—he wants a direct share of profits from these scam centers, according to a source with direct dealings with ethnic armed organizations in Myanmar.

The DKBA, a much smaller outfit with just over 1,000 troops, might outlive its usefulness as a member of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement if the Myanmar government sees no reason to maintain the relationship. Fortunately for the DKBA, the recent attack on the KNU’s 6th Brigade and incursion into KK Park did little to change international perception of Myanmar’s military government.

“If the world viewed the Myanmar junta as the good guys, they wouldn’t have stopped at the KNU 6th Brigade—they would have targeted a low-hanging fruit like the DKBA,” said the Thai police officer in Mae Sot.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based development professional and security analyst.

Anwar’s Lack of Fortune in Thailand’s Far South

Credit: Google Gemini

Don Pathan
www.stratsea.com

No Luck Anwar

Every time Anwar succeeded in getting the Thai government to accelerate progress, Thai politics invariably intervened, prolonging the peace process that has never been a high priority for any Thai administration.

Coming into power in November 2022, Anwar – a figure who has endured prison and a long political struggle – inspired excitement among Malay Muslims in Thailand’s southernmost provinces. They saw his rise as a victory against the ruling elite, a narrative that resonates deeply with the Malays of Patani and the rebels as well.

However, when Srettha Thavisin assumed premiership in August 2023, he largely ignored the far south, unwilling to antagonise the Thai Army and its uncompromising counterinsurgency stance. Furthermore, Srettha focused on maintaining a delicate political balance that had enabled Thaksin Shinawatra’s return from exile—a Faustian bargain with the conservative establishment that required careful nurturing. Upsetting the military was not part of that deal.

Yet, the Malaysian-facilitated peace process had been developing for over a decade, and Bangkok could only delay for so long. A nudge from Anwar three months into Srettha’s term led to the appointment of Chatchai Bangchuad, then deputy secretary-general of the National Security Council (NSC), as chief negotiator—the first civilian in the role in 12 years.

This move allowed the Peace Dialogue Panel and Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) – the group controlling combatants on the ground – to resume discussions on the Joint Comprehensive Plan toward Peace (JCPP). This roadmap includes proposed agreements on public consultations, violence reduction and political solutions.

Complications

But in the far south, nothing comes easily. When a draft of the JCPP was leaked, it drew harsh criticism from military and political insiders. Professor Surachart Bamrungsuk, a Pheu Thai insider, relentlessly attacked the NSC-led team, accusing them of exceeding their mandate and criticising European donors for not pressuring the BRN enough to curb the violence on the ground. The backlash left Thai negotiators isolated.

In reality, both Thai and BRN negotiators were participating in mediation training in Europe, and a Japanese organisation even offered to host high-level talks in Tokyo. Furthermore, Thailand participated in a back-channel discussion with BRN through foreign mediation without Malaysia’s participation. But the process never advanced beyond confidence-building measures. The political leadership above the negotiators showed no real intention of offering concessions to BRN or the Patani Malays.

Thai institutions have never been united on the south, even on basic issues like whether to classify BRN as a criminal organisation or as combatants. International NGOs face wrath for using the term “armed conflict”, and bodies like the Organization of Islamic Cooperation are criticised for engaging the BRN. Any hint of legitimacy for the insurgents provokes Thai ire—even as its negotiators are sent to meet with them.

Unlike the 1980s, when Patani Malay fighters received foreign support, today’s combatants are self-sufficient, drawing on local community backing to keep the conflict civil. Malaysia, meanwhile, practises quiet diplomacy, urging both sides to respect humanitarian norms.

But as an interlocutor, Malaysia faces a complex challenge: its proximity and refusal to support separatism require all Malaysian leaders to carefully balance between respecting Thailand’s territorial integrity and acknowledging the historical grievances of the Patani people.

Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, a local political action group, believes Malaysia must do more than just urge Thailand to come to the table. He argues that Thailand needs creative ideas, and Malaysia – with international help – can provide them.

“Negotiation is a give-and-take process,” Artef said, “but Thailand only wants to take.”

He points out to Thailand’s relentless push for a ceasefire, which does little to advance conflict resolution and more for public consumption, as Thai leaders are in a constant campaign to garner public endorsement.

In comparison, Malaysia was successful in mediating the peace process between the Moros and the Philippines government. That was because Malaysia was able to get a firm commitment from Manila for concession and compromise before it took up the mediation role. Malaysia did not make the same demand with Thailand before it committed itself as the mediator in February 2013.

While Malaysian officials discuss the southern Thai conflict with Thai NSC officials regularly, Dato Mohd Rabin Basir, the designated facilitator, has not had much luck reaching the army generals, the lynchpin behind conflict resolution in the far south.

Instability in Bangkok

But obstacles and roadblocks are nothing new in the quest for peace in this historically contested region known as Patani. Thailand’s political instability continues to take its toll.

In August 2024, the Constitutional Court removed Srettha on ethical grounds. He was replaced by Paetongtarn Shinawatra, Thaksin’s daughter, who was shielded by party elders. Her deputy, Phumtham Wechayachai, refused to resume talks unless BRN stopped its violence first. BRN replied that violence reduction was negotiable but demanded international monitoring of any ceasefire.

Thailand rejected these demands, despite BRN’s agreement to negotiate under the Thai Constitution—effectively taking independence off the table. Instead, Bangkok stuck to its old strategy: trying to identify and negotiate directly with the leaders of BRN’s military wing despite not knowing their identities and being unwilling to offer meaningful concessions. BRN insisted that protocol must be respected and insisted that the government do not get to pick and choose who in the movement they want to meet.

The Pheu Thai-led government feared that entering talks amid ongoing attacks would make them look weak. Ironically, it was not BRN that undermined Paetongtarn, but Cambodian leader Hun Sen, a long-time friend of the Shinawatra family. In June, he leaked a private phone call in which she appeared to kowtow to him while criticising her own border security general. The leak triggered a bilateral crisis, leading to border clashes four weeks later that killed 40 people and displaced 300,000.

Malaysia was called upon to mediate again, this time with the United States and China observing. Anwar also nudged Bangkok to restart the peace talks. A new, diverse negotiating team was planned, including retired generals, a former diplomat and a village chief from the far south, with an announcement set for September 2025.

But on 29 August, the Constitutional Court removed Paetongtarn from power over the Hun Sen incident. The Parliament then voted in Bhumjaithai’s Anutin Charnvirakul as prime minister under a four-month agreement with the opposition to pursue constitutional reform.

Anwar, as ASEAN chair, had earlier appointed Thaksin as an advisor on Myanmar and the far south—a move that yielded no results. Thaksin’s influence evaporated entirely on 9 September, when the Supreme Court ruled that his hospital detention was an attempt to avoid his reduced jail sentence. He is now back in jail.

Now, the peace process for the far south is once again in limbo, likely delayed until after the next general election. It makes little sense for a four-month government to appoint a negotiating team only to dissolve it shortly after. But for Anwar, the pursuit of peace in Thailand’s deep south remains a story of promise and perseverance, continuously unravelled by the political fortunes of its neighbour.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

Don Pathan

Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

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Thailand, Myanmar and the Pollution of Thai Waterways

Thai and United Wa State Army soldiers meeting on the border near Mae Hong Son in early 2025. (Credit: Royal Thai Army)

Don Pathan
www.mizzima.com

A ranking member of the Thai Senate, Ms. Angkhana Neelaphaijit, has called for United Nations intervention regarding the pollution of the Kok and Sai rivers, contaminated by Chinese gold and rare earth extraction operations in territories controlled by the Wa militia, located mere kilometers from Thailand’s border with Myanmar.

Angkhana Neelaphaijit

Angkhana referenced the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to justify such intervention.

The 2019 Ramon Magsaysay Award winner, who joined the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances in 2022, argued that China bears moral and legal responsibility to address this issue. She suggested Thailand should petition the UN to raise concerns with China, given Myanmar’s inability to control the United Wa State Army (UWSA), a 30,000-member ethnic armed group maintaining a ceasefire agreement with Myanmar’s government since 1989.

According to the Shan Human Rights Foundation, while recent media coverage has concentrated on gold extraction along the Kok and Sai rivers near UWSA territory approximately 25 kilometers from Thailand’s border, satellite imagery reveals rare earth mining operations at two sites in Mong Yawn, southern Mong Hsat, roughly 25 kilometers from northern Thailand’s border, facing Mae Ai district in Chiang Mai province.

Recent months have witnessed a series of public protests in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces, demanding government action to address the issue with both Myanmar and the UWSA. In early 2025, Thai conservative media sources even advocated military intervention against the Wa, claiming three UWSA outposts had violated Thai territory by 200 meters.

The powerful UWSA controls an autonomous territory along the China-Myanmar frontier. During the late 1990s, the UWSA expanded southward toward the Thai border after collaborating with Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw, to eliminate their longtime adversary, Shan opium warlord Khun Sa and his Mong Tai Army (MTA).

Access to UWSA territories remains strictly controlled. Myanmar military personnel and government representatives must surrender weapons and accept escort.

Responding to mounting public pressure regarding river contamination, Thailand and Myanmar took a modest bilateral initiative last week, agreeing during Naypyidaw discussions to establish a joint committee addressing the Kok and Sai river pollution.

Both nations are committed to enhancing river water quality, sharing water management information, and creating a joint technical working group for concrete cooperation on contamination solutions. However, the agreement made no reference to the UWSA or China.

A senior Thai military official from the Third Army Area command said there have been internal discussions about approaching China directly, since negotiations with the UWSA and seeking the Myanmar government's assistance have proven ineffective.

Thailand’s communications with the UWSA have consistently involved the group’s southern command, which invariably defers major decisions to Panghsang, their organization’s headquarters on the Sino-Myanmar border. This includes Thailand’s request for UWSA to move back from at least nine outposts that are situated right on the Thai border; three of these outposts are allegedly positioned 200 meters inside Thai territory. Wa forces maintain that orders must originate from Panghsang and suggest Thailand address border demarcation issues with Myanmar’s government, as they concern state sovereignty.

Other ethnic armed organizations said the UWSA will take no action without receiving concessions from Thailand. Like similar groups, legitimacy and recognition are something that are often desired. However, Thailand refuses to offer concessions to the UWSA, particularly given its drug trafficking history.

Several UWSA leaders face US Federal Court indictments for heroin trafficking and related crime, while their southern commander, Wei Hsueh-kang, carries a US$2 million bounty from American authorities for his conviction as far back as 1993.

Wei and his brothers, originally from Yunnan, arrived in the Burmese Golden Triangle during the 1970s, initially as Kuomintang operatives before entering the profitable heroin trade. When the UWSA formed in 1989 following the Communist Party of Burma’s dissolution, Wei provided financial backing, transforming the organization into Myanmar’s most formidable ethnic armed group. The UWSA granted him access to opium supplies needed for producing premium grade 4 heroin, known as “China White.”

The Tatmadaw quickly established a ceasefire arrangement with the UWSA, and within a decade, the Wa had effectively moved southward, displacing longtime rival Khun Sa’s now-defunct Mong Tai Army (MTA) and occupying territories along the Thailand-Myanmar frontier. Currently, UWSA installations, camps, and strongholds populate newly constructed settlements along Myanmar’s border adjacent to Thailand’s Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai, and portions of Mae Hong Son provinces.

Thailand’s requests for Tatmadaw mediation with the UWSA are not unprecedented. In 2014, the Thai Army discussed UWSA border positions with Myanmar leader Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing during his Thailand visit. As of today, the Tatmadaw possesses limited influence over the UWSA.

But the same cannot be said about China. Last week, the UWSA declared it would terminate all assistance to allied groups battling Myanmar’s military, citing a request from China.

“Beginning immediately, Wa State will not provide weapons, military transit, or economic assistance to other organizations under any circumstances, at any time or location,” announced Zhao Guoan, Wa Vice Chairman and Foreign Relations Minister, informing representatives from the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) during an August 20, 2025 high-level meeting in Panghsang.

The Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN) reported that Zhao attributed this reluctant decision to intense Beijing pressure. Chinese authorities had frozen billions in Wa State institutional, corporate, and individual assets, implemented comprehensive border restrictions, and threatened severe measures unless the Wa ceased supporting armed groups in active conflict, according to SHAN, citing Wa News Land, the UWSA’s media outlet, as saying.

Since the Brotherhood Alliance’s late 2023 offensive began, China has served as a peace broker between Myanmar and ethnic armed organizations. Beijing's position gradually shifted toward supporting the Burmese junta, demanding that certain groups, particularly the TNLA and MNDAA, return territories captured from Myanmar’s military. Analysts believe China views Myanmar’s military government as the sole entity capable of maintaining national unity, with current support aimed at ensuring the upcoming December 2025 and January 2026 General Elections proceed smoothly enough to legitimize the new administration. Ultimately, this concerns risk mitigation for Chinese investments, trade routes, and strategic interests rather than power-sharing arrangements between the Myanmar military government and the ethnic armed organizations.

UWSA: An Uncomfortable Neighbor

Surprisingly, there were periods when Thai soldiers and United Wa State Army (UWSA) troops engaged in friendly volleyball matches along the northern border.

These games represented friendly overtures from new neighbors whose presence deeply concerned the Thai Army for multiple reasons. The UWSA’s notorious drug trafficking reputation and their regional commander, Wei Hsueh-kang, certainly didn’t help matters.

Furthermore, Thailand and the UWSA never developed the necessary comfort level for peaceful coexistence. Typically, ethnic armed organizations maintaining ceasefires with the Tatmadaw are perceived as threats to Thailand, while those fighting Myanmar for self-governance or independence are considered allies and sometimes serve as buffers or proxies for Thai military forces.

After securing their southern command along the Thai border, the UWSA forcibly relocated over 100,000 Wa villagers from their China-Myanmar border stronghold to the southern command area.

However, the UWSA failed to convince Thai military leadership they posed no national threat. The massive population movement from the north, Wa drug operations and illicit regional investments, and the general perception that ceasefire-holding ethnic armed organizations threaten Thailand’s security—all contributed to maintaining this suspicious outlook.

Undoubtedly, historical distrust between Thailand and Burma shaped this threat perception, which traditionally views Myanmar’s friends and allies as dangers to Thailand.

Nevertheless, Thailand-Myanmar bilateral relations have not always been straightforward. Despite mistrust, various Thai governments since decolonization have served as Myanmar’s bridge to the international community, seeking to isolate the regime for its severe human rights abuses. Thailand was the first to enter Burma following the 1988 bloody crackdown against the pro-democracy uprising. Thaksin Shinawatra, shortly after assuming power in 2001, made extraordinary efforts to strengthen bilateral economic relations with the country. His assistance to Myanmar included whitewashing the UWSA through the Yongka Project development initiative, which never materialized due to a lack of international funding.

Over time, Wa-Thai military clashes gradually ceased, but tensions persisted. Thai security officials report the UWSA has not forgotten the “Surisri 143” incident—allegedly a Thai Army training exercise in May 2002 that saw Thai forces cross the border in tracked vehicles, supported by mortars and artillery, conducting a 24-hour operation eliminating several Wa positions. Some outposts were jointly occupied by the Tatmadaw. Thaksin later claimed the Army had “overreacted.”

While the UWSA sought to avoid war with Thailand and desired peace, they were unlikely to easily forget the May 2002 violence. Although both sides no longer engage in border gunfights, that two-decade-old hostility continues influencing Wa attitudes toward Thailand.

Unlike the early 2000s when Wa troops regularly exchanged gunfire with Thai soldiers, UWSA leaders would grant interviews and permit foreign media access to their China-Burma border territory. Today, statements are released through media platforms. Most posts showcase military strength through parades, troop movements, and daily training activities.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

THAILAND-CAMBODIA BORDER CRISIS

OPINION

The toxic nationalism of the Thai-Cambodia border crisis

Bangkok's rush to punish neighbor may hurt industries, stoke political dysfunction

 

Don Pathan

August 26, 2025 17:05 JST

 

Thai military and Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) personnel stand guard near the Thai-Cambodian border at Chong Chub Ta Mok area in Surin Province, Thailand, on Aug. 20, 2025.

Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst.

Following the border clashes that erupted on July 24 and lasted five days until a ceasefire was reached, Thai people from all walks of life are united in their anger against Cambodia and have come together to punish their eastern neighbor in any way they can -- despite knowing that their toxic nationalism comes with a heavy price.

More than 40 people were killed and about 300,000 were displaced by cross-border attacks on both countries. Not only are bilateral ties at a new low, the social and economic fabric of these two nations whose people share similar cultural traits -- residents along both sides of the border are predominantly Khmer-speakers -- has been ripped apart.

CONTiNUE READING

Clashing Narratives, Colliding Histories

 

Thai and Cambodian army officers shake hands at Chong Bok. Credit: Royal Thai Army
www.stratsea.com 

Introduction

The morning of 24 July 2025 started off with a brief but fierce gunfight between Thai and Cambodian troops dispatched to a poorly demarcated area around a disputed ancient Hindu temple, Prasat Ta Muen Thom, which is accessible by the people of both sides.

As expected, Thailand and Cambodia accused each other of starting the fight. The risk for deadly confrontation was obvious given recent developments and the military buildup in the area. But neither side had the political courage to rethink their strategy for fear of looking weak in the eyes of their constituency. 

Lack of unity between the political leaders in Bangkok and the Thai army made policy coordination that much more difficult. Cambodia, on the other hand, was getting on Thai troops’ last good nerve with the digging of trenches around the disputed area earlier this year.

To recap, armed clashes erupted on 28 May 2025, resulting in the death of one Cambodian soldier. Ten days later, on 8 June 2025, regional commanders from both sides met and agreed to fill up the trenches and withdraw their soldiers from the disputed location. They shook hands and posed for a photo and then retreated to their previous positions before the confrontation in late May.

But the absence of clashes does not spell peace. Cambodia was determined to take this case, along with other disputed territories on the border, to the International Court of Justice (ICJ); the Thai government rejected the idea, saying it is committed to bilateral negotiations through the Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) and will not accept the ICJ’s jurisdiction.

Things went downhill quickly on 18 June 2025 after Cambodia’s President of the Senate Hun Sen leaked a private phone conversation he had with the then Thai prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra three days earlier.

Besides the appearance of kowtowing to Cambodia, Paetongtarn made a critical remark about one of her senior military commanders, referring to him as an “opponent” who just “wanted to look tough.”

Street protests erupted in Bangkok as demonstrators called for her resignation.

Colonial Legacy Complicates Resolution

Asking Thailand and Cambodia leaders to think constructively about border affairs may be unrealistic given that the disputes are rooted in the colonial past—a legacy from which Thailand has struggled to move forward.

Thailand’s refusal to accept its colonial legacy goes beyond simply lamenting past losses. Consider Siam’s “lost” territories to British Malaya: the surrender of what are now northern Malaysian states – Kedah and Kelantan – continues to shape the Thai national psyche. “It was ours, and we gave it to the British for peace’s sake,” goes the common refrain.

The Thai state does not make a big issue of these “losses”, partly because Malaysia does not politicise the issue or rub it in Thailand’s face. Demarcation along the Thai-Malaysian political border is conducted by technical officials from both sides without incident, although separatist insurgency in Thailand’s Malay-speaking South serves as a reminder that post-colonial nation-state construction is never without challenges.

Nonetheless, Thailand is not alone in dealing with historical hangups. In 2003, deep-rooted resentment in Cambodia resulted in an anti-Thai riot that ended in an arson attack against the Thai embassy in Phnom Penh after a Thai actress was reported to have said Angkor Wat, one of the world’s most important archaeological sites, belongs to Thailand.

Instead of making the hard choice between explaining to their respective citizens about the injustice of the colonial past and the need to come to terms with it, Thai and Cambodian political leaders took the easy way out by exploiting this resentment for quick political gains. 

International Arena Becomes Battlefield

The competition extends beyond the battlefield as military actions coincided with intense diplomatic outreach, with both Thailand and Cambodia attempting to control the narrative. Both countries have turned to ASEAN, the United Nations and members of the international community to present their respective cases.

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet succeeded in getting the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to an urgent meeting “to stop Thailand’s aggression” but fail to get the Council to issue a resolution to call for an immediate ceasefire.

Thailand, in turn, has accused Cambodia of committing war crimes for targeting civilians and of violating a major international convention, the Ottawa Treaty, for planting fresh mines around Prasat Ta Muen Thom. Cambodia denied the allegations and added that the blast site was well within Cambodian territory.

Thailand fell short of calling on the treaty’s secretariat to send a fact-finding mission to investigate the incident. The blast site is part of a larger minefield, known as the K5 Belt, where the Thailand/China-backed Khmer Rouge fought the Vietnam-supported People’s Republic of Kampuchea throughout the 1980s. Both sides had flooded the area with landmines that, 50 years later, have yet to be fully removed. Neither Thailand nor Cambodia is a party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Thailand is unable to convince members of the international community of its justification to reject Cambodia’s proposal to allow ICJ to rule on the overlapping claims of the Ta Muen Thom Temple. The country has not been able to move on from the 1962 ICJ ruling that, based on the French map, gave the Preah Vihear temple to Cambodia. Thailand reluctantly accepted the ruling but continued to dispute the area surrounding the temple.

Pursuing the road towards ICJ may put Cambodia in a positive light in the eyes of the international community, but – as one Bangkok-based diplomat noted – this path was undermined when Cambodian rockets landed on Thai public schools, hospitals and a convenience store.

Taking the Moral High Ground

With a high number of displaced people and damaged properties, both sides appeared to have exercised some degree of restraint and confined the fighting to the border provinces. No major infrastructure or commercial assets in the border region have come under attack.

Footage of Thai villagers and school children running for cover prompted Thai citizens, particularly the conservative nationalists, to inflict more punishment on Cambodia. Their past public campaign forced previous Thai governments to go against Cambodia’s effort to obtain the United Nations World Heritage Site status for the Preah Vihear temple, which was granted in 2008.

Thailand’s deployment of F-16 fighter jets demonstrated the country’s superior military power. By limiting air and artillery attacks to military targets, Thailand appeared to be seeking international respect for embracing international norms.

Thailand’s race to the moral high ground may not be an easy climb, however. The Cambodian government was quick to point out that Thai airstrikes and artillery fire had damaged the Preah Vihear temple, not to mention the use of internationally prohibited cluster munitions.

In a statement dated 25 July 2025, the Thai army said cluster munitions were used for military targets only. The problem with cluster bombs is that a significant percentage of submunitions fail to detonate upon impact, leaving behind unexploded ordnance, turning the area into de facto landmines.

In the past, the aftermath of border gunfights followed a similar pattern: Thai and Cambodian troops would sit together the next day, eating lunch with their bare hands in a traditional style, showing the world that both countries have patched things up and moved on. This time, however, the fallout will be more costly in many ways. Lives have been lost, and raw emotions have poured out on social media, creating narratives beyond the control of any state agency’s public relations machines. Anyone with a mobile phone can now report on developments as they see fit.

Mediation in Kuala Lumpur

With Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim mediating the negotiation, Thailand and Cambodia came face-to-face in Malaysia as representatives from the United States and China observed the talks. Cambodia got the ceasefire that they wanted, starting on the midnight of 28 July 2025. The two sides vowed to meet regularly with Malaysia, while fellow ASEAN Member States (AMS) will serve as observers.

The mediation process in Kuala Lumpur. Credit: Reuters Photo

In the coming days, Thailand is expected to tell the world that its military might had forced the Cambodians to stand down. Domestically, the Thai army will use this opportunity to strengthen its institution and remain politically assertive amid a growing call for reform, which, in Thailand’s context, means armed forces should stay out of politics.

For Cambodia, the narrative is likely to centre on how a small nation stood up to a neighbour, one that failed to diminish Cambodia’s fighting spirit despite its superior firepower. Cambodia will use this crisis to solidify Prime Minister Hun Manet’s nationalist credentials. But given Cambodians’ restlessness due to economic downturn, this will not be easy.

The transition of power from strongman Hun Sen to his son, Manet, has been difficult, as the young leader has yet to convince his countrymen that he can lead them to a better future.

After leading Cambodia for four decades, his father left him with big shoes to fill. The world watched Hun Sen as he went through wars and genocide, emerging politically powerful and financially wealthy. The same cannot be said for Cambodia’s people, who are currently struggling to make ends meet.

Ordinary Cambodians are frustrated with the current conditions, but they are without outlets to voice their complaints. Indeed, the Hun family members control all media platforms, both online and offline. The National Assembly has 125 seats with Hun Sen as the president of the ruling Cambodia People’s Party; five seats are occupied by friendly oppositions.

Cambodia is turning to Vietnam and China while shutting down economic ties with Thailand. Whether this will offset the loss of income from one million Cambodian migrant workers who depend on Thailand for employment, on the other hand, remains to be seen.

The Pheu Thai-led government had initially clashed with the army over how to handle border affairs with Cambodia—specifically whether to close checkpoints as punishment or keep them open while pursuing diplomatic solutions. However, the Pheu Thai Party-led administration has been effectively sidelined after Hun Sen leaked the phone conversation, forcing the government to run for cover.

Following a petition from a group of senators, the Constitutional Court on 1 July 2025 suspended Paetongtarn from her post pending an ethics investigation. Since then, the Thai government has been on the defensive as the public calls for either a fresh election or the prime minister’s resignation.

Few expect the government to survive beyond the first quarter of next year. The army, since then, has been pretty much calling the shots on the border affairs.

It is not clear why Hun Sen chose to turn on the Shinawatra, a long-time family friend. Many theories have been floated, but the one that made the most sense was Thaksin’s refusal to push through the offshore gas deal in the Gulf of Thailand.

The 27,000-square-km of gas-rich area is claimed by both countries. Talk of a win-win arrangement between the two governments kicked off a storm of criticism in Thailand against the Shinawatra family, whom the public accused of standing to gain from the deal. According to one estimate, the disputed area is believed to hold at least US$300bn worth of reserves.

The clashes that erupted last Thursday claimed the lives of more than 38 people on both sides and displaced more than 300,000. In Kuala Lumpur, the two leaders agreed to meet regularly, starting with their regional military commanders. They also agreed on direct communications between the leaders and their defence ministers.

But there is nothing really new about this, as the two countries have gone through this before. The solution to the border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia may not necessarily lie in the bilateral mechanism but in the internal politics of Thailand and Cambodia. Considering the internal crisis that the two countries are going through, mustering the needed political courage to make peace with one another may not be high on the agenda of either country.

Tags: Feature Thailand

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  Don Pathan

  Don Pathan is a security analyst focusing on conflict in Myanmar/Burma and insurgency in Thailand's far south.

  View all posts